even if there was a defect in this respect. The question of subscribing for the stock and issuing the bonds for a road from the mouth of Kansas river to the south boundary of the State was submitted to the electors of Johnson county. Notice was given for the time required by the statute, and a full and fair vote was taken, so far as we are informed. The approval of the electors by their vote, at a meeting called for that purpose, is the object of the statute. Defects, irregularities, or informalities, which do not affect the result of the vote, do not affect its validity. The defect we are considering (if it is a defect) does not go to the question of jurisdiction, and does not impair the validity of the bonds.

The case of Lewis v. Commissioners of Bourbon Co., 12 Kan. 186, is cited on this point. In that case four questions were passed upon by the Supreme Court of Kansas. First. Was the presentation of a petition, signed by one-fourth of the qualified voters, a condition precedent to the valid action of the commissioners? Second. Did the failure to name the corporation in the propositions submitted to the electors avoid the whole proceedings? Third. A majority of the votes of the electors having been cast against the proposition to issue bonds, was the county board authorized to issue them? Fourth. Did the subsequent submission, and the proceedings thereon, confer the authority to issue the bonds?

The court held that the first objection was cured by the act of 1868. The second and the third objections were held to be fatal, and that the case was not relieved by the proceedings referred to in the fourth objection.

The court did in its language hold that the objection raised in the present case, to wit, that the name of the corporation was not inserted in the proposition for the popular vote, was fatal. Had this been the only or an indispensable part of the decision we should have been called upon to inquire whether the decision was one of that class of State decisions upon its own statute that was binding upon us. The other question, however, existing and decided in the Bourbon county case, was in its nature so exclusive, and so controlling, that any thing said, or professed to be decided beyond it, does not require much consideration. The court held that in the exercise of its general jurisdiction it had the power to inquire into the number of votes actually cast for and against the proposed issue of bonds, and upon making such inquiry it found and determined that, in fact, a majority of the votes cast were against the proposition. Upon this point all the decisions of this court, and, so far as we know of, all other courts, concur. If a majority of the electors cast their votes against the proposition to issue bonds, the entire foundation of the proceedings is gone. There is an absolute want of jurisdiction to proceed farther in the matter, and an attempt to do so is void, as are all proceedings or issues based upon it. With this elemental failure existing in the Bourbon county case, other and farther decisions tending to the same result are not to be regarded as authority.

The Gulf Railroad v. Com'rs of Miami County, 12 Kan. 234, is based upon the Bourbon case above referred to, and follows it without examination or discussion. It does not refer to the curative act of February 25, 1868, which was held in the Bourbon county case not to be applicable to an election where a majority of votes was cast against the proposition, but which act it was held did relieve against the defect of

the absence of the preliminary petition required by the statute. The court said that the act was intended to sustain and not to defeat the will of the people. This principle would have justified its application in relief of the defect before it, if there was such defect, and its consideration might well have altered the result. Both of these decisions were made after the bonds in this suit had been issued and the interest upon them regularly paid for a considerable time. The road had been built as promised, the county of Johnson and its people enjoyed the anticipated benefits, and we are of the opinion that we are not bound to follow a decision which releases them from all the corresponding obligations. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 1865; Bulls v. Muscatine, 9 id. 571, 1871; Supervisors v. Olcott, 16 id. 678, 1872.

Another question was also involved. It is a part of the case that on the 1st day of January, 1869, the railroad company executed to Nathaniel Thayer, F. W. Palfrey and George W. Weld, the plaintiffs in this suit, a deed of trust conveying a large quantity of lands, and transferring, among other things, its subscriptions from towns and counties, including that now in suit, to secure the payment of five millions of dollars of its bonds to be issued by the said company, as therein particularly described; that before the coupons now sued upon had become payable, the railroad company had issued five millions of its negotiable bonds, which are now outstanding and unpaid to the full amount thereof. The court says: The question then arises whether notice to one of the trustees in this deed of trust is notice to the holders of the mortgage bonds in such manner that in a suit by the trustees to enforce payment of the town bonds the character of a bona fide holder without notice is lost. In Curtis and others v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 194, the court say: "If Graham, one of the trustees, was chargeable, as director of the company, with knowledge that there had been no previous resolution, notice to him was not notice to his cestui que trust. He did not stand to them in the relation of an agent. He was selected and appointed as a trustee by the company, not by the cestui que trust. His powers and duties were prescribed by the company, not by the bondholders. There were at the time of the execution of the trust deeds no bondholders, no cestui que trust. It is a necessary attribute of an agency that it should be created by the principal. * * In this case, as the relation of principal and agent did not exist between the bondholders and Graham, notice to him, or knowledge by him, that there was no previous resolution was not constructive notice to the bondholders."

