too thin to conceal it; and then let us afk, whether the reception which the proposals are faid to have met with, be not precifely fuch as might have been expected from their own nature, and the circumftances of those to whom they were addreffed. There is no talk more inftructive than that of deftroying the wonders of hiftory, and reconciling the ftrange paffages of great mens lives with their general character and fituation. In the prefent inftance, the labour is trifling; a very flight glance over the foregoing outlines of the scheme, will be fufficient to ftrip it of the marvellous in which hiftorians have clothed it, and to reduce it into the rank of the very ordinary occurrences in the cabinets of great princes.

The plan of Henry IV. was evidently a scheme for the utter extirpation of all those principles which modern politicians hold to be the most virtuous and enlightened. Under the name of perpetual peace, a name in which every treaty is concluded, the whole continent of Europe was to be inftantly involved in a war, compared with which, no former hoftility could be called general or unfparing. In order to alter the names and the numbers and the fizes of the different members of the commonwealth, a univerfal pillage was to be promoted; and thofe who refufed to plunder, were to enjoy the fatisfaction of being claffed with the plundered. In this way, the whole of the evils pretended to be deftroyed were anticipated. Europe was to be plunged in hoftilities, that peace might, at fome future period, be, contrary to the whole fituation of human affairs, perpetual; thofe changes of dominion, for which war is chiefly dreaded, were to be the first step in the progrefs of the pacific system,―treachery and ufurpation were to be enforced by immediate war, that war might not, at fome future period, fpring from treachery and ufurpation, or be found neceffary to prevent them.

What is the balance of power? What but a union to prevent all changes of dominion, a conftant check upon the ambition of princes, a rallying point for principles of comprehenfive and virtuous policy, and a defence for the weak against the ftrong? All this fyftem is at an end, if the ftrong unite to arrange the dominion of the world, to parcel out states according to their fancy or interefts, to fpoil those who dare not refift, and to overwhelm, by an aggreffive league, fuch as are powerful or brave enough to oppofe. What matters it, that the longest tranquillity fhall be the confequence of rooting out all the feeds of contradiction and revenge, that peace fhall flourish when all are deftroyed who had a right to defend or regain their rights by war? So much the worse. Injuftice and wrong, in their worst forms, are then to enjoy a fecure triumph, and the evil has only gained the quality of being ir reparable. The folitudinem faciunt et appellant pacem,' never ap

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plied with half fo much force, either to the profeffed ufurpations of ancient Rome and of modern France, as to the plan of univerfal equity and peace afcribed to Henry the Great.

But it may be faid, that this only removes the difficulty one ftep; and that the evident abfurdities and inconfiftencies of the fcheme, are a fufficient ground of doubt respecting its existence with those who admire the talents of the French monarch. We fhould, however, recollect, that the incongruity is only between the title and the fubftance of the measure, between the pretext and the reality; and that, if other advantages than the chimerical one of perpetual peace could be fecured to France by the cooperation of certain foreign powers, France fhewed no want of forefight, at least, by her attempts to feduce them with bribes, and to blind the mafs of mankind with a council of Amphyctyons. There is, in fact, no great room to wonder at the folly of the plan by which France was to get rid, at once, of her great rival, to furround herself with petty states of her own creation, and to fhare the whole power of the continent with a few other nations, so impotent that they must be led by her, or fo diftant from the scene of action as to have no chance of ever taking part in any critical emergency. The indemnities all came from Auftria or her allies, . from the rival or the enemies of France. The favours were beitowed upon her friends, or upon fuch new ftates as the circumftances of the union muft throw at her mercy. But why examine -the ultimate effects of the scheme, when it is plain that its execution was never contemplated as either practicable or neceffary? If the propofition could induce the chief powers of the continent to take part in the humiliation of Austria, the end of France was ferved; a few years of their cooperation were abundantly fufficient to reward her for the trouble of fancying a grand plan of a

Christian Republic,' fufficient to make her mistress of all fhe had had been fighting for, of all fhe has fince gained by her arts and her arms.

