The Strategy of ConflictA series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactorythe situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages. 
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LibraryThing Review
ユーザー レビュー  HadriantheBlind  LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... レビュー全文を読む
目次
The Retarded Science of International Strategy  3 
An Essay on Bargaining  21 
Bargaining Communication and Limited War  53 
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision  83 
Enforcement Communication and Strategic  119 
Game Theory and Experimental Research  162 
Randomization of Promises and Threats  175 
The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance  187 
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多く使われている語句
action advantage adversary agreement allout balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly chance choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory guess identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation noattack nonzerosum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff matrix payoffs penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zerosum game