The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear AgeDouglas MacLean Rowman & Allanheld, 1984 - 170 ページ Striking a balance between the philosophical and the pragmatic, these original essays examine the moral and strategic paradoxes found in the policy of nuclear deterrence, how uncertainty and fear can become a source of strength and how increased power of destruction might make us safer. The essays analyze the logical structure of mutually assured destruction theory and of nuclear use theory, the moral arguments of the Pastoral Letter on Deterrence of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the nuclear freeze movement and the role of experts in the formulation of nuclear policy. The authors stress the need for responsible public involvement and the obligation of citizens to be informed on these questions. ISBN 0-8476-7329-4 : $29.95. |
目次
The Nuclear Gnostics Gregg Herken | 14 |
Tendencies | 28 |
Moral Issues in Deterrence Policy Rev J Bryan Hehir | 53 |
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多く使われている語句
accept action actor ADVANT Albert Wohlstetter American argument arms control arms race assured destruction attack behavior believe Bernard Brodie bishops bomb Brodie Bundy Catholic civilians conditional intention counterattack counterforce countervalue credibility David Gauthier debate deterrence fails deterrent intentions deterrent policy doctrine effect enemy existential deterrence expected utility expression fear force form the intention freeze movement Gauthier innocent intention to RETAL irrational issues Kavka maximizing McGeorge Bundy McNamara ment MIRVs missiles moral mutual mutual assured destruction national defense no-retaliation NON-RETAL nonmaximizing nuclear age nuclear deterrence nuclear elite nuclear policy nuclear retaliation nuclear strategy nuclear war nuclear weapons one's paradox of deterrence pastoral letter peace planning political possible prefers president principle probability problem question Reagan reason rence response retaliatory risks SALT II side situation Soviet Union strike policy suppose terrence threat threatening tion tional uncertainty United utility-maximizing war-fighting Wohlstetter wrong