may be some numbers assumed for the composition of the House of Representatives, to which, if the rule were applied, the result might give a member to the House more than was proposed. But it will be always easy to correct this by altering the proposed number by adding one to it, or taking one from it; so that this can be considered no objection to the rule. The committee, in conclusion, cannot admit that it is sufficient reason for rejecting this mode of apportionment, that a different process has heretofore prevailed. The truth is, the errors and inequalities of that process were at first not obvious and startling. But they have gone on increasing; they are greatly augmented and accumulated at every new census; and it is of the very nature of the process itself, that its unjust results must grow greater and greater in proportion as the population of the country enlarges. What was objectionable, though tolerable, yesterday, becomes intolerable to-morrow. A change, the committee are persuaded, must come, or the whole just balance and proportion of representative power among the States will be disturbed and broken up. APPENDIX. Extract of a Letter from Professor James Dean. "I cannot express my rule so densely and perspicuously as I could wish; but its meaning is, that each State shall have such a number of Representatives, that the population for each shall be the nearest possible, whether over or under, to [ ]. The number for each State may be ascertained thus: Divide the representative number by the number assumed to fill the blank, disregarding the remainder; the quotient, or the next greater number, will be the number of Representatives. In order to determine which is the proper one, divide the representative. number of the State by the two numbers separately, then subtract the least quotient from the assumed number, and the assumed number from the other quotient; and that from which results the least remainder is the number of Representatives for the State." States. The foregoing rule is illustrated thus: The population of Maine, for instance, which is 399,435, being divided by 47,700, the ratio assumed in the bill from the House of Representatives, gives a quotient of 8; the population being then divided by 8, the quotient is 49,929; divide by 9, the next higher number, the quotient is 44,381. The following table exhibits the results in the several States, according to this process. 639,747 42,981 14 44,416 13 14 44,061 13 19 49,251 19 7 49,004 8 42,878 7 110,358 2 55,129 3 36,766 2 157,147 3 52,362 4 39,283 3 171,904 4 42,927 57,301 3 130,419 3 43,473 262,508 6 43,751 11,928,054 251 3 2 65,209 2 5 52,501 5 253 240 NOTE. The principle laid down by Professor Dean appears to be this: Each State should have that share of representation which bears the nearest possible proportion to the ratio assumed. Thus Massachusetts, with 610,000 people, if the ratio be 47,700, should have 13 Representatives, because 13 bears the nearest possible proportion to 47,700. As 13 is to 1, so is 610,000 to 46,923. As 12 is to 1, so is 610,000 to 50,833. The first result, or 46,923, is nearer to 47,700, the assumed ratio, than the last result, or 50,833. The number 13, therefore, is more nearly apportioned to the assumed ratio than 12; and further trial of numbers will prove it to bear the nearest possible proportion to 47,700. Mr. Dean considers that, the ratio being assumed, the number of the House, and of each State's share of representation, should be apportioned to the ratio. The error of the bill is thus shown; its ratio bears no proportion, either to the whole number of the House, or to the respective quotas of representation of the several States. Its ratio is arbitrary, and its proposed number of this House is arbitrary; that is, the number is not to be found by any process. The necessary consequence is, that no State's share of the House is found by any rule of proportion. The number of the House being fixed, the ratio should be found by proportion. As 241, e. g. : 1 :: 11,928,054: 49,494. Thus, for a House of 241, the true ratio is found to be 49,494; then, by the rule of Professor Dean, each State is entitled to that number of Representatives which, when divided into its whole federative population, produces a quotient or ratio approximating nearest to the true ratio, 49,494; in other words, each State is entitled to that number of Representatives which bears the nearest possible proportion to the true ratio. BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.* MR. PRESIDENT, though I am entirely satisfied with the general view taken by the chairman of the committee,† and with his explanation of the details of the bill, yet there are a few topics upon which I desire to offer some remarks; and if no other gentleman wishes at present to address the Senate, I will avail myself of this opportunity. A considerable portion of the active part of life has elapsed, since you and I, Mr. President,‡ and three or four other gentlemen, now in the Senate, acted our respective parts in the passage of the bill creating the present Bank of the United States. We have lived to little purpose, as public men, if the experience of this period has not enlightened our judgments, and enabled us to revise our opinions, and to correct any errors into which we may have fallen, if such errors there were, either in regard to the general utility of a national bank, or the details of its constitution. I trust it will not be unbecoming the occasion, if I allude to your own important agency in that transaction. The bill incorporating the bank, and giving it a constitution, proceeded from a committee in the House of Representatives, of which you were chairman, and was conducted through that House under your distinguished lead. Having recently looked back to the proceedings of that day, I must be permitted to say, that I have perused the speech by which the subject was introduced to the consideration of the House, with a revival of the feeling of approbation and pleasure with which I heard it; and I will add, that it would not, perhaps, now be easy to find a better brief A Speech delivered in the Senate on the 25th of May, 1832, on the Bill for renewing the Charter of the Bank of the United States. Mr. Dallas. Mr. Calhoun, at that time Vice-President of the United States. synopsis than that speech contains, of those principles of currency and of banking, which, since they spring from the nature of money and of commerce, must be essentially the same at all times, in all commercial communities. The other gentlemen now with us in the Senate, all of them, I believe, concurred with the chairman of the committee, and voted for the bill. My own vote was against it. This is a matter of little importance; but it is connected with other circumstances, to which I will for a moment advert. The gentlemen with whom I acted on that occasion had no doubts of the constitutional power of Congress to establish a national bank; nor had we any doubts of the general utility of an institution of that kind. We had, indeed, most of us, voted for a bank, at a preceding session. But the object of our regard was not whatever might be called a bank. We required that it should be established on certain principles, which alone we deemed safe and useful, made subject to certain fixed liabilities, and so guarded, that it could neither move voluntarily, nor be moved by others, out of its proper sphere of action. The bill, when first introduced, contained features to which we should never have assented, and we accordingly set ourselves to work, with a good deal of zeal, in order to effect sundry amendments. In some of these proposed amendments, the chairman, and those who acted with him, finally concurred. Others they opposed. The result was, that several most important amendments, as I thought, prevailed. But there still remained, in my opinion, objections to the bill, which justified a persevering opposition, till they should be removed. The first objection was to the magnitude of the capital. In its original form, the bill provided for a capital of thirty-five millions, with a power in Congress to increase it to fifty millions. This latter provision was struck out on the motion of a very intelligent gentleman from New York, and I believe, Sir, with your assent. But I was of opinion that a capital of thirty-five millions was more than was called for by the circumstances of the country. The capital of the first bank was but ten millions; and it had not been shown to be too small; and there certainly was no good ground to say, that the business or the wants of the country had grown, in the mean time, in the proportion of * Mr. Cady. |