frence which might have been anticipated. A more dangerous rival had already made his appearance in Demetrius of Pharos, who, after his expulsion from his own dominions by the Romans [DEMETRius, p. 966, a.], had taken refuge at the court of Philip, and soon acquired unbounded influence over the mind of the young king. It was the Pharian exile who first gave a new turn to the foreign policy of Philip, by directing his attention to the state of affairs beyond the Ionian sea; and persuaded him to conclude peace with the Aetolians, in order to watch the contest which was going on in Italy. (Polyb. iv. 66, v. 12, 101, 105 ; Justin. xxix. 2, 3). The ambition of the young king was flattered by the prospect thus held out to him, but he did not deem the time yet come openly to take part in the contest, and in the meanwhile his attention was turned to the side of Illyria. Scerdilaidas, king of that country, had abandoned the alliance of the Macedonian monarch, by whom he deemed himself aggrieved ; and had taken advantage of Philip's absence in Greece to occupy some towns and fortresses on the frontiers of the two countries. The recovery of these occupied Philip during the remainder of the summer of 217, and the winter was spent principally in the preparation and equipment of a fleet with which he designed to attack the coasts of Illyria. But scarcely had he entered the Adriatic in the following summer (b. c. 216), when the rumour that a Roman fleet was coming to the assistance of Scerdilaidas inspired him with such alarm that he made a hasty retreat to Cephallenia, and afterwards withdrew to Macedonia, without attempting anything farther (Polyb. v. 108 —lls). But the news of the great disaster sustained by the Roman arms at Cannae soon after decided Philip openly to espouse the cause of Carthage, and he despatched Xenophanes to Italy to conclude a treaty of alliance with Hannibal. Unfortunately the ambassador, after having successfully accomplished his mission, on his return fell into the hands of the Romans, who thus became aware of the projects of Philip, and immediately stationed a fleet at Brundusium, to prevent him from crossing into Italy; while the king himself, on the contrary, remained for a long time in ignorance of the result of his negotiations, and it was not till late in the folwing year (b. c. 215) that he sent a second embassy, and a treaty of alliance was definitively concluded between him and the Carthaginian general. (Liv. xxiii. 33, 34, 38, 39 ; * iii. 2, vii. 9; Appian, Mac. 1; Justin, xxix.

Whether Philip really meditated at this time the invasion of Italy, or was merely desirous of establishing his power over all the countries east of the Adriatic, it is certain that his proceedings Yere marked by an unaccountable degree of hesitation and delay. He suffered the remainder of the *son of 215 to pass away without any active mea*and though in the following year (b. c. 214), **kugh appeared in the Adriatic with a fleet, with which he took the town of Oricus, and laid *ge to the important city of Apollonia, his arms **te soon paralysed by the arrival of a small Ro* force under M. Laevinus, and he was not only compelled to raise the siege of Apollonia, but *oyed his own ships to prevent their falling *!he hands of the enemy, and effected his retreat * Macedonia by land. (Liv. xxiv. 40.) The folowing year (213), he was more successful, having

made himself master of the strong fortress of Lissus, the capture of which was followed by the submission of great part of Illyria (Polyb. viii. 15): but this decisive blow was not followed up ; and the apparent inaction of the king during the two following years is the more remarkable, because the occupation of Tarentum by Hannibal would have seemed likely, at this juncture, to facilitate his communications with Italy.

Meanwhile, the proceedings of Philip in Greece were but too well calculated to alienate all the favourable dispositions previously entertained towards him. In B. c. 215, he had interposed in the affairs of Messenia, in a manner that led to a fearful massacre of the oligarchical party in that state: the reproaches of Aratus on this occasion were bitter and vehement, and from henceforth all friendship was at an end between them. Philip was, however, still so far swayed by his influence as to refrain at that time from the design of seizing by treachery on the fortress of Ithome: but after his return from his unsuccessful expedition to Illyria (B. c. 214) he returned to this project, and sent Demetrius of Pharos to carry it into execution. The latter was killed in the attempt; but his death produced no change in the counsels of Philip, who now invaded Messenia himself, and laid waste the open country with fire and sword. Meanwhile, the breach between him and Aratus had become daily more complete, and was still farther widened by the discovery that the king was carrying on a criminal intercourse with the wife of the younger Aratus. At length the king was induced to listen to the insidious proposal of Taurion, and to rid himself of his former friend and counsellor by means of a slow and secret poison, B. c. 213. (Polyb. vii. 10–14, viii. 10, 14; Plut. Arat. 49–52.)

