81.

Silence is the best course for any man to adopt who distrusts himself.

82.

The reason we are so changeable in our friendships is, that it is difficult to know the qualities of the heart, while it is easy to know those of the head.

"O Love, no inhabitant of earth thou art.
An unseen seraph, we believe in thee—
A faith whose martyrs are the broken heart;
But never yet hath seen, or e'er shall see,
The naked eye thy form, as it should be.
The mind hath made thee, as it peopled heaven
Even with its own desiring fantasy.

And to a thought such shape and image given As haunts the unquench'd soul, parch'd, wearied, wrung, and riven."-Childe Harold, Canto iv.

81. Πᾶς τις ἀπαίδευτος φρονιμώτατος ἔστι σιωπῶν.-PALLAD. ALEXAND. Epig.

66

"O my Antonio, I do know of these

That therefore only are reputed wise

For saying nothing."-Merchant of Venice.

82. "A government is inexcusable for employing foolish ministers, for they may examine a man's head, though they cannot his heart."-SHENSTONE, Thoughts on Politics.

83.

What men have given the name of friendship to is nothing but an alliance, a reciprocal accommodation of interests, an exchange of good offices; in fact, it is nothing but a system of traffic, in which self-love always proposes to itself some advantage.

84.

Love of justice in the generality of men is only the fear of suffering from injustice.

85.

Reconciliation with our enemies is only a desire of bettering our condition, a weariness of contest, and the fear of some disaster.

84. “An injury done to one is a threat held out to a hundred."-BACON, translated from PUBLIUS SYRUS :

"Multis minatur qui uni facit injuriam."

See No. 368. This thought, in the first edition, was dif ferently expressed: "Men blame injustice, not from any aversion they have to it, but with reference to the harm they may receive from it;" for which the author afterwards substituted the present Maxim.

85. "After three obstinate and equal campaigns, John of Antioch and Cyril of Alexandria condescended to explain

86.

When we are tired of loving we are very glad of some act of infidelity towards ourselves to disengage us from our own fidelity.

87.

It is more disgraceful to distrust one's friends than to be deceived by them.

88.

We often persuade ourselves that we love people more powerful than we are; and yet it is interest alone which produces our friendship. We do not associate with them for any good that we wish to do them, but for that which we would receive from them.

89.

Our mistrust justifies the deceit of others.

and embrace; but their seeming reunion must be imputed rather to prudence than reason, to the mutual lassitude rather than to the Christian charity of the patriarchs."GIBBON, Decline and Fall, chap. 47.

89. "Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli, et liis jus peccandi suspicando fecerunt."-SENECA, Ep. 3.

90.

How can we expect another to keep our secret if we cannot keep it ourselves?

91.

Self-love increases or diminishes in our eyes the good qualities of our friends in proportion to the satisfaction we derive from them, and we judge of their merits by the kind of intercourse which they keep up with us.

92.

Every one complains of his memory, and no one complains of his judgment.

90. This idea has been expressed by other writers, but by none more happily than by La Rochefoucauld.

"I have play'd the fool, the gross fool, to believe
The bosom of a friend would hold a secret

Mine own could not contain."

MASSINGER, Unnatural Combat, Act v. Sc. 2. "Toute révélation d'un secret est la faute de celui qui l'a confié."-LA BRUYERE, De la Société.

"Ham. Do not believe it.

Rosencr. Believe what?

Ham. That I can keep your counsel, and not mine own." SHAKSPEARE, Hamlet, Act iv. Sc. 2.

92. "When I complain of my memory, they seem not

93.

There are no people who are so troublesome. to others as the indolent: when they have satisfied their indolence they wish to appear diligent.

94.

The greatest ambition has not the least appearance of it when it finds the absolute impossibility of reaching the height it aspires after.

95.

Great names debase, instead of elevating, those who cannot sustain them.

96.

To undeceive a man persuaded of his own merit, is to do him as ill a service as that ren

to believe I am in earnest, and presently reprove me as though I accused myself for a fool; not discerning the difference between memory and understanding. Wherein they are very wide of my intention, and do me wrong; experience rather daily showing us, on the contrary, that a strong memory is commonly coupled with an infirm judgment."-MONTAIGNE, book i. ch. 9.

96. This alludes to an incident related by Ælian (Hist. Var. book iv. ch. 25) and Athenæus (book xii.), of one