THE

NOTES.

HE Southern Law Review for October-November, 1877, contains the following articles: Composition in Bankruptcy, by Orlando F. Bump, Esq.; Liability of public officers to private actions for neglect of official duty, by Hon. Thomas L. Cooley, LL. D.; Assiguments by corporations for the benefit of creditors, by James L. High, Esq.; Relevancy of evidence, a reply to Dr. Wharton, by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Q. C.; Inter-State revision and codification, by P. N. Bowman, Esq.; The taxation of money, by Charles A. Choate, Esq. The book notices display the customary discrimination and ability, the notes are interesting, and the digest of decisions published in the law journals will, as usual, be of great practical value to the profession. A new feature of value is the list of note-worthy articles appearing in the various American law journals since July 20, 1877. This list and the digest of reported decisions make accessible to the profession all the recent decisions and the current legal literature, and we trust that they may long be continued as features of the periodical before us.

The Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association met at New York city on the 16th inst., the President, John K. Porter, appointed the following committee of arrangements for the annual meeting at Albany, November 21: Elliott T. Shepard, George M. Diven, D. P. Barnard, Marcus T. Hun and Albert Mathews. These gentlemen added the following from the several judicial districts of the State: First district, Algernon S. Sullivan; Second district, William Allen Butler; Third district, Amasa J. Parker: Fourth district, William Waite; Fifth district, Charles Mason; Sixth district, H. Prindle; Seventh district, George F. Danforth; Eighth district, F. D. Locke.

A Maori chief, Karaitiana Takamoana, was good enough, some years ago, to expound the principle of bankruptcy. Said he, "I go to a storekeeper and I buy five pounds' worth things and don't pay. Some time after I go to a judge and say, 'I owe this man five pounds and only got one.' Then he says to me, 'You give him the pound,' and he says to the storekeeper, 'You give back a receipt for five pounds.' Then the judge says to me, All right; now you go and do it again.'

The Chicago Legal News of the 6th inst. says: "On Thursday of this week Mrs. J. Ellen Foster, of Clinton, appeared in the Supreme Court of Iowa and argued a liquor suit on appeal, in that tribunal. Her argument was listened to by a large number of the members of the bar and other citizens. The District Court adjourned for the special purpose of allowing the attorneys to hear her argument. It is spoken highly of; she is an able and eloquent speaker. Ten years ago there was not a Supreme Court in the United States where a woman's voice could be heard; to-day there are twelve. In ten years more the woman lawyer will stand upon an equality with the man in every court in the land." There are twelve States where women have equal privileges with men in respect to practicing at the bar, but we have yet to hear of a single prominent lawyer among those who have availed themselves of their privileges. In fact, very few women care to follow the profession. As advocates in

their own cases they sometimes do remarkably well, witness Myra Clark Gaines and Anne Besant, but they do not display equal ability in dealing with the affairs of others.

In the year 1683, as Jeffreys was making his northern circuit, he came to Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Here he was informed that some twenty young men of the town had formed themselves into a society, and met weekly for prayer and religious conversation. Jeffreys at once saw in these youths so many rebels and fanatics, and he ordered them to be apprehended. The young men were brought before his tribunal. A book of rules which they had drawn out for the regulation of their society was also produced, and was held by the judge as sufficient proof that they were a club of plotters. Fixing his contemptuous glance on one of them, whose looks and dress were somewhat meaner than the others, and judging him the most illiterate, he resolved to expose his ignorance, and hold him up as a fair His name was Thomas Verner. sample of the rest. "Can you read, sirrah?" said the judge. "Yes, my lord," answered Mr. Verner. "Reach him the book," said Jeffreys. The clerk of the court put his Latin Testament into the hand of the prisoner. The young lighted upon. It was Matt. vii. 1, 2: man opened the book, and read the first verse his eye Ne Judicate, ne judicemini," etc. "Construe it, sirrah," roared the judge. The prisoner did so: "Judge not, that ye be not judged; for with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged." Even Jeffreys changed countenance, and sat a few minutes in a muse; but instantly recovering himself, he sent the young men to prison, where they lay a year, and would without doubt have been brought to the scaffold, had not the death of the king, which occurred in the meantime, led to their release.From the "History of Protestantism," by the Rev. Dr. Wylie.

