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Resolved, That the goods imported in the said ship Amazon, and contained in the returns laid before Congress by the Assistant Secretary at War, are fully covered and protected by the said passport, and ought to be sent with all expedition, and without any let or hindrance, to the prisoners for whose use they were designed.

[The evening of this day was spent at Mr. FITZSIMMONS'S by Mr. GORHAM, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. PETERS, Mr. CARROLL, and Mr. MADISON. The conversation turned on the subject of revenue, under the consideration of Congress, and on the situation of the army. The conversation on the first subject ended in a general concurrence (Mr. HAMILTON excepted) in the impossibility of adding to the impost on trade any taxes that would operate equally throughout the United States, or be adopted by them. On the second subject, Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. PETERS, who had the best knowledge of the temper, transactions, and views of the army, informed the company, that it was certain that the army had secretly determined not to lay down their arms until due provision and a satisfactory prospect should be afforded on the subject of their pay; that there was reason to expect that a public declaration to this effect would soon be made; that plans had been agitated, if not formed, for subsisting themselves after such declaration; that, as a proof of their earnestness on this subject, the Commander was already become extremely unpopular, among almost all ranks, from his known dislike to every unlawful proceeding; that this unpopularity was daily increasing and industriously promoted by many leading characters; that

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his choice of unfit and indiscreet persons into his family was the pretext, and with some the real motive; but the substantial one, a desire to displace him from the respect and confidence of the army, in order to substitute General *** as the conductor of their efforts to obtain justice. Mr. HAMILTON said, that he knew General Washington intimately and perfectly; that his extreme reserve, mixed sometimes with a degree of asperity of temper, both of which were said to have increased of late, had contributed to the decline of his popularity; but that his virtue, his patriotism and firmness, would, it might be depended upon, never yield to any dishonorable or disloyal plans into which he might be called; that he would sooner suffer himself to be cut to pieces; that he (Mr. HAMILTON,) knowing this to be his true character, wished him to be the conductor of the army in their plans for redress, in order that they might be moderated and directed to proper objects, and exclude some other leader who might foment and misguide their councils; that with this view he had taken the liberty to write to the General on this subject, and to recommend such a policy to him.]

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 21ST.

Mr. MERCER made some remarks tending to a reconsideration of the act declaring general funds to be necessary, which revived the discussion of that subject.

Mr. MADISON said, that he had observed, through

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out the proceedings of Congress relative to the establishment of such funds, that the power delegated to Congress by the Confederation had been very differently construed by different members, and that this difference of construction had materially affected their reasonings and opinions on the several propositions which had been made; that, in particular, it had been represented by sundry members, that Congress was merely an executive body; and, therefore, that it was inconsistent with the principles of liberty and the spirit of the Constitution, to submit to them a permanent revenue, which would be placing the purse and the sword in the same hands; that he wished the true doctrine of the Confederation to be ascertained, as it might, perhaps, remove some embarrassments; and towards that end would offer his ideas on the subject.

He said, that he did not conceive, in the first place, that the opinion was sound, that the power of Congress, in cases of revenue, was in no respect legislative, but merely executive; and, in the second place, that, admitting the power to be executive, a permanent revenue collected and dispensed by them in the discharge of the debts to which it should be appropriated would be inconsistent with the nature of an executive body, or dangerous to the liberties of the Republic.

As to the first opinion he observed, that, by the Articles of Confederation, Congress had clearly and expressly the right to fix the quantum of revenue necessary for the public exigencies, and to require the same from the States respectively, in proportion to the value of the land; that the requisitions thus

made were a law to the States, as much as the acts of the latter for complying with them were a law to their individual members; that the Federal Constitution was as sacred and obligatory as the internal Constitutions of the several States; and that nothing could justify the States in disobeying acts warranted by it, but some previous abuse and infraction on the part of Congress; that as a proof that the power of fixing the quantum, and making requisitions of money, was considered as a legislative power over the purse, he would appeal to the proposition made by the British Minister, of giving this power to the British Parliament, and leaving to the American Assemblies the privilege of complying in their own mode, and to the reasonings of Congress and the several States on that proposition. He observed, further, that by the Articles of Confederation was delegated to Congress a right to borrow money indefinitely, and emit bills of credit, which was a species of borrowing, for repayment and redemption of which the faith of the States was pledged, and their Legislatures constitutionally bound. He asked, whether these powers were reconcilable with the idea that Congress was a body merely executive. He asked, what would be thought in Great Britain, from whose Constitution our political reasonings were so much drawn, of an attempt to prove that a power of making requisitions of money on the Parliament, and of borrowing money, for discharge of which the Parliament should be bound, might be annexed to the Crown without changing its quality of an executive branch, and that the leaving to the Parliament the mode only of complying with the requisitions of

the Crown would be leaving to it its supreme and exclusive power of legislation.

As to the second point, he referred again to the British Constitution, and the mode in which provision was made for the public debts; observing, that although the Executive had no authority to contract a debt, yet, that when a debt had been authorized or admitted by the Parliament, a permanent and irrevocable revenue was granted by the Legislature, to be collected and dispensed by the Executive; and that this practice had never been deemed a subversion of the Constitution, or a dangerous association of a power over the purse with the power of the sword.

If these observations were just, as he conceived them to be, the establishment of a permanent revenue, -not by any assumed authority of Congress, but by the authority of the States at the recommendation of Congress, to be collected and applied by the latter to the discharge of the public debts, could not be deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Constitution, or subversive of the principles of liberty; and that all objections drawn from such a supposition ought to be withdrawn. Whether other objections of sufficient weight might not lie against such an establishment, was another question. For his part, although for various reasons* he had

Among other reasons, privately weighing with him, he had observed that many of the most respectable people of America supposed the preservation of the Confederacy essential to secure the blessings of the Revolution; and permanent funds for discharging debts essential to the preservation of union. A disappointment to this class would certainly abate their ardor, and, in a critical emergency, might incline them to prefer some political connexion with Great Britain, as a necessary cure for our internal instability. Again, without permanent and general funds, he did not conceive that the danger of convulsions from the army could be effectually obviated. Lastly, he did not think that any

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