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to Selymbria, see Newman, in the Classical Museum, vol. i. pp. 153, 154.)

an ineffectual attempt to gain an ascendancy in Megara, through the traitors Ftoeodorus and Perilaus (Dem. de Cor. pp. 242, 324, de Fals. Leg. p. 435 ; This gleam, however, of Athenian prosperity Plut. Phoc. 15); and in the same year he marched was destined to be as short as it was glorious. into Epeirus, and compelled three refractory towns Philip, baffled in Thrace, carried his arms against in the Cassopian district,-Pandosia, Bucheta, and Atheas, a Scythian prince, from whom he had reElateia, to submit themselves to his brother-in-ceived insult and injury. The campaign was a law Alexander (Pseudo-Dem. de Hal. p. 84). successful one; but on his return from the Danube From this quarter he meditated an attack on Am- his march was opposed by the Triballi, and in a bracia and Acarnania, the success of which would battle which he fought with them he received a have enabled him to effect an union with the Aeto- severe wound. This expedition he would seem to lians, whose favour he had secured by a promise of have undertaken partly in the hope of deluding the taking Naupactus for them from the Achaeans, Greeks into the belief that Grecian politics occupied and so to open a way for himself into the Pelopon- his attention less than heretofore; and meanwhile nesus. But the Athenians, roused to activity by Aeschines and his party were blindly or treache Demosthenes. sent ambassadors to the Pelopon- rously promoting his designs against the liberties nesians and Acarnanians, and succeeded in forming of their country. For the way in which they did a strong league against Philip, who was obliged in so, and for the events which ensued down to the consequence to abandon his design. (Dem. Phil. fatal battle of Chaeroneia, in B. c. 338, the reader is iii. pp. 120, 129; Aesch. c. Ctes. pp. 65, 67.) referred to the article DEMOsthenes.

It was now becoming more and more evident that actual war between the parties could not be much longer avoided, and the negotiations consequent on Philip's offer to modify the terms of the treaty of 346 served only to show the elements of discord which were smouldering. The matters in dispute related mainly: 1. to the island of Halonnesus, which the Athenians regarded as their own, and which Philip had seized after expelling from it a band of pirates; 2. to the required restitution by Philip of the property of those Athenians who were residing at Potidaea at the time of its capture by him in 356; 3. to Amphipolis; 4. to the Thracian cities which Philip had taken after the peace of 346 had been ratified at Athens; 5. to the support given by him to the Cardians in their quarrel about their boundaries with the Athenian settlers in the Chersonesus [DIOPEITHES]; and of these questions not one was satisfactorily adjusted, as we may see from the speech (Tepì 'Aλovvýσov)| which was delivered in answer to a letter from Philip to the Athenians on the subject of their complaints. Early in B. c. 342 Philip marched into Thrace against Teres and Cersobleptes, and established colonies in the conquered territory. Hostilities ensued between the Macedonians and Diopeithes, the Athenian commander in the Chersonesus, and the remonstrance sent to Athens by Philip called forth the speech of Demosthenes (Tepi Xeppornoov), in which the conduct of Diopeithes was defended, as also the third Philippic, in consequence of which the Athenians appear to have entered into a successful negotiation with the Persian king for an alliance against Macedonia (Phil. Ep. ad Ath. ap. Dem. p. 160; Diod. xvi. 75; Paus. i. 29; Arr. Anab. ii. 14). The operations in Euboea in B. C. 342 and 341 [CALLIAS; CLEITARCHUS; PARMENION; PHOCION], as well as the attack of Callias, sanctioned by Athens, against the towns on the bay of Pagasae, brought matters nearer to a crisis, and Philip sent to the Athenians a letter, yet extant, defending his own conduct and arraigning theirs. But the siege of Perinthus and Byzantium, in which he was engaged, had increased the feelings of alarm and anger at Athens, and a decree was passed, on the motion of Demosthenes, for succouring the endangered cities. Chares, to whom the armament was at first entrusted, effected nothing, or rather worse than nothing; but Phocion, who superseded him, compelled Philip to raise the siege of both the towns (B. c. 339). (With respect