The war between Philip and the Romans had been carried on, for some time, with unaccountable slackness on both sides, when it all at once assumed a new character in consequence of the alliance entered into by the latter with the Aetolians. In the treaty concluded by the Roman praetor, M.Valerius Laevinus, with that people (before the end of B. c. 211), provision was also made for comprising in the alliance Scerdilaidas, king of Illyria, and Attalus, king of Pergamus, and the king of Macedonia thus found himself threatened on all sides by a powerful confederacy. (Liv. xxvi. 24; Justin. xxix. 4.) This news at length roused him from his apathy. Though it was then midwinter, he hastened to provide for the safety of his frontiers, both on the side of Illyria and that of Thrace, and then marched southwards, with an army, to the succour of the Acarnanians, who were attacked by the Aetolians, but the latter withdrew on learning the approach of Philip, and the king returned to Macedonia. Hostilities were renewed in the spring (b. c. 210), and the Romans opened the campaign by the capture of Anticyra ; but after this, instead of supporting their allies with vigour, they withdrew the greater part of their forces, and P. Sulpicius Galba, who had succeeded Laevinus in the command, found himself unable to effect anything more than the conquest of Aegina, while Philip succeeded in reducing the strong fortress of Echinus in Thessaly, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Romans and Aetolians to o it. (Liv. xxvi. 25, 26, 28 ; Polyb. ix. 41, 42.


The next summer (b. c. 209)*, the arms of Philip were directed to the support of his allies, the Achaeans, who were unable to make head against the Lacedaemonians, Messenians, and Eleans. Marching through Thessaly, he defeated the Aetolian general Pyrrhias, though supported by some Roman troops furnished him by Galba, in two successive actions, forced the pass of Thermopylae, and made his way successfully to the Peloponnese, where he celebrated the Heraean games at Argos. The Rhodians and Chians, as well as the Athenians and Ptolemy, king of Egypt, now again interposed their good offices, to bring about a peace between the contending parties, and negotiations were opened at Aegium, but these proved abortive in consequence of the arrogant demands of the Aetolians, in whom the arrival of Attalus at this juncture had excited fresh hopes. Philip now invaded Elis in conjunction with the Achaean praetor Cycliadas, but was worsted in an engagement under the walls of the city, in which, however, the king greatly distinguished himself by his personal bravery ; and the inroads of the Dardanians, and other Barbarian tribes, now compelled him to return to Macedonia. (Liv. xxvii. 29–33; Justin. xxix. 4.)

At the opening of the campaign of 208, Philip found himself assailed on all sides by the formidable confederacy now organized against him. Sulpicius with the Roman fleet, in conjunction with the king Attalus, commenced their attacks by sea, while the Illyrian princes, Scerdilaïdas and Pleuratus, and the Thracian tribe of the Maedi threatened his northern frontiers, and his allies, the Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Boeotians, were clamorous for support and assistance against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians. The energy and activity displayed by the king under these trying circumstances, is justly praised by Polybius: while he sent such support as his means enabled him to his various allies, he himself took up his post at Demetrias in Thessaly, to watch the proceedings of Sulpicius and Attalus; and though he was unable to prevent the fall of Oreus, which was betrayed into their hands [PLATOR), he not only saved Chalcis from a similar fate, but narrowly missed surprising Attalus himself in the neighbourhood of Opus. The king of Pergamus was soon after recalled to the defence of his own dominions against Prusias, king of Bithynia, and Sulpicius, unable to keep the sea single-handed, withdrew to Aegina. Philip was thus left at liberty to act against the Aetolians, and to support his own allies in the Peloponnese, where Machanidas, the Lacedaemonian tyrant, retired on his approach. The king was content with this success; and after taking part in the general assembly of the Achaeans at Aegium, and ravaging the coasts of Aetolia, returned once more into his own dominions. (Polyb. x. 41, 42; Liv. xxviii. 5–8.; Justin. xxix. 4.)

