Interpersonal Relations: A Theory of Interdependence

A-B relationship A's and B's a₁ AB-CoA action alternative analysis analysis of variance asymmetric game B-comp B's outcomes b₁ b₂ basis BCFCA behavior control CBCB cell CFCB Chapter Chicken choice CLalt coalition combinations competitive concordant conflict consequences cooperative coordination correspondent MBC costs degree of correspondence dependence diff discordant dyad effective matrix equal example factors fate control given matrix given outcomes grand means interaction interest magnitude Marya match mathematical analysis max rel maximize MBC component McClintock motivation mutual noncorrespondent MBC outcome transformations partner pattern of interdependence person play possible preferences Prisoner's Dilemma problems properties provides reflect rela relation requires response rewards sequential rules sequential transformations Sergey shown in Figure similar situation social subjects symmetric components Th pair Thibaut and Kelley threat game threat point tionship trans transformation process triad turn-taking values variance versus yield