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but is made by the statute one of fact, in which the pecuniary circumstances of the party making the grant, or, as here, procuring it to be made, are matters for consideration. It becomes a question of actual fraud." In this case the person paying the consideration owed no debts of his own at the time, but was, contingently, liable as second indorser on the notes of a third person; he had no occasion for credit in his own affairs, and had not obtained credit on the faith of the ownership of the property in question; and there was no affirmative evidence of fraud or fraudulent intent. Under these circumstances the grant was upheld.

THE PRESIDENT'S RELATIONS TO THE

ARMY.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR: In my letter upon the Army Bill, where I was led to consider the question whether the execution of the guaranties promised in the fourth section of the fourth article of the Federal Constitution was devolved upon Congress or the President, I mentioned that the subject led so naturally to a discussion of the general relations of the President to the Army, that I was tempted to pursue it. This I will endeavor to do in the present letter.

The President, according to the Constitution, is "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States." What does the expression commander-inchief mean? What would it mean if it stood alone, and what does it mean when used in connection with the other parts of the Constitution?

That ques

tion is to be answered first, out of the text of the instrument itself, next out of the political theories prevalent when it was framed, and lastly out of the subsequent history of the government.

Does it result from the President's being Commanderin-Chief that it is his right, as part of his executive function, conferred by the Constitution, and not limitable by Congress, to employ the Army in his discretion, at such places, and for such purposes as he may think proper, notwithstanding an act of Congress passed by the two Houses with his approval, or by two-thirds of each House against his dissent, enacting that the Army shall not be employed at a particular place, or in a particular manner, or for a particular purpose? Though Congress is empowered by the Constitution to declare war, raise and support armies, and provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, yet when the armies are once raised, the money provided, and the militia called forth, can Congress prescribe their employment in respect to time, place, or circumstance, or in any respect whatever? If Congress raise an army for service against the Indians, may the President refuse to employ it in the Indian country, and march it straightway to the seaboard? Or, when a bill was brought into the House of Representatives last winter, requiring the troops at Washington to be removed a certain distance from the capitol, where the two Houses were sitting, and were about to count the electoral votes, and a score of Republican voices cried out that it was an unconstitutional interference with the President's prerogative,

did those voices utter the truth, or no? Could the President then have brought the troops to surround the capitol, or even to enter it, against the will of Congress?

Looking at the text of the Constitution, let us first read the expression Commander-in-Chief, as if it stood alone, and then read it in connection with other parts of the instrument. Hamilton, in the Federalist, answering the objection urged against the Constitution,

that it made the President Commander-in-Chief, said that it made him only the "first general and admiral of the confederacy." Yet now, after the lapse of more than eighty years, in the fervor of partisan harangue, it is claimed that because the President is Commanderin-Chief of the Army and Navy, and Militia when taken into the Federal service, this army, navy and militia, of which he is only the chief captain, can be moved by him wherever he pleases, and be used as his judgment or his will inclines. But if a seaman were employed to command a ship upon an engagement to be kept in service as commander for four years, would any one thence infer that he had an irrevocable power to sail the ship into whatever seas he pleased, and traffic in such ports as he happened to prefer? Why the word "commander" should have a different meaning when applied to an army, and when applied to a ship, it would be hard to tell.

The Governor of New York is declared by its Constitution to be "Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval forces of the State." Is he too clothed with the power of using the armed forces of New York for such service as he pleases? Are all the laws of the State, which regulate the employment of the militia, so many encroachments on the Governor's constitutional prerogative?

To command an army is to give it its orders; but that means only that whatever orders are given must come through the commander, not that he may give any order he pleases. All orders to our army are to be issued by the President or his subordinates. To do what? That, and that only, which the laws allow; and the laws are made, not by him, but by Congress. His function is executive. The laws must of course be such as the legislature is, by the Constitution, authorized to enact; but the power to make them cannot, in the nature of things, be subject to the power to command the troops, for that would make the lat ter the superior of the two; in other words, would render the military superior to the civil power, a conclusion, the absurdity of which in this country demonstrates the folly of the premises.

