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Of the Portuguese militia 1200 instead of returning home, entered, voluntarily into the service of France, and were employed as pioneers. Part of the 24th Portuguese regiment of the line, too, instead of being sent with the rest of the garrison to France, were kept for the service of the French army, as that regiment, Massena, says, had manifested a good disposition: they were placed under the command of Portuguese officers who were warmly attached to the French and hated the English: 112 Portuguese cannoniers, and 40 horsemen, also offered

themselves, and were admitted into the French service. "But," says Massena, "I shall always have an eye on these troops, and take care to place them only in the least important stations.

It was the division of Ney's corps, under the orders of general Loison, that pushed the sieges of both

Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. The other troops had not in those enterprises discharged a firelock. They were however employed in covering the sieges, as well as in other movements, preliminary to Massena's intended march to Lisbon.

• Massena to the Prince of Neufchatel, Fort de la Conception, 30th Aug. 1810.

CHAP. XII.

Plan of Lord Wellington for the Defence of Portugal, and at the same time supporting the Cause of Spain.-His Army, for near Three Months after his Retreat from Talavera, how stationed. His Army augmented by Portuguese Troops, disciplined by Field Marshal Beresford.-How quartered in and after the Month of February.-Their Positions when they come nearly in contact with the Enemy advancing on PortugalAnd their Line of Retreat on strong and impregnable Fortifications near Lisbon-After the Surrender of Almeida, Lord Wellington begins to retreat and concentrate his Forces.-Marshal Massena, at the head of the French Army of Portugal, pursues.-Lord Wellington, for impeding as much as possible the Advance of the Enemy into the interior of the Country, obliges the Inhabitants to quit their Homes, and remove or destroy all that could be of use to the Enemy.-The Plan of Massena for turning the left Flank of the Allies, frustrated by Lord Wellington.Battle of Buzaco.-The French repulsed in an Attack on the Position of the Allies; but they turn the Left of the Allies, and advance on Coimbra, whither Lord Wellington, with the main body of his Army, arrives before him.-Retreat of Lord Wellington to his Lines at Torres Vedras.

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These described.—Difficulties in which the French are involved, being drawn into a Snare by the military Genius of Lord Wellington.-Their Sufferings, particularly from want of Provisions.-Their Positions at first in front of the Allies.-Skirmishes-Massena hemmed in on all Sides. His Operations confined to Self-defence against the Allies, and against Famine-Relative Positions of the French and the Allied Army of Portugal at the close of 1810.

"T is now time to return to lord

chief of the British army, whom in our last volume* we left at Merida, on his retreat from Talavera. The reasons were then stated why his lordship declined any further co-operation with the Spanish army at that time. But he was not pressed by the most urgent necessity, nor in extreme haste to retire immediately out of Spain; and if he should retire into Portugal, it was his intention to pro

where he in reality as

ceed no farther than the frontier,

serviceable to the Spanish government, as he should be in the position they had pointed out to him; nay, and even more serviceable.— Pursuant to this plan, the allied army was stationed for near three months between Merida and Badajoz; from whence he was obliged to retreat beyond the Spanish frontier, by the necessity of defending Portugal. The events of the war in Old Castile, rendered

• Vol. LI. HIST. EUR. p. 193.

it necessary for lord Wellington to retreat from Badajoz in December to the north of the Tagus. It enjoyed repose for some time at Lisbon, and in the vicinity of that capital. In February, the Eng lish army, augmented by Portuguese troops, disciplined by the general marshal Beresford, were quartered on an extended line, comprehending Oporto, Lamego, Vizeu, Coimbra, Abrantes, and Santarem. From the vicinity of Abrantes and Santarem, general Hill, with a considerable body of cavalry, descended to the Guadi ana, to watch and check the enemy, who had appeared before Badajoz. The more remote situations in the strong country of Tralos-montes was not defended. A party of the enemy had approached the city of Braganza, and, after having sum moned it to surrender, withdrew from the vicinity without success, It is unnecessary to follow the Anglo-Portuguese army in all their changes of position in the months of March and April, during the greater part of which months lord Wellington's head quarters were at Vizeu. It will be sufficient to notice their positions when they came nearly into contact with the enemy advancing towards, and engaged in the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. The front of the army was as follows: It was distributed into five divisions; the first under gen. Spencer, about 6,000, lay at Celerico, about twenty miles distant from the grand French army. The second, commanded by gen. Hill, about 8,000, was placed as the central division in the mountains at Portalegre, between the Tagus and the Guadiana, from whence it looked down

on the frontier of Spain. The third division under general Cole, was stationed at Guarda, which was the principal post, and twenty miles distant from the French lines: it was about 10,000 strong. The fourth division, 4,000, commanded by general Picton, lay at a village called Pen-hell. The fifth division, under general Craw furd, was stationed half way between the principal corps of the English army at Guarda and the French lines at Ciudad Rodrigo, that is, about ten miles from each. But this fifth division was constantly shifting its position, advancing, which it some times did even as far as St. Felizes, or retrograding according to contingent circumstances. The Portu guese troops, under the command of general Beresford, in the end of July joined lord Wellington, whose head quarters were at Celerico. All these divisions were posted in the mountains, or their slopes descending gradually into the plain, at the farther end of which stood Ciudad Rodrigo. Thus there lay between the two armies this plain, which was in breadth ten miles.

