Taber and Jackman was so overwhelming, that almost every one felt sure of their conviction. To such an extent did this opinion prevail, that no member of the Essex bar was willing to undertake their defence. Under these circumstances, two or three individuals, who had been early convinced that the major's stories were false from beginning to end, determined, the day before the trial, to send to Suffolk for counsel. Mr. Webster had just then removed to Boston from Portsmouth. His services were engaged; and, late in the night preceding the day of trial, he arrived at Ipswich, having had no opportunity to examine the witnesses, and but little time for consultation. The indictment against Taber was nol prossed, and the trial of the Kennistons was commenced. Mr. Webster, as senior counsel, conducted the defence with a degree of ability, boldness, tact and legal learning which had rarely been witnessed in Essex county; and, notwithstanding the accumulated mass of evidence against the Kennistons, they were acquitted.

"At the next term of the supreme judicial court, Jackman was indicted and tried; but the jury did not agree, though the Hon. William Prescott had been employed to assist the prosecuting officer. Jackman was again tried at the next term of the court, and this time defended by Mr. Webster, and acquitted.

"The criminal prosecutions growing out of this affair being thus ended, Mr. Pearson commenced an action against Goodridge for malicious prosecution, laying his damages at two thousand dollars, which sum the jury awarded him without leaving their seats. In this case also Mr. Webster was counsel for the plaintiff; and time had brought forth so many new facts, and the evidence was so clear and overwhelming against Goodridge, that the public became satisfied that he was his own robber!

He was surrendered by his bail, committed to jail, took the poor debtors' oath, and soon after left the commonwealth, and has not resided here since. The public rarely stop to consider how much they are indebted to men like Webster for laying bare the villainy of such a deep-laid and diabolical plot. But for him, there is no doubt the Kennistons and Jackman would have been convicted of highway-robbery, though innocent."

After Mr. Webster had resided about two years in Boston, he was urged by his friends to become a candidate for Congress for the third time. This offer he positively declined; and a short time afterward when his admirers wished to put forward his name before the Legislature of Massachusetts as candidate for election to the United. States Senate, he returned the same answer, and again declined the proffered honor. The truth was, that both his interests and his inclination bound him to his profession, and he would not permit himself to be diverted at that time from its duties even by the prospect of the highest political promotion. Seven years were thus spent by Mr. Webster in professional pursuits before he again allowed himself to be involved in the distracting strife of politics, excepting in capacities or relations which were to him matters of small moment. Thus, he served as one of the Presidential electors of Massachusetts at the re-election of Mr. Monroe; and he was also a delegate to the convention which revised the Constitution of the Commonwealth in 1821.

During the period in which Mr. Webster devoted himself exclusively to his legal practice in Boston, he was employed in many cases of great interest and of the highest consequence, both in Boston and in the Supreme Court of the United States. Our limits forbid us to enumerate of these; and we will confine ourselves to but one,

many

-the memorable Dartmouth College case against Woodward. In the year 1769 a charter had been obtained. from the Legislature creating and establishing the corporation of the college. It was designated therein as a charityschool, which had originally been founded by Dr. Eleazer Wheelock, and supported by funds which he had collected, or caused to be collected, both in England and America. Subsequently the Legislature of New Hampshire passed several acts which conflicted with some of the provisions of the original charter; and the question to be determined by the Supreme Court in that trial was, whether the acts of the Legislature, which virtually destroyed the original corporation, which was to consist of but twelve members and no more, and which created in effect a new and a different corporation, were binding upon the old corporation without their consent; if, moreover, those acts were not contrary to the Constitution of the United States. The cause was tried in the first instance in the court of Rockingham county, and judgment was given in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the acts of the Legislature in question. A writ of error was sued out by the original plaintiffs, and the cause removed to the Supreme Federal Court at Washington. The case was finally

argued on the 10th of March, 1818, before a full bench. Messrs. Webster and Hopkinson represented the plaintiffs in error, Messrs. Holmes and Wirt the defendant in error. Able as were the antagonists of Mr. Webster in this celebrated trial, his abilities transcended them all. After lengthy and elaborate arguments on both sides, the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs, the College of Dartmouth, and by a final decree declared the acts of the Legislature to have been invalid, and reversed the judgment of the court below.

As this was one of the most signal triumphs of Mr.

Webster's intellect, it may be proper to introduce here an extract from the masterly argument which he delivered on the occasion. Among his many great forensic efforts, none exhibited more clearly and imposingly the grasp, clearness and power of his mind in dealing with the most intricate and profound principles which are involved in one of the most abstruse and recondite of sciences. After having argued the two fundamental points that the acts of the Legislature were in violation of common right and the Constitution of New Hampshire, and that they were repugnant to the Federal Constitution, which forbids all ex post facto laws, he concluded his speech as follows:

"There are in this case all the essential constituent

parts of a contract. There is something to be contracted about; there are parties; and there are plain terms in which the agreement of the parties on the subject of the contract. is expressed. There are mutual considerations and inducements. The charter recites that the founder, on his part, has agreed to establish his seminary in New Hampshire, and to enlarge it beyond its original design, among other things, for the benefit of that province; and thereupon a charter is given to him and his associates, designated by himself, promising and assuring to them, under the plighted faith of this State, the right of governing the college and administering its concerns in the manner provided in the charter. There is a complete and perfect grant to them of all the power of superintendence, visitation and government. Is not this a contract? If lands or money had been granted to him and his associates for the same purposes, such grant could not be rescinded. And is there any difference, in legal contemplation, between a grant of corporate franchises and a grant of tangible property? No such difference is recognised in any decided case, nor does it exist in the common apprehension of mankind.

"It is, therefore, contended that this case falls within the true meaning of this provision of the Constitution, as expounded in the decisions of this court; that the charter of 1769 is a contract, a stipulation or agreement, mutual in its considerations, express and formal in its terms and of a most binding and solemn nature. That the acts in question impair this contract has already been sufficiently shown. They repeal and abrogate its most essential parts.

"A single observation may not be improper on the opinion of the court of New Hampshire, which has been published. The learned judges who delivered that opinion have viewed this question in a very different light from that in which the plaintiffs have endeavored to exhibit it. After some general remarks, they assume that this college is a public corporation; and on this basis their judgment rests. Whether all colleges are not regarded as private and eleemosynary corporations by all law-writers and all judicial decisions; whether this college was not founded by Dr. Wheelock; whether the charter was not granted at his request, the better to execute a trust which he had already created; whether he and his associates did not become visitors by the charter; and whether Dartmouth. College be not, therefore, in the strictest sense, a private charity, are questions which the learned judges do not appear to have discussed.

"It is admitted in that opinion that, if it be a private corporation, its rights stand on the same ground as those of an individual. The great question, therefore, to be decided, is, To which class of corporations do colleges thus founded belong? And the plaintiffs have endeavored to satisfy the court that, according to the well-settled principles and uniform decisions of law, they are private, eleemosynary corporations.

"Much has heretofore been said on the necessity of