ページの画像
PDF
ePub

of his daughters should marry, and have children," such children to have the mother's share. Both daughters married, but neither of them had children. Held, that they took equitable estates in fee as joint tenants, Ch. Div., June 13, 1877. Yarrow v. Knightly, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 907.

Estate in tail: construction: devise to A. for life, and after her death "to descend to her female heir."-Devise to trustees, in trust for A. for life, and "after her decease to descend to her female heir, and whether sister or daughter." Held, that A. took an estate in tail female. Ch. Div., May 15, 1877. Lewthwaite v. Thompson, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 910.

Legacy to executor: presumption of law: evidence to rebut: construction.-The presumption that a legacy to an executor and trustee was given to him solely on condition of his undertaking the trusts of the will is rebutted by the fact that the legacy was only payable after the death of the tenant for life. Ch. Div., Feb. 17, 1877. Re Reeve's Trusts, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 906. Release: 1 Vict., c. 26, s. 24: will speaking from its date : moneys advanced after date of will.-A will, made since the statute (1 Vict., c. 26), after reciting that the testator had advanced to his son A. various sums of money, contained these words, "I hereby release my said son from all claims in respect of the aforesaid moneys, *** and all other moneys due from him to me." Held, that the release only applied to moneys due at the date of the will, and not to moneys advanced afterward. Ch. Div., June 26, 1877. Everett v. Everett, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 913.

The

Solicitor and client: gift pending professional relationship: influence: independent advice: severance of relationship. The defendant had acted for many years as the confidential solicitor of the testator, a widower with no near relations; testator and defendant were on terms of great intimacy, defendant transacting all testator's business. Testator had allowed the defendant £100 a year, and by his will and codicils gave legacies to a considerable amount to defendant, his wife, and children. The will and codicils were prepared by the defendant. The testator was also in the habit of advancing money to the defendant from time to time. defendant, at the testator's request, prepared releases of various sums which had been lent him; these releases were sent to the testator, executed by him, and returned to the defendant. Upon the testator having occasion to execute a further codicil, J., a solicitor from Hereford, was, at the defendant's suggestion, called in to explain to the testator the purport and effect of his will, numerous codicils thereto, and the releases. J. attended and went through the various documents with the testator, and the codicil, which confirmed certain previous, and made some additional dispositions, was executed by the testator in J.'s presence. On the testator's death, the plaintiffs (relations of his) sought to set aside the releases as having been executed while under the professional influence of the defendant, and without proper independent advice. The defendant denied any undue influence, and contended that the testator had received proper independent advice from J. Held, that while the relationship of solicitor and client exists, a gift from the latter to his solicitor cannot be sustained. That the relationship might be severed for the occasion, but that in the present instance this had not been done, but was in full force when the releases to the defendant were executed. The releases must, therefore, be set aside, as they were executed by the testator while

under such influence, without proof that any independent advice was given, or that the parties were ever at arm's length, the attendance of J. having been, not to advise or to sever the relationship, but to ascertain whether the testator knew what he was doing. Mode of severing professional relationship under such circumstances, and what is proper independent advice, considered. Ch. Div., June 9, 1877. Morgan v. Minett, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 948.

INSURANCE.

Marine insurance: wagering policy: open policy on profits and commission: without benefit of salvage, "but to pay loss on such part as shall not arrive:" illegality: 19 Geo. 2, c. 37: return of premiums. - An assured under open policies of marine insurance on profits and commission on goods to be shipped, containing the classes "warranted free from all average," and "without benefit of salvage," "but to pay loss upon such part as shall not arrive," declared upon a number of British ships, one of which was lost. Held, that the policies were within 19 Geo. 2, c. 27, and void. Return of premium refused. Com. Pl. Div., April 19, 1877. Allkins v. Jupe, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 851.

LEASE.

Underlease: covenant by underlessee not to build: purchase by underlessee of immediate reversion: merger: liability in equity to building covenant. — A, being possessed of a piece of land for a term of ninety-nine years, laid it out in plots, and underleased one plot to the defendant for the residue of the term, less three days, the defendant covenanting not to build more than twenty feet in height on that side of his plot which adjoined a narrow passage. A underleased another plot, which abutted on the other side of the passage, to the plaintiffs. On A's death, the estate was sold under conditions which provided that the purchaser of the largest lot in value should take an assignment of the whole, and grant fresh underleases to the various underlessees, for the residue of the term of ninety-nine years, less two days. The defendant purchased his own plot, and the plaintiffs purchased their plot, which was the largest in value. The plaintiff's took an assignment of the whole, and granted a fresh underlease to the defendant of his lot for the residue of the term, less two days, at an apportioned ground-rent. Held, that though the defendant's original underlease was merged at law, he was still bound in equity to observe his building covenant; aud that the plaintiffs could obtain an injunction to restrain him from infringing it. Ch. Div., June 28, 1877. Birmingham Joint-Stock Co. v. Lea, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 843.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

