The Strategy of Conflict

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Harvard University Press, 1980 - 309 ページ
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A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
 

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LibraryThing Review

ユーザー レビュー  - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing

This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... レビュー全文を読む

目次

The Retarded Science of International Strategy
3
An Essay on Bargaining
21
Bargaining Communication and Limited War
53
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
83
Enforcement Communication and Strategic
119
Game Theory and Experimental Research
162
Randomization of Promises and Threats
175
The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance
187
The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
207
Surprise Attack and Disarmament
230
A Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
257
B For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game
267
Reinterpretation of a Solution Concept
291
INDEX
305
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著者について (1980)

Thomas Crombie Schelling was born in Oakland, California on April 14, 1921. He received a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1944. After working as an analyst for the federal Bureau of the Budget, he attended Harvard University. He spent two years in Denmark and France as an economist for the Economic Cooperation Administration. In 1950, he joined the White House staff of the foreign policy adviser to President Harry S. Truman. In 1951, he received his doctorate from Harvard and published his first book, National Income Behavior: An Introduction to Algebraic Analysis. He taught economics at Yale University, Harvard University, and the University of Maryland's Department of Economics and School of Public Policy before retiring in 2003. He wrote several books during his lifetime including International Economics, The Strategy of Conflict, Strategy and Arms Control written with Morton H. Halperin, Arms and Influence, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Choice and Consequence, and Strategies of Commitment. In 2005, he and Robert J. Aumann received the Nobel Prize in economic science for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis." He died on December 13, 2016 at the age of 95.

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