bably a little too high, there can be no doubt that the actual loss of property to the citizens of the Northern States, added to the loss consequent on the terrible check thus put upon the development or their mercantile marine, really constituted a most important item in the balance of the national accounts rendered necessary by the civil war. There were, of course, certain conditions essential to the complete success of a cruiser like the Alabama; and we can readily discern what those conditions are, now that the events of the civil war have become matters of history. In the halcyon days when the Alabama was rapidly adding prize to prize, and Captain Semmes was increasing his collection of chronometers-which he naïvely admits it was one of his amusements "to wind and compare daily"—the Federal flag was almost entirely absent from foreign stations, nearly every available ship being used for the maintenance of the blockade, so that the Alabama in the course of her cruises only had to fight twice with war ships. The first of these actions was that with the gunboat Hatteras, which was sunk, and the second that with the Kearsage, in which the Alabama met the same fate. In nearly every sea she sailed her course was unopposed, and the record of her doings presents scarcely any other features than those connected with the capture of unarmed merchant ships. The Federals were fully conscious of the only means that would suffice to put a period to her havoc-spreading career, and as soon as ever they had provided for the still more pressing exigencies of the blockade, proceeded to construct the Kearsage and her consorts specially for the purpose of destroying the Alabama. The spectacle must, however, have been most irritating to the citizens of a powerful republic, when they had for the time to bear unresistingly the injuries done to their commerce by such an intrinsically despicable adversary; injuries which, by their frequent repetition, threatened a serious drain of vital vigour, although, like the gnat's bite, individually of little moment. The strenuous efforts required and made at this time to provide an efficient blockading force are, perhaps, appreciated by only a few of our readers. When the war broke out, the navy of the United States consisted of 42 ships in commission, 26 of these only being screw vessels of war. With this force available, the Secretary of the Navy was called upon to form the blockade of a coast-line exceeding 3000 miles in length, and abounding with inlets, ports, and inner coast-lines, while in the neighbourhood were hovering crowds of adventurous blockade runners, ready to take the risk of capture for the sake of the chance of getting safely through with their precious cargoes. Both sides fully recognised the important effect which the blockade must have if it could be completed, and in one of his Reports the Secretary of the Federal Navy thus describes the action he took under these circumstances:-" It was necessary, first of all, to make available every naval vessel, to recall our foreign squadron, to increase our force by building new vessels, and by procuring for naval purposes from the merchant service every steamer which could be made a fighting vessel, to enlarge at once the capacity of the navy yards, to put into requisition the founderies and the workshops of the country for supplies of ordnance and steam machinery, to augment the number of the seamen, and to supply the deficiency of officers by selecting experienced and able ship-masters and others from the mercantile marine." By efforts such as these the number of ships in commission was doubled within four months of the commencement of hostilities, and in nine months had risen from 42 to 264. A year after the number stood at 427, and at the end of the year 1864-about three years and three-quarters from the outbreak of the war-it had reached 671. These are noteworthy facts, and they show most conclusively that nothing but sheer inability to do more prevented the earlier construction of ships of the Kearsage class. We all know how the end came at last, and how the efforts of the Federals were rewarded. Gradually, but surely, the grasp of their blockading squadrons tightened round the Confederate coast; port after port was closed to the blockade-runners; and unable themselves to produce the munitions of war or the matériel required for the continuance of the struggle, the Confederates had to yield. Had they become possessed of any armoured war ships which could have broken the blockade, the result might have been different, or at least the end would not have come so soon. But while the Federal war-fleet, numerous as it soon became, was fully occupied in keeping watch and ward along the Southern coast, the Sumter and other cruisers at first, and afterwards the Alabama, were roving far and wide, and bringing home most unpleasantly to the minds of Northern ship-owners the fact, that while the Confederates had no navy that could meet their own, they had ships afloat which could overhaul, capture, and ransom or destroy any merchantman. In the instructions which Captain Semmes received before sailing in the Sumter he was ordered "to do the enemy's commerce the greatest injury in the shortest time;" and certainly all the cruisers equipped by the Confederates acted up to the letter of these instructions. The policy adopted by the Southern States was not at all a new one, it was only a repetition of that which, under the name of "privateering," had become famous in the olden times, when steamships were not. Captain Semmes energetically repudiates the idea that the Sumter and the Alabama were privateers, basing his objection to that title on the fact that they were regularly commissioned by the Confederate Government. The Northerners gave them a worse name, and, even in official documents, termed them pirates. Whether pirates or not, however, they did the work of privateers; and in nearly all cases sought to avoid ships of war. Neither Englishmen nor Americans required to be taught that in fighting an enemy who is possessed of a large merchant navy, one of the surest means of inflicting damage is the striking a heavy blow at its commerce. As far back almost as our naval history extends this principle has been acted upon, and perhaps no better illustration of the effect of this mode of making war can be given than that afforded by the reign of Elizabeth, when English privateers swept the Spanish merchant ships, partially armed though they were, from the seas. What then, it may be asked, was it which gave such fame to the Alabama and her consorts? The answer appears to be simple and twofold. First, there were the peculiar circumstances of the struggle, in which these cruisers stood alone as the representatives of the Confederate naval power at sea. Secondly, to quote from Captain Semmes' preface:-"The Alabama was the first