Nor was there any thing fo abfurd in the outward appearance of Henry's plan, when fkilfully dreffed up and prefented by his Jeannins and his Sullys. The ideas of men, even in the prefent day, are fo very vague upon the fubject of international policy, that we conftantly find traces of errors, at least as grofs as that which the King's project was intended to inculcate. The partition of Poland has been defended on the grounds of the equilibrium; and the ableft writer on thefe matters who has appeared for many years, has almoft fallen into the fame mistake. M. Gentz has argued, as if the chief object of international policy were to preferve certain great ftates, and confolidate fmaller communities no large empires, forgetting that the balance of power' has no meaning,

meaning, unless it be applied to the rights of all exifting states, and that the univerfal monarchy of any one nation is only to be dreaded, inafmuch as it fuppofes the general ruin of national independence. It is an error of the very fame nature to which Henry's plan must have looked for a favourable reception with the bulk of mankind, and with thofe powers to whom it might be fimply proposed, with out the offer of new dominions, which generally accompanied the difclofure. To perfuade a few neighbouring princes that their independence was the great end of all foreign policy; that, provided they flourished in freedom, it mattered not how little regard was paid to other potentates; that the caufe of Europe meant their interefts;-was a fort of doctrine which lefs fkill and eloquence than the Prefident's and the Duke's might cafily have enforced. But other means, in fact, were ufed to fecure the active cooperation for which thofe general topics ferved as the pretexts. And when we confider what thofe means were, and how the French monarch employed them, we fhall both ceafe to wonder at his fuccefs in the negotiation, and to doubt what were its real objects.

The parties to whom he confided the fcheme, were, the Pope, the Venetian and Swifs republics, the Duke of Savoy, the Electors of Mentz, Cologne, Bavaria, and the Elector Palatine; the Nobles of Hungary and Bohemia, certain free towns, and others. The Pope was to receive a whole kingdom (Naples) in real fovereignty, with the nominal fupremacy of all Italy, and a place among the electors general; not to mention the inducements of perfecuting the infidels, and ftifling all fectarianifm. It was very fafe to entrust him with fuch fecrets; and it was not being too fanguine to expect his concurrence.

Venice was to receive the

full poffeffion of Sicily; certainly the richest acquifition with which the mafters of the Adriatic could be bribed. It may be remarked, that no pains were taken to inftruct the King of Sicily and Naples of thefe proceedings, which interested him as much as the Pope and Venice. He was to fall under the cognizance of the army of the Chriftian republic; the fecret was to be communicated to him by heralds, and put home to him by bayonets. The Duke of Savoy, too, was initiated with perfect fafety into 3 project which was to give him a rich crown, and exalt him from the lowest to the higheft rank among the princes of Europe. It is not recorded that he made any objections to the propofal; no doubt he was perfuaded of its excellent tendency to fecure the peace of the world, and never hinted at the propriety of difclofing the fcheme to the rightful owners of the realms which he was to receive. The Hungarian and Bohemian nobles naturally, that is, according to the nature of a feudal and factious ariftocracy, preferred any change which deftroyed the prefent hereditary dy

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nafty, and gave each of themselves a chance of the crown. a word, all who were to be benefited by the projected wrongs and oppreflions were made privy to the defign, and zealously pledged their aid to the execution of it. Thofe who were to be ruined by the fcheme, were fpared the pain of knowing its exiftence; and those who were only remotely affected, had not time to give their full attention to the fubject before its author was numbered with the victims of the fcheme fo happily confummated on St Bartholomew's day.