If there were nothing else in the Constitution than these two provisions- one that Congress should make the laws, and the other that the President should command the army, could there be any doubt in the minds of reasonable men that the latter, in his military office, would be bound by the laws which the former should pass? This result would follow from the nature of the two functions, one being legislative and the other executive. It could not be otherwise in any country, unless the two functions were united, as in Russia, in one person. There the emperor, who commands the army, makes also the laws, and in the use of his army he need respect only his own supreme will. But where the two functions are disunited, as in this country, the legislature must, in the nature of things, control the executive.

Why is it that the President cannot order a platoon to enter a man's house, or take possession of his land?

Because the act would be contrary to law. The same legislative authority which makes that act unlawful, can make any other act unlawful within the scope of the law-making power.

The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is an executive officer only. He executes the Federal laws. His function as commander gives him no power to command, but in obedience to the laws. In other words, to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army, is to be the organ or instrument by which the army is moved to its legitimate service. And what is, or is not legitimate service, depends upon the law-giver, and him alone.

What is the real significance of the political axiom so often declared in constitutions, and so much used in political discussions, that the military must ever be subordinate to the civil power? It is this: the supreme power of the State is the civil power, and the military is its arm. This arm is moved in this or that direction, and for this or that service, as the civil power, the head, ordains.

It should seem, therefore, that the appointment of the President to be Commander-in-Chief, does not, of itself, give him the right to move the troops wherever he will, and employ them in such service as he may choose.

But even if the office of Commander-in-Chief, stand ing by itself, might be said, with any show of plausibility, to make the army and navy instruments of his will, the other parts of the Constitution limit and define, in explicit terms, the relative rights of the President and Congress over the national forces.

Congress is expressly authorized to "declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water," to "raise and support armies," to "provide and maintain a navy," to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," to "provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions," and to "provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States." It is certain, therefore, that the President cannot use the army, in any act of war, until Congress has made declaration of the war. It is certain, also, that it belongs to Congress and not to the President to authorize the calling out of the militia to suppress an insurrection, and without such authority the President cannot call them, and when called they must be governed by authority of Congress, and not of the President. It is equally certain that it belongs to Congress and not to the President to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." Does not this place the ultimate control of the land and naval forces in the hands of Congress? To regulate commerce has been held to include the absolute control of all intercourse, and under this single power, all traffic and all interchange between the States themselves and between the nation and other nations are placed under the authority of Congress. Congress is to govern and regulate all the Federal forces, the only limitation being that the instrument, by which the government and regulation are to be effected, is the President. He is to execute the will of Congress in that particular, just as he is to execute the other laws that Congress may enact. And last of all, it is Congress and not the President, that is to "raise and support armies," and to "provide and

maintain a navy." What is an army? An embodied and armed force. Surely the power which is authorized to raise it is also authorized to declare the purposes for which it is raised. The power to raise and support is unlimited. The greater includes the less. Troops may be raised for a general service or for a particular service, and if Congress may direct them to be used for a particular service it may direct them not to be used for that service. For example, if Congress should withdraw the general delegation of power heretofore given to the President and decide for itself when and how to interfere for the protection of a State against domestic violence, it might in case of domestic conflict resolve that a particular government was the lawful one, and raise troops for the specific purpose of sustaining it; or if Congress should prefer to leave the general delegation on the statute book, reserving to itself the sole right of interfering whenever there was a dispute as to the rightful gov ernment, it might simply forbid, as in the instance of the last army bill, the use of the national forces on either side, until Congress itself had exercised its own judgment of the exigency.

The President is Commander-in-Chief of the navy as well as the army. That construction of the Constitution which would hold him beyond the control of Congress as to the disposition of soldiers, would hold him beyond the control of Congress as to the disposition of ships. If, therefore, a statute should authorize the building of a particular class of ships for a particular service, and that alone, the President might disregard the limitation, according to this new school of constitutional law. For example, if the construction of half a dozen monitors should be ordered in the next navy appropriation bill, to be kept always in the harbor of New York, the President might send them all, as soon as ready, to Washington, and if interrogated by Congress on the subject, might answer that it belonged to them to provide and maintain a navy, but to him to use it as he judged best.

The practice of the legislative and executive departments have never yet accorded with any such notion of presidential power, as in the present controversy has been asserted. The statutes of the United States are full of instances in which the disposition of troops has been prescribed by Congress. I will mention only a few of them. Section 5298 of the Revised Statutes authorizes the President to use the army, navy and militia to enforce the laws of the United States, and section 3298 requires him to perform certain conditions to such use of them.

