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not his purpose to develope the Socratic doctrine, and as he was not capable of penetrating into the peculiarity of a philosophic mode of thinking. But for that very reason his representation, with all its fidelity, is not adapted to give us a sufficient picture of the man whom all antiquity regarded as the originator of a new era in philosophy, and whose life each of his disciples, especially Plato the most distinguished of them, regarded as a model. Moreover it was the object of Xenophon, by way of defence against the accusers of Socrates, merely to paint him as the morally spotless, pious, upright, temperate, clear-sighted, unjustly condemned man, not as the founder of new philosophical inquiry. It may easily be understood therefore that there were various opinions in antiquity
as to whether the more satisfactory picture of
Socrates was to be found in Plato, in Xenophon, or in Aeschines. Since the time of Brucker however it had become usual to go back to Xenophon, to the exclusion of the other authorities, as the source of the only authentic delineation of the personal characteristics and philosophy of Socrates, or to fill up the gaps left by him by means of the accounts of Plato (Meiners, Geschichte der Wissenschafen, ii. p. 420, &c.), till Schleiermacher started the inquiry, “What can Socrates have been, besides what Xenophon tells us of him, without contradicting that authority, and what must he have been, to have justified Plato in bringing him forward as he does in his dialogues?” ( Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen, in the Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie, iii. p. 50, &c., 1818, reprinted in Schleiermacher's Werke, vol. iii. pt. 2, p. 293, &c.; translated in the Philological Museum, vol. ii. p. 538, &c.) Dissen, too, had already pointed out some not inconsiderable contradictions in the doctrines of the Xenophontic Socrates (de Philosophia morali in Xenophontis de Socrate Commentariis tradita, Gotting. 1812; reprinted in Dissen's Kleine Schriflen, p. 87, &c.). Now we know indeed that Socrates, the teacher of human wisdom, who, without concerning himself with the investigation of the secrets of nature, wished to bring philosophy back from heaven to earth (Cic. Acad. i. 4, Tusc. v. 4; comp. Aristot. Metaph. i. 6, de Part Anim. i. p. 642. 28), was far from intending to introduce a regularly organised system of philosophy; but that he made no endeavours to go back to the ultimate foundations of his doctrine, or that that doctrine was vacillating and not without contradictions, as Wiggers (in his Life of Socrates, p. 184, &c.) and others assume, we cannot possibly regard as a well founded view, unless his almost unexampled influence upon the most distinguished men of his time is to become an inexplicable riddle, and the conviction of a Plato, a Eucleides, and others, that they were indebted to him for the fruits of their own investigations, is to be regarded as a mere illusion. Now we fully admit that in the representation of the personal character of Socrates Plato and Xenophon coincide (see Ed. Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. p. 16, &c.); and further, that Socrates adjusted his treatment of the subject of his conversation according as those with whom he had to do entertained such or such views, were more or less endowed, and had made more or less progress; and therefore did not always say the same on the same subject (Xenophon, by F. Delbrück, Bonn, 1829. pp. 64, &c. 132, &c.).
But, on the other hand, in Xenophon we miss every thing like a penetrating comprehension of the fundamental ideas of the Socratic doctrine to which he himself makes reference. The representations of Plato and Xenophon however may be very well harmonised with each other, partly by the assumption that Socrates, as the originator of a new era of philosophical development, must have made the first steps in that which was its distinctive direction, and the immediate manifestation of which consisted in bringing into more distinct and prominent relief the idea and form of scientific knowledge (see Schleiermacher in the above quoted treatise); partly by the careful employment of the remarks made by Aristotle respecting the Socratic doctrine and the points of distinction between it and that of Plato (Ch. A. Brandis, in the above-mentioned treatise; comp. Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie, ii. 1. p. 20, &c.). These remarks, though not numerous, are decisive on account of their acuteness and precision, as well as by their referring to the most important points in the philosophy of Socrates. III. The philosophy of the Greeks before Socrates had sought first (among the Ionians) after the inherent foundation of generated existence and changing phenomena, and then (among the Eleatics) after the idea of absolute existence. Afterwards, when the ideas of being and coming into being had come into hostile opposition to each other, it had made trial of various insufficient modes of reconciling them ; and lastly, raising the inquiry after the absolutely true and certain in our knowledge, had arrived at the assumption that numbers and their relations are not only the absolutely true and certain, but the foundation of things. Its efforts, which had been pervaded by a pure appreciation of truth, were then exposed to the attacks of a sophistical system, which concerned itself only about securing an appearance of knowledge, and which in the first instance indeed applied itself to the diametrically opposite theories of eternal, perpetual coming into earistence, and of unchangeable, absolutely simple and single eristence, but soon directed its most dangerous weapons against the ethico-religious consciousness, which in the last ten years before the Peloponnesian war had already been so much shaken. Whoever intended to oppose that sophistical system with any success would have, at the same time, at least to lay the foundation for a removal of the contradictions, which, having been left by the earlier philosophy without any tenable mode of reconciling them, had been employed by the sophists with so much skill for their own purposes. In order to establish, in confutation of the sophists, that the human mind sees itself compelled to press on to truth and certainty, not only in the general but also in reference to the rules and laws of our actions, and is capable of doing so, it was necessary first of all that to the inquiries previously dealt with there should be added a new one, that after knowledge, as such. It was a new inquiry, inasmuch as previously the mind, being entirely directed towards the objective universe, had regarded knowledge respecting it as a necessary reflection of it, without paying any closer regard to that element of knowledge which is essentially subjective. Even the Pythagoreans, who came the nearest to that inquiry, had perceived indeed that the existence of something absolutely true and certain must be presupposed, but without investigating further what knowledge is and how it may be developed. It was the awakening of the idea of knowledge, and the first utterances of it, which made the philosophy of Socrates the turning-point of a new period, and gave to it its fructifying power. Before we inquire after the existence of things we must establish in our own minds the idea of them (Xen. Mem. iv. 6. § 1, 13, iv. 5. § 12; Plat. Apol. p. 21, &c.; Arist. Metaph. i. 6, de Part. Anim. i. 1, p. 642. 28); and for that reason we must come to an understanding with ourselves respecting what belongs to man, before we inquire after the nature of things in general (Xen. Mem. i. 1. § 11, comp. 4. § 7 ; Arist. Metaph. i. 6, de Part. Anim. i. 1). Socrates accordingly takes up the inquiry respecting knowledge in the first instance, and almost exclusively, in reference to moral action; but he is so penetrated with a sense of the power of knowledge, that he maintains that where it is attained to, there moral action will of necessity be found ; or, as he expresses it, all virtue is knowledge (Xen. Mem. iii. 9. § 4, iv. 6; Plat. Protag. p. 329, &c. 349, &c.; Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 13, iii. 11, Eth. Eudem. i. 5, iii. 1, Magn. Mor. i. 1, 35); for knowledge is always the strongest, and cannot be overpowered by appetite (Arist. Eth. Nicom. vii. 3, Eudem. vii. 13; Plat. Protag. p. 352, &c.). Therefore no man willingly acts wickedly (Arist. Magn. Mor. i. 9, comp. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. § 4, iv. 6. § 6, l l ; Plat. Apol. p. 25, e. &c.); for will appeared to him to be inseparably connected with knowledge. But just as knowledge, as such, that is without regard to the diversity of the objects to which it is directed, is something single, so also he could admit only a single virtue (Xen. Mem. iii. 9. § 2; Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. 1, Eudem. iii. 1); and as little could he recognise an essential diversity in the directions which virtue took, as in the practice of it by persons of different station and sex (Arist. Polit. i. 13). It may easily be conceived, therefore, that he did not venture to separate happiness from virtue, and that he expressly defined the former more accurately as good conduct (sêmpačía) in distinction from good fortune (eijrvXia, Xen. Mem. iii. 9. § 14); a distinction in which is expressed the most important diversity in all later treatment of ethics, which sets down either a certain mode of being or acting, as such, or else the mere enjoyment that results therefrom, as that which is in itself valuable. But how does knowledge develope itself in us? In this way: the idea, obtained by means of