The events of the succeeding years of the war are very imperfectly known to us, but it is evident that matters took a turn decidedly favourable to Philip and his allies. Attalus continued in Asia,

* Concerning the chronology of these events, and the error committed by Livy, who assigns this campaign to the year 208, see Schorn (Gesch. Griechenl. p. 136, not.), and Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. viii. p. 268, not.). Clinton (F. H. vol. iii. p. 48) has followed Livy without comment.

and the Romans, whose attention was directed wholly towards affairs in Spain and Africa, lent no support to their Grecian allies. Meanwhile, the Achaeans, under Philopoemen, were victorious in the Peloponnese over Machanidas, and the Aetolians, finding themselves abandoned by their allies, and unable to cope single-handed with the power of Philip, who had a second time carried his ravages into the heart of their country, and plundered their capital city of Thermus, at length consented to peace upon the conditions dictated by the conqueror. What these were we know not, but the treaty had hardly been concluded, when a Roman fleet and army, under P. Sempromius Tuditanus, arrived at Dyrrhachium. Philip hastened to oppose him, and offered him battle, but the Roman general shut himself up within the walls of Apollonia; and meanwhile the Epeirots, by their intervention, succeeded in bringing about a peace between the two parties. A preliminary treaty was concluded between Philip and Sempronius at Phoenice in Epeirus, B. c. 205, and was readily ratified by the Roman people, who were desirous to give their undivided attention to the war in Africa. (Liv. xxix. 12; Polyb. xi, 4, 7; Appian. Mac. Exc. 2.) It is probable that both parties looked upon the peace thus concluded as little more than a suspension of hostilities. Such was clearly the view with which the Romans had accepted it, and Philip was evidently well aware of their sentiments in this respect. Hence he not only proceeded to carry out his views for his own aggrandizement and the humiliation of his rivals in Greece, without any regard to the Roman alliances in that country, but he even went so far as to send a strong body of auxiliaries to the Carthaginians in Africa, who fought at Zama under the standard of Hannibal. (Liv. xxx. 26, 33, 42, xxxi. 1.) Meanwhile, his proceedings in Greece were stained by acts of the darkest perfidy and the most wanton aggression. The death of Ptolemy Philopator, king of Egypt (b. c. 205), and the infancy of his successor, at this time opened a new field to the ambition of Philip, who concluded a league with Antiochus against the Egyptian monarch, according to which the Cyclades, as well as the cities and islands in Ionia subject to Ptolemy, were to fall to the share of the Macedonian king. (Polyh. iii. 2, xv. 20; Appian. Mac. Exc. 3; Justin. xxx. 2. In order to carry out this scheme, it was neces. sary for Philip to establish his naval power firmly in the Aegaean, and to humble that of Attalus and the Rhodians, and the latter object he endeavoured to effect by the most nefarious means, for which he found ready instruments in Dicaearchus, an Aetolian pirate, and Heracleides, an exile from Tarentum, who seems at this period to have held the same place in the king's confidence previously enjoyed by Demetrius of Pharos. While Dicaearchus, with a squadron of twenty ships, cruised in the Aegaean, and made himself master of the principal islands of the Cyclades, Heracleides contrived to ingratiate himself with the Rhodians, and then took an opportunity to set fire to their arsenal, and burn great part of their fleet. (Polyb. xiii. 4, 5, xv. 20, xviii. 