Bill of exchange: advance secured by bills and by assignment of debts due to borrower: bills negotiated: bankruptcy of acceptor: application of proceeds of assigned debts.-Advances were secured by bills drawn by the lender upon, and accepted by the borrower, and by the assignment of debts due to him, notice being given to the debtors. The lender discounted the bills with his bankers. The borrower became bankrupt, and the bankers proved under the bankruptcy for the full amount of the bills. It was arranged between the lender and the trustee in the bankruptcy that the latter should collect the assigned debts and hold the proceeds without prejudice to the lender's rights. Held, that the lender was not entitled to the

proceeds, unless he took up the bills, and that the trustee should be ordered to apply the proceeds in discharging the lender's liability upon the bills. Court of Appeal, March 15, 1877. Ex parte Mann, Re Kattengell, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 840.

TRADE-MARK.

Secret preparation: use of name of original producer: injunction. Where a person has, without unfair means, become acquainted with the secret of the preparation of an unpatented article, universally known by the name of the original producer, he may, after the death of the original producer, make and sell the article, and advertise it as made from the original recipe; provided he does not lead the public to suppose that the article sold by him is made by the successors in business of the original producer. Ch. Div., June 14, 1877. Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Co., 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 848.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.*
NEGLIGENCE.

Traveler crossing railroad track: contributory negli gence. A traveler about crossing a railroad on an embankment twelve feet high, in an open country, where an approaching train could be seen for some hundred feet, walked his horses up the ascent at a distance of ninety feet from the road without looking up or down the road; when near the track, the train being within a short distance, going at twenty-five miles an hour, he lashed his horses to cross the track; the wagon was struck by the engine and he killed. Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence. In a suit by his wife against the railroad company for causing his death, she was properly nonsuited, although there may have been negligence in the engineer. Gerety v. Philad., Wilm. and Balt. R. R. Co.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

1. Agreement concerning lands: party to be charged only need sign memorandum.-Penn in 1784 leased a lot to Wormley for ten thousand years, at an annual rent, with right of distress and re-entry to forfeit the lease in default of payment, if there were not sufficient distress on the premises to pay the rent. Wormley died in 1829 without known heirs; App then took possession of the lot; the plaintiff had been agent of Penn before Wormley's death, and so continued until 1838, when Penn's devisee conveyed to him the groundrent and all the grantor's estate in the lot. No rent having been paid by Wormley, the plaintiff, July 1, 1839, entered for its non-payment, declaring his intention to resume possession. By arrangement with App, in order that plaintiff might make title to him, he removed every thing from the lot, and continued in its occupancy to take care of it for plaintiff. In October, 1839, App and plaintiff signed without seals a paper by which App agreed to take the lot," describing it, on a ground-rent of $60. Held, that this paper was an agreement in writing, under the statute of frauds, for a lease of the land on ground-rent. The requirements of the statute are met by a memorandum in writing signed by the party to be charged therewith. If signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the vendee no more is required. It is not necessary that the writing be under seal nor in any particular form of words. Cadwalader v. App.

* To appear in 31 P. F. Smith's (81 Penn. St.) Reports.

2. Adverse possession: statute of limitations.-App paid rent till 1850, when he asked plaintiff for a deed and wanted it made to his son Samuel; afterward Samuel, who occupied the lot, said to plaintiff, he would claim the property, that plaintiff had no title and his father would pay no more rent. Held, even if Samuel spoke by authority of his father, it was a mere declaration accompanied by no act and was not evidence of an adverse holding by App. The statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of one who has entered in subservience to the title of another until the privity between them is severed by some unequivocal act; mere declaration of his intention is insufficient. April 24, 1851, App wrote to plaintiff that having failed to comply with his agreement to make him a deed for the lot, etc., "and said neglect *** having continued for so long a time and after repeated demand, I notify you that I no longer recognize your title and will hold you accountable for the rent already paid you * * * under the claim set up by you," etc. Held, that this was a disclaimer of any adverse holding prior to that date. Ib.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

Repeal of statutes -An affirmative statute repeals a precedent affirmative statute where its matter necessarily implies a negative and the repugnancy is such that the two acts cannot be reconciled. A general statute without negative words will not repeal a previous statute which is particular, though the provisions in the two be different. Wright, assignee, v. Vickers.