*

And again, on the page following, it is said: "The trustees are not to be regarded as the agents of the purchasers of the bonds and mortgages assigned to them. No consideration proceeds from them. They were mere assignees of those securities, coupled with no interest, in trust to hold them as security for the payment of all the mortgage bonds that should thereafter be sold or negotiated by the company. * * * Whoever purchased the mortgage bonds became purchasers of the bonds and mortgages so assigned as security for their payment, or of an equitable right to hold them as such security."

We think this is sound doctrine, and that it establishes the proposition that notice to Thayer did not operate to destroy the bona fide holding of the bondholders under the deed of trust in which he was named as one of the trustees.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Bailment: right of pledgee to use animal pledged.-A person to whom a horse is pledged in security of a debt may use the horse but he must pay for the value of its services.(citing American authorities). Sheriff Court, Renfrewshire, Scotland. Kirkwood v. Brown (Scot. L. Mag.).

Cloud on title: deed from wife to husband.-Where the wife, in 1866, made a deed of her real estate directly to her husband, held, that the same was absolutely void at law, and, therefore, it will not be enforced in equity. Where a deed is made by a wife directly to her husband, but there is nothing upon its face to show the relation between them, such a deed, though void, is a cloud upon title, as evidence aliunde is necessary to establish its invalidity. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Brooks v. Kearns (Chic. L. News).

Eminent domain: condemnation of land for railroad uses: payment a condition precedent: injunction: waiver.-Where land has been condemned for railroad purposes, commissioners appointed, damages assessed, etc., the right of the land-owner to payment for his property as a constitutional condition precedent to the transfer of the title to the land taken, exists in all its original vigor. Where the corporation is insolvent and the damages are not paid, it is the right and duty of the trial court to issue an injunction restraining the corporation from operating its cars over the land until the owner shall have been paid the assessed damages, and there is no vested right in the corporation, and no doctrine of public policy or convenience which can absolve a court of equity from this duty. Courts of equity, in such cases, will indulge in no presumption that the land owner has waived or postponed his right to insist on payment of the damages, and will insist on, at least, as conclusive evidence of alleged waiver as is required in cases of vendor's lien, the condemnation and seizure of the land being a statutory proceeding in invitum. Sup. Ct., Missouri, April, 1877. Evans v. Missouri, I. & N. R. R. Co. (Cent. L. J.).

Fraud: when sale fraudulent: knowledge of vendee.Where goods were sold and the vendor at the time was indebted, and his creditors attached the property on the ground of a fraudulent sale to defeat the vendor's creditors, held, it is sufficient if the purchaser of the goods knew of the fraudulent intent of the seller or had notice of such facts as would have put a man of ordinary prudence upon inquiry, which, being made with ordinary diligence, would have discovered the fraudulent purpose or intent of the seller. Sup. Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. Jones v. Hetherington.

Judgment: holder of subsequent lien on land affected by, may show amount due on.- A judgment was entered on a bond in the penal sum of $8,000, conditioned for the payment of "all moneys borrowed from the said, The Ashland Banking Company, or which may from time to time be borrowed from the same, lawful money as aforesaid, at or upon the days and times when the same shall fall due". Held, that the holder of a subsequent mortgage should be allowed to show the real amount due, for which the bond entered up was security. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, May 7, 1877. Price's Appeal.

Mesne profits: evidence: estoppel.-A defendant in an action of mesne profits, against whom judgment in the ejectment has been entered, is not precluded

from proving that he was not actually in possession at the service of the writ of ejectment, in order to relieve himself from liability for mesne profits. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, May 7, 1877. Miller v. Henry.