37; Diod. xxviii. Exc. Wales. pp. 572, 573; Polyaen. v. 17. § 2.) Meanwhile, Philip himself had reduced under his dominion the cities of Lysimachia and Chalcedon notwithstanding they were in a state of alliance with the Aetolians, and he next proceeded to lay siege to Cius, in Bithynia. The Rhodians (who had not yet come to an open rupture with Philip, though his share in the perfidy of Heracleides could be no secret) in vain interposed their good offices in favour of Cius: their representations were treated with derision; and the king having made himself master of the place, gave it up to plunder, sold all the inhabitants as slaves, and then consigned the empty city to his ally, Prusias, king of Bithynia. On his return to Macedonia, he inflicted a similar fate on Thasos, though it had surrendered on capitulation. (Polyb. xv. 21–24; Liv. xxxii. 33.) But these repeated injuries at length roused the Rhodians to open hostilities: they concluded a league with Attalus (b. c. 20.1), and equipped a powerful fleet. Philip had taken Samos, and was besieging Chios, when the combined fleets of the allies presented themselves, and a general battle ensued, in which, after a severe and long protracted struggle, the allies were victorious, although the Rhodian admiral. Theophihscus, was killed, and Attalus himself narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the enemy. The advantage, however, was by no means decisive, and in a second action off Lade, Philip obtained the victory. This success appears to have left him almost free scope to carry on his operations on the coasts of Asia ; he took Chios, ravaged without opposition the dominions of Attalus, up to the very walls of Pergamus, and afterwards reduced the whole of the district of Peraea held by the Rhodians on the main land, including the cities of lasus and Bargylia. But meanwhile the Rhodians and Attalus had strengthened their fleet so much that they were greatly superior at sea, and Philip was, in consequence, compelled to take up his winter-quarters in Caria. It was not till the ensuing spring (b. c. 200), that he was able to elude, by a stratagem, the vigilance of his enemies, and effect his return to Europe, where the state of affairs imperiously demanded his presence. Attalus and the Rhodians having failed in their attempt to overtake him, repaired to Aegina, where they readily induced the Athenians, already on hostile terms with Philip, to join their alliance, and openly declare war against the Macedonian king. (Polyb. xvi. 11, 12, 24–26 ; Polyaen. iv. 17. § 2; Liv. xxxi. 14, 15.) But a more formidable enemy was now at hand. The Romans were no sooner free from their longprotracted contest with Carthage than they began to lend a favourable ear to the complaints that Pouted in on all sides from the Athenians, the Rhodians, Attalus, and Ptolemy, against the Macedonian monarch ; and notwithstanding some Teluctance on the part of the people, war was declared against Philip, and the conduct of it *gned to the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, B. c. 2". But it was late in the season before he was * to set out for his province; and after sending * mall force, under C. Claudius Centho, to the *ance of the Athenians, he took up his quarters for the winter at Apollonia. Meanwhile Attalus and the Rhodians neglected to prosecute the war, Perhaps waiting for the arrival of the Roman * Philip, on his part, was not slow in avail. ing himself of the respite thus granted him. While he went Nicanor to invade Attica, he himself * his amstowards Thrace, where he reduced **ssion the important towns of Aenus and