induction, as that which is general, out of the individual facts of consciousness, is settled and fixed by means of definition. Those are the two scientific processes, which, according to the most express testimonies of Aristotle and others, Socrates first discovered, or rather first pointed out (Arist. Met. xiii. 4; comp. Xen. Mem. iv. 6. § l ; Plat. Apol. p. 22, &c.); and although he did not attempt to develope a logical theory of them, but rather contented himself with the masterly practice of them, he may with good reason be regarded as the founder of the theory of scientific knowledge. Socrates, however, always setting out from what was immediately admitted (Xen. Mem. iv. 6. § 15), exercised this twofold process on the most different subjects, and in doing so was led to obtain an in
sight into this or that one of them, not so much by the end in view as by the necessity for calling forth self-knowledge and self-understanding. For this end he endeavoured in the first place, and chiefly, to awaken the consciousness of ignorance; and inasmuch as the impulse towards the development of knowledge is already contained in this, he maintains that he had been declared by the Delphic god to be the wisest of men, because he did not delude himself with the idea that he knew what he did not know, and did not arrogate to himself any wisdom (Plat. Apol. pp. 21, 25, Theaet. p. 150). To call forth distrust in pretended knowledge he used to exercise his peculiar irony, which, directed against himself as against others, lost all offensive poignancy (Plat. de Rep. i. p. 337, Symp. p. 216, Theaet. p. 150, Meno, p. 80: Xen. Mem. iv. 2). Convinced that he could obtain his object only by leading to the spontaneous search after truth, he throughout made use of the dialogical form (which passed from him to the most different ramifications of his school), and designates the inclination to supply one's deficiencies in one's own investigation by association with others striving towards the same end, as true love (Brandis, Gesch. der griechisch-römischen Philos. ii. p.64). But however deeply Socrates felt the need of advancing in self-development with others, and by means of them, the inclination and the capability for wrapping himself up in the abstraction of solitary meditation and diving into the depths of his own mind, was equally to be found in him (Plat. Symp. pp. 174, 220). And again, side by side with his incessant endeavour thoroughly to understand himself there stood the sense of the need of illumination by a higher inspiration. This he was convinced was imparted to him from time to time by the monitions or warnings of an internal voice, which he designated his balusivtov. By this we are lot to understand a personal genius, as Plutarch (de Genio Socratis, c. 20), Apuleius (de Deo Socrat. p. 111, &c. ed. Basil.), and others, and probably also the accusers of Socrates, assumed ; as little was it the offspring of an enthusiastic phantasy, as moderns have thought, or the production of the Socratic irony, or of cunning political calculation. It was rather the yet indefinitely developed idea of a divine revelation. (See especially Schleiermacher, in his translation of the works of Plato, i. 2, p. 432, &c.) On that account it is always described only as a divine something, or a divine sign, a divine voice (amuelov, pavi, Plat. Phaedr. p. 242, de Rep. vi. p. 406, Apol. p. 31, &c.). This voice had reference to actions the issue of which could not be anticipated by calculation, whether it manifested itself, at least immediately, only in the way of warning against certain actions (Plat. Apol. p. 31), or even now and then as urging him to their performance (Xen. Mem. i. 4, iv. 3. § 12, &c.). On the other hand this daemonium was to be perceived as little in reference to the moral value of actions as in reference to subjects of knowledge. Socrates on the contrary expressly forbids the having recourse to oracles on a level with which he places his daemonium, in reference to that which the gods have enabled men to find by means of reflection. (Xen. Mem. i. 1. § 6, &c.) Thus far the statements of Xenophon and Plato admit of being very well reconciled both with one another and with those of Aristotle. But this is not the case with reference to the more exact definition and carrying out of the idea of that knowledge which should have moral action as its immediate and necessary consequence. What is comprised in, and what is the source of this knowledge? Is it to be derived merely from custom and the special ends and interests of the subject which acts? Every thing, according to the Xenophontic Socrates, is good and beautiful merely for that to which it stands in a proper relation (Mem. iii. 8. § 3, 7). The good is nothing else than the useful, the beautiful nothing else than the serviceable (Mem. iv. 6. § 8, &c., Symp. 5. § 