It may be asked, then, where lies all the improbability which has given occafion to the reafonings of M. Chambrier and others against the existence of the plan? That a prince of Henry's plain good fenfe and intimate acquaintance with affairs fhould have formed the defign of giving perpetual peace to the world by means infinitely more chimerical than ever entered the head of a cloistered enthufiaft, might indeed excite our wonder. But there is nothing very aftonishing in the real ftate of the fact, that an ambitious and patriotic monarch, flushed with conquefts, which, neverthelefs, like all the victories of civil war, fet bounds to the further progrefs of his arms against his foreign enemies, fhould have refolved to foment divifions among them, and raife fuch a party in his own favour as might fpare the armies of France, while it raifed her to the highest pitch of continental influence. Under pretence of giving peace to Europe-a pretence addreffed not to his coadjutors whom he was bribing with fpoil, but to the world in general, like all the appeals made in manifeftoes and proclamations-he was only exciting a war of partition, and giving a new pofition to the balance which he faw that France could hold, as the placed it. He was not one of those statesmen who try to form coalitions by defcribing the real interefts of their neighbours in diplomatic conferences, and expect to make foreign armies march into the field by argument and declamation on the propriety of hoftilities. His reafoning was much more practical; it was levelled to the mean capacities of cabinets, as it was drawn from a thorough knowledge of their nature. To one he faid, Attack the House of Auftria, and you fhall have Lombardy for your fhare of the fpoil;' to another, Go to war, and here are fifty thoufand men to aflift you.' Thefe were the fort of topics chiefly infifted upon by Henry; and he knew them to be wonderfully well fuited to the comprehendons of the pawers he had to deal with. That he ever looked beyond the firit movements of his coalition, or expected any thing from the organization of the Italian commonwealth, it would be abfurd to imagine. His end was gained if Auftria was attacked on all files. Having fecured Germany, the Pope, the Duke of Savoy and Switzerland, by liberal offers of pillage;

having

having made fome progrefs in keeping the northern powers quiet by negociation, and probably by fecret offers alfo; and having fucceeded in exciting the utmoft difcontent among the fubjects of fome of the Auftrian provinces, no doubt can be entertained of his final, and even fpeedy fuccefs, to the whole extent of his wifhes the general difmemberment of his great rival's dominions, had he lived longer, or been followed by lefs peaceful fucceffors.

We have feen that the reception of his plan, where he propounded it, prefents nothing more wonderful than the structure of the fcheme itfelf. No improbability then remains to excite our doubts, unlefs perhaps fome admirer of Henry's character fhould imagine that the, perfidy of the tranfaction fuited ill with his general good faith, and other moral qualities. But to fuch a reafoner we thall only fuggeft this plain confideration, that the monarch who could carelesly plunge his country and his neighbours' in all the horrors of war, to purfue the gratification of his paffion for a filly woman, was either not very likely to feel squeamish upon the much more doubtful queftion of gaining a great and good end by improper means; or was a perfon upon whole fteadinefs of principle in public affairs no confidence could be placed. The character of this fingular perfon is in truth vaftly too mixed, to admit of any fuch pofitive inferences as thofe which are drawn against the likelihood of particular paffages in a man's life, from their difcrepancy with his general habits.

Although we are of opinion that the foregoing confiderations render any difcullion of the authenticity of the ftatements in Sully's memoirs a matter of fubordinate importance, we shall neverthelefs add a few words, for the purpofe of noticing the evidence upon which thofe reft. It is to this view of the question that M. Chambrier directs his whole attention; and it may ferve as a fupplement to the remarks already offered upon the intrinfic merits of the fubject.

Sully, fays our author, is the only hiftorian who mentions the particulars of Henry's plan, as we have above sketched it. Others talk of his grand defign; but they mean by thofe terms a project for the general conqueft of Auftria, which is faid to have been his real view, after he fhould have obtained the perfon of the Princefs of Condé, by making war upon the Netherlands. From fo hurtful a fcheme, the Duke is reported to have turned him afide by his frugal fyftem of government; and D'Etrées, in his Memoires, fhews that, immediately after Henry's death, this prudent minifter ufed his utmost influence with Louis XIII. and Mary the regent, in favour of pacific councils. M. Chambrier then argues, that the memoirs of Sully having been compiled

from