The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of EvilOxford University Press, 2002/09/12 - 304 ページ What distinguishes evils from ordinary wrongs? Is hatred a necessarily evil? Are some evils unforgivable? Are there evils we should tolerate? What can make evils hard to recognize? Are evils inevitable? How can we best respond to and live with evils? Claudia Card offers a secular theory of evil that responds to these questions and more. Evils, according to her theory, have two fundamental components. One component is reasonably foreseeable intolerable harm -- harm that makes a life indecent and impossible or that makes a death indecent. The other component is culpable wrongdoing. Atrocities, such as genocides, slavery, war rape, torture, and severe child abuse, are Cards paradigms because in them these key elements are writ large. Atrocities deserve more attention than secular philosophers have so far paid them. They are distinguished from ordinary wrongs not by the psychological states of evildoers but by the seriousness of the harm that is done. Evildoers need not be sadistic:they may simply be negligent or unscrupulous in pursuing their goals. Cards theory represents a compromise between classic utilitarian and stoic alternatives (including Kants theory of radical evil). Utilitarians tend to reduce evils to their harms; Stoics tend to reduce evils to the wickedness of perpetrators: Card accepts neither reduction. She also responds to Nietzsches challenges about the worth of the concept of evil, and she uses her theory to argue that evils are more important than merely unjust inequalities. She applies the theory in explorations of war rape and violence against intimates. She also takes up what Primo Levi called the gray zone, where victims become complicit in perpetrating on others evils that threaten to engulf themselves. While most past accounts of evil have focused on perpetrators, Card begins instead from the position of the victims, but then considers more generally how to respond to -- and live with -- evils, as victims, as perpetrators, and as those who have become both. |
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... sense that we do not choose evil simply for its own sake. Until the past two decades, surprisingly few secular moral philosophers have attended specifically to the concept of evil. The traditional problem of evil (to be discussed ...
... sense that we do not choose evil simply for its own sake. Until the past two decades, surprisingly few secular moral philosophers have attended specifically to the concept of evil. The traditional problem of evil (to be discussed ...
12 ページ
... sense to a notion that Kant, who understood it differently, found inapplicable to human beings. Levi was acutely sensitive to complicity issues in his reflections on death-camp prisoners who performed services for captors in exchange ...
... sense to a notion that Kant, who understood it differently, found inapplicable to human beings. Levi was acutely sensitive to complicity issues in his reflections on death-camp prisoners who performed services for captors in exchange ...
13 ページ
... sense of what is morally at stake in the theological problem of evil, but without solving it and without presupposing either theism or atheism. In contrast to the classical treatments of the theological problem of evil, however, the ...
... sense of what is morally at stake in the theological problem of evil, but without solving it and without presupposing either theism or atheism. In contrast to the classical treatments of the theological problem of evil, however, the ...
15 ページ
... sense. Historian Michael Burleigh notes, for example, that the atrocities of the Nazi “euthanasia" program were not as great as those of Hitler's Final Solution.“ Yet an atrocity is already so evil that in some contexts it seems ...
... sense. Historian Michael Burleigh notes, for example, that the atrocities of the Nazi “euthanasia" program were not as great as those of Hitler's Final Solution.“ Yet an atrocity is already so evil that in some contexts it seems ...
16 ページ
... sense of one's own worth as a person. Severe and unremitting pain or humiliation, debilitating and disfiguring diseases, starvation, extreme impotence, and severe enforced isolation are evils when they are brought about or supported by ...
... sense of one's own worth as a person. Severe and unremitting pain or humiliation, debilitating and disfiguring diseases, starvation, extreme impotence, and severe enforced isolation are evils when they are brought about or supported by ...
目次
3 | |
2 Nietzsches Denial of Evil | 27 |
Two Extremes | 50 |
4 Kants Theory of Radical Evil | 73 |
5 Prioritizing Evils over Unjust Inequalities | 96 |
6 Rape in War | 118 |
7 Terrorism in the Home | 139 |
8 The Moral Powers of Victims | 166 |
9 The Moral Burdens and Obligations of Perpetrators | 188 |
Diabolical Evil Revisited | 211 |
Notes | 235 |
Index | 265 |
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abuse argues atrocity paradigm basic benefits better Cambridge Categorical Imperative chapter choices comfort women concept of evil conflicts crimes culpable wrongdoing death deeds defined definition diabolical evil difficult Essays ethics evildoers example feminism feminist find first forgiveness Genealogy Genealogy of Morality gratitude gray zone guilt hatred hostility human identified inequalities inflicted intolerable harm John Rawls justified Kant Kant’s lesbian less lives marriage Martha Nussbaum Mary Daly mercy misogyny moral Moral Luck motherhood mothers motives murder Nietzsche Nietzsche's Nussbaum obligation offender ofjustice one’s oppression penalty perpetrators perspectives philosophers practices principle prioritize prisoners punishment question radical evil rape Rawls Rawls’s reflection regarding relationships resentment response same-sex sense sexual sexual slavery significant simply slavery slaves social Sonderkommando specific spouses Stockholm Syndrome stoic stoicism suffering survivors terrorism theory of evil things tion torture trans University Press utilitarian values victims violence Wiesenthal Wiesenthal’s women wrong York