3, &c.), and almost throughout, moral precepts are referred to the motives of utility and enjoyment (Mem. i. 5, § 6, ii. 1. § 1, iv. 3. § 9, &c.; comp. ii. 1. § 27. &c., i. 6. § 9, iv. 8. § 6); while on the contrary the Platonic Socrates never makes use of an argument founded on the identity of the good and the agreeable. In the passages which have been brought forward to show that he does (Protag. pp. 353, &c. 333), he is manifestly arguing ad hominen from the point of view of his sophistical antagonist. Now, that the doctrine of Socrates must have been a self-contradictory one, if on the one hand it laid down the above assertions respecting knowledge, and undertook to prove that only good conduct, and not good fortune (edrpašta not evrvXia), was valuable in itself (Xen. Mem. iii. 9. § 11), and yet on the other hand referred the good to the useful and the agreeable, even the defenders of the representation given by Xenophon admit, but suppose that this contradiction was an unavoidable consequence of the abstract and merely formal conception of virtue as knowledge (see especially Zeller, l.c. ii. p. 63, &c.). But however little Socrates may have had occasion for, or been capable of, analysing what was comprised in this knowledge, i.e. of establishing a scientifically organised system of ethics (and in fact, according to Aristotle, Eth. Eudem. i. 5, he investigated what virtue was, not how and whence it originated), he could not possibly have subordinated knowledge, to which he attributed such unlimited power, and of which he affirmed that opposing desires were powerless against it, to enjoyment and utility. A man who himself so manifestly annulled his own fundamental maxim could not possibly have permanently enchained and inspired minds like those of Alcibiades, Eucleides, Plato, and others. In fact Socrates declared in the most decisive manner that the validity of moral requirements was independent of all reference to welfare, may even to life and death, and unlimited (Plat. Apol. pp. 28, 38, Crito, p. 48; comp. Xen. Men, i. 2, § 64, 6. § 9), and in those dialogues of Plato in which the historical Socrates is more particularly exhibited, as in the Protagoras, Charmides, Laches, and Euthyphro, we find him offering the most vigorous resistance to the assumption that the agreeable or useful has any value for us. That Socrates must rather have had in view a higher species of knowledge, inherent in the self-consciousness, as such, or developing itself from it, is shown by the expressions selected by Aristotle. (origräuai, Adyol, ppovijaeis), which even still make their appearance through the shallow notices of Xenophon (Brandis, l.c. ii. p. 43.). But in connection with this, Socrates might may must have endeavoured to show how the good is coincident with real utility and real
enjoyment; and it is quite conceivable that Xenophon's unphilosophical mind may on the one hand have confounded sensual enjoyment and utility with that of a more exalted and real kind, and on the other comprehended and preserved the externals and introductions of the conversations of Socrates rather than their internal connection and objects. Besides, his purpose was to refute the prejudice that Socrates aspired after a hidden wisdom, and for that very reason he might have found himself still more induced to bring prominently forward every thing by which Socrates appeared altogether to fall in with the ordinary conceptions of the Athenians. Whether and how Socrates endeavoured to connect the moral with the religious consciousness, and how and how far he had developed his convictions respecting a divine spirit arranging and guiding the universe, respecting the immortality of the soul, the essential nature of love, of the state, &c., we cannot here inquire. [Ch. A. B.] SO'CRATES, designated in the title of his Ecclesiastical History Scholasticus, from his following the profession of a scholasticus or pleader, was, according to his own testimony (Hist. Eccles. v. 24), born and educated in the city of Constantinople, in which also he chiefly or wholly resided in after life. When quite a boy (kouës wéos dov) he studied (Hist. Eccles. v. 16) under the grammarians Ammonius and Helladius, who had been priests at Alexandria, the first of the Egyptian Ape, the second of Jupiter, and had fled from that city on account of the tumults occasioned by the destruction of the heathen temples, which took place, according to the Chronicon of Marcellinus, in the consulship of Timasius and Promotus, A. D. 389 [AM Monius GRAMMATIcus]. From these data Walesius calculates that Socrates was born about the beginning of the reign of Theodosius the Great (A. d. 379) : his calculation is based on the assumption that Socrates was placed under their charge at the usual age of ten years, and that he attended them immediately after their removal from