steam-ship in the history of the world—the defective little Sumter excepted—that was let loose against the commerce of a great commercial people. The destruction which she caused was enormous. She not only alarmed the enemy, but she alarmed all the other nations of the earth which had commerce afloat, as they could not be sure that a similar scourge, at some future time, might not be let loose against themselves. The Alabama, in consequence, became famous. It was the fame of steam." To understand the full force of this observation, it must be remembered that, although steamships are now very extensively employed in the mercantile marine, yet the great majority of merchant ships-in fact, nearly all those employed in the carrying trade to distant countries -are still equipped as sailing ships, some of them having, it is true, auxiliary steam power, that enables them to proceed at low speed through the region of the calms, or to make some headway should progress under sail in the course desired become impossible. Against other sailing vessels, equipped as privateers, these merchantmen formerly had some chance, as their superior fleetness might save them; but against a steam privateer, even of moderate speed only, like the Alabama, they have no chance whatever. Perhaps it was this fact more than any other that gave rise to the belief, formerly so wide spread, in the great speed of the Alabama, since she was usually engaged in overhauling sailing ships. As we have said, Captain Semmes puts her full speed down at ten knots; and it is well known that most of our iron-clads have considerably higher speeds; while the Atlantic mail steamers occasionally make passages across at an average speed of thirteen or fourteen knots. The Alabama's career would probably have been cut short much sooner had she been a cruiser engaged in destroying British commerce, for our war ships on foreign stations were constantly crossing her path; and, being so much superior in fighting power, while they possessed equal or greater speed, would, without doubt, have either captured or sunk her. The success she achieved, however, points clearly to the advantage which this country would possess in war time in having such a numerous fleet of swift ocean-going mail steamers: since, by supply ing them with one or two heavy guns, they might be turned into commerce-destroying cruisers, quite as useful as, if not more efficient than, the Alabama, their very high speed and great coal supply enabling them to steam away from all, or nearly all, ships of war belonging to other countries. America and France could, it is true, do something in the same direction; but their resources are only limited when compared with our own. Naval men, both in this country and America, not only became impressed with the advantages that would result from the employment of this irregular force of steam privateers; but also began to advocate the introduction into the war navies of a class of swift, unarmoured cruisers-Alabamas of the future-which should have a good, though not a very heavy armament; should be able to fight any other unarmoured ship, and should be faster than the fastest mail steamers, so that they could "show heels" to any iron-clad, and overhaul any merchant ship, whether equipped as a privateer or not. It was in America that this idea first took a tangible form; and, as soon as the completion of the blockade permitted, a class of ship was designed, and several vessels were pushed on with all possible rapidity, in order to fulfil the requirements which the naval authorities considered essential in these swift cruisers. No secret was made of the employment proposed for them. In case of a war with England, they were to "wipe out our mercantile marine;" or, to quote from another description, they were "to have out-Alabamaed the Alabama in chasing, capturing, and destroying British shipping." No words of ours can, however, so properly convey an idea of the real sentiments of Americans respecting this, the so-called Wampanoag class, as those written by an American; and on this account we have extracted the following passage from Dr. Boynton's "History of the Navy During the Rebellion," a work, be it observed, of which its author states that "the whole material for this work has been drawn from documents in possession of the Navy Department;" so that it may be regarded as semi-official. Speaking of these cruisers, he says :-"It was evident that in case of a war with France or England, or both, though we might with our iron-clads defend our coast from the combined attack, yet if we had no powerful ocean cruisers with which to destroy their commerce, or threaten them at home, that our coast might be virtually blockaded by their fleets and our commerce destroyed; while their own merchant ships would be safely employed on every sea . . . . The enterprise and energy which characterised the (Navy) Department during the whole war enabled it to provide for these new dangers, while sorely pressed by the difficulties and burdens of the rebellion. It decided to lay down an entirely new class of ships, of which the Wampanoag may be regarded as the type. It was not intended that these vessels should be overloaded with a battery. Their armament consists of a few heavy guns. They are full shiprigged; their capacity for carrying coal is great in proportion to their size; and under either sail or steam they were expected to make at least fifteen knots per hour. . . . The peculiarities of these ships are obvious; their spread of canvas is enormous, and this, with their great length and comparative narrowness of beam, gives them the utmost speed attainable by vessels under sail. At the same time, instead of the weight of a full battery, they carry the most powerful engines that even their immense hulls can bear; and have, therefore, the maximum speed which any ocean steamer has yet attained. Their few heavy guns, and the rapidity of their movements, enable them to cope with any wooden ship if they choose to risk a battle; and they are fleet enough to avoid a conflict when they do not desire to fight. In case of a war with England, it is quite easy to see what the proper work of such cruisers would be. It would not be to fight the British Navy, for we have other ships better fitted for that work. It would not be their province to defend our coast and sea-board cities, for that can be done effectually by our iron-clads. But let one of these enormous sea-racers take in a full supply of coal, and then, using her engines only when absolutely necessary, cross the ocean under sail, and place herself on one of the highways of British commerce, prepared there to use steam or sails as might best suit her purpose, who can measure the havoc she would make? Suppose thirty such were scattered over the seas, how long would the merchant marine of England remain afloat? Such are the formid |