strict demonstration, than that God's certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a Contingence of these events, as is without all Necessity; and so is inconsistent with the Arminian notion of liberty.

Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more fatality in things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of the most Arminian divines, who acknowledge God's omniscience, and universal Prescience. Therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as implying HOBBES' doctrine of Necessity, or the stoical doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists, than their own doctrine and therefore it doth not become those divines to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this

account.

Corol. 3. Hence all arguments of Arminians, who own God's omniscience, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the Calvinistic doctrine of efficacious grace; on this ground that those doctrines, though they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or co-action, yet suppose them under Necessity, must fall to the ground. And their arguments against the Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God's commands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the Calvinists as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer Necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections must be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being levelled against their own doctrine, as well as against that of the Calvinists.*

*In these two sections our author has abundantly demonstrated, that foreknowledge infe s necessity; such a necessity as exists in the connection of a consequent with its antecedent; and has represented, in various lights, how the most contradictory and absurd conclusions follow from the opposite hypothesis. But as his argument, strictly speaking, did not require a further explanation or distinction of the principles on which it rested, which yet are important, it may not be improper in this place briefly to enquire into the rationale of those principles, by which his reasoning may appear with additional evidence, and the radical principles themselves confirmed by their connection with others. As these remarks are presented in the form of a series analytically disposed, we shall prefix to them the corresponding ordinal numbers.

1. Any kind of NECESSITY is a sufficient ground of foreknowledge, in the view of omniscience; but as is the kind of necessity, or the nature of the connection between cause and effect, so is the nature of the foreknowledge. But this difference in the nature of the connection affects-not the certainty of the event, but the mode of causation, or from what CAUSE the certainty arises.

2. All necessity, or certainty of connection between antecedent and consequent, must arise from one of these two sources, viz. the NATUre of things, or, the DECREE OF GOD. Chance is nothing; and nothing has no properties, consequently has no causal influence.

SECT. XIII.

Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.

Every act of the will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause, then, according to what has already been demon

3. The necessity which arises from the NATURE OF THINGS, is either absolute or hypothetical. ABSOLUTE NECESSITY belongs only to the first cause, or God. He exists ABSOLUTE Y; and to suppose him not to exist, or not to have existed, is a contradiction. For the supposition itself is made by a confessedly contingent being; but a contingent being necessarily implies an absolute being, with as much certainty as an effect implies a cause; and consequently a first cause.

4. The first cause excepted, every other being, or mode of being, or any event whatever, is only of HYPOTHETICAL NECESSITY. Any event is necessary, only on account of its relation to the first cause. This relation, or necessary connection, between an event and the first cause is either in the way of contrast, or in the way of dependence.

5. There are two things necessarily related to the first cause by way of coNTRAST; passive power, which is a natural evil—if limited existence, dependence, and insufficiency, in their necessary tendency, may be so called-and sin, which is a moral evil; or some thing which, in point of obligation, ought not to be.

6. The other mode of necessary relation to the first cause, arising from the nature of things, is that of DEPENDENCE. Every contingent being and event must necessarily depend upon God, as an effect depends upon its cause. Nor is it conceivable without involving the grossest contradiction and absurdity, that any contingent being should continue to exist, any more than begin to exist, independent of the first cause. Sublata causa, tollitur effectus, is justly entitled to be called an axiom in metaphysical science.

7. It was before observed, that all necessity must arise either from the nature of things, or from the decree of God. What arises from the nature of things, as a consequence, has for its antecedent, either an efficient or a deficient cause.

8. A DEFECT, no less than active efficiency, may be an antecedent, as founded in the nature of things, from whence a corresponding consequence must follow ; but there is no defect in any antecedent but may be counteracted by a decree; so far counteracted, as that the defect shall not be an operative cause.

9. The purposes of God are a series of antecedents, from whence follow, by the very nature of things, corresponding good consequences, and good only: but the defect which is inseparable from created existence, considered in itself, is also a cause in the sense of an antecedent; otherwise a created existence would be as indefectible as the creating or first cause, which involves the most absurd consequences.

10. Defect is either natural or moral; and each arises from the nature of things, as contradistinguished to decree, but in a different manner. NATURAL DEFECT arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast to God's natural perfections: which contrast forms the primary difference between creator and creature.