The effect of this last decisive victory was to lay Greece at the feet of Philip; and, if we may believe the several statements of Theopompus, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he gave vent to his exultation in a most unseemly manner, and celebrated his triumph with drunken orgies, reeling forth from the banquet to visit the field of battle, and singing derisively the commencement of the decrees of Demosthenes, falling as it does into a comic Iambic verse,

Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παιανιεὺς τάδ ̓ εἶπεν. (Theopomp. ap. Ath. x. p. 435; Diod. xvi. 87; Plut. Dem. 20.) Yet he extended to the Athenians treatment far more favourable than they could have hoped to have received from him. Their citizens who had been taken prisoners were sent home without ransom, due funeral rites were paid to their dead, whose bones Philip commissioned Antipater to bear to Athens; their constitution was left untouched; and their territory was even increased by the restoration of Oropus, which was taken from the Thebans. On Thebes the conqueror's vengeance fell more heavily. Besides the loss of Oropus, he deprived her of her supremacy in Boeotia, placed her government in the hands of a faction devoted to his interests, and garrisoned the Cadmeia with Macedonian troops. The weakness to which he thus reduced her made it safe for him to deal leniently with Athens, a course to which he would be inclined by his predilection for a city so rich in science and art and literature, no less than by the wish of increasing his popularity and his character for moderation throughout Greece. And now he seemed to have indeed within his reach the accomplishment of the great object of his ambition, the invasion and conquest of the Persian empire. In a congress held at Corinth, which was attended, according to his invitation, by deputies from every Grecian state with the exception of Sparta, war with Persia was determined on, and the king of Macedonia was appointed to command the forces of the national confederacy. He then advanced into the Peloponnesus, where he invaded and ravaged Laconia, and compelled the Lacedaemonians to surrender a portion of their territory to Argos, Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messenia; and, having thus weakened and humbled Sparta and established his power through the whole of Greece, he returned home in the latter end of B. c. 338.

In the following year his marriage with Cleo

piece of lyrical poetry, which was intended to apply to the approaching downfal of the Persian king, and spoke of the vanity of human prosperity and of far-reaching hopes cut short by death. (Diod. xvi. 91, 92; Ael. V. H. iii. 45; Cic. de Fat. 3; Paus. viii. 7.)

Philip died in the forty-seventh year of his age and the twenty-fourth of his reign, leaving for his son a great work indeed to do, but also a great help for its accomplishment in the condition of Greece and of Macedonia; Greece so far subject as to be incapable of impeding his enterprise,-Macedonia with an organized army and a military discipline unknown before, and with a body of nobles bound closely to the throne, chiefly through the plan introduced or extended by Philip, of gathering round the king the sons of the great families, and providing for their education at court, while he employed them in attendance on his person, like the pages in the feudal times. (Ael. V. H. xiv. 49; Arr. Anab. iv. 13; Curt. viii. 6, 8; Val. Max. iii. 3, ext. 1.)