Alexandria to Constantinople; and it is confirmed by the circumstance that Socrates writing of some dissensions among the Macedonians and Eunomians of Constantinople about A. p. 394 (H. E. v. 24), mentions as one reason for his particularity in speaking of these, and generally of events which had occurred at Constantinople, that some of them had occurred under his own eyes; a reason which he would hardly have urged in this place had it not applied to the particular events in question ; and had he been younger than Walesius’ calculation would make him, he would hardly have been old enough to feel interested in such matters; indeed he must, on any calculation, have given attention to them at a comparatively early age. And had he been much older than Walesius makes him, he must have commenced his attendance on his masters after the usual age, and then he would hardly have said that he went to them kouièjì vé0s ov, “when quite young.” Walesius suspects from the very high terms in which Socrates speaks of the rhetorician Troilus, and the acquaintance he shows with his affairs, that he studied under him also, which may be true. Beyond this, little seems to be known of the personal history of Socrates, except that he followed the profession of a pleader at Constantinople, and that he survived the seventeenth consulship of the emperor Theodosius the Younger, A. D. 439, to which period his Ecclesias. tical History extends (H. E. vii. 48). In fact, he probably survived that date several years, as he published a second edition of his history (H. E. ii. 1), and had opportunity between the first and second editions to procure access to several additional documents, to weigh their testimony, and to re-write the first and second books. Photius, in his brief notice of Socrates and his history (Biblioth. Cod. 28), and Nicephorus Callisti (H. E. i. 1) in a still briefer notice, do not speak of his profession of a scholasticus or pleader; from which some have inferred (e. g. Hamberger, apud Fabric. Biblioth. Graec. vol. vii. p. 423, note g.; comp. Ceillier, Auteurs Sacrés, vol. xiii. p. 669), that the title of his work is inaccurate in giving him that designation: but we think that no such inference can be justly drawn from the omission of so unimportant a circumstance in notices so brief as those of Photius and Nicephorus. The general impartiality of Socrates may be taken as an indication that he was not an ecclesiastic; while his literary habits and his balancing of evidence (e.g. H. E. ii. 1) are in harmony with the forensic pursuits in which the title scholasticus shows him to have been engaged. Another much disputed point is, what were his religious opinions, or, to state the question more accurately, did he belong to the church claiming to be “Catholic,” and which comprehended the bulk of the Homočusian or orthodox community, or to the smaller and “schismatical” body of the ratapoi, “Puritans” or Novatians. From the general accordance of the Novatians with “the Church" in religious belief and ecclesiastical constitution, the only difference between the two bodies being the sterner temper and stricter discipline of the dissenting community [Nova TIANUs], it is difficult to trace any decisive indications in the writings of Socrates to which body he gave his adherence. The testimony of Nicephorus Callisti (H. E. i. 1) would be decisive, had it been the testimony of a contemporary, and more impartial in tone. He speaks of him as “Socrates the pure (katapés, i.e. Puritan) in designation, but not also in principle.” To the testimony of Nicephorus we may oppose the silence of earlier writers, as Cassiodorus (De divinis Lection. c. 17, and Praefat. Historiae Tripartitae), Liberatus (Breviar. c. 2), Theodore Anagnostes or Lector (Epistola Histor. Eccles. praefira), Evagrius (H. E. i. 1), some one or other of whom would have probably mentioned his being a Novatian, had he really belonged to that sect. (See the Veterum Testimonia collected by Valesius, and prefixed to his edition of Socrates.) It is argued that he has carefully recorded the succession of the Novatian bishops of Constantinople; has spoken of these prelates in the highest terms, and has even recorded (H. E. vii. 17) a miracle which occurred to Paul, one of them ; and that he appears to have taken a peculiar interest in the sect, and to have recorded various incidents respecting them with a particularity which would hardly be expected except from a member of their body. But these things, as Walesius justly contends, may be accounted for by his avowed purpose of recording events occurring in Constantinople more minutely, because he was a native and resident of that city (H. E. v. 24), and by sympathy with the stricter morality of the Novatians, or by some family connection or intimate friendship with some of their members (comp. Socrat. H. E. i. 13).