11. This natural defect is different from defectibility: for defectibility expresses, in strictness, an effect not a cause; a liableness to defection. But the question returns, WHAT renders a creature liable to defect? To say, Its liableness to defect, or its defectibility, assigns no true cause; for the question returns as before, WHAT makes it liable. WHAT makes it defectible?

strated, it is not contingent, but necessary; the effect being necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause, let that

12. Perhaps there is no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent circumlocution, than PASSIVE POWER, to express that natural defect, which exists in a created nature as a contrast to the natural (not the moral) perfections of God.

13. Passive power is as inapplicable to God, as it is applicable to a creature ; for natural perfection is as applicable to him, as natural imperfection is to us.Therefore to say, that a creature is not the subject of passive power, is the same as to say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is ; which is the grossest pantheism-the deification of every creature, of every atom that exists.

14. All antecedents originate in either passive power or the divine decrees. From the former proceed, according to the nature of things, all evil consequents; from the latter, all good.

15. MORAL DEFECT is a contrast to the moral perfections, excellence, or holiness of God; and arises, as a necessary consequence-not from the divine decree as its antecedent, but--from the hypothetical nature of things; that is, passive power, IF not aided by a decretive interposition, and IF also united to liberty of choice in an accountable being.

16. The removal of the antecedent is the prerogative of the supreme Lord of nature; but if the antecedent be not removed, that is, altered from what it was as to its causal influence, the consequence can no more be prevented, than the nature of things can be changed.

17. That nature of things, or that necessity of consequence, whereby the effect is infallibly connected with its cause, is nothing else but the essence of TRUTH, emanating from the first cause, the GOD OF TRUTH, or the TRUE GOD.

18. We now observe, that an event may be necessarily connected with its cause by a divine decree. If the divine will contemplate an end, and decree accordingly, it necessarily implies that the means, or the antecedents to this consequence, are decreed.

19. Hence, an event may be necessary, either because virtually determined by the divine will, IN a series of antecedents; or because the nature of things operates without being affected, as to their causal influence, by decretive antecedents.

20. To suppose any sort, or any degree of defect, to be decreed, is absurd in different ways. It is contrary to an established axiom, that from good nothing but good can proceed-and it is absurd to impute that to a divine decree, which antecedently arises from the nature of things.

21. In reality, DIVINE DECREES (as before hinted) are nothing else than a wonderful chain or series of positions, which are so many antecedents, counteracting defects arising from the hypothetical nature of things. Whence it necessarily follows, that if there were no PASSIVE POWER there could be no DIVINE DECREES. For if good, and only good, arose from the nature of things; the decree, which has good only for its object, would be superfluous, and therefore unworthy of divine volition.

22. Hence also, whatever event is in itself good, is an object of divine decree in its antecedent; and the event itself is connected with the decretive position by the very essence of truth. But whatever is in itself evil arises from the hypothetical nature of things not counteracted by decretive positions.

23. In God, his absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite and unchangeable nature, is to be regarded as an antecedent; from which all possible happiness is the necessary consequence. Such an antecedent is not the result of mere, arbitrary, or decretive will, but of absolute necessity, but all antecedents in a creature, or every causal influence, of which good, or happiness, whether natural or moral, is the consequence, must be the positions of decretive will, as the only possible mode of securing a good result.

24. As is the antecedent, so is the consequent; for the connection is formed by eternal truth. If therefore a good event,--for instance, a virtuous or holy choice -be the consequent, the antecedent is a decretive position.

25. In reference to God, the proper and only ground of infallible certainty that his choice is good and praiseworthy, is the GOODNESS OF HIS NATURE. Were we to admit in thought the possibility of a defectible nature in him, in the same proportion must we admit a possible failure in the goodness of his choice. And in

cause be what it will. If the cause is the will itself, by antecedent acts choosing and determining; still the determined caused act must be a necessary effect. The act, that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause, cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause; but must be wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as the motions of the hands and feet. The consequent commanded acts of the will are as passive and as necessary, with respect to the antecedent determining acts, as the parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command them. And therefore, if all the free acts of the will are all determined effects determined by the will itself, that is by antecedent choice, then they are all necessary; they are all subject to, and de

reference to a created being, the proper and only ground of certainty that his choice will be good, is the antecedent goodness of his nature or disposition. This alone is a sufficient causal influence; but the goodness of a creature's disposition can be secured, as a ground of certainty, only by DECRETIVE INFLUENCE of a nature corresponding with the nature of the effect.