patra, the daughter of Attalus, one of his generals closed the first day's festivities at Aegae, the tra[CLEOPATRA, No. 1], led to the most serious dis-gedian Neoptolemus recited, at Philip's desire, a turbances in his family. Olympias and Alexander withdrew in great indignation from Macedonia, the young prince taking refuge in Illyria, which seems in consequence to have been involved in war with Philip, while Olympias fled to Epeirus and incited her brother Alexander to take vengeance on her husband. But this danger Philip averted by promising his daughter Cleopatra in marriage to his brother-in-law [CLEOPATRA, No. 2], and Olympias and her son returned home, still however masking resentment under a show of reconciliation. The breach between Philip and Alexander appears to have been further widened by the suspicion which the latter entertained that his father meant to exclude him from the succession. This feeling was strengthened in Alexander's mind by the proposed marriage of his half-brother Arrhidaeus with the daughter of Pixodarus, the Carian satrap, to whom accordingly he sent to negotiate for the hand of the lady for himself. Philip discovered the intrigue, and, being highly exasperated, punished those who had been the chief instruments of it with imprisonment and exile. Meanwhile, his preparations for his Asiatic expedition were not neglected, and early in B. c. 336 he sent forces into Asia, under Parmenion, Amyntas, and Attalus, to draw over the Greek cities to his cause. But the great enterprise was reserved for a higher genius and a more vigorous hand. In the summer of the last-mentioned year Philip held a grand festival at Aegae, to solemnise the nuptials of his daughter with Alexander of Epeirus. It was attended by deputies from the chief states of Greece, bringing golden crowns as presents to the Macedonian king, while from the Athenians there came also a decree, declaring that auy conspirator against Philip who might flee for refuge to Athens, should be delivered up. The solemnities of the second day of the festival commenced with a splendid procession, in which an image of Philip was presumptuously borne along amongst those of the twelve Olympian gods. He himself advanced in a white robe between his son and the bridegroom, having given orders to his guards to keep at a distance from him, as he had sufficient protection in the goodwill of the whole of Greece. As he drew near to the theatre, a youth of noble blood, named Pausanias, rushed forward and plunged into his side with fatal effect a Celtic sword, which he had hidden under his dress. The assassin was immediately pursued and slain by some of the royal guards. His motive for the deed is stated by Aristotle (Polit. v. 10, ed. Bekk.) to have been private resentment against Philip, to whom he had complained in vain of a gross outrage offered to him by Attalus. Olympias and Alexander, however, were suspected of being implicated in the plot, and the suspicion seems only too well-grounded as far as Olympias is concerned. The murder, it is said, had been preceded by omens and warnings. Philip had consulted the Delphic oracle about his projected expedition to Asia, and had received the ambiguous answer,Εστεπται μὲν ὁ ταῦρος, ἔχει τέλος, ἔστιν ὁ θύσων. Again, the oracle of Trophonius had desired him to beware of a chariot, in consequence of which he never entered one; but the sword with which Pausanias slew him had the figure of a chariot carved in ivory on its hilt. Lastly, at the banquet which

Philip had a great number of wives and concubines. Besides Olympias and Cleopatra, we may mention, 1. his first wife Audata, an Illyrian princess, and the mother of Cynane; 2. Phila, sister of Derdas and Machatas, a princess of Elymiotis; 3. Nicesipolis of Pherae, the mother of Thessalonica; 4. Philinna of Larissa, the mother of Arrhidaeus; 5. Meda, daughter of Cithelas, king of Thrace; 6. Arsinoë, the mother of Ptolemy I., king of Egypt, with whom she was pregnant when she married Lagus. To these numerous connections temperament as well as policy seems to have inclined him. He was strongly addicted, indeed, to sensual enjoyment of every kind, with which (not unlike Louis XI. of France, in some of the lighter parts of his character) he combined a turn for humour, not always over nice, and a sort of easy, genial good-nature, which, as it costs nothing and calls for no sacrifice, is often found in connection with the propensity to self-indulgence. Yet his passions, however strong, were always kept in subjection to his interests and ambitious views, and, in the words of bishop Thirlwall, "it was something great, that one who enjoyed the pleasures of animal existence so keenly, should have encountered so much toil and danger for glory and empire" (Greece, vol. vi. p. 86). He was fond of science and literature, in the patronage of which he appears to have been liberal; and his appreciation of great minds is shown, if not by his presumed intimacy with Plato, at any rate by his undoubted connection with Aristotle. His own physical and mental qualifications for the station which he filled and the career of conquest which he followed, were of the highest order ;-a robust frame and a noble and commanding presence; "ready eloquence, to which art only applied the cultivation requisite to satisfy the fastidious demands of a rhetorical age; quickness of observation, acuteness of discernment, presence of mind, fertility of invention, and dexterity in the management of men and things” (Thirlwall, vol. v. p. 169). In the pursuit of his political objects he was, as we have seen, unscrupulous, and ever ready to resort to duplicity and corruption. Yet, when we consider the humanity and generous clemency which have gained for him from Cicero (de Off. i. 26) the praise of having been "always

COIN OF PHILIPPUS IV. KING OF MACEDONIA.

