"My third instance shall be of Athalia, queen of Jerusalem, of whom the holy Scriptures say, Athalia vero mater regis Ochosiæ, videns filium suum mortuum surrexit et interfecit omne semen regium. Tollens autem Josaba filia regis Joran et soror Ochosiæ Joas filium Ochosiæ furata est eum de medio filiorum regis qui interficiebantur, et nutricem ejus de triclinio et abscondit eum a facie Athalia ut non interficeretur,' &c. 4 Reg. xi. Which, being translated, means, That the wicked Athalia, observing king Ochosias, her son, was dead, and had left but very young children to succeed him, through lust of governing the kingdom, slew all the king's children excepting Joas, who, through the courage of a valiant lady, inspired thereto by the grace of God, was carried away from his cradle, and sent by her secretly to the high-priest, who educated him until he was seven years old. This wicked queen reigned tyrannically for seven years, when the high-priest had her put to death by those who lay in wait for the purpose. He then caused the young child to be anointed king, who, notwithstanding his youth, being only seven years of age, governed his kingdom excellently well, through the advice of the high-priest and other prudent counsellors. The holy Scriptures say, 'Joas regnavit 40 annis in Hierusalem, fecitque rectum coram Domino cunctis diebus quibus docuit eum Joiada sacerdos.' 66 Thus you have the third example, which shows how the concupiscence of vain honours is nothing more than a disorderly passion, to take by force the possessions of another. This it was that made queen Athalia a murderess, false and disloyal, and induced her to obtain, by a succession of crimes, the government of the kingdom of Jerusalem. You have heard how she was privily slain by such as lay in wait for her, which is a lawful manner of slaying tyrants, and is the death which all such ought to suffer.-With this I conclude the third article of my major. "I come now to my fourth article, to which I propose adding eight facts, by way of conclusion, and eight others as corollaries, the stronger to lay my foundation for the justification of my aforesaid lord of Burgundy. I shall first lay down as law, that any subject-vassal, who by an artful desire of obtaining the realm of his sovereign lord and king, shall employ any witchcraft, or other illegal means, against his corporal safety, sins most grievously, and commits the crime of high treason, in the first degree, and, consequently, is deserving a double death. I secondly prove my proposition, by adding, that any subjectvassal who is an enemy to his sovereign lord sins mortally. My conclusion is therefore true,—and that he is a tyrant I shall prove by my lord St. Gregory, who says: "Tyrannus est proprie qui non dominus reputatur. Sic dominium perversum tyrannis nuncupatur.” "It appears plain, that whoever commits the crime of high treason against the person of the prince is guilty of the highest possible offence, and is deserving of a double death. By the first death, I mean the separation of the body from the soul, which causes a perdurable damnation; for St. John the evangelist says, 'Qui vivit non morietur nec lædetur a morte secunda;' that is to say, That every human creature who shall obtain a victory over Covetousness and her three daughters, need not to be afraid of the second death, namely, eternal damnation. The second fact is, that in cases where a subject-vassal has been guilty of this crime, he cannot be too severely or too speedily punished; but a man of rank is more deserving of punishment than a simple subject, a baron than a simple knight, a count than a baron, a duke than a count, the cousin to the king than a foreigner, the king's brother than a cousin, the son to the king than his brother. Such is the first part of the second fact, and I thus prove the second part; for as the obligation is greater, by many degrees, to desire to preserve the safety of the king's person and the good of the state, so the punishment of those who act contrary increases according to their rank; and the consequence I draw from it will prove true, namely, that the son is more bounden than the brother, the brother than the cousin, a duke than a count, a count than a baron, a baron poet Spenser ventured to adapt the word in its superlative degree to the English tongue. He says somewhere "the prowest knight alive." In fact, the word "preux "may be considered as summing up the whole catalogue of knightly virtues in one expression. The exclamation was sometimes varied-"Honneur aux filz des preux !" which seems to be the original expression. than a knight, &c. to guard and preserve the honour of the king and the welfare of the realm; for to each