26. From these principles and considerations, which can here be but briefly stated, as necessarily connected with their legitimate consequences, we infer, that God foresees ALL GOOD, in every created being, in every mode, in every event, by the evidence of a DECRETIVE NECESSITY; a necessity resulting from actual influx, or perpetual energy, in the position of antecedents, and the essence of truth connecting the causal influence with the effect.

27. From the same principles we learn, that God foresees or foreknows ALL EVIL-however blended with the good, as the different colours in a pencil of light are blended-in every being, and in every event where found, by that ne cessity which is HYPOTHETICAL only; a necessity resulting from the nature of things left to their own causal influence; which influence, in any given circumstances, will manifest itself either in the way of contrast, of dependence, or both united.

28. Again: Volitions are acts of the mind, and each voluntary act is compounded of a natural and moral quality. The NATURAL quality of a voluntary act proceeds from decretive necessity; for there is nothing in it but what is good, decreed, and effected by the first cause. The MORAL quality of a voluntary act is either good or evil.

29. A voluntary act morally GOOD, is altogether of decretive necessity, both as to its physical and moral quality; and is therefore foreknown because of decretive appointment and energy. But a voluntary act morally BAD, is partly of decretive, and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that of consequence.

30. The PHYSICAL QUALITY of a voluntary act morally bad, is of decretive necessity, and is foreknown because foreappointed; but the MORAL QUALITY of the same act, or its badness, is foreknown only by relation, connection, or consequence. Thus deformity is the absence of beauty, and may be known by the standard of beauty from which it deviates. Weakness is the absence of strength, and may be known by relation. A shadow is known by the interception of rays, and may be known in the same manner. Darkness is caused by the absence of light, and may be known by the light excluded.

31. How the BAD quality of a moral act may be foreknown by the evidence of relation, will further appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil itself. For what is moral evil, or sin, but WHAT OUGHT NOT TO BE, in point of moral obligation? Now for at all knowing, or foreknowing, what ought not to be, which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or evidence is the knowledge of what ought to be.

32. If therefore what ought to be, is known to the omniscient by constituted relations, or voluntary appointment; what ought not to be, may be known by evident consequences.-W.

cisively fixed by the foregoing act, which is their cause: yea, even the determining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by another act preceding, if it be a free and voluntary act; and so must be necessary. So that by this, all the free acts of the will are necessary, and cannot be free unless they are necessary: because they cannot be free, according to the Arminian notion of freedom unless they are determined by the will; and this is to be determined by antecedent choice, which being their cause, proves them necessary. And yet they say, Necessity is utterly inconsistent with Liberty. So that, by their scheme, the acts of the will cannot be free, unless they are necessary, and yet cannot be free if they be necessary!

But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, that the free acts of the will have no cause, and are connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before and determines them, in order to maintain their proper and absolute Contingence, and this should be allowed to be possible; still it will not serve their turn. For if the volition come to pass by perfect Contingence, and without any cause at all, then it is certain no act of the will, no prior act of the soul was the cause, no determination or choice of the soul had any hand in it. The will, or the soul, was indeed the subject of what happened to it accidentally, but was not the cause. The will is not active in causing or determining, but purely the passive subject; at least, according to their notion of action and passion. In this case, Contingence as much prevents the determination of the will, as a proper cause; and as to the will, it was necessary, and could be no otherwise. For to suppose that it could have been otherwise, if the will or soul had pleased, is to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of choice or pleasure; contrary to what is now supposed; it is to suppose that it might have been otherwise, if its cause had ordered it otherwise. But this does not agree to it having no cause or orderer at all. That must be necessary as to the soul, which is dependent on no free act of the soul: but that which is without a cause, is dependent on no free act of the soul; because, by the supposition, it is dependent on nothing, and is connected with nothing. In such a case, the soul is necessarily subjected to what accident brings to pass, from time to time, as much as the earth, that is inactive, is necessarily subjected to what falls upon it. But this does not consist with the Arminian notion of liberty, which is the will's power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly active in it, without passiveness, and without being subject to Necessity. Thus, Contingence belongs to the Arminian notion of Liberty, and vet is inconsistent with it.