Section 2002 is as follows: "No military or naval officer, or other person engaged in the civil, military or naval service of the United States, shall order, bring, keep or have under his authority or control any troops or armed men, at the place where any general or special election is held in any State, unless it be necessary to repel the armed enemies of the United States, or to keep the peace at the polls," and section 5528 makes a violation of section 2002 punishable by fine or imprisonment at hard labor, and 5532 adds disqualification to hold any Federal office. Sections 5287 and 5288 authorize the President to use the army, navy and militia to enforce neutrality. Section 5316 authorizes him to use the same for the enforcement of the revenue laws. Sections 1984 and 1989 authorize him to use them to enforce civil rights.

The extraordinary notion that the President has exclusive control over the use of the army has been

in part produced by a vague impression of resemblance between his constitutional prerogative and that of Sovereigns under constitutional governments. This impression is begotten partly of pride, partly of fear, and greatly of ignorance. There are some people who take such pride in every thing American that they must needs consider their own chief magistrate as mightier than a King. It is not an uncommon thing to hear one of these foolish persons boast that their President has more power than the Queen of England, nay, that he is the greatest magistrate in the world. A false analogy here ministers to pride. Because the President is chief magistrate it is inferred that he is like other chief magistrates, and as these are in general Kings, it does not require a great stretch of the imagination to fancy that he also is a sort of King. But an American President is not a King, nor any thing like a King, any more than he is like the Emperor of Russia, the Sultan of Turkey, or the Mikado of Japan. It is true that he sends and receives envoys, and when sovereigns address him, they call him, in the language of diplomacy, their "great and good brother," but that no more makes him like one of them than the Indians calling him their great father makes him loving and paternal. The chief magistracy is not of necessity a kingly office. That officer in Switzerland has not the trace of the King about him. The Governors of our States are chief magistrates also, but they are not little Kings. If we would know how nearly the President resembles a Sovereign in his attributes, we should compare these attributes with those of the Queen of England. The people of England are the subjects of Victoria, the people of the United States are not the subjects of President Hayes; the Queen holds her office for life, and, departing, transmits it to her heirs; the President holds his office for four years and has no personal relation with his successors; the Queen declares war, the President cannot; the Queen bestows honors and titles, the President does not; the Queen is irremovable, the President is removable; the Queen is not amenable to the laws, the President is; the Queen appoints all officers in her dominions, the President appoints none, without the permission of the Senate or of Congress; the Queen makes all treaties of her own authority, the President cannot make one, without the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Scarce an attribute or a distinction, substantial or ceremonial, can be mentioned in which the President of the United States does not fall short of the Sovereign of England. There is indeed a view of the two offices flattering to our national pride. The President is or should be chosen by the free suffrages of his countrymen, the largest constituency in the world; his crown is the respect which they bear him, and his glory the simple dignity of the greatest republican office in the world. Washington, sitting in the presidential seat, was a more commanding figure than any sovereign on the throne.

But what after all are the relations of the Army and Militia of England to the Crown of England? During the struggle between Charles I and the Parliament, each strove to gain possession of the military force of the kingdom. We all know how the struggle ended, and we also know how, after the struggle was over, the monarchy came to be restored. Hallam, commenting in his Constitutional History on the attitude of the Parliament to the new King, makes these observations:

"There was undoubtedly one very important matter of past controversy, which they may seem to have avoided, the power over the militia. They silently gave up that momentous question. Yet it was become, in a practical sense, incomparably more important that the representatives of the commons should retain a control over the land forces of the nation, than it had been at the commencement of the contro

versy. War and usurpation had sown the dragon's teeth in our fields, and instead of the peaceable trained bands of former ages, the citizen soldiers who could not be marched beyond their counties, we had a veteran army accustomed to tread upon the civil authority at the bidding of their superiors, and used alike to govern and obey. It seemed prodigiously dangerous to give up this weapon into the hands of our new sovereign. The experience of other countries, as well as our own, demonstrated that public liberty could never be secured, if a large standing army should be kept on foot, or any standing army without consent of Parliament. But this salutary restriction the Parliament did not think fit to propose, and in this respect I certainly consider them as having stopped short of adequate security."

