served. That rule expired on the 10th May. On that day, a summons for time to plead was served, returnable at three o'clock, on the 11th. Before that [time the plaintiff's attorney signed judgment. Campbell obtained a rule to set it aside, on the ground that it was signed too soon, according to the rule laid down in Tidd's Practice. "If a declaration be delivered or filed, with notice to (a) plead within the first four days of term, the defendant has all the morning of the fifth day to plead, and judgment cannot be signed for want of a plea, till the opening of the office in the afternoon of that day. But in any other part of the term, if the defendant do not plead within the four days, the plaintiff may sign judgment in the morning of the fifth day. Shepherd v. Mackreth. (b)" Patteson shewed cause, and contended, that the rule there laid down could not be correct. No reason is given why a different rule should prevail as to essoign declarations and others. The practice of the Common Pleas is clearly to allow the same time for pleading in all cases; and it is more convenient that it should be so, for different rules of practice, where there is no reason for them, can only lead to confusion. Per Curiam (after consulting the Master.) The practice in this court has for a long time continued, according to the rule given in Tidd's Practice; and although the rule in Common Pleas may be different, we think it better to abide by that which is known in this court. 1824. DUNCAN against CARLTON. Rule absolute. (a) 1 V. 470,, 8th edit. (6) K. B. E. T. 35 G.3., MS. 1824. was dismissed HARRISON against BAINBRIDGE. A bill in equity THE plaintiff in this case commenced a suit in Chancery against the defendant. His bill was disbrought an ac- missed with costs, which were taxed at 60%. 10s. 5d., with costs, and the plaintiff tion for the recovered a ver same cause, and but not paid. The plaintiff afterwards commenced an dict. The costs action at law for the same cause of action, and recovered a verdict for 150l. A rule having been obtained by Patteson to set off the sum of 607. 10s. 5d. against the judgment in that action. in equity may be set off against the judgment, subject to the lien of the attorney. Wightman shewed cause, and contended, that the costs in equity could not be set off against a verdict at law, or at all events that the plaintiff's attorney had a right of lien upon the sum for which judgment was obtained. Per Curiam. Hall v. Ody (a) is decisive, as to the right of setting off the costs in equity against the judgment in this court; but it must be subject to the attorney's lien. Rule absolute. (a) 2 B. & P. 28. 1824. BY KENNARD against HARRIS. an order of nisi prius this cause was referred to an arbitrator, and among other things it was directed that the costs of the reference and award should be paid by the defendant. The arbitrator made his award on the 13th of November 1123. The plaintiff obtained a rule nisi for setting it aside. It now appeared by the affidavit of the defendant's attorney that the costs of the reference and award had been taxed and paid to, and accepted by, the plaintiff, on the 23d January 1824, before he had moved to set aside the award. Gaselee was now heard against the rule, and E. Lawes contrà. Per Curiam. The plaintiff, after accepting the costs of the reference and award, is precluded from moving to set it aside. If no award had been made, no costs would have been due; by accepting the costs of the award he admits the award to be valid, and cannot now say that it is bad. Rule discharged. A party, after receiving the costs of referwhich by the ence and award, terms of a rule of reference were to be paid party, cannot by the other move to set aside the award. 1824. Monday, Where, in an inferior court, the damages in ATTERBOROUGH against HARDY. AN action was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant, in the King's Court of Record for the declaration the town of Nottingham, to recover the sum of 81. 175, are laid at 10. and upwards, for goods sold and delivered. The damages in the pro the defendant may remove the cess and declaration were laid at 201. The defendant cause without entering into a removed the cause into this court by habeas corpus, recognizance to without entering into any recognizance to pay the debt and costs. A rule for a procedendo having been obtained by Chitty on that ground, pay the debt and costs according to the 19 G.3. c.70. 6.6. F. Pollock shewed cause, and contended, that upon upon the true construction of the 19 G.3. c.17. s.6. the defendant was not bound to enter into a recognizance on removing the cause, as the plaintiff had thought fit to lay his damages at 201. Per Curiam. The 21J.1. c. 23. enacts that causes shall not be removed where it shall appear or be laid in the declaration, that the debt, damages, or thing demanded do not amount to 5l. The 19 G.3. c.70. s.6 which enacts that no cause, where the cause of action shall not amount to 10%., shall be removed unless the defendant enter into a recognizance, must be construed in the same sense. Now, in this case, the damages, as laid in the declaration, did exceed 10%. This rule for a procedendo must, therefore, be discharged. Rule discharged. 1824. REMMINGTON against JOHNSON. a plea is ne D. F. JONES had obtained a rule to shew cause A demand of why the interlocutory judgment and subsequent cessary before signing proceedings should not be set aside with costs, and why judgment, exthe plaintiff or his attorney should not pay the costs of cept where dethe application, on the ground that the plaintiff had custody of the signed interlocutory judgment, for want of a plea, with- plaintiff has deout having demanded a plea. Platt now shewed cause on an affidavit, stating, that the defendant, at the time of the commencement of the present action, and down to the present time, was in the custody of the sheriff of the county of Huntingdon, in another suit; and he cited Rose v. Christfield (a), Wilkinson v. Brown (b), as establishing, that no demand of a plea is necessary, where the defendant is in custody of a sheriff, whether in the same or in another suit. D. F. Jones, in support of the rule, contended, that as a general rule, the plaintiff could not sign judgment for want of a plea, without first demanding a plea; and that even supposing the exception of cases of defendants in custody of the sheriff, not to be confined to instances of defendants being in the custody of the sheriff in the same suit, but to extend to instances of the custody of the sheriff in another suit, still the exception could only apply to cases where the plaintiff had declared against (a) 1 T. R. 591. 6 T. R.524. the fendant is in sheriff, and clared against him as being in that custody. |