THE

BIBLICAL REPOSITORY

AND

CLASSICAL REVIEW.

THIRD SERIES, NO. XVIII.-WHOLE NUMBER, LXXIV.
APRIL, 1849.

ARTICLE I.

BY PROF. H. N. DAY., of Western Reserve College, Ohio.

ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE.

Die Beredsamkeit eine Tugend, oder Grundlinien einer syste matischen Rhetorik; von Dr. Franz Theremin. Ziveite, verbesserte auflage. Berlin, 1837.

THE first edition of this work appeared in 1814. The author, who is Court-preacher at Berlin, has published a number of volumes of Sermons, Poetry, &c., besides an elaborate work on Eloquence, entitled "Demosthenes and Massillon; a contribution to the history of eloquence," which appeared in 1845.

He is a writer of considerable power and originality. His mind is clear, philosophical and vigorous. His style is remarkably simple, terse, and expressive.

The occasion of the production of this work was a conviction in the author's mind of the radical imperfection of existing theories of eloquence, and a corresponding imperfection in the existing treatises on rhetoric. The author has the happiness of witnessing a remarkable change in the views which prevail in Germany, in respect to this art, since the first publication of his treatise.

As well from the character as from the number of works which have recently appeared in Germany, the inference is a lawful one that the art is no longer regarded there as incapable of being reduced to strictly philosophical principles. It is no longer regarded as a mere contrivance-a jugglery, whose highest aim is to subvert the judgment, supplant the reason, and set aside the moral feeling by insidious play with blind passions, or by the glare of sophistry and the dissimulations of false logic, and therefore, from its very nature, unable to rise above a mere collection of arbitrary THIRD SERIES, VOL. V. NO. 2 1

unconnected rules, unworthy of regard from the philosopher and from the man of elevated moral principle: no longer, either, as a mere negative, critical art, having no developing, invigorating, nourishing power or aim in itself, looking only to manner, and, by its soulless rules and cautions fitted to produce, at the best, but mannerism, smooth, fair, precise perhaps, but cold, stiff, and expressionless, and, therefore, to be shunned and despised by every free, generous, feeling spirit: nor yet as an art which only a peculiar age and peculiar circumstances can originate or allow; possible, perhaps necessary, in the condition of the ancient States of Greece and Rome, but wholly unsuited to our age of the world. It is now extensively received as an important art, worthy of the study of the philosopher in its scientific relations, and necessary in the training of every one who would gain the name of a true orator. If there have appeared as yet no complete, philosophically constructed textbooks of rhetoric, or of homiletics even, which can commend itself to universal favor; if no satisfactory theory of the art has as yet been worked out; if we must alike reject the theory of Schott, as too narrowly limiting the design of eloquence in confining it to the production of a harmony of will between the speaker and hearer; and that of Hoffmann, who determines its laws from a too exclusive regard to the form of the thought; and that of Palmer, who pushes this theory of Hoffmann so far as to deny the applicability of rhetorical principles to pulpit discourse, which, he insists, must derive its form from its Scriptural theme-the text; and, in fine, that of Theremin, who seems to embrace in eloquence all discourse designed to produce a moral effect on others, whether in public or in private, in the relations of friendship, of the family, or of the state, while yet, like Schott, he limits its aim to an effect on the will alone; if we are satisfied with none of these views of the art, we must yet admit in all these discussions an earnestness of endeavor, a care and labor of investigation, a precision and force of reasoning worthy of a true philosophical spirit, and rich in promise as to ultimate philosophical results.

We should esteem it a most hopeful sign, if, in the whole range of English literature of modern times, a solitary work could be found characterized by the spirit which appears in these and other recent German productions. While both in Great Britain and in the United States, the broad field of secular eloquence, in both its departments, deliberative and judicial, is thrown open by our free, political constitutions, inviting every generous, patriotic spirit to the most assiduous culture of oratory-a field almost entirely closed to the German, and even the field of pulpit eloquence is in these two countries more open, more extended, and more inviting than in Germany, yet it now seems probable that from German divines will proceed the first philosophical conception of rhetoric and just theory of eloquence. We say German divines; for it is

a fact worthy of notice, that the recent developments in the theory of eloquence have been made chiefly from the side of homiletics, or the department of sacred oratory.

There is still occasion with us, as there was in Germany at the time of the first publication of Theremin's treatise, for a thorough investigation into the principles of rhetoric. We have no satisfactory text-book of the art; our rhetorical works are too much tame, spiritless compilations. Dr. Campbell stands out almost alone as a truly philosophical writer on the subject. Our prevalent conceptions of rhetoric, moreover, respect almost exclusively the mere outward form of eloquence, and shut out of view its heart and soul. The consequence is, it is justly despised and rejected by many, not to say most, commanding minds, as leading to a frigid, repulsive mannerism. Archbishop Whately has, in his little work, redeemed a small portion of the proper and most essential domain of rhetoric. But with this exception, so far as English literature is concerned, rhetoric is little else than a theory of verbal expression, which, from the necessities of the case, when considered apart from the thought and intent of speaking, can never rise higher than a mere collection of rules without philosophical ground or connection, and the study of which, however assiduous, can never foster a true spirit of oratory.

A free discussion of the question, which forms the subject of this work of Theremin, cannot but be esteemed to be seasonable with us, although so long after the publication of the work, as it bears directly on what is conceived to be the radical defect in our views of the art.

