hens.

to plunder. But while they were busied in this occupation, the Persians rallied, surprised them in their turn, and drove them out of the town. The confederates now made a precipitate retreat to the coast, but even this did not preserve them from Persian vengeance. The army of the great king came up with them at Ephesus, and after an obstinate engagement, totally defeated them. In consequence of this disaster, dissensions arose among the confederates, and the Athenians returned home, abandoning the cause of their unfortunate allies. Such was the issue of their first contest with the Persian arms, which certainly did not prognosticate that splendid success, with which their enterprises were afterwards crowned.

A. C. 490.

Miltiades.

This affair directed the eyes of the Persian monarch towards Greece, both as an object of resentment and of ambition. His first step was to send round heralds to the different states, demanding earth and water, the usual tokens of submission. All, overawed by the power of Persia, complied, excepting Athens and Lacedemon. These two cities, with a barbarous patriotism, threw the ambassadors into wells, and casting earth upon them, declared, that they had now obtained their demand.

Darius, who then reigned in Persia, proceeded now to more formidable measures. Mardonius was first sent with a large army to cross the Hellespont, and attack the northern districts; but a violent storm having dispersed his fleet, he returned without effecting any thing of importance. A new plan was then arranged. An immense fleet and army having been assembled, it was determined to transport them from the shore of the Lesser Asia, and to land them, first in the island of Euboea; after having subdued which, and signally punished the Eretrians, they might pass over into Attica. Mardonius, who had been at least unfortunate, was superseded, and the command given to Datis and Artaphernes; the one distinguish ed by long experience in war, the other by his noble birth. They were accompanied by Hippias, the expelled tyrant of Athens, who had hoped, from the sympathy and ambition of the Persian monarch, to obtain what he could not expect from the consent of his fellow citizens, or the interference of the other states. The armament sailed first to Euboea, took and plundered Eretria, and from thence prepared to pass over into Attica.

The Athenians, while so great a storm was impending, were not inattentive to the means of security. Besides collecting all their own military force, they applied for aid to the other states of Greece, and particularly to the Lacedemonians. That slow and cautious people, either from superstition or timidity, declared that their religion rendered it unlawful for them to dispatch an army before the time of full moon. The other states were still more backward. The Plateans alone, who lay under peculiar obligations to the Athenians, joined them with 1000 men.

Miltiades was at this time the most eminent man in Athens. He was sprung from one of the most distinguished families in the city. Having conducted a colony to the Chersonese, where he reigned with almost absolute power, he had an opportunity, when Darius led his expedition against the Scythians, of observing the materials and disposition of the Persian

armies. The Athenian system of military command Athens. seems then to have been singularly cumbersome and inconvenient. Ten generals were appointed, who com manded in rotation, each for a single day; while one of the archons, named the Polemarch, had the supreme decision in all doubtful questions. Miltiades, however, in this crisis of public danger, was raised by his own talents, and the wisdom of his colleagues, to the chief direction of affairs. Some urged the propriety of a protracted, and merely defensive system of warfare, until the torrent should have spent its force, and the strength of Greece had time to be collected. But Miltiades, addressing himself to Cailimachus, who was then Polemarch, after representing the transcendent importance of this decision, which would either obliterate the name of Athens, or raise her to the first rank among Grecian states, gave his opinion decidedly in favour of an immediate engagement. The whole Athenian people were now ardent and united in this glorious cause; but a delay might breed divisions, and cause this spirit to evaporate. Room would be left for Persian influence and Persian gold, the fatal effects of which had been recently experienced in the fall of Eretria. Callimachus, satisfied with these arguments, acceded to the advice of Miltiades. Aristides, who was one of the ten generals, gave, on this occasion, the first example of that virtuous disinterestedness which marked his character, by resigning, on his day, the command to Miltiades. This example was followed by the rest. Miltiades, however, with a prudent moderation, declined fighting till his own day arrived. He drew up his army in a man- Battle of ner which enabled him to call forth all its ener- Marathon. gies, while it rendered unavailing those of the enemy. The strength of the latter consisted in cavalry and bowmen; accustomed to fight at a distance, and to advance and retreat alternately, over the vast plains of Asia. The force of the Grecian armies, on the contrary, consisted almost entirely in their heavy infantry, armed with pikes, and ranged in a deep phalanx. Miltiades, who knew the strength and valour of this body, was satisfied, that when it came to close combat, nothing in the Persian army could resist its charge. To diminish the effect of superior numbers, he chose a spot which was confined on one side by a mountain, and on the other by a morass. He placed his heavy armed foot, in which all his confidence rested, (though, including the Plateans, it amounted only to 10,000 men,) on each of the wings, leaving the centre to be occupied by light armed troops, and even by slaves, a number of whom had been armed on this emergency. These were more numerous, but from their inferiority in discipline, Miltiades fully calculated on their giving way in the first instance. The Persians, on the other hand, ranged their cavalry and light troops in the wings, and placed in the centre the forces of Persia Proper, which alone were fitted to engage in close combat. Miltiades, in order to encumber the movements of the enemy's cavalry, had caused trees to be felled, and laid across the field. The Persian wings, however, advancing as well as these obstacles would permit, poured upon the Greeks a. shower of missile weapons of every description. The Athenians, agreeably to the order of Miltiades, did not return a single javelin, but raising a shout,

