1823. In the Matter of February last, and only applies to those who "at or before the passing of the act," had incurred penalties of STEAVENSON. or disabilities. These persons being elected on the 29th of September, had not incurred any penalty or disability when the indemnity act passed, and cannot therefore be protected by it. Campbell shewed cause in the first instance. The object of the indemnity act was to enlarge the time before allowed for receiving the sacrament, taking the oath, &c. required of persons accepting certain offices and employments. The preamble of the statute certainly appears to be limited to such persons as had made default before the act passed, but is capable of receiving a larger construction. The title is material, to shew a different intention in the legislature: that is, "An act to indemnify such persons in the United Kingdom as have omitted to qualify themselves for offices and employments, and for extending the time limited for those purposes respectively." The enacting part too extends to all those who, at or before the passing of the act, have or shall have omitted, &c. That certainly is future as well as past, and must extend to all that are in default before the 25th of March, 1824. or assurance, and received the sacrament of the Lord's supper, and made and subscribed the said declarations, and taken and subscribed the said oath according to the directions of the said acts and every or any of them; and that the qualification of such person or persons qualifying themselves in manner and within the time appointed by this act, shall be to all intents and purposes as effectual as if such person or persons had respectively taken the said oaths and assurance, and received the sacrament, and made and subscribed the said declaration, and taken and subscribed the said oath within the time and in the manner appointed by the several acts before mentioned." Per 1823. In the Matter Per Curiam. There may perhaps be some obscurity in the words of this statute, but there is none in its title. It was manifestly the intention of the legislature to ex- of STEAVENSON. tend the time for taking the oaths and performing the other acts required of persons filling certain offices; and this being a remedial statute, we should so construe it as to give full effect to that intention. Rule refused. BALDEY and Another against PARKER. ASSUMPSIT for goods sold and delivered. Thursday, Plea, 4. went to the general issue. At the trial before Abbott C. J. at shop of B. and Co., linendra pers, and con purchase of the London sittings after Trnity term 1822, the fol- tracted for the lowing appeared to be the facts of the case. The plain- various articles, tiffs are linendrapers, and the defendant came to their each of which shop and bargained for various articles. A separate price was agreed upon for each, and no one article was of the value of 101. Some were measured in his presence, some he marked with a pencil, others he assisted in cutting from a larger bulk. He then desired an ac was under the value of 10, amounted to 70%. A separate price for each article was agreed upon; some 4. but the whole marked with a pencil, others were measured count of the whole to be sent to his house, and went in his presence, and others he assisted to cut 701. from larger away. A bill of parcels was accordingly made out and bulks. He then desired that an account was of the whole might be sent and to his house, the and went away. A bill of parcels was accordingly sent, together with the goods, when A. refused to accept them: Held, first, that this was all one contract, and therefore within 29 Car. 2. c. 3. s. 17. Secondly, that there was no delivery and acceptance of any of the goods so as to take the case out of the operation of that section. 1823. BALDEY against PARKER. goods, (Baldey) as he could bargain with him respecting the discount, and said that he ought to be allowed 201. per cent. The goods were afterwards sent to the defendant's house, and he refused to accept them. The Lord Chief Justice thought that this was a contract for goods of more than the value of 10l. within the meaning of the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds, and not within any of the exceptions there mentioned, and directed a nonsuit; but gave the plaintiffs leave to move to enter a verdict in their favour for 70l. A rule having accordingly been obtained for that purpose, It is quite Scarlett and E. Lawes now shewed cause. clear that this was an entire contract for the whole of the goods. Suppose after the bargain for them all was made, the plaintiffs had refused to let the defendant have some one particular article, they could not have compelled him to take the residue; or if one of the articles when sent home differed from that bargained for, the purchaser might have rejected the whole, for no jury would ever have found that there were separate contracts, and have compelled him to take that part which corresponded with the order. Then as to the supposed acceptance, the plaintiffs always retained their lien for the price; the defendant had no right to take away the goods without paying for them, nor could he have maintained trover without tendering the price. There was not then any such change of possession as contemplated by the statute. Denman and Platt, contrà. The plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict on both grounds. For there was a separate and distinct bargain for each article; and even if that were not so, the defendant accepted the goods, so as to take the case out of the statute of frauds. Whether the contracts were several or not, cannot depend upon the time when the various articles were purchased, but upon what passed at the making of the bargain. Now it was distinctly proved that a separate price was fixed upon each article, and the purchase of each was complete before the parties went on to bargain for any others. If that be not so, it will be difficult to determine what space of time must elapse between the purchase of any two articles, in order to make the contracts separate. In Emmerson v. Heelis (a), it was held that the purchaser of several lots at an auction was to be considered as making a separate contract for each lot. Had the defendant left the shop for a few minutes between the purchase of each article, that certainly would have made them separate contracts, and there does not appear to be any substantial difference between such a case and the present. Then as to the second point, there was a complete delivery and acceptance within the meaning of the statute. There was a complete change in the state of the property. The defendant assisted in measuring the articles, and in severing them from the bulk; the price of each was fixed; so that nothing remained to be done before they were to be delivered to the defendant. The change of property was therefore complete. Rugg v. Minett. (b). Some the defendant actually marked with a pencil; and in Hodgson v. Le Bret (c), that was considered as an acceptance. So also was cutting off the pegs in pipes of wine. Ander 1823. BALDEY against PARKER. (a) 2 Taunt. 58. (b) 11 East, 210. (c) 1 Campb. 253. D 4 son 1823. BALDEY against PARKER. son v. Scott. (a) The policy of the statute of frauds was, that a mere verbal agreement should not bind; but it does not apply where any act has been done to shew the approval of the contract. Chaplin v. Rogers. (b) Elmore v. Stone. (c) Searle and Others v. Keeves. (d) [Holroyd J. Hanson v. Armitage (e), and Carter v. Toussaint (ƒ), are strong authorities against you.] In the former the purchaser had not exercised any judgment on the article ordered, and in the latter the firing of the horse was the act of both parties, and not done to shew an approval of the contract. Neither does Howe v. Palmer (g) apply, for the goods were severed by the vendor alone. With respect to the vendor's right of lien, that has never been decided to be the criterion by which cases of this nature are to be judged of. Indeed lien imports that the property has passed. [Holroyd J. If the property has passed subject to a lien, is that a delivery and acceptance within the meaning of the statute ?] ABBOTT C. J. We have given our opinion upon more than one occasion, that the 29 Car. 2. c. 3. is a highly beneficial and remedial statute. We are therefore bound so to construe it as to further the object and intention of the legislature, which was the prevention of fraud. It appeared from the facts of this case, that the defendant went into the plaintiffs' shop and bargained for various articles. Some were severed from a larger bulk, and some he marked in order to satisfy himself that the same were afterwards sent home to him. The |