Negotiable instrument, what is not: note including attorney's fee for suit.-Defendants, the maker and payee of an instrument in which the maker waived "any and all exceptions under and by virtue of any execution, exemption, homestead or stay laws of the State of Missouri, or that of any other State," and in which he promised also "to pay a reasonable attorney's fee for the bringing of suit in collection of this note, if suit thereon be brought or collection thereof be enforced after the same shall become due," were sued as maker and indorser, respectively. Held, (1) affirming Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33, that it was not a negotiable promissory note; (2) that the defendants were not jointly liable; (3) that the assignor could only be held liable in an action against him upon his implied undertaking to pay after due diligence used by the assignee in the institution and prosecution of suit against the maker for the recovery of the money due, or in the event of insolvency or non-residence of the maker, so that suit would be unavailing or could not be instituted. Sup. Ct., Missouri, April, 1877. Samstag v. Conley (Cent. L. J.).

Prescription: line fence.- The plaintiff is the owner in fee of certain lands, and he has held open, actual, continued and uninterrupted possession of the lands to a certain fence beeween himself and the defendant (which fence was not on the section line between them) for more than twenty years next preceding the commencement of this suit, and during this time a fixed and permanent division fence has been kept up and continued unchanged there. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the ownership and possession of the said land up to the fence, in virtue of his adverse possession, wherever the original line may have been between them. Sup. Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. Meyer v. Weigman.

Promissory note: accommodation indorser: where fraud alleged, holder of accommodation paper taken as collateral security not a purchaser for value.-The holder of accommodation paper, pledged to him as collateral security for an antecedent debt, is not a purchaser for value, and a note in his hands may be impeached for fraud in its making and procurement. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania, Feb. 6, 1877. Cummings v. Boyd (W. N. Cas.).

Removal of cause: jurisdiction. The defendant filed its application and bond for the removal of the cause from the State to the Federal court. After approving the bond, the State court permitted the plaintiff to enter a nonsuit. Held, that after the filing of the proper application and bond the State court could proceed no further in the cause, and that any attempt in that direction was coram non judice; and that, consequently, the nonsuit was improperly granted. Sup. Ct., Missouri, April, 1877. Berry v. Chic., R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (Cent. L. J.).

Rent: crops reserved in a lease: when rent due: tenant's ownership in crop undivided.—The share of the crops reserved by the lease to the land-owner is to be regarded as rent. The owner of the land acquired no property in the part of the crop reserved for rent until it was set apart to him by the ten

ants; the ownership of the tenants continued till that time. The rent in such case is not paid till the part of the crop is set apart by the tenant for the landlord, and is not payable until this can be done. Sup. Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. Townsend v. Isenberger.

Railroad aid bonds: Illinois statute: bonds void in hands of innocent holders for value. The act of March 7, 1867, authorizing certain towns and cities to appropriate money in aid of railroads, confers no authority on such towns and cities to issue bonds or borrow money with which to pay such donations. Nor does the subsequent act of February 26, 1869, confer such authority. The act of March 24, 1869, has a prospective operation, and cannot be insisted upon as legalizing bonds already issued under the previous acts mentioned. Such donations or appropriations were to be paid by a tax which it was the duty of the corporate authorities to levy and collect. Where our mode of payment of municipal indebtedness is fixed by statute, by implication, it excludes all others. Held, also, that the bonds in question, having been issued without authority of law, are void in whosoever hands they may be. Sup. Ct., Illinois, June 22, 1877. Town of Middleport v. Treasurer of Iroquois County (Chic. L. News).

Slander: words imputing crime: how understood: evidence: malice: rumor: damages: mental anxiety.Where slanderous words, imputing a crime, are spoken, they are to be considered in an actionable sense, unless the evidence tends to show that, from the circumstances of the speaking, or from facts known to the hearer, they were not calculated to impress him with the fact that a crime was charged. Proof of the speaking of slanderous words at times not charged in the petition is admissible for the purpose of showing malice. In such action it is not competent for plaintiff to prove that because of the speaking of the slanderous words there was a rumor in the neighborhood in reference to the charge. It is not competent in an action of slander to prove that the plaintiff has been troubled, and suffered mental anxiety, because of the speaking of the words. Sup. Ct., Iowa, April, 1877. Prime v. Eastwood.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

BOUNDARIES.