of these ranks and dignities is a certain corresponding duty attached,and the higher the rank, the greater the obligation; for the larger the possessions, and the more noble the person, the more he is bounden, as St. Gregory, before quoted, says, 'Cum crescunt dona et rationes donorum.' "To continue my argument: the nearer the person is to the king by blood or hereditary honours, should he commit such crimes, it is by far more scandalous than if they were done by others removed at a greater distance from royalty. It is more scandalous for a duke or a potent lord, nearly related to the king, to practise his death, in order to gain his kingdom, than it would be for a poor subject no way related to the king; and being more iniquitous, the more deserving punishment. "I shall, in the third place, prove my proposition by saying, Where there is greater danger there should be a greater degree of punishment; for the machinations of near relations to the king are of far more importance and more perilous than those of poor people. And as they are more dangerous, they are deserving of severer punishment to obviate the perils that may happen, and to check the desires that may arise in such as are so near to the crown, to gain possession of it. For this end, they may exert every influence, by force or otherwise, to grasp it, which a poorer subject would never think of doing, as he could not have any expectations of wearing it. My third truth is, That it is lawful for any subject, without any particular orders from any one, but from divine, moral, and natural law, to slay, or to cause to be slain, such disloyal traitors; I say it is not only lawful for any one to act thus in such cases, but it is also meritorious and highly honourable, particularly when the person is of such high rank that justice cannot be executed by the sovereign himself. I shall prove this truth by twelve reasons, in honour of the twelve Apostles. "The three first reasons are drawn from the authorities of three moral philosophers: three others are from three dogmas of sacred theology of St. Augustin, who says, in the last part of the second book of Sentences: Quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit nolentibus subditis, vel etiam ad consensum coactis : et non est recursus ad superiorem per quem de tali judicium posset fieri. Talis enim qui ad liberationem patriæ talem tyrannum occidit, laudem et præmium accissit. Hic primum laudatur. Item debet laudari per quæ facit opus dignum laude. Idem licitum præmium et honorabile accipit, et idem debet accipere. Ille facit opus meritorium quia nullum opus est dignum, primo nisi fieret meritorium.' To translate this briefly, the holy doctor declares, that a subject who shall put to death such a tyrant does a work deserving praise and remuneration. My second authority is as follows: Salisberiensis sacræ theologiæ eximii doctoris in libro suo Policratiri, lib. ii. cap. 15. Sic dicit :-'Amico adulari non licet; sed aurem tyranni mulcere licitum est, ei namque scilicet tyranno licet adulari quem licet occidere;' that is to say, It is unlawful to flatter a friend, but not so to deceive by fair words the ears of a tyrant; for since it is lawful to put him to death, it is allowable to cheat him by flattering speeches. My third authority is from several doctors, whom I class together, not to exceed the number of three, namely, Ricardi de Media-Villa, Alexandri de Hallis et Astensis, in summa qui conclusionem præfatam ponunt in iii. efforum; adding, for higher authority, the confirmation of St. Peter the apostle, who says, 'Subditi estote regi quasi præcellenti sive ducibus, tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum, quia sic est voluntas Dei.' Scribitur primæ Pet. ii. That is to say, It is the will of God that all should obey the king, as sovereign lord over his kingdom; and the duke, as being sent by the king to punish those who have done ill, and remunerate the good. Hence it follows, that dukes are obliged, to the utmost of their power, to avenge the injuries that are done, or may be intended, against the king's person, and to oppose all such attempts as may come to their knowledge. "I now proceed to the authorities from moral philosophers, the first of which is,- Ante forum principis pluribus locis cuilibet subditorum licitum est occidere tyrannum, et non solum licitum, immo laudabile. That is to say, It is lawful for any subject to destroy a tyrant, and not only lawful, but even honourable and worthy of praise. Cicero, in libro de Officiis, Laudatis illos qui illum Cæsarem interfecerunt quamvis esset sibi familiarium amicus, eo quod jura imperii quasi tyrannus usurpaverat.' That is, Tully writes, in his noble book on