Maroneia, and then advancing to the Chersonese, laid siege to Abydus. The desperate resistance of the inhabitants prolonged the defence of this place for so long a time that it would have been easy for their allies to have relieved them, but Attalus and the Rhodians neglected to send them assistance, the remonstrances of the Roman ambassador, M. Aemilius Lepidus, were treated with derision by Philip, and the city ultimately fell into his hands, though not till almost the whole of the inhabitants had perished either by the sword of the enemy or by their own hands. (Liv. xxxi. 2–5, 6, 14, 16–18; Polyb. xvi. 27–34.) Immediately after the fall of Abydos, Philip learnt the arrival of Sulpicius in Epeirus, but finding that the consul had already taken up his winterquarters, he took no farther measures to oppose him. Claudius, who had been sent to the support of the Athenians, was more enterprizing, and not content with guarding the coasts of Attica, he, by a bold stroke, surprised and plundered Chalcis. Philip, on this news, hastened to oppose him, but finding that Claudius had already quitted Chalcis, which he was not strong enough to hold, the king pushed on with great rapidity, in the hopes of surprising Athens itself, an object which, in fact, he narrowly missed. Foiled in this scheme, he avenged himself by laying waste the environs of the city, sparing in his fury neither the sepulchres of men, nor the sacred groves and temples of the gods. After this he repaired to Corinth, and took part in an assembly of the Achaeans, but failed in inducing that people to take part more openly in the war with the Romans; and having a second time ravaged the territory of Attica, returned once more into Macedonia. (Liv. xxxi. 18, 22–26.) The consul, Sulpicius, was now, at length, ready to take the field, B. c. 199. He had already gained some slight successes through his lieutenant, L. Apustius, and had been joined by the Illyrian prince Pleuratus, Amynander, king of Athamania, and the Dardanian, Bato. The Aetolians, on the contrary, though strongly solicited both by Philip and the Romans, as yet declined to take part in the war. Sulpicius advanced through Dassaretia, where Philip met him with his main army, and several unimportant actions ensued, in one of which, near Octolophus, the Romans gained the victory; and this advantage, though of little consequence in itself, had the effect of deciding the Aetolians to espouse the Roman cause, and they joined with Amynander in an inroad into Thessaly. At the same time the Dardanians invaded Macedonia from the north, and Philip found it necessary to make head against these new enemies. He accordingly quitted his strong position near the camp of Sulpicius, and having eluded the vigilance of the Roman general, effected his retreat unmolested into Macedonia, from whence he sent Athenagoras against the Dardanians, while he himself hastened to attack the Aetolians, who were still in Thessaly, intent only upon plunder. Philip fell upon them by surprise, put many of them to the sword, and totally defeated their army, which would have been utterly destroyed, had it not been for their ally, Amynander. The Roman general meanwhile, after pushing on into Eordaea and Orestis, where he took the city of Celetrus, had fallen back again into Epeirus, without effecting anything of importance: the Dardanians had been repulsed and defeated by Athenagoras, and thus, on the whole, the result of the campaign had been certainly not unfavourable to Philip. (Liv. xxxi. 27—43.) It was apparently late in the season before the new consul, P. Willius Tappulus, arrived in Epeirus to succeed Sulpicius, and a mutiny that broke out in his own army prevented him from undertaking any hostile operations. Philip meanwhile had followed up his victory over the Aetolians by laying siege to Thaumaci, in Thessaly, but the courageous defence of the garrison protracted this siege until so late a period of the year, that Philip was compelled to abandon the enterprise, and return to Macedonia for the winter. (Id. xxxii. 3, 4.) After spending this period of repose in the most active preparations for renewing the contest, he took the field again with the first approach of spring, B. c. 198, and established his camp in a strong position near the pass of Antigoneia, where it completely commanded the direct route into Macedonia. Willius advanced to a position near that of the king, but was wholly unable to force the pass; and while he was still deliberating what to do, his successor Flaminimus arrived, and took the command of the army. (Id. ib. 5, 6, 9.) The events of the war from this period till its termination have been already fully given under FLAMININUs. By the peace finally granted to Philip (B. c. 196), the king was compelled to abandon all his conquests, both in Europe and Asia, withdraw his garrisons from all Greek cities, surrender his whole fleet to the Romans, and limit his standing army to 5000 men, besides paying a sum of 1000 talents. Among the hostages given for the fulfilment of these hard conditions, was his son Demetrius. (Polyb. xviii. 27 ; Liv. xxxiii. 30.) Whatever resentment and enmity he might still entertain against his conquerors, Philip was now effectually humbled, and it is certain that his conduct towards Rome at this time is characterised by every appearance of good faith and of a sincere desire to cultivate the friendship of the all-powerful republic. At the suggestion of the Roman deputy, Cn. Cornelius, he sent an embassy to Rome, to request that the treaty of peace might be converted into one of alliance (Polyb. xviii. 31); and in the following year (195), he sent a strong body of auxiliaries to the assistance of Flamininus against Nabis. (Liv. xxxiv. 26.) At a subsequent period he resisted all the efforts of the Aetolian envoy, Nicander, to induce him once more to take up arms in concert with Antiochus, as well as the tempting offers of that monarch himself, who spared no promises in order to gain him over to his alliance. (Id. xxxv. 12, xxxix. 28.) At the commencement of B. c. 191, he sent ambassadors to Rome, with offers of support and assistance against Antiochus, who was then already in Greece. The Syrian king had the imprudence at this time to give personal offence to Philip, who immediately engaged in measures of more active hostility, lent all the assistance in his power to the Roman praetor, Baebius, and co-operated with the Romans in the siege of Limnaea, while he took the opportunity to expel Amynander from Athamania, and make himself master of that province. (Id. xxxvi. 4, 8, 13, 14.) Though he took no part in the decisive battle at Thermopylae, he joined the consul Acilius Glabrio shortly after, and it was arranged between them that Philip should besiege Lania at the same time.