tunate man was never welcome there. An accusation was soon preferred against him by Xantippus, the father of Pericles; he was condemned to pay 50 talents; and not being possessed of that sum, was thrown into prison, where he soon after died of his wounds.

Athens. pressed forward in the most rapid manner upon the ranks of the enemy. A mode of attack so unusual, excited at first surprise and derision; but these were soon changed into terror, when they felt the charge of this formidable body, which their cavalry in vain attempted to penetrate. Every thing gave way before the weight of the Athenian phalanx, and in a short time both wings of the enemy were routed, and fled in confusion. Miltiades, then, recalling his victorious wings from the pursuit, attacked in flank and rear the Persian centre, which, having defeated the troops opposed to it, was following them precipitately. The most arduous part of the contest now ensued; for this was the body whose firmness had dissipated all the other armies of Asia. Its situation, however, and the superior valour of the Greeks, soon decided the conflict. The Persians, routed, sought refuge in their ships, whither they were pursued by the victorious Greeks. As an instance of the eagerness with which the latter followed, it is related, that one, having laid hold of a boat with his hand, when that was cut off, seized it with his teeth. The Athenians, in this engagement, lost only 200 citizens, with two of their generals, one of whom was Callimachus the polemarch. The Persians left upwards of 6000 on the field of battle, besides losing an immense booty, and several of their ships. They then made an attempt, by doubling the promontory of Sunium, to take Athens by surprise. But Miltiades, by a rapid march, arrived in time to render this attempt fruitless. The Persian commander then sailed back to the coast of Asia.

Misfortunes and death of Miltiades.

Such was this battle, for ever memorable by an issue so contrary to all appearances, and so auspicious to the happiness and freedom of mankind. A small city, hardly numbered till now among the states of Greece, had baffled and driven back in confusion the collected might of the ruler of Asia. Athens had now begun her career of glory; and a series of triumphs succeeded, which soon raised her to be the first among the Grecian states.

The popular favour, however, which attended the general who had led them to victory, was not of long duration. Such a pre-eminence, enjoyed by any one citizen, was thought dangerous to the liberty of all; and Miltiades having, in the Chersonese, possessed the power, and even the title of tyrant, was supposed likely to aim at a similar pre-eminence in Athens. We hear of no behaviour of his own which could give countenance to those rumours; but their circulation gradually predisposed men's minds unfavourably towards him. This soon appeared, when a disaster befel him. Being sent with a fleet to chastise the islands which had submitted to, and assisted the Persians, he performed his commission at first with success, and exacted large sums from them. But on coming to Paros, he was prompted by private resentment against Tisagoras, a leading man in the island, to make so enorinous a demand, as determined the inhabitants to resist to the last extremity. He was wounded in the siege; but at the end of 76 days, the place was on the point of falling, when Miltiades, discovering a light on the shore of the opposite continent, hastily mistook it for the approach of a Persian armament, raised the siege, and returned to Athens. An unfor

Athens.

Aristides.