Fixed monuments control courses: when boundary is monument. The rule is well settled that a conveyance is to be construed in reference to its visible location calls as marked or appearing upon the land in preference to quantity, course or distance, and any particular may be rejected if inconsistent with other parts of the description and sufficient remains to locate the land intended to be conveyed. A boundary line referred to in a deed as the "Johnson" boundary, held to be in the nature of a monument, and parol evidence competent to show where this boundary was. Judgment below affirmed. Robinson v. Kime. Opiuion by Andrews, J.

[Decided June 12, 1877.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Laws 1860, chap. 501, forbidding dramatic representations in New York city on Sunday, valid.-The title to Laws of 1860, chapter 501, is "An act to preserve the public peace and order on the first day of the

week, commonly called Sunday." The subject of which it treats is a single one, and that is the prevention of public dramatic entertainments in the city of New York on Sunday. Held, that the act is not obnoxious to the requirement of the constitution, article 3, section 16, that "no * * * local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Judgment below affirmed. Neuendorf v. Duryea. Opinion by Folger, J. Church, C. J., dissented.

Of pecuniary condition, when inadmissible.-In an action involving a loan, evidence was offered showing that at various times, some three years previous to the time of making the alleged loan, plaintiff had made declarations that he was without means of his own amounting to as much as the loan. It was shown, however, that he did at the time the loan was claimed to have been made have money enough in his possession to make it. Held, reversing the decision of the court below, that a rejection of the evidence was proper. Nicholson v. Waful. Opinion by Folger, J. [Decided June 19, 1877. Reported below, 6 Hun, 655.]

MORTGAGE.

1. Right of holder to contract with reference to.-The holder of a bond and a mortgage on real estate may make an executory agreement with the maker thereof and a third person for an extension of the time of payment, for a decrease of the sum to be paid, and for a different mode of payment, but it must be a lawful agreement, founded upon a new and good consideration. When such agreement is made it takes the place of the bond and mortgage, or is incorporated with them pro tanto. Judgment below affirmed. Clapp v. Hawley. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. When mortgage not enforceable.-Where time was not of the essence of a contract under which the bond and mortgage was given, and the contract has been in part performed by the defendant and plaintiff has received his portion of the avails of such part performance, and plaintiff has not insisted upon performance, and there has not been a specified time agreed upon or named by either party at or before which there should be a full performance or an omission to make it a default; held, that neither the bond nor mortgage could be enforced. Ib. [Decided May 22, 1877.]

TRIAL. When case sustained by uncontradicted evidence must be submitted to jury.-The general rule is that where a disinterested witness, who is in no way discredited, testifies to a fact within his own knowledge, which is not of itself improbable or in conflict with other evidence, the witness, is to be believed and the fact is to be taken as legally established, so that it cannot be disregarded by court or jury. But in this case, which was an action by a real estate broker for money alleged to be due upon a contract made by him with defendant's testator to pay him for services in procuring the sale of real estate, the only witness was plaintiff's son, who was a clerk in his office, and whose compensation was in part dependent upon the receipt by his father of commissions for the sale of property, and this witness testified to a single conversation in which the testator agreed to pay plaintiff more than twice the usual fee for procuring the sale of the property. Held, that the case should be submitted to the jury. Judgment below reversed. Kavanagh v. Wilson, executor. Opinion by Earl, J.

[Decided June 12, 1877.]

USURY.

1. Contract fair on face does not raise presumption of: burden of proof.-Where a commission merchant contracted with a dealer in produce for the loan or advance to such dealer of money at the legal rate of interest to enable the dealer to purchase or carry his merchandise, and also for an agreed commission to undertake the care, management and sale of the commodity, such contract being in a proper and usual form, held, affirming judgment below, that such contract did not of itself establish usury, and it was upon the party seeking to impeach it upon that ground to prove that it was usurious. Matthews v. Coe. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. Practice: general objection to report of referee.— Where there is no evidence to support the finding of a referee, an exception to the report presents a question of law reviewable on appeal. Ib. [Decided June 22, 1877.]