TRIAL.

Expressions made by judge in charge.-A judge may express to a jury an opinion on the facts in a case properly referred to them; but must not infringe their province, so as to mislead them or relieve them of full responsibility of pronouncing judgment on the facts themselves. When there is sufficient evidence for a jury on a given point, the judge should submit it calmly and impartially. If the judge states the evidence he shouid state it accurately, as well that which makes for a party as that which makes against him. The judge should studiously avoid deductions and theories not warranted by the evidence. Burke v. Maxwell's Administrators.

USURY.

Purchaser of land incumbered by judgment on usurious debt cannot plead: usury not fraudulent as to creditors.-Wren borrowed money at usurious interest and gave a bond for its payment, on which judgment was entered. He was afterward adjudged a bankrupt, and his land sold by the assignee subject to the judgment. Held, that the purchaser could not have the judgment reduced by the amount of the usury. The act of May 28, 1858 (usury), applies only to the parties to the transaction; it being at the election of the borrower whether he will withhold the excess or recover it back within the time limited. In the distribution of a fund judgment creditors may attack a judgment collaterally for fraud on them, but not because it is a fraud on the debtor. A subsequent judgment creditor cannot set aside a judgment merely because it is erroneous. Payment of usury is not necessarily fraudulent as to creditors. Whenever the usurious contract is intended to defraud creditors, or when the circumstances of the debtor are known to be such, that it can be reasonably presumed that this will be the natural effect, creditors have the right to postpone the excess of interest. The purchaser, having bought subject to

the judgment, is presumed to have paid as much as the amount of the judgment less than he would have done. There was no privity of contract between the creditors and the purchaser, and he cannot invoke their equities and claim under them for his exclusive benefit. Miners' Trust Co. Bank v. Roseberry.

SUPREME COURT COMMISSION, OHIO.*

BAILMENT.

1. Liability of bailee without reward.-In case of a deposit of property, to be kept by the bailee without reward and returned to the depositor on demand, the law holds such a bailee liable only for losses arising from his gross negligence. Griffith v. Zipperwick.

2. What constitutes negligence.-What will constitute such gross negligence must be determined as a question of fact, in each particular case, by the jury, under proper instructions from the court. Ib.

3. Duty of bailee without reward.-Good faith requires, generally, that such a bailee should keep the goods intrusted to him, with as much care as he ordinarily keeps his own, of the same kind. And he should also keep them with such degree of care as is reasonable, with reference to the nature of the goods, and the particular circumstances of the bailment. Ib.

4. Facts showing want of good faith: bonds left for safe-keeping.-On the trial of an action brought to recover the value of certain government bonds, deposited by the plaintiff with the defendants as gratuitous bailees, and which were stolen from the vault of their banking-house by burglars, the evidence tended to show that the plaintiff's bonds, when deposited, were inclosed in a tin box, fastened with a padlock, of which the plaintiff retained the key; that defendants had a small burglar-proof safe in their vault, in which they kept similar bonds of their own and other depositors, which were all inclosed in paper envelopes, but that plaintiff's box, and similar bonds of another depositor, also inclosed in a box, were kept in the vault, outside of the burglar-proof safe, such other depositor consenting that his box should be thus kept. Held, that the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that these facts, if proved, would be conclusive evidence of a want of good faith or of gross negligence, and would require a verdict for the plaintiff, nor was it error to instruct the jury that they might properly take the character of plaintiff's package or box into consideration. Ib.

MISTAKE OF FACT.

1. Rescission of contract for.-A contract made under mistake as to a material fact may be rescinded by the party sought to be charged, upon discovery of the mistake, he being guilty of no want of diligence in not ascertaining what the real facts were. There is no difference in principle between the rescission of a contract to perform, and the rescission of a contract which is in itself the rescission of another and existing contract. Byers v. Chapin.

2. Grounds of rescission: duty of party seeking it.— A party selling articles for a specific purpose impliedly warrants that they are fit for that purpose, and a failure of such warranty is ground for rescission of a contract based upon it. A purchaser making such rescission, when it is his duty to expend labor and skill in order to render the articles fit for the purpose of their

From advance sheets of 28 Ohio State Reports.

original construction, impliedly warrants that the unfitness of the articles is not occasioned by any fault of his own. Ib.