morality, That those who killed Julius Cæsar are praiseworthy, because Julius had usurped the government of Rome as a tyrant. My third authority is from Boccacio, who, in his book De Casibus Virorum illustrium, lib. ii. cap. 15, contra filios tyrannorum, in speaking of the tyrant, says, 'Shall I call him king? shall I call him prince? shall I preserve my allegiance to him? Oh no: he is an enemy to the public welfare. May I employ conspiracies and open force against him? It is very proper and necessary so to do, -for there is not a more agreeable sacrifice than the blood of a tyrant, and it is insupportable to receive blame for having done good.' "I come now to my three authorities from the civilians. As I am no lawyer, it will suffice if I mention the judgments that have been given without producing them; for in my life I never studied the canon nor civil law more than two years, and twenty years have passed since that time, so that what little I may have learnt I have quite forgotten since the period of my studies. The first authority of the civil law is, That any one may put to death deserters from the laws of chivalry; and who can be a greater deserter from chivalry than he who deserts the person of his king, the fountain of chivalry, and without whom it cannot long exist? Secondly, It is lawful for every one to kill thieves and robbers, who infest forests and rob on the highways, because they are particularly the enemies of the public weal, and consequently plotting to destroy all travellers: consequently, it is lawful to kill a tyrant, who is continually practising against his king, the sovereign lord, and against the public good. Thirdly, If it be lawful for any one by the civil and imperial law to put to death a thief found by night in a house, it is much more so to slay a tyrant, who day and night devises the death of his sovereign lord. This consequence clearly follows, and will be apparent to any man of sound understanding, if he consider it, and the antecedent texts from holy writ. "Before I touch on the three examples from the holy Scriptures, I wish to reply to some objections that may be made to what I say, in arguing thus: All murder is forbidden by every law, divine, natural, moral, and civil. Whatever may be said to the contrary, I shall prove it from Scripture: Non occides,' in Ex. xx. is one of the divine commandments, which forbids any kind of murder. That it is forbidden by the natural law, I prove by this quotation, Natura enim inter homines quandam cognationem constituit qua hominem homini insidiari nefas est.' I prove it forbidden by the moral law, from 'Quia per id: hoc non facias aliis quod tibi non vis fieri: alterum non lædere; jus suum unicuique tribuere : hoc est morale, insuper et de naturali jure.' That the civil and imperial laws forbid murder, those laws shall prove, Qui hominem occidit capite puniatur, non habita differentia sexus vel conditionis. Item omne bellum omnis usus armorum vitiosus præcipue prohibitus est: nam qui vitio præcipue bellum gerit, læsæ majestatis reus est. Item regis proprium furta cohibere, adulteria punire, ipsos de terra perdere: qui enim talia sibi appropriat aut usurpat, principem injuriatur et lædit: quoniam ut dicit lex judiciorum vigor: juris et publica tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo quantumcunque sceleribus implicito assumere valeat ultionem.' "To reply to the above arguments: It should be known that theologians and jurists use diversely this word homicidium; but, notwithstanding, they agree in the same opinion respecting the thing. The theologians say, that to kill a man lawfully is not homicide; for the word homicidium carries with it 'quod sit justum propter hoc dicunt quod Moyses, Phinees, et Mathathias non commiserunt homicidia, quia juste occiderunt;' but some jurists say, that killing of a man, just or unjust, is homicide, while others deny it, saying there are two modes of homicide, legal and illegal; and for justifiable homicide no man ought to be punished. I answer, therefore, with the theologians, that the killing of a tyrant is not homicide, inasmuch as it is just and legal. According to the general law, I confess it would be homicide; but if there be shown justifiable cause for it, no punishment, but remuneration, should follow. "With regard to that part of the argument which says, 'Quod hominem homini insidiari nefas est, et quæ magis insidiatur homini,' &c. it alludes to a tyrant who is continually practising the death of his king and sovereign lord. Et homo est nefas, et perditio, et iniquitas. As for him who slays a man, by watching a proper opportunity for it, to save the life of his king, and preserve him from mortal peril, he does no "nefas," but acquits himself of his duty toward his sovereign lord. Et homo est nefas, et perditio, et iniquitas;' and therefore he who kills such a one, by watching a proper opportunity, does it to save the life of his king. In regard to that passage which says, 'Non facias aliis, &c. alterum non lædere,' &c. I reply, that it makes against the tyrant, and in favour of him who slays him; for he (the tyrant) does against his king that which he would not have to be done against himself, et ipsum regem injuriatur et lædit.' For which reason, he who has put to death such a person, according to his deserts, has done nothing contrary to the laws, but has preserved the meaning of them, namely, true equity and loyalty towards his king and sovereign lord. 6 "To the other quotation from the laws that says, 'Hominem occidere capitale esse, omnis usus armorum,' &c. I answer, that there are no laws nor usages so very general but that there may be some exceptions made from them. I say, that the case of killing a tyrant is exempted, more especially when he is guilty of the crimes before mentioned. How can any greater cause of exemption be shown than that, when the murder is done through necessity, to save the king from being put to death? Even when conspiracies against his royal person have been so far carried by witchcraft and otherwise, that he is disabled from administering justice; and the tyrant being found deserving of that punishment, the king, from weakness of intellect, cannot, or will not, punish him, the killing of him, in such cases, is not against the law, properly speaking, for all laws have two meanings: the first is the textual signification, the other is the 'quo animo,'-the person committing a crime has done it, and the law, as intended by those who made it, is to be explained according to the intent of its framers, and not always according to the literal sense. "Thus the philosopher brings forward the example of citizens who made a law for the defence of their city, that no one, under pain of death, should mount the ramparts, because their city was besieged; and they were afraid, should strangers mount the walls with the inhabitants there might arise danger to them, from these strangers, at a proper opportunity, joining their enemies, or at least making them signs to show where they might the more It happened, that this town was attacked at several places,-when easily attack the town. the strangers and pilgrims who were within it, observing the enemy were much superior to the inhabitants, armed themselves and mounted the walls at the weaker parts, when they repulsed the enemy, and saved the town. The philosopher then asks, Since these pilgrims have mounted the walls contrary to the express words of the law, they have infringed it, and should they not be punished? I say no; for although they have acted contrary to the literal text of the law, they have not disobeyed the spirit of it, which was the saving of the town, for had they not mounted the walls in its defence, it must have been taken. "As to the laws which declare, that none ought to administer justice but the prince, nor do any deeds of arms without his license,-I maintain, that these laws were made for the preservation of the king's honour and person, and for the public good. Should there exist a tyrant of great power and authority, who is continually practising, by witchcraft and other means, the death of the king, and to deprive him of his kingdom,-and should that king, from weakness of intellect or want of force, be unable to punish him, and should he permit him to go on in his wickedness,-I should disregard, in this case, the law that forbids me to bear arms without the king's license, or to take the authority into my own hands in a general sense only. What have I to do with the literal sense of it? Am I to leave my king I am bound to defend my king, and put to death the in such peril? By no means. tyrant ; for should I, by thus acting, do contrary to the text of the law, I follow the spirit of it, and the object it was directed to, namely, the preservation of the honour and life of my king; and I should think myself more deserving of praise than if I had suffered the tyrant to live on in his wickedness. I ought therefore to be rewarded, and not punished, for having done a meritorious deed, tending to a good purpose, for which end all laws were made. "St. Paul says, 'Littera occidit, charitas autem ædificat; which means, that to follow the literal sense of the holy Scriptures is death to the soul, but that we ought to obey the true meaning in all charity,-that is to say, to mark and accomplish the end for which the divine laws were made. Spiritual edification is a goodly thing. Item, the laws divine, natural and human, give me authority for so doing, and by so doing I am a minister of the divine law; and it is plain, that the objections I have started, as probably to be made against what I have said, are not of any weight. "I come now to my three instances from the holy Scriptures, to confirm the truth of my third fact. In the first place, Moses, without any authority whatever, slew the Egyptian who tyrannised over the Israelites. At this period, Moses had no authority to judge the people of Israel, for this power was not given to him until forty years after the perpetration of this act. Moses, however, was much praised for having done it. 