It is true that by its abolition for debts contracted prior to the 4th of July, 1834, some creditors, (probably a small portion,) will be deprived of the means of enforcing the debt, on which they may have calculated when it accrued. But it can never be the duty of the state to protect the citizen against the disappointment of expectations, not warranted by reason and justice. It would be monstrous to arrest the progress of reform, in acknowledged abuses, because a small portion of citizens had entered into contracts, in the expectation that these abuses would never be reformed. It is to be remembered also, that for all debts contracted prior to the 4th of July, 1834, the creditor has already had, at the very least, the benefit of eighteen months compulsory process; and in the great majority of cases a still longer enjoyment of the same remedy. It cannot, I presume, by any person be deemed reasonable, that absolutely no limitation should run to this power over the liberty of the citizen; and that misfortunes accruing in the morning of life, should, by the various legal modes of perpetuating the debts created by them, be allowed to consign its whole duration to ruin and despair. For these reasons, I cannot doubt, that it is expedient to perfect the work of humanity and justice already begun, by an entire abolition of imprisonment for debt. It is scarcely necessary to add, that if further legislation is required to prevent fraudulent concealment and transfers of property, it should receive our prompt attention. The rights of the creditor are as sacred as those of the debtor; and nothing is more to be desired by the honest debtor, than that every facility should exist in detecting the frauds, by which the law is sought to be evaded.

At the last session of the General Court, important changes were made in the militia system. Sufficient time

has not elapsed, to enable us to judge from experience of their effect. It probably was not supposed, that they would furnish an adequate remedy for the whole of the existing evils. The importance of efficient reform, in this branch of our system, is universally acknowledged. A thorough, equitable, and effective organization of the militia is believed to be essential to the security of the State. No substitute for it has ever been proposed, for the emergencies of peace or of war. The evils likely to result from its being broken down in the public estimation are of the gravest character; and few greater public services, it is believed, can be rendered to the community, than that of restoring the militia, to what it is apprehended to have lost of public favor and respect. It is a subject partly within the sphere of the general government; and the attention of Congress has lately been invited to it, by the Secretary of War, in a manner well calculated to produce a beneficial effect.

The approaching expiration of the charter of the bank of the United States gives increased interest, at the present session of the General Court, to the important question of the Currency. The discovery of modern times, that a convertible paper money can be made to answer most of the purposes of gold and silver coin, has made the currency of the country more dependent on legislation, than might be wished. Property would be more stable, if the expansion and contraction of the currency, which represents it, and by which its exchanges are carried on, were left wholly free to follow the natural laws, which affect its amount and value. Every addition made to the amount of the currency, in consequence of an issue of paper, has the effect of reducing the value of the circulating medium, as compared with all other things ex

changed for it, and among them labor, which is immediately benefitted by the impulse given to business and the consequent rise of wages. Thus far the introduction of paper operates to the disadvantage of the mere capitalist, of the money lender, and of the creditor, and to the advantage, in various ways, of the laboring classes, of debtors, and those possessed of other kinds of property. To dispense with paper, therefore, when once firmly established, and restore a circulation entirely of specie would derange the previously existing proportion between money and other articles of value, to the advantage of the capitalist, the money lender, and the creditor, and to the disadvantage of all persons who have money to borrow or pay.

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These principles bear on the question of suppressing the circulation of small bills. Were this question an entirely open one, there would no doubt be an approach to unanimity in favor of the suppression. As a circulating pabanishes coin of the same denominations, a suppression of paper would tend in some degree to restore silver and gold. It is generally considered, that this accession to the circulating metallic medium would give greater solidity to the paper currency, and prevent the contraction from reaching the extreme point, to which it is now carried, in periods of alarm.

Before, however, we adopt any measures to this end, we must consider, that the existing value of all the property in the community has been adjusting itself for years to the mixed currency now circulating; and that the present moment is not well chosen for a voluntary contraction of it. The suppression of any portion of the circulating paper and the substitution of specie would throw a tax upon the community, equivalent to the new supply of specie

required to fill the vacuum in the currency. This burden would not be equally diffused; but would fall most heavily on those, who have debts to pay and contracts to fulfil. Like a contraction of the currency produced by any other cause, it would fall most severely on those least able to support it. It would also be attended with other inconveniences which need not be specified. But notwithstanding these difficulties, it is by no means improbable that, at some period more favorable to the change, the people of the Commonwealth will deem it expedient to take measures for increasing the amount of the circulating coin, by such gradual and judicious steps, as shall secure the benefits of the change, with the least practicable derangement of existing relations.

A very considerable part of the revenue of the State arises from the tax of one per centum on banking capital. To give the State treasury the entire benefit of this tax is supposed to be one ground of the various laws, which have been enacted, of late years, prohibiting the banks from trading on borrowed capital. When a strong temptation arises to evade these laws, it is exceedingly difficult to enforce them. If the bank tax were transferred from the capital to the income of the banks, this motive would cease to operate, and the restrictions alluded to might be removed, without injury to the treasury. Supposing the net income to average seven per centum, which, within a very small fraction, was the case at the last annual return, a tax of fourteen two-sevenths per centum on the income would be equivalent to the tax of one per centum now levied on the capital. This change would have the additional advantage of proportioning the burden of the tax on the different banks, according to their activity.

There are strong grounds for the opinion, that many of the evils now complained of in the practical operation of our banking system, would disappear, on the repeal of the laws limiting the rate of interest. The policy of interfering between citizen and citizen, as to the terms, on which one is willing to borrow and the other to lend, would be doubtful, even were the execution of the law unattended with difficulty. But such is not the case, and these laws are notoriously violated. When this is done, the borrower not only pays the illegal interest, but he pays, in some form or other, for the risk and inconvenience of the transaction. The effect of these laws is to drive capital abroad, where the rate of interest is higher; and at home to give it a direction to every other species of investment, rather than ordinary loans. Those whose necessities compel them to borrow money, if prevented by laws which limit the rate of interest, from obtaining it by way of loan, must get it by a forced sale of property. In this way, twenty per centum of principal may be sacrificed to save one of interest. The burden of this state of things falls chiefly on the borrower, the landholder, and all who wish, by the pledge of property, to raise money. Were the restrictions alluded to removed, the entire disposable money capital of the community would be kept constantly in the money market. It would, at all times, be furnished to the borrower, at its lowest current value. It would be kept at home, instead of being sent abroad. It would seek short investments, and thus be kept pressing into the market. The various indirect practices, which have of late excited no little jealousy would be discontinued; and the dependence of the public on the banks, even for legitimate accommodations, considerably lessened. The general rate of interest,