MORTGAGE.

1. When deed absolute in form treated as mortgage.A deed absolute in form, if intended to secure the pay of money, and the relation of debtor and creditor exists between the grantor and the grantee at the time of its execution, will be treated as a mortgage. But where no such relation exists, and the grantor and grantee, at the time of the execution of the deed, agree in writing that the grantor shall have the option of repurchase in a given time, at a certain price, the transaction is a conditional sale. Slutz v. Desenberg. 2. Rule to determine character of instrument.-To determine whether a deed, absolute in form, is in equity a mortgage, requires that the real intention of the parties to the transaction be ascertained. A fair criterion seems to be this: If, under all the facts and circumstances, the relation of lender and borrower, or creditor and debtor, do not subsist, and the grantor is under no personal obligation that can be enforced by the grantee as creditor or mortgagee, the transaction will be treated as a sale and not as a mortgage. Ib.

3. Position, rights and liabilities of parties to instrument.-Where the transaction is a sale, with a right of repurchase by the grantor within a stipulated time at a stipulated price, and is not in equity a mortgage, the grantor, under such contract of repurchase, occupies the position of a vendee, with such rights and liabilities as attend such relation, and not of mortgagor. Ib.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE ANNOTATED POCKET CODE.

The Revised Code of Civil Procedure of the State of New York, as amended in 1877, according to the Standard Text deposited in the Office of the Secretary of State by the Revision Commissioners. With Notes and References to Decisions bearing thereon. Also, the Temporary Act, the Suspension Act, the Repealing Act, and the Unre pealed Sections of the Former Code. Albany, N. Y.: John D. Parsons, Jr., 1877.

THE

IE lawyers of this State cannot complain that the New Code has not, at least so far as the text is concerned, been made accessible to them. Nearly every publisher of law books in the State has issued an edition, and some of them have gone so far as to issue two editions; the second edition being put forth because the first was discovered to be full of errors. We mentioned a few weeks ago, in a review of the book prepared by Mr. Throop, that it was the only Code yet printed that could be relied upon as accurate. All previous publications purporting to be the Code, were at best only approximations, and, in the nature of things, could not be relied upon as accurate. The Codes published since the work of the commissioners has been accessible, are, presumptively, accurate in their text, though in one of the "second edition" issues, we have discovered errors of considerable importance.

Among all the editions of the Code yet appearing, in many respects the one before us will be found the most useful to the practicing lawyer. In the first place its size recommends it. It is not, indeed, a book for the vest pocket, but it can be conveniently carried in a coat pocket. For a year or two at least, all the practitioners in the State will need to take the law governing practice with them, and the ponderous octavo, which is the regular thing in the law book line, cannot be transported, without great trouble, to every

place where its owner may want to consult it. For reference and study the larger works are suitable enough, and every practitioner should have one to remain in his office. But a handy volume which can be carried and put down anywhere, and is right side up in any shape, will at the end of the year give evidence of more frequent and constant use than the larger book. Several of the Codes issued have been printed with small type on thin paper, with the view of making them handy for use and carriage, but they are all of them of an inconvenient shape, and thus are not well fitted for the purpose designed. This volume is all that could be desired, not only in size, but in shape. It, however, does not secure convenience for one purpose, by the sacrifice of convenience for another; that is, it is not made small by reducing the size of the type to a degree that renders the print not easily readable. The pages of this volume can be read as easily as those of the edition of Mr. Throop, which is a splendid specimen of printing.

The volume before us contains another feature which peculiarly fits it for the use of the practicing attorney. Every section of the book is annotated as fully as in any large Code, and every fact of importance bearing on the section-where it appears in pre-existing laws or for what it is a substitute - is stated, and every case wherein the previous law was construed or passed upon, is given. Where the decision referred to, or explanation made, bears only on a single sentence or paragraph of the section, that circumstance is indicated. This work appears to have been thoroughly well done, and a somewhat extended examination has satisfied us that all the references are reliable and will prove of value to those having occasion to use them. The principles enunciated in the cases cited are not given, as this would have taken so much space and would have so enlarged the book as to render it no longer a handy volume. Every case decided bearing upon a given section is referred to, and the practitioner can, if he desires, very easily reach all that is necessary.

Another feature in this work is, that it gives not only the new Code, but all of the old Code that is not abrogated, fully annotated. This brings the whole law governing practice into one book, and those using this Code need not search through two or more volumes when examining a question controlled by that law.