great," and which he seems to have practised quite as much from choice as from policy, we may well admit that he does not appear to disadvantage, even morally speaking, by the side of his fellow-conquerors of mankind. (Demosth. Olynth., Phil., de Fals. Leg., de Cor., de Chers., de Pac.; Aesch. de Fals. Leg., c. Ctes.; Isocr. Phil., Ep. ad Phil.; Diod. xvi.; Just. vii.-ix.; Plut. Demosth., Phoc., Alex., Reg. et Imp. Apoph.; Ath. xi. p. 476, xiii. p. 557, xiv. p. 614; Strab. vii. pp. 307, 320, 323, viii. pp. 361, 374, ix. p. 437; Ael. V. H. iv. 19, PHILIPPUS V. (Þíλππos), king of MACEvi. 1, viii. 12, 15, xii. 53, 54, xiii. 7, 11; Gell. ix. DONIA, son of Demetrius II., was one of the ablest 3; Cic. de Off. ii. 14, 15, Tusc. Quaest. v. 14, ad and most eminent of the Macedonian monarchs. Att. i. 16; Polyb. ii. 48, iii. 6, v. 10, viii. 11-13, It appears that he was born in the year B. C. 237, ix. 28, &c. xvii. 14; Leland, Life of Philip; and he was thus only eight years old at the death of Winiewski, Comm. Hist. et Chronol. in Dem. Orat. his father Demetrius. The sovereign power was conde Cor.; Drumann, Gesch. des Verfalls der Griechsequently assumed by his uncle Antigonus Doson, ischen Staaten; Wachsmuth, Hist. Ant. vol. ii. Eng. transl.; Weiske, de Hyperb. Errorum in Hist. Phil. Genitrice; Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. v. vi.) [E. E.]

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COIN OF PHILIPPUS II., KING OF MACEDONIA.

PHILIPPUS III. (ÞíλπTOS), king of MACEDONIA. The name of Philip was bestowed by the Macedonian army upon Arrhidaeus, the bastard son of Philip II., when he was raised to the throne after the death of Alexander III., and is the only appellation which appears upon his coins. He returned to Macedonia, where he and his wife Eurydice were put to death by order of Olympias, B.C. 317. For his life and reign, see ARRHI[E. H. B.]

DAEUS.

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PHILIPPUS IV. (Þíλππos), king of MACEDONIA, was the eldest son of Cassander, whom he succeeded on the throne, B. c. 297, or, according to Clinton, early in 296. The exact period of his reign is uncertain, but it appears to have lasted only a few months, when he was carried off by a consumptive disorder, B. c. 296. No events are recorded to us of this short interval; but it appears that he maintained the friendly relations with Athens which had been established by his father, and he was probably advancing into Greece to support his partisans in that country, when his death took place at Elateia in Phocis. (Paus. ix. 7. § 3; Justin. xv. 4, xvi. 1; Porphyr. ap. Euseb. Arm. p. 155; Dexipp. ap Syncell. p. 504, ed. Bonn; Droysen, Hellenism. vol. i. pp. 565, 566;| Clinton, F. H. vol. ii. pp. 180, 236.) [E. H. B.]

who, though he certainly ruled as king rather than merely as guardian of his nephew, was faithful to the interests of Philip, whom he regarded as his natural successor, and to whom he transferred the sovereignty at his death, in B. c. 220, to the exclusion of his own children. (Polyb. ii. 45, 70, iv. 2; Paus. viii. 8. § 9; Justin. xxviii. 4; Porphyr. ap. Euseb. Arm. p. 158.) He was careful however to appoint friends of his own to all the more important offices of the state; one of whom, Apelles, bore the title of guardian of the young king (Polyb. iv. 87), though the latter seems to have in fact assumed the administration of affairs into his own hands from the very beginning of his reign. The prudent and vigorous administration of Antigonus had greatly strengthened the Macedonian empire; but the youth time of his accession (Polyb. iv. 5; Justin makes of Philip, who was only seventeen years old at the him only fourteen), was regarded with contempt by his enemies, and the Aetolians seized the opportunity to commit acts of aggression and hostility in diately applied to the young king for assistance; the Peloponnese. Aratus and the Achaeans immebut Philip, though not unmindful of his allies, was at first unwilling to engage in open war with the Aetolians on account of what he regarded as mere plundering expeditions. Soon, however, the defeat of the Achaeans at Caphyae, and the daring outrage of the Aetolians in seizing and burning Cynaetha, aroused him to the necessity of immediate action, and he proceeded in person to Corinth at the head of a considerable force. He arrived too late to act against the Aetolians, who had already quitted the Peloponnese, but by advancing to Tegea he succeeded in overawing the Lacedaemonians, who were secretly disposed to favour the Aetolians, and for a time prevented them from quitting the cause of their allies. He next presided at a general assembly of the Achaeans and other allied states at Corinth, at which war was declared against the Aetolians by the common consent of all present, including besides Philip himself and the Achaeans, the Boeotians, Phocians, Epeirots, Acarnanians, and Messenians. Few of these, however, were either disposed or ready to take an active part in immediate hostilities, while the Lacedaemonians and Eleans openly espoused the cause of the Aetolians. It was evident therefore that the chief burden of the war would devolve upon Philip and the Achaeans, and the young king returned to Macedonia to prepare for the contest. (Polyb. iv. 5, 9, 16, 19, 22-29, 31-36; Plut. Arat. 47). His first care was to fortify his own frontiers against the neighbouring barbarians, and