WASTE.

Felling of timber by tenant: where right of action accrues. The felling of timber trees by a tenant for the purpose of sale to the injury of the reversioner is waste, and an action lies by the reversioner immediately to recover the damages to the freehold, and it

is no defense to the action that the tenant acted in good faith or under a claim of right, or that he was in possession, claiming title in fee to the land upon which the waste was committed. The reversioner is not debarred from his remedy for waste because the proceeding may involve the determination of a disputed title. Judgment below affirmed. Robinson v. Kime. Opinion by Andrews, J. [Decided June 12, 1877.]

in which the purchase price is to be paid in installments which are called payments of rent. The court say: It was decided by this court, in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; 7 id. 139, that the liability of property to be sold under legal process, issuing from the courts of the State where it is situated, must be determined by the law there, rather than that of the jurisdiction where the owner lives. These decisions rest on the ground that every State has the right to regulate the transfer of property within its limits, and that whoever sends property to it impliedly submits to the regulations concerning its transfer in force there, although a different rule of transfer prevails in the jurisdiction where he resides. He has no absolute right to have the transfer of property, lawful in that jurisdiction, respected in the courts of the State where it is located, and it is only on a principle of comity that it is ever allowed. But this principle yields when the laws and policy of the latter conflict with the former.

The policy of the law in Illinois will not permit the owner of personal property to sell it, either absolutely or conditionally, and still continue in possession of it. As possession is one of the strongest evidences of title to this class of property, it is not allowable to separate the possession from the title except in the manner pointed out by statute. To suffer real ownership to be in one person and the ostensible ownership in another, without notice to the world, the courts of Illinois say, give a false credit to the latter, and in this way works an injury to third persons. Accordingly, the real owner of personal property creating an interest in another, to whom it is delivered, if desirous of preserving a lien on it, must comply with the requirements of the chattel-mortgage act. R. S. Illinois, 1874, chap. 95, p. 711-12. This act requires that the instrument of conveyance, if it have the effect to preserve a mortgage, or a lien on the property, it must be recorded, whether the party to it be a resident or nonresident of the State. If this be not done there is no validity to the instrument, so far as third persons are concerned.

Secret liens, which treat the vendor of personal property who has sold it and delivered possession of it to the purchaser, as the owner until the payment of the purchase-money, cannot be maintained in Illinois. They are held to be constructively fraudulent as to creditors, and the property, so far as their rights are concerned, is considered as belonging to the purchaser holding the possession. McCormick v. Hadden, 37 Ill. 370; Ketchum v. Watson, 24 id. 591. Nor is the transaction changed by the agreement assuming the form of a lease. Courts will always look to the purpose to be attained by the contract rather than the name given to it by the parties, in order to determine its real character. If that purpose be to give the vendor a lien on the property until payment in full of the purchase-money, it is liable to be defeated by creditors of the purchaser who is in possession of it. This was held in Murch v. Wright, 46 Ill. 488. In that case the purchaser took from the seller a piano at the price of $700. He paid $50 down, which was called rent for the first month, and was to pay $50 each month as rent until the whole amount was paid, when he was to own the piano. The court say, "that it was a mere subterfuge to call this transaction a lease," and held that it was a conditional sale, with the right of rescission on the part of the vendor, in case the purchaser should fail in payment of his installments—a contract legal

and valid as between the parties, but made with the risk on the part of the vendor of losing his lien, in case the property should be levied upon by the creditors of the purchaser while in possession of the latter. The case at bar is like this case in all essential particulars.

The engine Smyser is the only subject of controversy in this suit, and that was sold on condition that each and all of the installments should be regularly paid, with a right of rescission on the part of the vendor in case of default in any of the specified payments.