A correspondent sends us the following card. The names are not as in the original: "Law Practice. John Doe, Attorney and Counsellor at Law, St. Paul, Minn., Sept. 29, 1877. "All letters on business may be addressed to him, Public Law Library, where he will be making out law briefs from 9 a. m. to 5 p. m. Dinner from 12 m. to 2 p. m. excepted. Will furnish briefs of law, or facts where dilligent investigation is necessary, and copy and send any law from any book in public library to lawyers outside of St. Paul, all for $1.00 per hour. After briefs of either law or fact are made out satisfactorily, determining the merits of any case, in any original case, he will where desired, associate with him any first-class lawyer in cases that cannot be settled without trial, and then settle upon future fees. I have been in the law practice about one-third of a century in South Bend, Ind., and St. Louis, Mo., and done Auerbach, Finch & Schaffer's business three years throughout this State, settling every suit brought without the necessity of a trial in a single case. All legal opinions warranted; and where the warranty does not hold good all fees to be returned on notice, and demand. Terms cash, and stamps for return letters must be sent. All warrantys predicable of warranted facts, or his own investigation of them. On notification by postal card, he will call at any office on legal business.

The principle of warranty is in practice, but that of a law-writer. He assumes that every statement of his book is law, is the law of reason, if it is not, he has fallen below an authoritative standard. For many years I have seen no occasion for changing opinions, for either courts or lawyers. The love of justice, unwearying investigation, and illumination of mind from God, are all necessary for the mastering of cases."

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, OCTOBER 27, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association will take place in this city on Tuesday, the 20th of November next, and it is hoped that a large number of the profession will be in attendance. Very many throughout the State have been chosen members and have signified their acceptance of the duties and obligations of membership. The next thing in order is the payment of dues, for this organization possesses the common infirmity of all the creations of civilized men, of needing funds to sustain it. It is to be hoped that the profession, who have been prompt to aid, by word and deed, in the formation of the association will be equally prompt in contributing to its sustenance the sum asked for by the treasurer. The amount which is paid will be more than returned to every contributor through the influence of the association. There is no member of the profession in this State so well situated as to business and position, that this society cannot materially aid him, and there is no one so poorly circumstanced as to be out of the reach of its helping hand. Some few individuals may feel that they cannot afford to contribute the sum asked from them. The truth is that they cannot afford to do otherwise if their aid is necessary to sustain the association. Many, no doubt, are anxious that the association prosper, as they recognize its probable beneficial influence upon the bar in a social and business way, but they think that enough will take an interest in it to keep it up, and each individual considers that his support and aid is of very little importance. To these we would say that the influence exerted by the organization will be just in proportion to the support that it receives from the profession. If the active membership is large, the bar will be advanced to its ancient position and more among the people. If few adhere to it, it will exert but a feeble power, and will probably do as much harm as good. We trust, therefore, that every individual who has been invited to enroll himself among the members of the association will do so and will do all that he may to promote its welfare, for by so doing he will advance the interests of our common profession and those of every individual

connected with it.

business men of the country and also of most of the legal profession. The existing law, and it is not practicable to have a better one, is unsatisfactory in several particulars. First. It does not benefit the creditor, because it exhausts, by legal charges, the estate of the insolvent and leaves little or noth

ing to apply upon his debts. Second. It does not benefit the honest debtor, because it affords him relief only through a tedious, vexatious and expensive process, which is needless for the protection of adverse interests and advantageous only to the officials who exact fees therefor. Third. It does not benefit the legal profession as a whole, inasmuch as it operates to destroy an important branch of business, that of collecting accounts, and embarrasses proceedings in State courts and under State laws. Fourth. It is injurious to the merchants, as it interferes with arrangements between debtor and creditor, designed to save all parties from loss by giving to a few dissatisfied or dishonest persons a right to overturn any agreement made. Fifth. It is not uniform in its operation, but gives to the debtor in one State a larger share of his property than is awarded to the debtor in another. In short, it is at present of no advantage whatever, except to those Federal officials who are designated to carry out its provisions and to a small coterie of attorneys who make a specialty of bankruptcy practice. It is said, by those who have made a study of the matter, that the bankrupt law has played no small part in producing and perpetuating the present depression in business. Whether this be so or not, the sentiment of the business community is in favor of its repeal, and we trust that the bill now before the Senate may soon become law, despite the powerful influence of an interested few who wish the present state of things to continue.

The Bar of Iowa held a meeting at Des Moines, in that State, on the 20th inst., to consider the charges against Judge Dillon, made by Cate, who is said to have inspired the attacks in the Nation upon that judge. A committee, which had thoroughly investigated the whole matter, made a report setting forth the facts which were established and which showed that the charges were without foundation. This conclusion was stated by the committee, and a resolution, declaring that the Iowa Bar wholly exonerated Judge Dillon from any charge of lack of official or judicial integrity, was unanimously adopted. This action on the part of the Iowa Bar would seem unnecessary but for the

to blacken his reputation. Not only have they published the charges of wrong-doing in the newspaper mentioned, but they have scattered copies of these charges throughout the whole region where the judge holds court, and have brought them to

THE CONTRACTS OF INCOMPETENTS.