The slavish Parliament, which brought in the King, anxious to make a parade of their submission, passed 64 An act for ordering the forces in the several counties of this Kingdom," with this magniloquent preamble: "For as much as within all his majesty's realms and dominions, the sole and supreme power, government, command and disposition of the militia, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength is, and by the laws of England ever was, the undoubted right of His Majesty, and his royal predecessors, Kings and Queens of England, and that both, or either of the Houses of Parliament cannot, nor ought to pretend to the same; nor can, nor lawfully may raise, or levy any war, offensive or defensive, against His Majesty, his heirs or lawful successors." But, notwithstanding the preamble, they proceeded to qualify this apparently unqualified power by enacting: 1. That the King might issue commissions of lieutenancy to persons to call together "all such persons, at such times, and to arm and array them in such manner as is hereinafter expressed and declared, and to form them into companies, troops and regiments, and in case of insurrection, rebellion or invasion, them to lead, conduct and employ, or cause to be led, conducted or employed, as well within the said several counties, cities and places, for which they shall be commissioned respectively, as also into any other, the counties and places aforesaid, for suppressing all such insurrections and rebellions, and repelling of invasions, as may happen to be, according as they shall from time to time receive directions from his majesty," with various other directions about providing horses, arms and munitions.

The bill of rights, enacted in the beginning of the reign of William and Mary, declared, “that the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom, in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law." In pursuance of the policy thus declared, the mutiny act, in which provision is made for the raising of troops, is passed every year. By an act of 8 Geo. II. (chap. 30), it was provided that the secretary at war should send orders for the removal of all troops two miles or more from the places of election of members of Parliament. The penalty for disobedience was dismissal from the service and disqualification to hold any office, military or civil.

Parliament here determined what orders the Crown and the Crown's Ministers should give for the disposition of troops.

An act of George III (ch. 107, § 95), enacted that the

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King might call out the militia, the occasion being first communicated to Parliament if sitting, or if not sitting, declared in council, and notified by proclamation, the Parliament to be immediately called together. This act provided that the militia should not be sent out of the Kingdom.

The act of 22 and 23 Vict., chap. 27, declared "It shall be lawful for Her Majesty to enlist, and have in pay, and maintain out of the said revenues, in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Isles, any number of non-commissioned officers and private men belonging to the said Indian army, not exceeding, at any one time, six thousand." And all this was done in a country where, according to the preamble of the act of Charles, the sole and supreme command and disposition of all forces by sea and land, and of all fortified places, was vested in the Crown.

I venture the opinion that if, on the passing of the annual mutiny act, a clause were moved, that the troops should not be employed in a particular service or stationed at a particular place, and a member of Parliament were to object that such a clause would be an infringement of the Queen's prerogative, he would be laughed at for his pains. Be that as it may, it is certain that from whatever side we view the question, the authority of Congress to raise and support armies, for such service, and such service only, as it judges expedient, cannot be reasonably questioned.

It is not a pleasing reflection that a question, so free from doubt, should be, nevertheless, debated with partisan vehemence, and that opinions upon it should be divided very much according to the dividing line of parties. We boast that ours is a government of opinion, but opinion to be valuable must be deliberate, collected from the whole public and founded on fact. Those gusts of passionate thought, miscalled opinion, which sometimes sweep over a country, are not safe guides for governments. A constitution is the embodiment of public opinion, matured by the thought and experience of many generations, and should always prevail over that momentary opinion, which comes and goes like an exhalation and springs more from caprice than from judgment. When the opinions of a party or of a community run for the moment counter to the commandments of the constitution, a statesman should remember, that, however clamorous may be the voices of his party or his time, he may safely reason from the experience of the past and appeal from the present to the future.

The great maxims of free governments are the fruit, not of one generation or of one century, but of many generations and many centuries; they have been fought for and suffered for; they have been established and consecrated by blood and fire. If we would preserve them and profit by them, we must remember them, teach them and stand by them. It is an accepted article of the political creed of every free country, that the military is and must be subject to the civil power. Whoever teaches that any military officer, from the highest to the lowest, from the Commander-in-Chief to the sergeant of a guard, can lawfully command his soldiers to enter any place or do any act which the law-making power of his country forbids, should be accounted, as he is in fact, the enemy at once of his country and his race.