he was able to conclude a treaty with Scerdilaïdas, Paeonia, which was well calculated to check the king of Illyria, who undertook to assail the Aeto- inroads of the Dardanians, and afterwards invaded lians by sea. Early in the ensuing spring (B. C. Thessaly, where he reduced the Phthiotic Thebes. 219) Philip entered Epeirus with an army of 15,000 The Achaeans, on their side, had raised large foot and 800 horse, and was quickly joined by the forces, and carried on the war with much success whole forces of the Epeirots and Acarnanians; but in the Peloponnese. Meanwhile, events of far his successes were limited to the reduction of some greater importance had been passing in Italy, and forts and towns on the frontiers of Aetolia and the news of the battle of Thrasymene, which reached Acarnania, and to the ravage of the adjoining Philip while he was celebrating the Nemean games country, when he was recalled to Macedonia by at Argos, determined him to listen to the overtures the news of an invasion of the Dardanians. The for peace which had been renewed by the neutral barbarians, indeed, retired on hearing of his return, powers, the Chians, Rhodians, and Ptolemy, king but Philip spent the remainder of the summer and of Egypt. A treaty was soon brought about, by autumn in Thessaly, and it was not until the which it was agreed that both parties should rewinter had already set in, and his Achaean allies tain what they then possessed; and thus ended, had begun to despair of his arrival, that he sud-after a duration of three years, the contest comdenly presented himself at Corinth at the head of monly known as the Social War. (Polyb. v. 24, a small but select army. This unexpected ma- 29, 30, 97-105.) nœuvre was completely successful; he surprised and totally defeated a force of Aetolian and Eleian troops under Euripidas, and following up his advantage, took the strong fortress of Psophis by a sudden assault, laid waste without opposition the rich plains of Elis, and then advancing into Triphylia, made himself master of the whole of that region, though abounding in strongholds, within six days. After this brilliant campaign, he took up his quarters at Argos for the remainder of the winter. (Polyb. iv. 37, 57, 61-82.)

The ensuing spring (B. C. 218) he first turned his attention to the reduction of the important island of Cephallenia, but failed in an attack on the city of Palae in consequence of the treachery and misconduct of one of his own officers, Leontius, who purposely prevented the troops under his command from carrying the breach by assault. Hereupon Philip abandoned the enterprise; but landing suddenly at the head of the Ambracian gulf, he penetrated unexpectedly into the heart of Aetolia, where he surprised the capital city of Thermus, in which all the wealth and treasures of the Aetolian leaders were deposited. The whole of these fell into the hands of the king, and were either carried off or destroyed, together with a vast quantity of arms and armour; but not content with this, Philip set fire to the sacred buildings, and destroyed all the statues and other works of art with which they were adorned. The Aetolians in vain attacked his army on his retreat, and he succeeded in carrying off the spoils in safety to his fleet. (Polyb. v. 2-9, 13, 14.) Having by this sudden blow struck terror into the Aetolians themselves, he next turned his arms against their Peloponnesian allies, and returning in all haste to Corinth, assembled the Achaean forces, and invaded Laconia before the Spartans had heard of his having quitted Aetolia. Descending the valley of the Eurotas he passed close to Sparta itself, laid waste the whole country as far as Taenarus and Malea, and on his return totally defeated the forces with which Lycurgus had occupied the heights near Sparta, in order to intercept his retreat. (Id. v. 17—24.) An attempt was now made by the Chians and Rhodians to effect a peace by their mediation; but though Philip consented to a truce for the purpose of carrying on the negotiations, these proved abortive, and the war was still continued. The operations of the next year (B. C. 217) were less brilliant, but fortune still favoured the arms of Philip and his allies; the king, who had returned to Macedonia, took the important fortress of Bylazora, in