IT is

T is a settled principle of law that the contracts of lunatics and insane persons are invalid, but the application of this principle to particular facts. has given rise to a number of interesting cases which it may be worth our while briefly to examine.

The most recent case that has come to our notice is that of Lancaster County Bank v. Moore, 78 Penn. St. 407; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 24, where defendant, desiring to borrow money, gave S. his note, which S. procured to be discounted at plaintiff's bank, and the money deposited to defendant's order. Afterward a petition de lunatico inquirendo was presented against defendant, and he was found to be a lunatic, and to have been a lunatic from a time anterior to the making of the note. The plaintiff had no notice of defendant's lunacy. The court held that defendant's insanity was not a defense to an action on the note. The court, after citing Beals v. See, 10 Barr. 56, wherein it was held that an executed contract by a merchant for the purchase of goods could not be avoided by proof of insanity at the time of the purchase, unless a fraud was committed on him by the vendor, or he had knowledge of his condition, continued as follows: "The broad principle decided in Beals v. See was, that the insanity, when established, was not, under the circumstances, a defense. The soundness of this rule is too apparent to need any extended vindication. Insanity is one of the most mysterious diseases to which humanity is subject. It assumes such varied forms and produces such opposite effects as frequently to baffle the ripest professional skill and the keenest observation. In some instances it affects the mind only in its relation to or connection with a particular subject, leaving it sound and rational upon all other subjects. Many insane persons drive as thrifty a bargain as the shrewdest business man, without betraying in manner or conversation the faintest trace of mental derangement. It would be an unreasonable and unjust rule that such persons should be allowed to obtain the property of innocent parties, and retain both the property and its price. Here the bank in good faith loaned the defendant the money on his note; the contract was executed so far as the consideration is concerned, and it would be alike derogatory to sound law and good morals that he should be allowed to retain it to swell the corpus of his estate. It will be seen that the fact that the bank had no notice of the defendant's insanity is an important element in the case. The proceedings in lunacy were not commenced until after the note was discounted, and the plaintiffs were not even affected with constructive notice. We limit our decision in this case to its own facts, and do not decide the case of a contract made during proceedings in lunacy or after inquisition found.”

In Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378, the Com

mission of Appeals held that a deed executed by one non compos mentis - which the court in that case defined to mean "totally and positively incompetent"— is absolutely void; and that, where a defendant in an action to recover the possession of real property claims under such a deed, the fact of the incapacity of the grantor may be shown by plaintiff to defeat such claim, although no fraud is alleged and such incapacity had not been legally or judicially determined at the time of or prior to the execution of the deed. The court further held that an inquisition under a writ de lunatico inquirendo, stating that at the time of the execution of a deed the grantor was non compos mentis, is presumptive but not conclusive evidence of the grantor's incapacity in an action wherein a party claims under the deed.

In Banker v. Banker, 63 N. Y. 409, which was an action by the heir and next of kin of John Banker, deceased, to annul a marriage between the deceased and the defendant on the ground that the deceased was non compos mentis at the time of the marriage ceremony, it appeared that two days after the marriage an inquisition was found declaring that the said John Banker was at the time of unsound mind, and that he had been so for six months prior thereto. The court held, following Van Deusen v. Sweet, supra, that the inquisition was only presumptive evidence of incapacity, and that the fact that proceedings under a writ de lunatico inquirendo were pending at the time of the marriage, and that the defendant had knowledge of the fact, did not affect the question. In that case the court below found as a fact that John Banker was of sound mind when the marriage took place. In L'Amoreux v. Crosby, 2 Paige, 422, the Chancellor stated very clearly and accurately the principles adjudicated in this State as to the effect of an inquisition of lunacy. Among other things he said: "As to acts done by a lunatic or drunkard, before the issuing of the commission, and which are overreached by the retrospective finding of the jury, the inquisition is only presumptive, but not conclusive, evidence of incapacity. But all gifts of the goods and chattels of the idiot, lunatic or drunkard, and all bonds or other contracts made by him after the actual finding of the inquisition declaring his incompetency, and until he is permitted to assume the control of his property by the court, are utterly void." See, also, Osterhout v. Shoemaker, 3 Hill, 516; Hart v. Durmer, 6 Wend. 497; Hoyt v. Adee, 3 Lans. 173; Goodell v. Harrington, 3 T. & C. 345; Demelt v. Leonard, 19 How. 141. The rule is stated to be that inquisitions are admissible in evidence, but that they are not conclusive except against the parties immediately concerned and their privies. Hoyt v. Adee, 3 Lans. 173; Goodell v. Harrington, 3 T. & C. 345.

After one has by inquisition been found an habitual drunkard, he cannot, until it is vacated or a