The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of EvilOxford University Press, 2002/09/12 - 304 ページ What distinguishes evils from ordinary wrongs? Is hatred a necessarily evil? Are some evils unforgivable? Are there evils we should tolerate? What can make evils hard to recognize? Are evils inevitable? How can we best respond to and live with evils? Claudia Card offers a secular theory of evil that responds to these questions and more. Evils, according to her theory, have two fundamental components. One component is reasonably foreseeable intolerable harm -- harm that makes a life indecent and impossible or that makes a death indecent. The other component is culpable wrongdoing. Atrocities, such as genocides, slavery, war rape, torture, and severe child abuse, are Cards paradigms because in them these key elements are writ large. Atrocities deserve more attention than secular philosophers have so far paid them. They are distinguished from ordinary wrongs not by the psychological states of evildoers but by the seriousness of the harm that is done. Evildoers need not be sadistic:they may simply be negligent or unscrupulous in pursuing their goals. Cards theory represents a compromise between classic utilitarian and stoic alternatives (including Kants theory of radical evil). Utilitarians tend to reduce evils to their harms; Stoics tend to reduce evils to the wickedness of perpetrators: Card accepts neither reduction. She also responds to Nietzsches challenges about the worth of the concept of evil, and she uses her theory to argue that evils are more important than merely unjust inequalities. She applies the theory in explorations of war rape and violence against intimates. She also takes up what Primo Levi called the gray zone, where victims become complicit in perpetrating on others evils that threaten to engulf themselves. While most past accounts of evil have focused on perpetrators, Card begins instead from the position of the victims, but then considers more generally how to respond to -- and live with -- evils, as victims, as perpetrators, and as those who have become both. |
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... justification. My theory presupposes no such agency, but can be adapted for those who do. When not guided by moral agents, forces of nature are neither goods nor evils. They just are. Their "agency" routinely produces consequences vital ...
... justification. My theory presupposes no such agency, but can be adapted for those who do. When not guided by moral agents, forces of nature are neither goods nor evils. They just are. Their "agency" routinely produces consequences vital ...
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... justification, unfathomable to mere humans. The atrocity paradigm thus makes sense of what is morally at stake in the theological problem of evil, but without solving it and without presupposing either theism or atheism. In contrast to ...
... justification, unfathomable to mere humans. The atrocity paradigm thus makes sense of what is morally at stake in the theological problem of evil, but without solving it and without presupposing either theism or atheism. In contrast to ...
17 ページ
... justify an option as “the lesser of two evils.” Common sense here is not philosophically deep. Unlike most contemporary ethical theories, it does not distinguish among such conn u cepts as ”unjustified,” ”wrong, culpable,” and ”harmful ...
... justify an option as “the lesser of two evils.” Common sense here is not philosophically deep. Unlike most contemporary ethical theories, it does not distinguish among such conn u cepts as ”unjustified,” ”wrong, culpable,” and ”harmful ...
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... justified in committing the lesser of two atrocities. If the deed is morally justified, it is not culpable and therefore does not produce an evil, even if others suffer undeservedly. Yet there is the well-known problem of ”dirty hands ...
... justified in committing the lesser of two atrocities. If the deed is morally justified, it is not culpable and therefore does not produce an evil, even if others suffer undeservedly. Yet there is the well-known problem of ”dirty hands ...
46 ページ
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目次
3 | |
2 Nietzsches Denial of Evil | 27 |
Two Extremes | 50 |
4 Kants Theory of Radical Evil | 73 |
5 Prioritizing Evils over Unjust Inequalities | 96 |
6 Rape in War | 118 |
7 Terrorism in the Home | 139 |
8 The Moral Powers of Victims | 166 |
9 The Moral Burdens and Obligations of Perpetrators | 188 |
Diabolical Evil Revisited | 211 |
Notes | 235 |
Index | 265 |
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abuse argues atrocity paradigm basic benefits better Cambridge Categorical Imperative chapter choices comfort women concept of evil conflicts crimes culpable wrongdoing death deeds defined definition diabolical evil difficult Essays ethics evildoers example feminism feminist find first forgiveness Genealogy Genealogy of Morality gratitude gray zone guilt hatred hostility human identified inequalities inflicted intolerable harm John Rawls justified Kant Kant’s lesbian less lives marriage Martha Nussbaum Mary Daly mercy misogyny moral Moral Luck motherhood mothers motives murder Nietzsche Nietzsche's Nussbaum obligation offender ofjustice one’s oppression penalty perpetrators perspectives philosophers practices principle prioritize prisoners punishment question radical evil rape Rawls Rawls’s reflection regarding relationships resentment response same-sex sense sexual sexual slavery significant simply slavery slaves social Sonderkommando specific spouses Stockholm Syndrome stoic stoicism suffering survivors terrorism theory of evil things tion torture trans University Press utilitarian values victims violence Wiesenthal Wiesenthal’s women wrong York