If it were true, that when an army is once raised the President can use it as he will, without other

check than his liability to impeachment, then indeed it were better that an army should never be raised again. But it is not true. The people of this country have not been left in that unhappy dilemma. They can have an army, a small one it should ever be, but an army nevertheless, and their Congress can make laws for its government and employment which their President must obey.

NEW YORK, Sept. 11, 1877.

THIS

DAVID DUDLEY FIELD.

SALARIES OF JUDGES IN NEW YORK STATE. HIS journal, sometime ago (vol. 10, pp. 213, 229 and 261), contained three articles on salaries of judges in England and Ireland. In the present sketch, I endeavor to give a history of judicial salaries in this State, from the organization of the Supreme Court in 1691 to the present time. A full and learned history of the courts of this State, from the settlement of the country by the Dutch, to the date of the writing of the article, will be found in the first volume of E. D. Smith's Reports of the Common Pleas. It was written by Chief Justice Daly, and leaves nothing but a continuation to be wished for.

By the commission of Henry Sloughter, Esq., as Governor of New York, dated January 4, 1690, he had full power and authority, with the advice and consent of the council, to establish so many courts of judicature and public justice as he may think fit and necessary for the hearing and determining of all causes, as well criminal as civil, according to law and equity, and for awarding execution thereupon. These judges, once appointed, could not be removed without cause.

Col. William Smith, commonly known as Tangress Smith, was appointed chief justice in 1692. He held this position until 1700, in which year he was succeeded by William Atwood, who was sent out from England. Pending Atwood's arrival, Abraham De Peyster acted as chief justice. Col. Smith was again appointed chief justice on Atwood's leaving the country.

The Earl of Bellomont, in a letter to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, dated New York, December 15, 1698, says: that Col. Smith, although chief justice of the Province, is no sort of a lawyer, having been bred a soldier. This letter is interesting, and I give part of it: "He is a man of sense, and a more gentleman-like man than any I have seen in this province, but that does not make him a lawyer. Then he lives four score miles off, and comes but twice a year to this town at the time of the Supreme Court's sitting, just to earn his sallary, which is a hundred pounds per annum, sterling; and so is of very little use or service to the government. Whereas a man in that station ought to be a lawyer, and a man of great integrity, and resident in this town to be always ready to assist the government. As to the men that call themselves lawyers here, and practice at the bar, they are almost all under such a scandalous character, that it would grieve a man to see our noble English laws so miserably mangled and prophaned. I do not find that a man of 'em ever arrived at being an attorney in England. So far from being barristers, one of them was a dancing-master, another a glover by trade, a third, which is Mr. Jamison, was condemned to be hanged in Scotland for burning the Bible and for blasphemy, a fourth, which is Mr. Nicoils, your lordships have had his character formerly from me, and there are two or three more as bad as the rest; besides

their ignorance in the law, they are all, except one or two, violent enemies to the government, and they do a world of mischief in the country by infecting the people with ill principles toward the government. Now that there is a prospect of doubling the revenue, I am humbly of opinion we ought to have good judges sent from England, and King's council to mind the interest of the crown. The lawyers here do so prey on the people, that it is a melancholy thing to hear how unequally justice is, and has been distributed in this province; in so much as I am told, a suit at common law is more expensive and dilatory here than in England."

The need of good judges and a good attorney-general is one of the most frequent causes of complaint in the Earl of Bellomont's letters to the Lords of Trade. His attorney-general, James Graham, he says: is an understanding man, but being bred to a trade, and neither to learning nor the law, it cannot be supposed that he should be well qualified for the post he is in. He says that Graham's information and pleadings are defective, and that by reason thereof the government suffers great loss.

William Pinhorne was suspended by the Earl of Bellomont in 1698, for the following, among other reasons: That he had been turned out of the council by Col. Fletcher, on his arrival in the province, because he resided in the Jersey's, but having presented Col. Fletcher with some plate, he was made a judge with a salary of £100.

