A motion was made by Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. WILSON, to strike out the limitation of twenty-five years, and to make the revenue coëxistent with the debts. This question was lost, the States being New Hampshire, no; Massachusetts, no; Connecticut, divided; New York, aye; New Jersey, aye; Pennsylvania, aye; Delaware, aye; Maryland, aye; Virginia, no; North Carolina, aye; South Carolina,

no.

A motion was made by Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. WILSON to strike out the clauses relative to the appointment of collectors, and to provide that the collectors should be inhabitants of the States within which they should collect; should be nominated by Congress, and appointed by the States; and in case such nomination should not be accepted or rejected within days, it should stand good. On this question there were five ayes and six noes.

WEDNESDAY, 12TH, THURSDAY, 13TH, FRIDAY, 14TH, AND SATURDAY, 15TH of March.

These days were employed in reading the despatches brought on Wednesday morning by Captain Barney, commanding the Washington packet. They were dated from December the fourth to the twentyfourth, from the Ministers Plenipotentiary for peace, with journals of preceding transactions; and were accompanied by the preliminary articles signed on the thirtieth of November, between the said Ministers and Mr. Oswald, the British Minister.

The terms granted to America appeared to Congress, on the whole, extremely liberal. It was observed by several, however, that the stipulation obliging Congress to recommend to the States a restitution of confiscated property, although it could scarcely be understood that the States would comply, had the appearance of sacrificing the dignity of Congress to the pride of the British King.

The separate and secret manner in which our Ministers had proceeded with respect to France, and the confidential manner with respect to the British Ministers, affected different members of Congress differently. Many of the most judicious members thought they had all been, in some measure, ensnared by the dexterity of the British Minister; and particularly disapproved of the conduct of Mr. Jay, in submitting to the enemy his jealousy of the French, without even the knowledge of Dr. Franklin, and of the unguarded manner in which he, Mr. Adams, and Dr. Franklin, had given, in writing, sentiments unfriendly to our Ally, and serving as weapons for the insidious policy of the enemy. The separate article was most offensive, being considered obtained by Great Britain, not for the sake of the territory ceded to her, but as a means of disuniting the United States and France, as inconsistent with the spirit of the alliance, and a dishonorable departure from the candor, rectitude, and plain dealing professed by Congress. The dilemma in which Congress were placed was sorely felt. If they should communicate to the French Minister every thing, they exposed their own Ministers, destroyed all confidence in them on the part of France, and

as

might engage them in dangerous factions against Congress, which was the more to be apprehended, as the terms obtained by their management were popular in their nature. If Congress should conceal every thing, and the French Court should, either from the enemy or otherwise, come to the knowledge of it, all confidence would be at an end between the allies; the enemy might be encouraged by it to make fresh experiments, and the public safety as well as the national honor be endangered. Upon the whole, it was thought and observed by many, that our Ministers, particularly Mr. Jay, instead of making allowances for, and affording facilities to France, in her delicate situation between Spain and the United States, had joined with the enemy in taking advantage of it to increase her perplexity; and that they had made the safety of their country depend on the sincerity of Lord Shelburne, which was suspected by all the world besides, and even by most of themselves. See Mr. Laurens's letter, December the twenty-fourth.

The displeasure of the French Court, at the neglect of our Ministers to maintain a confidential intercourse, and particularly to communicate the preliminary articles before they were signed, was not only signified to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, but to sundry members by the Chevalier de la Luzerne. To the former he showed a letter from Count de Vergennes, directing him to remonstrate to Congress against the conduct of the American Ministers, which a subsequent letter countermanded, alleging that Dr. Franklin had given some explanations that had been admitted; and told Mr. Livings

ton that the American Ministers had deceived him (De Vergennes) by telling him, a few days before the preliminary articles were signed, that the agreement on them was at a distance; that when he carried the articles signed into Council, the King expressed great indignation, and asked, if the Americans served him thus before peace was made, and whilst they were begging for aids, what was to be expected after peace, &c. To several members he mentioned that the King had been surprised and displeased, and that he Isaid he did not think he had such allies to deal with. To one of them, who asked whether the Court of France meant to complain of them to Congress, M. Marbois answered that great powers never complained, but that they felt and remembered. It did not appear, from any circumstances, that the separate article was known to the Court of France, or the Chevalier de la Luzerne.

The publication of the preliminary articles, excepting the separate article in the newspaper, was not a deliberate act of Congress. A hasty question for enjoining secrecy on certain parts of the despatches, which included the articles, was lost; and copies having been taken by members, and some of them handed to the Delegates of Pennsylvania, one of them reached the printer. When the publication appeared, Congress in general regretted it, not only as tending too much to lull the States, but as leading France into suspicions that Congress favored the premature signature of the articles, and were, at least, willing to remove, in the minds of the people, the blame of delaying peace from Great Britain to France.56

MONDAY, MARCH 17th.

A letter was received from General Washington, enclosing two anonymous and inflammatory exhortations to the army to assemble, for the purpose of seeking, by other means, that justice which their country showed no disposition to afford them. The steps taken by the General to avert the gathering storm, and his professions of inflexible adherence to his duty to Congress and to his country, excited the most affectionate sentiments towards him. By private letters from the army, and other circumstances, there appeared good ground for suspecting that the civil creditors were intriguing, in order to inflame the army into such desperation as would produce a general provision for the public debts. These papers were committed to Mr. GILMAN, Mr. DYER, Mr. CLARK, Mr. RUTLEDGE, and Mr. MERCER. The appointment of these gentlemen was brought about by a few members, who wished to saddle with this embarrassment the men who had opposed the measures necessary for satisfying the army, viz: the halfpay and permanent funds; against one or other of which the individuals in question had voted.

This alarming intelligence from the army, added to the critical situation to which our affairs in Europe were reduced by the variance of our Ministers with our Ally, and to the difficulty of establishing the means of fulfilling the engagements and securing the harmony of the United States, and to the confusions apprehended from the approaching resignation of the Superintendent of Finance, gave peculiar awe and solemnity to the present moment, and oppressed