When, however, Walesius adduces as positive evidence of his adherence to the “Catholic” church, that he repeatedly mentions it without qualification as “the church,” and classes the Novatians with other sectaries, he employs arguments as little valid as those which, just before, he had refuted. Socrates, though a Novatian, might speak thus in a conventional sense, just as Protestants of the present day often speak of “Catholics,” or “Catholic church,” Dissenters of “the church " or “ the church of England,” and persons of reputedly heterodox views of “Orthodoxy” or “the Orthodox: ” such terms, when once custom has determined their application, being used as conventional and convenient without regard to the essential justness and propriety of their application. The question of the Novatianism of Socrates must be regarded as undetermined; but the preponderance of the various arguments is in favour of his connection with the “Catholic church.” The 'Ekkamauaari iotopia, Historia Ecclesiastica, of Socrates extends from the reign of Comstantine the Great to that of the younger Theodosius, A. D. 439, and comprehends the events of a hundred and forty years, according to the writer's own statement (H. E. vii. 48), or more accurately of a hundred and thirty-three years, in one of the most eventful periods of the history of the Church, when the doctrines of orthodoxy were developed and defined in a succession of creeds, each step in the process being occasioned or accompanied and followed by commotions which shook the whole Christian community and rent it into sects, some of which have long since passed away, while others have continued to exist. Three general councils, the first Nicene, the first Constantinopolitan, and the first Ephesian are recorded in the history, and two others, the second Ephesian, fi Apatpuki, and the Chalcedonian, were held at no great interval from the period at which it ends. The interest and importance of the period may be further inferred from the fact that we have three histories of it by contemporary writers (Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret) which have come down to us in a complete form, and which furnished materials for the Historia Tripartita of Cassiodorus [CAssionoR Us; EPIPHANIUS, No.1 l), and that we have fragments of another (that of Philostorgius) written about the same period. Of these histories that of Socrates is perhaps the most impartial. In fact he appears to have been a man of less bigotry than most of his contemporaries, and the very difficulty of determining from internal evidence some points of his religious belief, may be considered as arguing his comparative liberality. His history is divided into seven books. Commencing with a brief account of the accession and conversion of Constantine the Great, and the civil war of Constantine and Licinius, the author passes to the history of the Arian controversy, which he traces from its rise to the banishment of Athanasius, the recal and death of Arius, and the death, soon after, of Constantine himself, A. D. 306–337 (Lib. i.). He then carries on the history of the contentions of the Arian or Eusebian and Homöousian parties during the reign of Constantius II. A. D. 337–360 (Lib. ii.). The struggle of heathenism with Christianity under Julian, and the triumph of Christianity under Jovian (A. D. 360–364), then follow (Lib. iii.). The renewed struggle of the Arians and Homöousians under Valens, A. D. 364–378 (Lib. iv.); the triumph
of the Homöousian party over the Arian and Macedonian parties, in the reign of Theodosius the Great A. D. 379–395 (Lib. v.); the contention of John Chrysostom with his opponents, and the other ecclesiastical incidents of the reign of Arcadius A. D. 395–408 (Lib. vi.); and the contentions of Christianity with the expiring remains of heathenism, the Nestorian controversy, and the council of Ephesus, with other events of the reign of the younger Theodosius, A. D. 408 to 439, in which latter year the history closes, occupy the remainder of the work. This division of the work into seven books, according to the reigns of the successive emperors, was made by Socrates himself (Comp. ii. 1). In the first two books he followed, in his first edition, the ecclesiastical history of Rufinus; but this part, as already montioned, he had to write for his second edition. The materials of the remaining books were derived partly from Rufinus, partly from other writers, and partly from the oral account of persons who had been personally cognizant of matters, and who survived to the time of the writer. Socrates has inserted a number of letters from the emperors and from prelates and councils, creeds, and other documents which are of value, both in themselves, and as authenticating his statements. He aimed not at a pompous phraseology, où ppáaews &ykov opovričovres (Lib. i. 1), but at perspicuity (Lib. iii. 1), and his style, as Photius remarks (Biblioth. Cod. 28), presents nothing worthy of notice. The inaccuracy with respect to points of doctrine with which the same critic charges him (dAAd kal év ross 64) uagwoo Atav early