that Glabrio carried on the siege of Heracleia, but the latter city having fallen first, the king was ordered to desist from the siege of Lamia, which thereupon surrendered to the Romans. Philip was indignant at being thus balked of his prize, but he nevertheless obtained permission from the consul, while the latter was occupied in the siege of Naupactus, to turn his arms against some of the cities which had taken part with the Aetolians; and not only made himself master of Demetrias, and other places in Thessaly, but overran the whole of Perrhaebia, Aperantia, and Dolopia. (Id.xxxvi. 25, 33, 34, xxxix. 23.) The Romans, at this period, evinced their satisfaction with the conduct of Philip by restoring to him his son Demetrius and the other hostages, and remitting all the arrears of tribute, which remained yet unpaid (Pol. xx. 13, xxi. 9; Liv. xxxvi. 35): the king, in return, rendered them still more important services, by providing every thing necessary for the march of their army through Macedonia and Thrace, when advancing to the attack of Antiochus in Asia; and securing its passage, without obstruction, as far as the Hellespont. (Liv. xxxvii. 7 ; Appian. Mac. Exc. 7. § 3.) But the seeds of fresh disputes were already sown, and Polybius has justly remarked that the real causes of the second war of the Romans with Macedonia arose before the death of Philip, though it did not break out till a later period. So long as the Romans were engaged in the contest with Antiochus, and stood in need of the support of the Macedonian king, he had been allowed to retain possession of the conquests he had made during that war; and though Athamania had been again wrested from him by Amynander and the Aetolians, he still held many towns in Perrhaebia and Thessaly, which he had captured from the Aetolians, with the express permission of Acilius Glabrio. But after the fall of Antiochus, deputies from those states appeared at Rome (B. c. !85), to demand the restitution of the cities in question, and at the same time Eumenes warned the senate of the increasing power of Philip, who was diligently employed in strengtheninghisinternal resources, while he was secretly enlarging his frontiers on the side of Thrace, and had made himself master of the important cities of Aenus and Maroneia. This was enough to arouse the jealousy of the senate. After the usual form of sending deputies to inquire into the matters on the spot, it was decreed that Philip should surrender all his conquests in Perrhaebia and Thessaly, withdraw his garrisons from the cities of Thrace, and confine himself within the ancient limits of Macedonia. (Liv. xxxix. 23–29, 33; Polyb. xxiii. 4, 6, 11, 13, 14.) The indignation of the king was vehemently excited by these commands, but he was not yet prepared to resist the power of Rome, and accordingly complied, but, before he withdrew his troops from Maroneia, made a barbarous massacre of many of the unhappy citizens. At the same time he sent his younger son, Demetrius, to Rome, to answer, the complaints which were now pouring in from all sides against him: aid the young prince was received with so much favour by the senate, that they agreed to pardon all the past grounds of offence against Philip, out of consideration for his son, B. c. 183. (Polyb. xxiii. 13, 14, xxiv. 1–3; Liv. xxxix. 34, 35, 46, 47.) Unhappily the partiality thus displayed by the Romans towards Demetrius had the effect of arousing the jealousy both of Philip himself and of his eldest son, Perseus:

and from henceforth the disputes between the two |

brothers embittered the declining years of the king [DEMETRius, p. 966]. Many other causes combined to the same effect; and the intrigues which the Romans were perpetually carrying on among his subjects and followers naturally aggravated the suspicious and jealous turn which his temper had by this time assumed. He was conscious of having alienated the affections of his own subjects by many acts of injustice and cruelty, and he now sought to diminish the number of the disaffected by the barbarous expedient of putting to death the children of all those whom he had previously sacrificed to his vengeance or suspicions (Liv. xxxix. 53, xl 3–5). But while he was thus rendering himself the object of universal hatred at home, he was unremitting in his preparations for the renewal of the war with Rome. By way of disguising the real object of his levies and armaments, which was, however, no secret for the Romans, he undertook an expedition against the barbarian tribes of Paeonia and Maedica, and advanced as far as the highest ridge of Mount Haemus. It was during this expedition that Perseus succeeded in effecting the object for which he had been so long intriguing, and having by means of forged letters convinced the king of the guilt of Demetrius, induced him to consent to the execution of the unhappy prince. But Philip was unable to stifle the feelings of grief and remorse occasioned by this deed, and these passions broke forth with renewed violence when he afterwards discovered the deceit that had been practised upon him, and learnt that his son had been unjustly sacrificed to the jealousy of his elder brother. He believed himself to be haunted by the avenging spirit of Demetrius, and was meditating the punishment of Perseus for his perfidy, by excluding him from the throne in favour of his cousin Antigonus, the son of Echecrates, when he himself fell sick at Amphipolis, more from the effects of grief and remorse than any bodily ailment, and died shortly after, imprecating curses in his last moments upon the head of Perseus. His death took place before the end of B. c. 179, in the 59th year of his age, after a reign of nearly 42 years (Liv. xl. 6, 16, 21–24, 54–56; Polyb. Friv. 7, 8; Euseb Arm. p. 158; Dexippus ap. Syncell p. 508; Clinton, F. H. vol. ii. p. 243). The character of Philip may be summed up in the remark of the impartial Polybius (x. 26) that there are few monarchs of whom more good or more evil could justly be said. His naturally good qualities were gradually eclipsed and overgrown by evil tendencies, and he is a striking, though by no means a solitary, example of a youth full of hopeful Promise degenerating by degrees into a gloomy and *itious tyrant. Of his military and political abilities the history of his reign affords sufficient Proof, notwithstanding occasional intervals of apParent apathy and inaction for which it is difficult **count. He was also a fluent and ready *er, and possessed a power of repartee which he loved to indulge in a manner not always con**tent with kingly dignity (Polyb. xvii. 4; Liv. *ii. 34, xxxvi. 14). In addition to the darker stains of perfidy and cruelty, his private character was disgraced by the mostumbridled licentiousness, *well asby habitual excesses in drinking. (Polyb.

| Besides his two sons already mentioned, he left a third son, named Philip (but whether legitimate or not we are not informed), who could have been born but a few years before the death of his father. [Philippus, No. 25.] (In addition to the ancient authorities cited in the course of the above narrative, the reign and character of Philip will be found fully discussed and examined by Schorn, Gesch. Griechenlands, Bonn, 1833; Flathe, Gesch. Macedoniens, vol. ii.; Thirlwall's Greece, vol. viii. chap. 63–66; and Brandstätter, Gesch. des Aetolischen Bundes, Berlin, 1844.) [E. H. B.]

coin of Philippus v. king of MACEDONIA.

PHILIPPUS, MA'RCIUS. 1. Q. MARcius Q. F. Q. N. Philippus, consul B. c. 281, with L. Aemilius Barbula, had to carry on war with the Etruscans, and had a triumph on the 1st of April on account of his victory over them. In B. c. 263 he was magister equitum to the dictator Cn. Fulvius Maximus Centumalus (Fasti Capit.).

2. L. MARcius Q. F. Philippus, the father of No. 3, formed a hospitable connection with Philip W., king of Macedonia (Liv. xlii. 38), though on what occasion is not mentioned. This fact is alluded to in the annexed coin of the Marcia gens, which bears on the obverse the head of the Macedonian monarch, and on the reverse L. Philippvs, with a

horseman galloping, probably in reference to the Ilalule.

One is disposed to think that this L. Marcius was the first person of the gens who obtained the surname of Philippus in consequence of his connection with the king of Macedonia, and that the Fasti erroneously give this cognomen to the consul of B. c. 281.

3. Q. MARc1Us L. F. Q. N. Philippus, son of No. 2, was praetor B. c. 188, and obtained Sicily as his province. Two years afterwards, B. c. 186, he was consul with Sp. Postumius Albinus. These consuls were commanded by the senate to conduct the celebrated inquiry into the worship of Bacchus, which had been secretly introduced into Italy and been the occasion of much immorality and profanity. We accordingly find the name of Philippus in the senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus, which has come down to us. After Philippus had finished his share in these investigations, he set out for Liguria, where he and his colleague had to carry on war. Here, however, he was unsuccess

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ful. In the country of the Apuani, he was surprised by the enemy in a narrow pass, and lost

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