'Ut patet auctoritate Exodi ii. quia tanquam minister legis hoc facit. Ita in proposito in hoc faciendo ego ero minister legis.' The second instance is that of Phineas, who, without any orders, slew the duke Zambry, as has been related. Phineas was not punished for this, but on the contrary praised, and greatly requited in affection, honour, and riches. In the affection that God showed him, greater than before. In honour, Quia reputatum est ei ad justitiam,' &c. In riches, Quia per hoc acquisivit actum sacerdotii sempiternum non tantum pro se, sed pro tota tribu sua.' The third instance is that of St. Michael the archangel, who, without waiting for any commands from God, or others, but solely from his natural love, killed the disloyal traitor to his God and Sovereign Lord,—because Lucifer was conspiring to invade the sovereignty and honour of God. St. Michael was rewarded for his action in love, honour and wealth. In love, in that God had a stronger affection for him than any other, and confirmed him in his love and grace. In honour, Quia fecit eum militiæ cœlestis principem in æternum.' That is to say, He made him the prince of his angelic chivalry for ever. In wealth, for he gave him riches and glory to his satisfaction Tantum quantum erat capax, de quibus loquitur, O altitudo divitiarum sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et investigabiles viæ ejus.' Ad Rom. xi. "Thus my third fact has been proven by twelve reasons. The fourth is, That it is more meritorious, honourable and legal, that a tyrant should be slain by one of the king's relations than by a stranger no way connected with him by blood,-by a duke than by a count,-by a baron than by a simple knight, and by a knight than by a common subject. "I thus prove my proposition. He who is related to the king has an interest to guard his honour and life against every injurious attempt, and is bounden so to do more than any stranger; and, in like manner, descending from those of high rank to the common subject. Should he fail in this his duty, the more deserving is he of punishment; while, on the contrary, by performing it, he gains the greater honour and renown. Item in hoc magis relucent amor et obedientia occisoris, vel occidere præcipientis ad principem et dominum suum quia est magis honorabile si fuerit præpotens dux vel comes. Item in hoc magis relucet potentia regis quod est honorabile et quanto occisor vel dictæ occisionis præceptor non fuerit vilior et potentior tanto magis,' &c. In regard to alliances, oaths, promises, and confederations, made between one knight and another, in whatever manner they be, should they be intended to the prejudice of the prince or his children, or the public welfare, no one is bound to keep them; for, in so doing, he would act contrary to the laws, moral, natural, and divine. I shall now prove the truth of this. Arguendo sic: Bonam æquitatem (dictamen rectæ rationis) et legem divinam boni principes in persona publica servare, et utilitatem reipublicæ debent præferre, et præsupponere in omnibus talibus promissionibus, juramentis, et confederationibus: immo excipiuntur implicite secundum dictamen rectæ rationis: bonam æquitatem et charitatis ordinem quia alias esset licitum non obedire principi immo rebellare contra principes, quod est expresse contra sacram Scripturam, quæ sic dicit: 'Obedite principibus vestris, licet etiam discolis.' Et alibi: 'Subjecti estote regi præcellenti, sive judicibus, tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum.' 1 Pet. ii. ut sup. allegatum est. Ex illo arguitur sic: Quandocunque occurrunt duæ obligationes ad invicem contrariæ major tenenda est, et minor dissolvenda quantum adhoc, sed in casu nostro concurrunt duæ obligationes. Et cum obligatio ad principem sit major, et alia minor obligatio ad principem tenenda est, et alia non in tali casu. Item arguendo eandem quæstionem, quandocunque aliquis facit quod est melius quamvis juravit se id non facturum, non est perjurium, sed perjurio contrarium: ut expresse ponit magister senten |