dispuésis) may be taken as a corroboration of what has been said concerning the comparative liberality of his temper. His diligence and general in partiality are admitted by the best critics, Walesius, Cave, Fabricius, &c. “His impartiality,” says Mr. Waddington (Hist. of the Church, part ii. c. 7, ad fin.), “is so strikingly displayed as to render his orthodoxy questionable to Baronius, the celebrated Roman Catholic historian ; but Walesius, in his life, has clearly shown that there is no reason for such a suspicion. We may mention another principle which he has followed, which, in the mind of Baronius, may have tended to confirm the notion of his heterodoxy—that he is invariably adverse to every form of persecution on account of religious opinions—5uaryudv 6é Aéyw to drogouw tapättew rows in vx4 ovtas—" and I call it persecution to offer any description of molestation to those who are quiet.” Some credulity respecting miraculous stories is his principal failing.” The first printed edition of the Greek text of the Historia Ecclesiastica of Socrates was that of Rob. Stephanus (Estienne), fol. Paris 1544. The volume contained also the ecclesiastical histories of the other early Greek writers, Eusebius (with his Life of Constantine), Sozomen, Theodoret, Evagrius, and the fragments of Theodore Anagnostes or Lector. It was again printed with the Latin Yersion of Christopherson, and with the other Greek ecclesiastical historians just mentioned, also accompanied by the version of Christopherson, except In the case of Theodore Lector, of whom Musculus's version was given, fol. Geneva 1612; but the standard edition is that of Hen. Walesius, who published, as part of his series of the ancient "reek ecclesiastical historians, the histories of So
*ates and Sozomen, with a new Latin version and
valuable notes, fol. Paris 1668. His edition was reprinted at Mentz, fol. 1677, and the Latin version by itself at Paris the same year. The remainder of the Mentz edition was issued with a new title page, Amsterdam, 1695. The text, version, and notes of Walesius were reprinted with some additional Variorum notes, under the care of William Reading, in the second volume of the Greek ecclesiastical historians, fol. Cambridge 1720. This edition of Reading was reprinted at Turin, 3 vols. fol. 1748. There is a reprint of the text of Walesius, but without the version and notes, 8vo. Oxford, 1844. There have been several Latin versions, as those of Musculus, fol. Basil. 1549, 1557, 1594, John Christopherson (Christophorsonus), bishop of Chichester, fol. Paris, 1571, Co. logn, 1570, 1581 ; and (revised by Grynaeus, and with notes by him), fol. Basil. 1570 and 1611 ; and in the Bibliotheca Patrum, vol. v. part 2, fol. Cologn 1618, and vol. vii. fol. Lyon 1677. There are a French translation by Cousin, made from the Latin version of Walesius, 4to. Paris, 1675, and English translations by Meredith Hanmer, with the other Greek ecclesiastical historians, folio, Lond. 1577, 1585, 1650, and by Samuel Parker (with translations of Sozomen and Theodoret), 2 vols. 8vo. 1707. The latter, which is an abridged translation, has been repeatedly reprinted. (Walesius, De Vila et Scriptis Socratis et Sozomeni, prefixed to his edition of their histories; Vossius, De Historicis Graecis, lib. ii. c. 20; Fabric. Bibl. Graec. vol. vii. p. 423, &c.; Cave, Hist. Litt. ad ann. 439, vol. i. p. 427, ed. Oxford, 1740–1743; Dupin, Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Auteurs Eccles. vol. iv. or vol. iii. part ii. p. 78, ed. Mons. 1691 ; Ceillier, Auteurs Sacrés, vol. xiii. p. 669; Lardner, Credibility, &c. part ii. vol. xi. p. 450; Ittigius, De Biblioth. Patrum; Watt. Bibliotheca Britannica; Waddington, Hist, of the Church, l.c.) [J. C. M.] SO'CRATES, minor literary persons. 1. A tragic actor at Athens in the time of Demosthenes. (Dem de Cor. p. 314; comp. SIMYLUs.) 2. Of Argos, an historical writer, whose time is unknown. He wrote a trepitiyoma is "Apyovs. (Diog. Laërt. ii. 47, and Menag. ad loc.; Schol. ad Pind. var. loc.; Schol. ad Eurip. Phoen. 45; Fabric. Bibl. Graec. vol. ii. p. 689; Vossius, de Hist. Graec. p. 499, ed. Westermann.) 3. Of Bithynia, a Peripatetic philosopher. (Diog, l.c.) 4. An epigrammatic poet, of whom nothing is known beyond the mention of his name by Diogenes Laërtius (l.c.). There is a single epigram in the Greek Anthology, among the Arithmetical Problems, under the name of Socrates. (Anth. Pal. xiv. 1; Brunck. Anal. vol. ii. p. 477; Jacobs, Anth. Graec, vol. iii. p. 181, Comm. vol. ii. pt. iii. p. 335.) 5. Of Cos, the author of a work entitled étrikafioreis Seáv. (Diog. Laërt. l.c.; Schol. ad Apoll. Rhod. i. 966 ; Ath. iii. p. 111, b. ; Schol. ad Aristoph. Eq. 959.). He is probably the writer whose treatise trepi 60 (ww is quoted by Plutarch (de Is. et Osir. 35, p. 364, f.). The exact meaning of the phrase, émikaijaeis Seáv, is doubtful. Wossius explains it as prayers to the gods, but Menagius contends that it rather means the epithets or surnames which were assigned to the several gods for various reasons. (Fabric. l.c.; Vossius, l. c. ; Menag. ad Diog. l.c.)