We have spoken thus favorably of this volume, not merely on account of the skill, care and accuracy with which the work upon it is done, but also because it is in its form, typography and arrangement precisely what we have long wished to see in the way of a work of this kind. The Code of Civil Procedure is a book to be used, not one to be read and put away. It is to the practicing lawyer what the lancet is to the surgeon, a thing never to be left behind, and the publisher who presents it in a form fitted for the purpose of easy carriage, while containing every thing of value usually found only in more pretentious tomes, is worthy the thanks and the support of the profession.

THE NOTARIES' MANUAL.

The Notaries' Manual, showing the Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Notaries, according to the common law throughout the Union. Detroit: Richmond, Backus & Co., 1877.

This handy little volume is intended as a common law guide to Notaries throughout the country. It gives

the rules of law governing the notarial office in a clear and concise manner, and it may, we think, be relied on as accurate in all its statements. The statute law of Michigan, where the book is issued, is, in respect to the same subject, also given, but as that resembles, in most particulars, the statute law prevailing in other States, the work can be used and depended upon by those for whom it is designed in almost every section of the country. The various topics considered in the book are these: The Office, Affidavits, Acknowledgments, Commercial Protests, Marine Protests, Liabil ity for Negligence, Proofs in Bankruptcy, Special Duties, and Fees. A number of forms, sufficient to meet the necessary requirements of Notaries, are also given. The book will be found to supply those for whom it is designed, with all the information they are apt to need, and in a better and more convenient shape than the larger works on the same subject.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down in the New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, Sept. 18, 1877:

Judgment affirmed with costs-Towle v. Remsen; Steele v. Lord; The Village of Gloversville v. Howell, McVey v. Cantrell; Potter v. Smith; Alexander v. Dutcher; Magnin v. Dinsmore; Campbell v. Conner; Pierce v. Keator; Beckwith v. Whalen; Hickler v. Leighton; Oakley v. The Mayor, etc.-— Order affirmed with costs-Williams v. Thoru; In re N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co.; In re Gilbert Elevated R. R. Co.; Kobbe v. Elevated R. R. Co.; Tilton v. Ormsbee. - Judgment and order affirmed with costs. Peck v. Collins.

Judgment affirmed with no costs to either party as against the other in this court - The Children's Aid Society v. Loveridge. Order affirmed and judgment absolute for respondent, on stipulation, with costsHathaway v. Howell. Order affirmed with costs and judgment absolute for defendant as of date of argument - Miller v. Winchell.- Order affirmed with costs and judgment absolute for defendant on stipulation - Ham v. The Mayor. Order of General Term affirmed and judgment ordered on report of referee, with cost payable out of the fund - Boon v. Moss.

· Order of General Term, also assessments of 1869, 1872 and 1874 affirmed, and reversed as to that of 1870, and that assessment vacated without costs to either party In re Petition of Hebrew Benevolent Orphan Asylum. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event - Ferguson v. Crawford; The Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch; Lanigan v. The Mayor.

A

NOTES.

NEW treatise on the Law of Private Corporations for Pecuniary Gain is announced by the publishing house of John D. Parsons, Jr. Its author is Geo. W. Field, Esq., who is well known to the legal world by his able work on Damages, and other treatises of merit. As the subject of corporations is one upon which most of the elementary treatises are much behind the times, those of the profession who are interested therein will welcome the announcement meutioned, as Mr. Field's reputation is such as to insure that the work will be all that can be desired to meet the existing want.

[merged small][ocr errors]

Coverture and Idiocy," has been appointed Professor of Common Law and Evidence in the Union College of Law, of Chicago. As a legal author, Mr. Ewell has displayed both ability and acquirements of the first order, and these ought to make him a successful teacher.

The Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations opened its fifth annual conference on the 30th ult., at Antwerp, under the presidency of Lord O'Hagan. M. T. O. Engels, manager of the Belgian Lloyds, is the president of the local committee; and, in welcoming the members of the association to Antwerp, he alluded to its growing importance as a seaport, and its consequent advantages as a place of meeting for those interested in settling the conflicting practices connected with general average questions, which occupied a prominent place in the programme of the congress for the year. Lord O'Hagan, in his introductory address, gave a history of the steps which led to the convening of the first conference at Brussels on the 10th of October, 1873. The primary object of the association was described in their first resolution as "the substitution of the arbitrament of reason and justice for the arbitrament of the sword." While this noble design had not been lost sight of, the exigencies of the time had led the successive conferences that had since been held, to fix their attention, in the main, on questions the discussion of which was likely to have a more immediate practical result. He proceeded to point out the advantages of, and the steps that had been taken by the association to further a uniform usage for the nations of Europe and America with reference to bills of exchange, general average, patents, copyright, coinage, maritime capture, and the extradition of criminals. Lord O'Hagan concluded his address by dwelling on the ancient commercial and maritime renown of the city of Antwerp. From the secretary's report it appeared that there had been added to the vice-presidents: For the United States, the Hon. Bancroft Davis, American Minister at the Court of Berlin; for Canada, Sir William Young, Chief Justice, Halifax; and others. Among those added to the members of council was Mr. T. Aston, Q. C. Letters were read from Lord Cairns, Sir John Lubbock, and Lord Derby, the latter encouraging the association to hope that when they had practical results to show they would have the support of the English government. Among those present at the conference were: Dr. Tristram, Q. C.; Dr. Spinks, Q. C.; C. Clarke, Q. C.; J. Hinde Palmer, Q. C.; and Professor Amos. The conference closed its labors on the 3d inst.

The Central Law Journal says, that on the occasion of the Special Term of the United States Circuit Court, which met at Des Moines week before last, to hear the motion to confirm the sale of the Central Railroad of Iowa, Judge Dillon addressed the bar at some length, with reference to the charges which had been made against his integrity by one of the litigants in the case, and circulated in pamphlet form throughout his circuit, and published in influential journals in the east. Judge Dillon went over the case at considerable length, with the record before him, and showed that the charges made were false in every particular. As our readers are already familiar with the facts of

** * *

the case, we do not deem it is necessary to print Judge Dillon's remarks in full. After Judge Dillon had concluded, Judge Love made some appropriate remarks. A meeting of the bar was called to take action in the matter; but as few members of the bar of the circuit not connected with the case were present, it was adjourned until the regular October term. Cate, the author of the slanders, was in town, and was invited to the bar meeting, but did not put in an appearance. In the course of his address Judge Dillon said: "The bar is my constituency. They are the proper accusers of a bad judge, and the proper defenders of a just judge unjustly assailed. Against such assaults as have been made against me, a judge is almost helpless, so far as positive action by him is concerned. Under the act of Congress he cannot punish a libeler for contempt of court. If the bar do not sustain a judge, he is defenseless. He cannot, like his assailants, go week after week into the press, or issue pamphlets, and in this manner defend his official action. Such a course is alike indelicate and impossible. By misrepresentation it is possible to so present the rulings in any case as to raise at least ungenerous suspicions among the uninformed. The bar, and the press, and the public have had the penetration to see the conspiracy to defame me. And the counsel in the cause and the bar at large, have nobly discharged their duty, and the press of my circuit, and, indeed, elsewhere, have as nobly discharged its duty to the public; and in the sacred name of justice, rather than as the expression of my personal gratitude, I now and here, in the most solemn and deliberate manner, thank them for it. The bar have resented this outrage as an affront and wrong to themselves, and I have been touched as never before in the course of my judicial experience, now neither short nor uneventful, by their general uprising; by the expressions of their steady and unshaken confidence, and by the demonstrations of their devotion and affectionate regard. I am proud of it. This repays me for the laborious days and nights of nearly twenty years, which, with pure purpose, and to the best of my humble abilities, I have loyally consecrated to my profession, as a minister of justice. I can never forget it. It would, indeed, be sad and most discouraging, if the fabric of a man's character, almost the only substantial reward of an American judge-reared in toil, stone by stone, through the period of the greater part of an active life, would crumble at the touch of unestablished and baseless slanderers, or could be swept away by an artificial tempest having origin in the disappointment, ignorance, or diseased imagination of litigants. I have not referred to this matter for the personal wrong done to myself, for the assault upon me has proved harmless and impotent, but rather to call the attention of the bar to the great outrage done judicial office and to the administration of public justice. Every thoughtful person, lawyer or layman, will agree with Lord Chancellor Thurlow, that the villifying and misrepresenting the conduct of judges and magistrates, intrusted with the administration of justice and the laws of the country, is a crime of a very heinous nature, and most destructive in its consequences, because it tends to lower them in the opinion of the public, who ought to feel a proper reverence and respect for their high and important stations.' In no country is this vital truth so important as in ours, where public opinion is formed more largely than elsewhere by the public press."

« 前へ次へ »