Such was the unworthy fate of the most illustrious A. C. 489. of Athenian commanders. Yet so fruitful was she then in great men, that scarcely had he disappeared, when two arose, who were well worthy of supplying his place. These were the celebrated rivals Themis- Themistotocles and Aristides. No greater contrast could be cles and exhibited, than by the character of these two men. The former seems to have possessed every quality which could enable him to take the lead among the multitude. Bold, impetuous, enterprising even to rashness, and at the same time artful, subtle, versatile, he at once possessed a conformity of character which made him the object of their favour, and could practise every art for availing himself of that favour; nor was he restrained by any very scrupulous rules of morality, from using such means as seemed most likely to accomplish his ends. to accomplish his ends. He promoted, however, to the utmost, the greatness of his country, whether out of patriotism, or at least as connected with his own greatness. While he favoured the cause of the people, Aristides, on the other hand, supported that of the aristocracy. This man was in every respect the reverse of Themistocles. Moderate, rigidly and immoveably just, little ambitious of popularity, he rested satisfied with the approbation of his own mind, and stooped to none of those arts by which his rival conciliated the public affection. The party, besides, to which Themistocles had attached himself, was now become decidedly superior. After a severe struggle, therefore, he found means to effect the banishment of his rival, which was decreed by means of the ostracism, an institution peculiar to Athens, and of a very remarkable nature. By it, any citizen, without accusation or trial, by the mere votes of the people, (written on a species of shell,) might be banished for ten years. It inflicted no stigma, being generally imposed on the most eminent citizens, from whom it was supposed that most was to be feared. Some have branded it as an absurd and capricious exercise of popular despotism; while others applaud it as a mild and effectual method of preventing that tyranny, which, in a popular state, is apt to ensue from the too commanding character of any one individual. Something between the two may probably be the soundest opinion; for though, in such a constitution as that of Athens, there seems a real ground for the institution, yet there is no doubt that it was often capriciously and unjustly

exercised.

Themistocles was now left supreme head of the republic. In this capacity he performed a signal service to his country, and to all Greece. The war with Ægina reviving, made the Athenians continually sensible of their naval deficiency. Impressed with this, Themistocles found means to persuade them, that the money produced by the silver mines, which had hitherto been spent in feasting and entertaining the people, should be employed in constructing a fleet. A hundred gallies were accordingly put upon the stocks; and with such ability were the funds managed, that Athens soon became the first maritime power in

Athens, Greece. This became the safety, both of herself and of all the other states, in the mighty storm which was now impending.

Xerxes succeeds Darius,

Darius, after the disastrous result of his expedition to Greece, was withheld from farther attempts by an insurrection in Egypt, as well as by domestic dissenA. C. 485. sion. About five years after, however, he died, and was succeeded by Xerxes, a rash and ambitious young prince, who, persuaded by his flatterers that nothing was impossible to the master of such an empire, determined to collect all his forces for this arduous enterprise. Darius had been three years occupied in preparations, which Xerxes devoted four to complete. All the ports of the Asiatic colonies, as well as of Egypt and Phoenicia, were employed in the construction of an innumerable multitude of vessels, surpassing in magnitude any that had yet appeared in those seas. Twelve hundred ships of war, and three thousand of burden, were at length completed. All the subjects and vassals of Persia were called upon to furnish their quotas of troops, and an armament was thus collected, to which the world has seen nothing equal, either before or since. Herodotus has given an elaborate enumeration, which makes them amount to upwards of two millions, besides women and eunuchs; which, added to five hundred thousand who manned the fleet, raises the whole number employed to nearly three millions. Wishing to avoid the unfortunate example of Darius, as well as the inconveniences of a long navigation with so many troops on board, he determined to transport his army over the Hellespont. After some difficulty, a bridge of boats was extended from one side to the other, over which the army continued passing for seven days and seven nights without interruption, until the whole arrived on the Thracian territory. Then, separating into three divisions, they advanced, covering the plains of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. Most of the inhabitants of these countries, overawed by this immense force, joined their standard. After a memorable encounter, they penetrated through the pass of Thermopyla, and being joined by the Thebans, poured down with their whole force upon Attica and Peloponnesus. The Peloponnesian states, conceiving themselves unequal to cope in the open field with so mighty a force, determined to withdraw within the peninsula, and to fortify the isthmus of Corinth. The consequence of this arrangement was, to leave exposed the territory of Attica. Themistocles then saw, that the land force of that state alone could never cope with the whole power of the Persians, seconded, as it was, by a strong body of Grecian auxiliaries. Instantly, therefore, with equal wisdom and decision, he formed his plan, which was to abandon the city, and embark on board the fleet all the hopes and fortunes of Athens. To persuade the people, however, to the adoption of such a measure, was no easy task. No where, perhaps, was local attachment so strongly rooted as among the Grecian states. It was interwoven with all the feelings of religion, of patriotism, and of parental veneration. To abandon, to a barbarous foe, their city, the temples of their gods, the tombs of their ancestors, appeared absolute profanation. Themistocles, on this occasion, exerted all his address. He represented to his countrymen the necessity and advantage of this measure;

And invades Greece.

