nises, in the fullest manner, the benefits which civil society derives from those Christian institutions which cherish piety, morality and religion. I am conscious, that we should not strike out of the constitution all recognition of the Christian religion. I am desirous, in so solemn a transaction as the establishment of a constitution, that we should keep in it an expression of our respect and attachment to Christianity ;--not, indeed, to any of its peculiar forms, but to its general principles.'

There was another impression, which had become quite prevalent in the Convention, among many who formerly were sturdy advocates for an opposite doctrine-namely, that the Commonwealth's senators should be based upon population, as well as the other branch of the Legislature, and that districts should be made upon this principle. Mr. Webster's argument on this article was elaborate and powerful. He entered into the great principles of checks and balances in a political constitution. The argument was warmly opposed by many who might be supposed to be interested on his side of the question. This speech had a most wonderful effect, and many of the members who had been of a different opinion, declared that they were convinced that he was right. In this argument he brought the experience of all times to bear upon the subject so fully and happily, that those who opposed him still lost much of the zeal with which they had supported the other side of the debate at the commencement of it.

The third prominent speech in this Convention was made upon 'a resolution to alter the Constitution so

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that judicial officers shall be removable by the Governor and Council upon the address of two-thirds, instead of a majority, of each branch of the Legislature, and that the Legislature have power to create a Supreme Court of Equity and Court of Appeals.' The remarks of Mr. Webster were so brief and so compact, and yet so full of sound sense on these subjects, that an extract from the speech would do him injustice, therefore we give it entire.

Regrets are vain for what is past; yet I hardly know how it has been thought to be a regular course of proceeding, to go into committee on this subject, before taking up the several propositions which now await their final readings on the President's table. The consequence is, that this question comes on by surprise. The chairman of the select committee is not present; many of the most distinguished members of the convention are personally so situated, as not to be willing to take part in the debate,-and the first law officer of the government, a member of the committee, happens at this moment to be in a place (the chair of the committee of the whole) which deprives us of the benefit of his observations. Under these circumstances, I had hoped the committee would rise; it has, however, been determined otherwise, and I must therefore beg their indulgence while I make a few observations.

As the constitution now stands, all judges are liable to be removed from office, by the Governor, with the consent of the council, on the address of the two houses of the Legislature. It is not made necessary that the two houses should give any reasons for their address, or that the judge should have an opportunity to be heard. I look upon this as against common right, as well as repugnant to the general principles of the Government. The commission of the judge purports to be, on the face

of it, during good behavior. He has an interest in his office. To give an authority to the Legislature to deprive him of this, without trial or accusation, is manifestly to place the judges at the pleasure of the Legislature.

The question is not what the Legislature probably will do, but what they may do. If the judges, in fact, hold their offices only so long as the Legislature see fit, then it is vain and illusory to say that the judges are independent men, incapable of being influenced by hope or by fear; but the tenure of their office is not independent. The general theory and principle of the Government is broken in upon, by giving the Legislature this power. The departments of Government are not equal, co-ordinate and independent, while one is thus at the mercy of the others. What would be said of a proposition to authorise the Governor or judges to remove a senator, or member of the house of representatives from office? And yet, the general theory of the constitution is to make the judges as independent as members of the Legislature. I know not whether a greater improvement has been made in government than to separate the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches, and to provide for the decision of private rights, in a manner, wholly uninfluenced by reasons of state, or considerations of party or of policy. It is the glory of the British constitution to have led in the establishment of this most important principle. It did not exist in England before the revolution of 1688, and its introduction has seemed to give a new character to the tribunals. It is not necessary to state the evils which had been experienced, in that country, from dependent and time-serving judges. In matters of mere propriety, in causes of no political or public bearing, they might perhaps be safely trusted; but in great questions concerning public liberty, or the rights of the subject, they were, in too many cases, not fit to be trusted at all. Who would now quote Scroggs, or Saunders, or Jeffries, on a question concerning the right of the habeas corpus, or the right of suffrage, or the liberty of the press, or any other subject closely connected with

political freedom? Yet on all these subjects, the sentiments of the English judges since the revolution,—of Somers, Holt, Jreby, Jekyl, &c., are, in general, favorable to civil liberty, and receive and deserve great attention, whenever referred to. Indeed, Massachusetts herself knows, by her own history, what is to be expected from dependent judges. Her own charter was declared forfeited, without a hearing, in a court where such judges

sat.

• When Charles the second, and his brother after him, attempted the destruction of chartered rights, both in the kingdom and out of it, the mode was by judgments obtained in the courts. It is well known, that after the prosecution against the city of London was commenced, and while it was pending, the judges were changed; and Saunders, who had been consulted on the occasion, and had advised the proceeding on the part of the crown, was made chief-justice for the very purpose of giving a judgment in favor of the crown; his predecessor being removed to make room for him. Since the revolution of 1688, an entire new character has been given to English judicature. The judges have been made independent, and the benefit has been widely and deeply felt. A similar improvement seems to have made its way into Scotland. Before the union of the kingdoms, it cannot be said that there was any judicial independence in Scotland; and the highest names in Scottish jurisprudence have been charged with being under influences which could not, in modern times, be endured. It is even said that the practice of entails did not extensively exist in Scotland till about the time of the reigns of the last princes of the Stuart race, and was then introduced to guard against unjust forfeitures. It is strange indeed, that this should happen at so late a period, and that a most unnatural and artificial state of property should be owing to the fear of dependent judicatures. I might add here, that the heritable jurisdictions, the greatest almost of all evils, were not abolished in Scotland till about the middle of the last century; so slowly does improvement

make progress when opposed by ignorance, prejudice or interest.

In our own country, it was for years a topic of complaint, before the revolution, that justice was administered, in some of the colonies, by judges dependent on the British crown. The Declaration of Independence itself, puts forth this as a prominent grievance, among those which justified the revolution. The British king, it declares, "had made judges dependent on his own will alone, for the tenure of their offices." It was therefore to be expected, that in establishing their own governments, this important point of the independence of the judicial power would be regarded by the States. Some of them have made greater, and others less provision on this subject; the more recent constitutions, I believe, being generally framed with the most and best guards for judicial independence.

Those who oppose any additional security for the tenure of judicial office, have pressed to know what evil has been experienced-what injury has arisen from the constitution as it is. Perhaps none;-but if evils probably may arise, the question is, whether the subject be not so important as to render it prudent to guard against that evil. If evil do arise, we may be sure it will be a great evil; if this power should happen to be abused, it would be most mischievous in its consequences. It is not a sufficient answer, to say that we have as yet felt no inconvenience. We are bound to look to probable future events. We have, too, the experience of other States. Connecticut, having had judges appointed annually, from the time of Charles the second, in the recent alteration of her constitution, has provided, that hereafter they shall hold their office during good behavior, subject to removal on the address of two-thirds of each house of the Legislature. In Pennsylvania, the judges may be removed, "for any reasonable cause," on the address of two-thirds of the two houses. In some of the States, three-fourths of each house is required. The new constitution of Maine has a provision, with which I should be content;