During the course of these events it is certain that the character of Philip appears in the most favourable light. Throughout the military operations he displayed uncommon abilities. His daring and rapid movements disconcerted all the plans of his enemies; and the boldness of his conceptions was accompanied with a vigour and skill in the execution of them, which might have done credit to the oldest and most practised general. But his military talents were accompanied with merits of a still higher order. His policy inclined always to the side of clemency and moderation, and he had established a well-earned popularity throughout Greece, by repeated proofs of generosity and good faith. So high, indeed, was his character in these respects, that all the cities of Crete are said to have voluntarily united in placing themselves under his protection and patronage (Polyb. vii. 12; Plut. Arat. 48). Unfortunately these favourable dispositions were not destined to last long; and the change that subsequently came over his character appears to have commenced almost immediately after the close of the Social War. It is scarcely probable, as sug gested by Plutarch, that his naturally evil disposition had been hitherto restrained by fear, and that he now first began to show himself in his true colours; Polybius more plausibly ascribes the change in his character to the influence of evil counsellors; though these very probably did no more than accelerate the natural effects too often produced by the intoxication of success and the possession of arbitrary power at an early age. It is certain at least that the evil counsellors were not wanting. Apelles and the other officers to whom the chief posts in the administration had been confided by Antigonus Doson, had hoped to hold the uncontrolled direction of affairs, under the reign of the young king, and could ill brook to see their power supplanted by the growing influence of Aratus, who at this period chiefly swayed the counsels of Philip. Having failed in repeated attempts to undermine the power of the Achaean leader, by calumnies and intrigues, they went so far as to engage in the most treasonable schemes for frustrating all the designs of Philip himself, and thwarting the success of his military enterprizes. Their machinations were at length discovered, and Apelles himself, together with Leontius and Megaleas, the partners of his guilt, were severally put to death. (Polyb. iv. 76, 82-87, v. 2, 4, 14 -16, 25-28; Plut. Arat. 48.)

But the removal of these adversaries was far from giving to Aratus the increased power and in

this decisive blow was not followed up; and the apparent inaction of the king during the two following years is the more remarkable, because the occupation of Tarentum by Hannibal would have seemed likely, at this juncture, to facilitate his communications with Italy.

Meanwhile, the proceedings of Philip in Greece were but too well calculated to alienate all the favourable dispositions previously entertained towards him. In B. c. 215, he had interposed in the affairs of Messenia, in a manner that led to a fearful massacre of the oligarchical party in that state: the reproaches of Aratus on this occasion were bitter and vehement, and from henceforth all