Athens.

The Athe

but his chief dependence was on a dexterous management of that superstition, which at present formed a powerful obstacle to his scheme. He contrived to get an oracle from Delphi, which advised them to defend themselves with wooden walls; which he interpreted to be their ships. He procured from the same quarter a high panegyric on Salamis, where he wished the fleet to station itself. He accompanied the evacuation of the city with a variety of ceremonies, which gave it the appearance of a religious act. The nians take women and children were sent to Troezene, which shelter on generously received them, although Argos, to whose board their territory it belonged, had basely espoused the Persian fleet. interest. When the time of departure, however, arrived, the scene which ensued was affecting beyond expression. Besides separating from all those objects and places, which from infancy they had been accustomed to regard with affection, they were obliged to leave behind a number of old citizens, whom they had not time to remove. Some emotions of tenderness were even inspired by those domestic animals, who, by dismal howlings, expressed their affection and regret for their departing masters.

We have now to look back to the operations of the two fleets. Xerxes, recollecting the disaster which that of Darius had sustained, in doubling the promontory of Mount Athos, determined to cut a canal through the neck of the peninsula, sufficient to allow two gallies to sail abreast. The fleet passing through this canal, followed the army along the coasts of Greece, till it arrived and anchored in the bay of Sepias. No harbour could contain so immense an armament; it was therefore necessary to station itself in the road, which extends from the city of Castanea to the promontory of Sepias. The Grecians meanwhile had stationed theirs at Artemisium, the northern promontory of Euboea. The Lacede monians still retained such a pre-eminence among the other states, as procured for their admiral the command of the whole fleet, although of 380 triremes, they sent only ten.

A. C. 480.

ments near

Artemi

The Athenians, who had already sent 120, and Engagewere preparing more, were disposed to murmur; but Themistocles, with consummate prudence, prevailed sium. on them to acquiesce, rather than cause dissension at so critical a period. Most of the Peloponnesian states urged the necessity of an immediate retreat, in order to assume a station, where they might defend their own coasts. This proposal was strenuously opposed by Themistocles, who looked upon it as equally dishonourable and pernicious to Greece. By his arguments, and by threatening that the Athenians would withdraw, and found a colony elsewhere, he prevailed on the allies to relinquish this design. Meanwhile the Persians, unable to find secure anchorage for their immense fleet, had suffered extremely from a violent storm. Before they had recovered from this disaster, the Greeks made a nocturnal attack, took thirty of their vessels, and destroyed as many more. Next day they again attacked them, and cut off the Cilician squadron. The same storm which had shattered the grand Persian fleet, completely destroyed a division of them which had sailed round Eubœa, in order to take the Greeks in the rear. These favourable circumstances animated the hopes of the confe

Athens. derates, and dispelled, in some measure, the terror which had been inspired by the power and numbers of the enemy. When, therefore, on the third day, the Persians advanced and offered battle, it was not declined. The combat was more obstinate and bloody than any of the preceding. At length, however, the Persians retiring, resigned their claim to the honours of victory. The Greeks, however, had suffered so much, that it appeared impossible to fight such another battle. It was at last determined to retire, and station themselves in the Saronic Gulf, between Athens and Salamis.

Xerxes

burns Athens.

Meantime Xerxes, with the flower of his army, seizes and advanced in person into Attica, and proceeded to Athens. That city was still occupied by a few, who could not be removed, or who had preferred remain ing. These, abandoning the town, endeavoured to defend themselves in the citadel. They were for some time successful; the strength of the situation, and their own superior valour, rendering the attempts of the enemy fruitless. At length, however, a path was discovered, on a side of the edifice, supposed in accessible, and therefore left unguarded. By this the Persians ascended, and having put all to the sword, set fire to the citadel, as well as to the temple of Minerva, which was its chief ornament. So elated was Xerxes with this easy conquest, that he immediately sent an express to announce it to Artabanus, at Susa.