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In 1693, Caleb Heathcote was Judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Westchester county, Ellis Duxbury in Richmond county, Thomas Garton in Ulster county, Isaac Arnold in Suffolk county, Thomas Hix in Queens county, and Stephen Courtlandt in Kings county. These were Justices of the Peace, and being first on the Commission of the Peace, were from that fact judges of the Common Pleas in their respective counties. The judge of the Common Pleas was assisted with any two of the three next in the Commission of the Peace." In Albany and New York there was a Mayor's Court, which had the power of the Common Pleas. At this time Abraham De Peyster was Mayor of New York, and Peter Schuyler, Mayor of Albany. James Graham was Recorder of the city of New York, and Derick Wessels, Recorder of Albany. Col. William Smith was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature, which at this time had the power of the King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer. William Pinhorne was second justice, and Stephen Courtland, Chidley Brooke, and John Lawrence, justices.

At this time there were but three other counties in the province, and one of these, Duke's county, consisting of Nantuckett and Martha's Vineyard, was claimed by Sir William Phipps. Of the other two counties, Orange had about twenty families, and was under the charge of New York, and Dutchess having a very few inhabitants, was committed to the care of Ulster county. The whole number of inhabitants in the province, exclusive of Indians, did not exceed 19,000.

Joseph Dudley, the first chief justice of the province of New York, in 1691 was allowed a salary of £130. Thomas Johnson, second judge, received £100 per annum. The other judges and the attorney-general received nothing. James Graham, the attorney-general in 1693, received a salary of £50. Dudley was

removed in 1692 because he was a non-resident. The salary of William Smith, chief justice in 1693, was £130, allowed for riding "ye circuit;" in 1698 he received £100 per annum. In 1702, Chief Justice Atwood's salary was £300 per annum, paid out of the king's exchequer. Abraham De Peyster, the second judge, received £150. Robert Walters, associate judge, was allowed £50; and James Graham, the attorney-general, received from his majesty's exchequer £150 per annum. The salary to the chief justice was temporary, for Gov. Montgomery in a letter dated June 30, 1729, to the Lords of Trade, says the salary of the chief justice had been £130 per annum from 1691 to 1715, when the General Assembly raised the salary to £300, limiting the same, however, to five years. He accounts for this increase in salary by the fact that the chief justice was a member of the General Assembly, and had a number of friends there, and says this increase was a reward for the services he did there. By the same General Assembly the salaries of the second judge and the attorney-general was reduced to nothing. Daniel Horsmanden received as chief justice and for holding circuit from September 1, 1765, to September 1, 1766, £300. David Jones, the brother of the great-great-grandfather of the Hon. Samuel Jones, late Justice of the Superior Court of the city of New York, William Smith and Robert R. Livingston, the other justices, received £200. Horsmanden, who was chief justice in 1774, had a salary of £500 sterling, paid by the crown, and £300, New York currency, paid by the province. The other judges received £200, New York currency, per annum. The attorney-general, John Faber Kempe, received £350 sterling, paid by the crown, and £150 New York currency, paid by the province for extra services.

Robert R. Livingston was the only one of the justices of the Supreme Court that sided with the colonists at the commencement of the Revolution. The convention of Representatives of the State of New York -the convention that adopted the first Constitution of the State of New York- -on the 3d day of May, 1777, elected John Jay chief justice, and Robert Yates and John Morris Scott associate justices of the Supreme Court. Mr. Scott declined to accept the office, and John Sloss Hobart was declared elected in his place. On the 4th day of April in the following year the salary of the chief justice was fixed at £300 ($750) per annum, and that of the associate justices at £200. From this time these salaries were gradually increased by the legislature, until in 1797 the salaries of the chief justice and the associate justices were, respectively, $2,000 per annum.

By the laws of 1801, the chancellor and chief justice received each an annual salary of $2,000, and each of the other judges of the Supreme Court $1,875. On the 19th day of June, 1812, the legislature raised the salaries of all the judges to $3,000 for three years, and in 1816 increased the sum to $4,500. But the legislature of 1820, thinking probably that such large salaries were demoralizing and undemocratic, reduced the salary of the judges to $3,500 each, and the next year, suffering from a continuation of the same fit of economy, further reduced the salaries to $3,000. From 1823 to 1835 the salary of the judges was $2,000 each. The latter year it was raised to $2,500, which amount was in 1839 increased to $3,000. In 1827 the salary of the eight circuit judges was $1,250 each per annum. In 1835 this amount was increased to $1,600.

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