Before entering upon the discussion of the question which forms the subject of this work, whether eloquence is a virtue, it may be necessary, however, still further and more distinctly to vindicate the propriety of the discussion itself. It is seriously to be apprehended that the whole matter will appear so foreign to our habits of thought that the question will seem unmeaning; or, even if a meaning can be attached to its terms, that the discussion of it will be deemed wholly idle and profitless. It may be difficult for some to conceive on what possible ground such a question could rise for consideration.

It will be deemed a sufficient answer to this, that the question has, in fact, arisen, and has awakened earnest discussion among the best minds of a most practical age. It is not a question which had its birth in the vacuity of thought that characterizes the mediæval age. It is no question of scholastic parentage. It was first and most earnestly discussed among the practical Greeks. Not only this, the discussion was originated from pressing prac

Yet how inadequate is Whately's conception of rhetoric as limited to mere argumentation, or address to the judgment? How opposite to the prevalent German conception which confines it to address to the will?

tical demands. Eloquence had become corrupt. It had degenerated into a mere play of words. It had lost its very soul and life -the rational end and intent essentially implied in all true oratory. In the hands of the Sophists, rhetoric was a mere juggling artifice. It was show, pretense; it had no heart. Socrates, perhaps, should receive the credit for restoring to eloquence, now a dead form, its heart and life. It is a part of the fruit of his labors and teachings, that eloquence at Athens, having caught again its breath, grew up to such an admirable stature and beauty in the succeeding age. It was from the school of Isocrates, the admirer, pupil, and constant friend of Socrates, that the flood of Athenian orators, all of the first rank, of whom Cicero speaks,' issued. In that school, Grecian oratory had its birth. But this question lay at the foundation of the Socratic teachings. It was involved essentially in all his discussions of the subject. The grand conclusion at which he arrives, in the admirable dialogue of the Gorgias, and to which the whole discusssion presses, is, that rhetoric must be practised "for the right," ni to dinάiov dei, so far, at least, as the rhetorical argument is used in the dialogue as exemplifying and illustrating more generic principles. Thus, too, in the Socratic view, the true orator must be a good man, who is no other, in his view, than one who practices the right. It is evident, that if the question did not come up in this identical form in the discussions of Socrates, it was fully involved in them; and it is as evident that the arguments of Socrates went to show that in all true oratory there was a moral procedure. The whole tribe of the Sophists resisted strenuously this opinion. The real point at issue between them was this. After undergoing this warm discussion, by the Sophists and their antagonists, the question gradually settled down upon the Socratic side; and his opinion became the prevalent, almost the uncontroverted sentiment.

But what it is pertinent here to remark is, that the discussion of this question originated on exclusively practical grounds; and was taken up and carried on by the most practical of men. The presumption is, then, that there is a possible philosophical ground on which this question can rest, even if we can find it no where in the field of our speculations. No great ethical question of interest to the race ever arose out of actual life which had not a

true philosophical basis to rest upon. We may discard the philosophy in the light of which this question was discussed among the Greeks; we may reject the philosophical grounds on which the ancients were content to rest their decision of it. We may not, however, rationally deny to a question of this character, thus originating, a claim upon our interest; certainly not for the reason 1 De Orat. II. 22. Isocrates, magister istorum omnium, cujus e ludo, tanqnam ex equo Trojano, meri principes exierunt.

that we do not at once discern the point of view from which the Greeks contemplated it.

But we have not only the fact, that the discussion of this question actually arose from practical life among the most practical of men, to create a strong presumption in favor of the propriety, not to say importance of discussing this question; we have, in addition, the fact, already intimated, that the affirmative decision of the question, after earnest controversy, met with almost universal acquiescence. That eloquence was a virtue, became as settled and unquestioned as any principle in philosophy or ethics.

With Aristotle, it was the germ and essential characteristic of his whole conception of rhetoric. With him rhetoric was but a subdivision of ethical science, and the entire development of the art or science was from a purely moral ground. His first grand division of the art, founded on the different kinds of discourse, rests on a moral foundation; and can be vindicated, as Theremin well observes, only as resting on this basis.

The Stoics, it would seem from a remark of Quintilian,' discussed the point at length and in full, without, however, manifesting any doubt in regard to the correctness of the prevalent sentiment. They did not hesitate to maintain that eloquence was a virtue, even while they allowed the advocate to urge mere verisimilitudes against known truth.'

Among the Romans, the reception of this sentiment was unhesitating and universal. It settled into a practieal principle, carrying everywhere, as Cicero tells us, an authority never questioned more than that of civil laws themselves. And he himself in his Dialogue de Oratore, rising higher perhaps than the popular sentiment, pronounces eloquence, in so many words, to be one of the chiefest virtues; est enim eloquentia una quædam de summis virtutibus.

Such harmony of sentiment in regard to a point at first controverted, cannot be accounted for on the supposition of any erroneous ethical theory then prevailing, nor on that of any erroneous conception of the intrinsic nature of eloquence. If the predominance of the æsthetic sentiment among the Greeks might be supposed to incline them to regard everything as morally right which was perfect in form, and thus lead them to attribute to a perfect oratory a moral excellence, we have yet to account for the prevalence of the opinion against the stoical exaltation of the substance over the form which was the predominant theory in Rome.

'De Orat. Ins. 11, 20, 5. Quod philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus colligunt. 2 Cic. de Orat. III. 18. 3 Cic. de Off. II. 14. Acad. Qu. I. 2. Nos autem præceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam (quoniam utramque vim, virtutem esse nostri putant) sic parentes, ut legibus

et cœt.