The

When the confederate fleet, from their station at Salamis, beheld the disaster of Athens, they were struck with the deepest alarm. Eurybiades, their Spartan admiral, in conformity with the general sentiment, resolved to retire to the isthmus, with the view of covering the coast of Peloponnesus. Themistocles, however, to whom such a step appeared altogether ruinous, and also instigated by an Athenian, called Menesiphilus, went immediately to Eurybiades, and represented, that if the Peloponnesians were once brought to their own coast, no power could prevent them from leaving the fleet, and returning to their homes; that all the hopes of Greece rested in her fleet; that therefore if this measure was adopted, Greece was lost. Eurybiades was little disposed to listen; and, offended with the warmth of Themistocles, lifted up his cane; to which the other replied in the memorable words: "Strike, but hear." Eurybiades heard, and at length agreed to call a council of the fleet. Here Themistocles prudently avoided the argument which he had urged most strongly to Eurybiades, but which was now likely to prove offensive. He represented the advantages of fighting in a narrow sea, where the enemy could not avail themselves of their numbers, and where, therefore, the superior valour of the Greeks, and strength of their vessels, might be expected to prevail. He even threatened, that the Athenians would desert allies who paid so little regard to their interest, and would found a colony in Italy. This last argument proved the most powerful of all, as the Athenian vessels formed the strength of the fleet. The dispute, how ever, was warm; and even personal sarcasms were thrown out upon Themistocles, to which, however, he replied so skilfully, as made them recoil on his adversaries. It was at length determined to stay.

But when shortly after the Persian fleet began to approach, and the sea appeared covered with innumerable vessels, their courage again wavered, and a general disposition prevailed to set sail, without delay, for the isthmus. Themistocles, ever fertile in expedients, adopted on this occasion a most singular one. By means of a Persian captive, whom he had with him, he sent a message to Xerxes, expressing his attachment to that monarch, and informing him of the intended retreat of the Greeks. He advised him, therefore, to send two hundred vessels round the islands of gina and Salamis, which, placing themselves in the rear of the confederates, might prevent the meditated escape. To a monarch so confident of his own power, the advice appeared plausible, and it was therefore adopted without hesitation. night, therefore, when the Grecians were deliberating on retreat, news arrived that it was no longer practicable; that they were completely surrounded. This intelligence was confirmed by a most respectable authority. Themistocles, forgetting in this emergency his private resentments, had persuaded the Athenians to recal his rival Aristides; and that distinguished patriot having made his way through the Persian fleet, arrived while the council was yet sitting. The intelligence he brought was confirmed by others; so that the Greeks now saw that they had no alternative but to prepare for immediate battle.

Next

Athens.

The Athenians were stationed on the left wing, Battle of nearest to the coast of Attica, and were opposed to Salamis. the Phoenicians, the first naval power' under the dominion of Persia. The Peloponnesians, on the right of the Greeks, were opposed to the Ionians, and other Asiatic Greeks, who occupied the left of the Persians. Themistocles judiciously delayed the attack till the hour when a customary breeze sprung up from behind, under favour of which he bore down upon the Persians. Although he was not the nominal commander, yet the universal opinion of his skill made his example the rule to every one. The Grecian fleet amounted to three hundred and eighty vessels, while that of the Persians exceeded twelve hundred. In consequence of the confined situation, however, in which the battle took place, the latter could not bring a much greater number into the action, but were obliged to arrange their vessels in successive lines, one behind the other. The first and severest shock was on the right, between the Athenians and Phoenicians. But besides the glorious motives by which the former were animated, they acted in an orderly manner, and on a regular plan; while their adversaries fought blindly, and without concert. Victory therefore soon declared on their side. On the other wing, where the Asiatic Greeks fought for Xerxes, it was still sooner decided. These nations, remembering their origin and ancient liberty, were little ambitious of imposing on kindred tribes the same servitude under which they themselves groaned. They soon either deserted or fled. The whole of the first line thus discomfited, fell back on those behind, among whom they spread dismay and disorder. There were no means of rallying such a confused multitude; in a short time the whole fleet took to flight, and the victory of the Grecians was complete. A body of select Persian infantry, which had thrown

Athens. themselves on the rock of Psyttaleia, to cut off such of their enemies as might seek shelter there, were themselves surrounded and cut to pieces.

Thus terminated this battle, so memorable in the annals of Greece and of mankind. Xerxes, from the shore, where he had seated himself, beheld this mighty disaster, which levelled his towering hopes in the dust. Themistocles at first entertained a plan of detaching a squadron to occupy the Hellespont, and prevent the return of the Persians. But Aristides prudently observed, that their object was far less to destroy this armament, than finally to rid Greece of it; and that it was dangerous to reduce such a host to despair. Themistocles then adopting an opposite policy, sent by his former channel an intimation to. Xerxes, that such a design was entertained by the Greeks, exhorting him to lose no time in effecting Retreat of his retreat. Xerxes, in whom the impression of fear was then as predominant as that of false confidence had before been, made no hesitation in taking the advice; and, with the great mass of his army, made a tumultuous retreat to the Hellespont. He left Mardonius, however, with three hundred thousand men; a number which included perhaps all the real strength of that formidable army, freed from its useless incumbrances.