It is true the instrument of conveyance purports to be a lease and the sums stipulated to be paid are for rent, but this form was used to cover the real transaction, as much so as was the rent of the piano in Murch v. Wright, supra. There the price of the piano was to be paid for in thirteen months, and here the value of the engine, $12,093.96, was to be paid in one year. It was evidently not the intention of the parties that this sum should be paid as rent for the use of the engine for one year. If so, why agree to sell and convey the full title on the payment of the last installment? In both cases the price of the property was agreed upon, to be paid for in short installments, and no words employed by the parties can have the effect of changing the true nature of the contracts. In the case at bar the agreement contemplated that the engine should be removed to the State of Illinois and used by Conant & Co. in the prosecution of their business as contractors of a railroad. It was accordingly taken there and put to the use for which it was purchased, but while in the possession of Conant & Co., who exercised complete ownership over it, it was seized and sold, in the local courts of Illinois, as their property. These proceedings were valid in the jurisdiction where they took place, and must be respected by the Federal tribunals.

The Rhode Island Locomotive Works took the risk of losing their lien in case the property should be levied on by the creditors of Conant & Co. while in the possession of the latter, and they cannot complain, as the laws of Illinois pointed out a way to them to preserve and perfect it.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO.*

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

When question of fact for jury: erroneous charge.In an action for an injury occasioned by negligence, when the case is such as necessarily devolves carefulness on the plaintiff, and the proof given by him discloses a case which fairly puts in question the due exercise of care on his part, the jury, in the determination of the question of contributory negligence, should be left free to consider all the evidence in the case. charge of the court in such case, so given to the jury that they may reasonably regard it as confining them, upon the question of contributory negligence, to the evidence given only on the part of the defendant, is misleading, and, therefore, erroneous. Weaver v. Gary.

LIS PENDENS.

A

Benefit of, lost by laches.--The benefit of the rule relating to lis pendens may be lost by such long-con

From advance sheets of 28 Ohio State Reports.

tinued inaction as amounts to gross negligence in the party prosecuting, when such inaction is to the prejudice of innocent persons. A mortgage was executed in 1837, upon which bill of foreclosure was filed in 1840, decree taken and order for sale issued in 1842. Save continuances, no further action was had in the case until 1868. In the meantime, the mortgagor, who had remained in open and notorious possession, had sold portions of the premises to innocent purchasers, without actual notice of the pending suit. Such purchasers, and those under whom they claimed, had remained in actual possession more than twentyone years, when the plaintiff in the foreclosure suit, in 1869, caused to be issued another order of sale. Held, that the failure to take any action in the cause from 1842 to 1868, unexplained, was such negligence as prevented an enforcement of the decree against actual purchasers, without actual notice. Fox v. Reeder.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Who entitled to recover for death from, under statute : next of kin: husband and wife. In an action by the personal representative under the statute of 1851 (S. & C. 1139, 1140), to recover damages for causing by wrongful act and neglect the death of a woman, who died intestate, leaving a husband, but no children, or their legal representatives, held, (1) the surviving husband is, within the meaning of said act, the next of kin, and as such entitled to the fruits of any judgment obtained in the action. (2) While the proceeds of a judgment recovered in an action under this statute are directed to be distributed to the beneficiaries of the judgment in the proportions provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal estates left by persons dying intestate, the money realized is not to be treated as part of the general estate of the intestate. The personal representative in whose name the action is brought is a trustee of the fund, and must distribute the proceeds of the judgment to those to whom the general personal estate would descend according to the course of the statute of descents and distribution. Steel, adm'r, v. Kurtz.

2. Amount of damages limited to compensation for actual loss.-(3) The amount of damages (within the limit of the statute) are to be ascertained by the jury from the proofs in the case, and are to be a fair and just compensation to the widow or next of kin, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting to the beneficiary from such death. (4) In such action, the jury, in assessing the damages, are limited to giving pecuniary compensation for injuries resulting to the beneficiaries in the action on account of the death of the deceased. No damages can be given on account of the bereavement, mental suffering, or as a solace on account of such death. Ib.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

Alteration of note: what is: effect of.— Changing the rate of interest in a note from six to seven per cent is a material alteration. Such alteration, when made by the principal with the consent of the holder and owner, but without the consent of the surety, discharges the surety, though such alteration was made without fraudulent intent. Harsh v. Klepper.

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND, OCTOBER TERM, 1876.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

1. Upon after-acquired property: title of mortgagee. -At law in Rhode Island a mortgage of personal