Between the principal British station at Guarda and Lisbon there was a distance of 190 miles, which is a march of twenty days. There are three roads leading from Lisbon to the frontier of Spain: first, one by Abrantes; second, by Elvas; and a third by Coimbra. The route of the British army in its progress northward lay by Abrantes. The first post of great importance on this route is Santarem. It is strongly situated on heights, at the distance of fortyfive miles from Lisbon. It com.

mands the great eastern road, and forms the defence of Lisbon, against an enemy advancing from the Spanish frontier: it is flanked on the south-east by the Tagus, and on the north-east byexceedinglysteep mountains; it is further strengthened by fortifications, which command the road that runs between those heights and the river. To give an idea of the extent of Santarem, it will be sufficient to say, that it contains seventeen churches. Santarem bears sad marks of the French invasion in 1808. Junot's army pillaged both churches and altars; they respected nothing but the fortifications. The next important post on the great eastern road to Spain, is Abrantes, distant thirty miles from Santarem; than which it is of still greater importance. It is seventy miles distant from Lisbon, and one hundred and twenty from Guarda, which was the principal station of the British army: it is situated fast by the Tagus; it was a Roman station; a circumstance which sufficiently indicates its natural strength. It was not fortified. Villa Velha is another military position, inasmuch as it commands another passage over the Tagus. It is environed by rugged and bare mountains, through which the Tagus seems to burst by force. Castello Branco is situate at the foot of another pass. The country around is full of military positions, so strong, that it may be considered as one fortification. Castello Branco was also a Roman station. The citadel and walls are in ruins, It could not stand a siege; but still it is a strong position. Midway between Castello Branco and Guar da is Cavilha. Here the country

begins to rise, to become rugged, and to be covered with heights, forming what in the peninsula are called Sierras, or chains of mountains. The Sierra d'Estrellas, or Mountain of Stars, in the immediate vicinity of Covilha, rises to the height of 6,000 feet above the level of the sea. It is so steep, that while the stones of some of the houses built thereon are 50 or 60 feet from the ground on one side, their floors, as in the city of Edinburgh, on the opposite side are on a level with it. A city so large and so situated as Covilha, must be of incalculable advantage, in case of a retreat, in opposing an advancing enemy.

From Covilha the ground rises from mountain to mountain to Guarda, the principal station of the English. It stands on one of the mountains of the Sierra d'Estrellas, near the source of the Mondego; it has an old castle, and is encompassed by turreted stone walls. Guarda is so situated, that when seen at a distance it looks like a steeple on the summit of the mountain on which it is situate. The roads leading to it are extended over clefts of rocks: it is beyond a doubt the strongest position in Portugal; it is impreg

able. So long as lord Wellington could feed his army at Guarda, he could set the whole power of France at defiance. Guarda might be reduced by famine, but not by force. From Guarda to Ciudad Rodrigo, for a considerable time, the head quarters of Massena, the distance is about twenty-five miles; but the two armies were so far advanced beyond their respective head quarters, that divisions of them were sometimes within ten,

seven, and even five miles of each other. On the same general line with Guarda, but some miles lower down, and nearer the plain, are the towns or villages of Sabugal, Alfaytes, Coa, Monqulada, and Fort La Conception.

From the heights of Pen-hell, Celerico, and Guarda, our army could every day see, at no great distance, the French lines in the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo. The cavalry changed their position, advancing or retreating according to circumstances. Sometimes they descended quite into the plain; when, of course, there was some skirmishing with the French out posts.

Such then were the positions of the British army, and such their line of retreat. For though the course of the campaign rendered it advisable to fall back on Lisbon by the valley of the Mondego and Coimbra, it was, no doubt, lord Wellington's first intention to fall back, not by the Coimbra road to Lisbon, but that of Abrantes, which presented so many advantageous positions for opposing, harassing, and wearing out the enemy; in some of which positions too he had left garrisons for covering the flanks of his army, and securing their retreat. With regard to the position of the French army, it lay in general in the great plain, at the feet of the mountains on which the English and Portuguese remained in the encampments. In this plain are situated the city of Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and, at a certain distance, Valencia. The whole of the divisions were not stationed in the plain; but they were all of them so posted that they could effect a junction before they could VOL. LII.

be forced to come to a general engagement.

The great object of the French was, to conquer the Peninsula; that of lord Wellington to preserve Portugal.

The cavalry attached to brigadier-general Crawfurd's advanced guard remained in the villages near the fort of La Conception till the 21st of July, when the enemy obliged it to retire towards Almeida, and fort Conception was destroyed. From that day, till July the 24th, general Crawfurd continued to occupy a position near Almeida, within 1,800 yards of the fort; and his left extended towards Zuma. On the morning of the 24th, shortly after day-light, the enemy attacked him in this position with a body of 7,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. It was the object of the enemy to cut off the division under Crawfurd from joining the main army. The brigadier, who had only 4,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, retired by the bridge across the Coa. A position close in front of the bridge, was maintained as long as it was necessary to give time to the troops that had passed to take up one behind the bridge and the river; and the bridge was afterwards defended with the greatest gallantry. The enemy made three efforts to storm it; all of which were repelled, with very considerable loss on both sides. After it was dark, general Crawfurd withdrew the troops from the Coa, and retreated to Carvelhal; for it did not enter into the plan on which lord Wellington conducted the campaign, to support the fifth corps or division of his army in its advanced positions. He had formed a plan

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