frence which might have been anticipated. A made himself master of the strong fortress of Lissus, more dangerous rival had already made his appear- the capture of which was followed by the submisance in Demetrius of Pharos, who, after his expulsion of great part of Illyria (Polyb. viii. 15); but sion from his own dominions by the Romans [DEMETRIUS, p. 966, a.], had taken refuge at the court of Philip, and soon acquired unbounded influence over the mind of the young king. It was the Pharian exile who first gave a new turn to the foreign policy of Philip, by directing his attention to the state of affairs beyond the Ionian sea; and persuaded him to conclude peace with the Aetolians, in order to watch the contest which was going on in Italy. (Polyb. iv. 66, v. 12, 101, 105; Justin. xxix. 2, 3). The ambition of the young king was flattered by the prospect thus held out to him, but he did not deem the time yet come openly to take part in the contest, and in the meanwhile his attention was turned to the side of Illyria. Scer-friendship was at an end between them. Philip dilaïdas, king of that country, had abandoned the alliance of the Macedonian monarch, by whom he deemed himself aggrieved; and had taken advantage of Philip's absence in Greece to occupy some towns and fortresses on the frontiers of the two countries. The recovery of these occupied Philip during the remainder of the summer of 217, and the winter was spent principally in the preparation and equipment of a fleet with which he designed to attack the coasts of Illyria. But scarcely had he entered the Adriatic in the following summer (B. C. 216), when the rumour that a Roman fleet was coming to the assistance of Scerdilaïdas inspired him with such alarm that he made a hasty retreat to Cephallenia, and afterwards withdrew to Macedonia, without attempting anything farther (Polyb. v. 108 -110). But the news of the great disaster sustained by the Roman arms at Cannae soon after decided Philip openly to espouse the cause of Carthage, and he despatched Xenophanes to Italy to conclude a treaty of alliance with Hannibal. Unfortunately the ambassador, after having successfully accomplished his mission, on his return fell into the hands of the Romans, who thus became aware of the projects of Philip, and immediately stationed a fleet at Brundusium, to prevent him from crossing into Italy; while the king himself, on the contrary, remained for a long time in ignorance of the result of his negotiations, and it was not till late in the following year (B. c. 215) that he sent a second embassy, and a treaty of alliance was defini-cedonia thus found himself threatened on all sides tively concluded between him and the Carthaginian general. (Liv. xxiii. 33, 34, 38, 39; Polyb. iii. 2, vii. 9; Appian, Mac. 1; Justin, xxix. 4.)

Whether Philip really meditated at this time the invasion of Italy, or was merely desirous of establishing his power over all the countries east of the Adriatic, it is certain that his proceedings were marked by an unaccountable degree of hesitation and delay. He suffered the remainder of the season of 215 to pass away without any active measures, and though in the following year (B. C. 214), he at length appeared in the Adriatic with a fleet, with which he took the town of Oricus, and laid siege to the important city of Apollonia, his arms were soon paralysed by the arrival of a small Roman force under M. Laevinus, and he was not only compelled to raise the siege of Apollonia, but destroyed his own ships to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, and effected his retreat to Macedonia by land. (Liv. xxiv. 40.) The folowing year (213), he was more successful, having

was, however, still so far swayed by his influence as to refrain at that time from the design of seizing by treachery on the fortress of Ithome: but after his return from his unsuccessful expedition to Illyria (B. c. 214) he returned to this project, and sent Demetrius of Pharos to carry it into execution. The latter was killed in the attempt; but his death produced no change in the counsels of Philip, who now invaded Messenia himself, and laid waste the open country with fire and sword. Meanwhile, the breach between him and Aratus had become daily more complete, and was still farther widened by the discovery that the king was carrying on a criminal intercourse with the wife of the younger Aratus. At length the king was induced to listen to the insidious proposal of Taurion, and to rid himself of his former friend and counsellor by means of a slow and secret poison, B. c. 213. (Polyb. vii. 10—14, viii. 10, 14; Plut. Arat. 49-52.)

The war between Philip and the Romans had been carried on, for some time, with unaccountable slackness on both sides, when it all at once assumed a new character in consequence of the alliance entered into by the latter with the Aetolians. In the treaty concluded by the Roman praetor, M. Valerius Laevinus, with that people (before the end of B. c. 211), provision was also made for comprising in the alliance Scerdilaïdas, king of Illyria, and Attalus, king of Pergamus, and the king of Ma

by a powerful confederacy. (Liv. xxvi. 24 ; Justin. xxix. 4.) This news at length roused him from his apathy. Though it was then midwinter, he hastened to provide for the safety of his frontiers, both on the side of Illyria and that of Thrace, and then marched southwards, with an army, to the succour of the Acarnanians, who were attacked by the Aetolians, but the latter withdrew on learning the approach of Philip, and the king returned to Macedonia. Hostilities were renewed in the spring (B. c. 210), and the Romans opened the campaign by the capture of Anticyra; but after this, instead of supporting their allies with vigour, they withdrew the greater part of their forces, and P. Sulpicius Galba, who had succeeded Laevinus in the command, found himself unable to effect anything more than the conquest of Aegina, while Philip succeeded in reducing the strong fortress of Echinus in Thessaly, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Romans and Aetolians to relieve it. (Liv. xxvi. 25, 26, 28; Polyb. ix. 41, 42.)

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