Xerxes.

Battle of Platea.

The Athenians had now returned to their city; and Mardonius hoping to gain them over by the dread of a second time losing it, sent Alexander, king of Macedon, to urge them to submit. The Athenians firmly rejected his proposal; but this magnanimity did not meet with its proper return on the part of the Peloponnesians. They again resolved to confine themselves to the defence of their own peninsula, by drawing a wall across the isthmus. The consequence was, that Athens was a second time taken and plundered. The remonstrances of the Athenians, however, and perhaps the dread of their desertion, at length recalled Sparta to more honourable sentiments. She collected her own force and that of her allies, marched it beyond the isthmus, and joined the Athenians. The combined armies, next summer, fought the battle of Platea, in which, though the Lacedemonians took the leading part, yet the services of Athens were considerable. She engaged those Greeks, a numerous body, who, to the shame of their country, fought on the side of its enemies. The signal services they had rendered to the common cause, secured them the command of the left wing, which had before been uniformly conferred on the Tegeans.

The Athenians distinguished themselves still more in an action which was fought on the same day, near the promontory of Mycale, in Ionia. The wrecks of the Persian fleet having taken refuge on the coasts of Asia Minor, the Greeks followed them. Under these circumstances, the Ionians conceiving this a favourable opportunity for throwing off the Persian yoke, applied to them for aid. They did not decline the invitation, but landed, and joining their forces to those of the Ionians, gave battle to the Persians, who had assembled an army vastly superior. After an obstinate combat, the Persians were completely routed. The Spartans pursued those who fled towards the passes of the mountains, while the Athenians stormed

their camp. In consequence of this victory, Ionia Athens. was freed, and a large portion of the Asiatic coast rescued from the hands of the enemy.

The Athenians followed up their victory, by besieging Sestos, a large town of Thrace, commanding the straits of the Hellespont, which they took after a long siege.

wishes of

The first care of the Athenians, after returning to A. C. 478. their city, was to rebuild their walls, and to give Athens rethem additional strength and solidity. This measure built, conwas opposed by the Lacedemonians, under pretence trary to the of its being contrary to the interest of Greece that the Sparthere should be strong places beyond the isthmus. tans. Their real motive, however, was suspected to be an aversion to the rising greatness of the Athenians. Themistocles conducted himself here with great art. He got himself appointed ambassador to Sparta; and before setting out, he caused all the citizens, of every age and sex, to apply themselves to the task of building the walls, making use of any materials which were within their reach. Fragments of houses, temples, and other buildings, were accordingly employed, producing a grotesque appearance, which remained to the days of Plutarch. He then set out for Sparta, but on various pretences declined entering on his commission, till he had received intelligence that the work which he had set on foot was nearly completed. He then went boldly to the Lacedemonian senate, declared what had been done, and justified it not only by the natural right of the Athenians to provide for their own defence, but by the advantage of opposing such an obstacle to the progress of the barbarians. The Lacedemonians, sensible of the justice of this argument, and seeing that remonstrance would now avail nothing, were fain to acquiesce.

Themistocles, ever studious of the maritime greatness of Athens, caused a new and more commodious harbour to be built at Piræus, which in process of time was joined to the city by a very thick wall, five miles in length.

The confederate fleets continued to pursue their advantages. They scoured the shores of Asia Minor, and the Ægean, drove out the Persian garrisons, and enriched themselves by plunder. They also, after an obstinate defence, stormed and took Byzan. tium.

The Lacedemonians had hitherto, by common con- A. C. 476. sent, held the chief command, both by land and sea. The recent events, however, had thrown a lustre around Athens, of which no other state could now boast. They had reaped the chief glory both in the battles of Marathon and Salamis; they had suffered most; had always stood forward generously in the common cause; while Sparta had too often observed a cold and selfish policy. These favourable impressions were heightened by the contrast of the consummate justice and good conduct of her commanders, Aristides and Cimon, with the haughtiness and insolence of Pausanias the Spartan king. Moved by these different considerations, the allies unanimously determined to transfer the chief command at sea, now much more important than land, to the Athenians. The Lacedemonians wisely forbore an opposition, which they knew would be vain: and as a common treasury was necessary for the prosecution