not found in children and idiots, in whom we ought most to expect meeting with them. I answer, 1. Those who admit innate ideas, do not believe them more natural to the mind than its faculties; and as the state and constitution of the body disturbs the faculties of idiots, the same cause may hinder them from showing any signs of innate ideas. 2. The fact is not strictly true. Even idiots and infants have the idea of their existence, individuality, identity, &c.

In the remainder of that paragraph, Mr. Locke diverts himself with the absurdity of those who believe the expressions of abstract maxims to be innate; but the most determined scholastic never maintained any such opinion; and he combats a chimera which is the work of his own fancy.

I know not how it has happened that, instead of a few general reflections which I intended, I have sent you a long and tiresome criticism on some passages of a single chapter. The remains of lassitude, probably, made it easier for me to follow and dispute with Mr. Locke, than to think and reason alone. Have patience, and pardon me. There are many remarks to make on the second chapter, where he treats of innate practical principles. But I will not tire you with that subject, unless you desire it.

Our newspapers say, that the king of Prussia has beat the Austrians, and killed twenty thousand of their men; with the loss of fifteen thousand of his own. This was the object he had in view when he passed through Leipsic. If the news be true, the war must become general; and, according to appearances, it will be terrible. But I much fear lest his Prussian majesty meet with the fate of Charles XII. What are his resources for defence against the united strength of France and Austria, and perhaps of Russia?

I have the honour to be, with the most perfect consideration, ALLAMAND.

Yours, &c.

III. MR. ALLAMAND TO MR. GIBBON.

Bex, October 12th, 1756.

Sir, I am delighted with your last letter, equally distinguished by accuracy and penetration; and with you, sir, I believe that the question approaches to its decision.

You are right in saying, that the self-evident propositions, which I mentioned, are not merely ideas, but judgments: yet you will have the goodness to observe, that Mr. Locke having given them as examples of ideas which pass for being innate, but which he does not regard as such, the mistake is chargeable on him, and not on me, who had nothing farther to do than to refute his manner of reasoning. Besides, you will be pleased to remark, that the real question is, whether not only certain ideas, but also certain common and selfevident propositions be innate. The only examples produced of innate ideas are those of God, unity, and existence; the other examples are of innate propositions, which you call judgments.

You ask, whether it be possible that our judgments should be innate, judgment being nothing else but the act of our intellectual

faculties in comparing our ideas, and our judgment concerning selfevident truths being merely the perception of those truths by a simple glance of the mind? I grant all that; but would ask, what else is an idea but a glance of the mind? Those who define it otherwise, wildly depart from the original sense of the word; and talk unintelligibly, when they say that ideas are species; that is, appearances of things impressed on the mind, as the images of corporeal objects are impressed on the eye. All metaphysicians have committed this mistake; and Mr. Locke, though sensible of it, has chosen in his anger to direct his batteries against the weathercocks rather than against the building itself. According to the meaning of these metaphysicians, there are surely no innate ideas, because in their sense of the word there are no ideas whatever. An idea is merely an act or perception of the mind: and the question concerning innate ideas is merely to determine, whether certain truths be not so common and so evident, that every mind, not absolutely stupid, must recognise them at a single glance, without the assistance of any teacher, and without the intervention of any discussion or reasoning; and often without being sensible that this glance is cast on them. The affirmative appears to me incontrovertible; and the question thereby is solved.

You will please to remark, that this way of explaining the matter is as favourable to innate ideas, and therefore as opposite to Mr. Locke's doctrine, as the unintelligible hypothesis above mentioned. For what reason do we contend in favour of innate ideas? To oppose evidence and certainty to universal scepticism; whose cause is ruined by proving certain truths to be so necessary and so natural to man, that they are universally recognised by a single glance. This may be proved according to my meaning of the word idea, as well as according to the sense in which this word was vulgarly taken; and the proof would not have been very pleasing to Mr. Locke, who without professing himself a sceptic, yet shows a leaning to the sceptical side; and whose works have contributed much to the diffusion of scepticism in the present age. His too eager desire of fixing the limits of human knowledge, a thing highly necessary, has made him leave nothing but limits.

After these general observations on the main question, it is not very necessary to descend to the particulars in which you think me mistaken. Yet you will permit me to answer your objections. 1. It is true, that Mr. Locke, § 5, c. 1, joins the two expressions, "being in the mind, without being actually perceived by the mind;" and "being in the mind, without having ever been perceived by the mind;" but at the conclusion of the paragraph he lays himself open to my criticism, by expressing himself as follows: "So that to be in the understanding and not to be understood, to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say, any thing is and is not in the mind or understanding." It is clear, sir, that this great philosopher erred in writing this passage; maintaining, what I took the liberty to contradict, that nothing could be in the understanding without being perceived to be there. I doubt not that he would have

corrected this mistake had it been pointed out to him; but he certainly falls into it, and employs it as a principle of reasoning against his adversaries.

2. You think that we ought to admit his distinction between "ideas in the mind," and "ideas in the memory." I admit the distinction with all my heart, provided you take the word idea in the same acceptation as I do. In that sense an idea is in the mind, when the mind actually considers the proposition which is the object of its idea, that is, of its glance or perception; and an idea is in the memory when the mind, having formerly cast that glance on it, finds thereby a greater facility in recalling it, remembering at the same time that it formerly was the object of its perception. But if understand by ideas these chimerical species, the mere fictions of metaphysicians, and as it seems to me, not sufficiently disproved by Mr. Locke, I return to my assertion, and maintain that the distinction is unintelligible between "being in the mind,” and “being in the memory."

you

A violent headache, which I brought with me from our venerable class, hinders me from continuing this letter, or rendering what I have already written shorter and more perspicuous. I intreat you to excuse its imperfections. Your penetration will perhaps discern how all difficulties may be solved concerning innate practical principles. Mr. Locke treats this subject better than he does the others; but in several parts he is somewhat puzzled.

I rejoiced at the hopes of seeing you for a moment at Vevay, and was surprised at being disappointed. If I rightly understand this word of your language, it cannot be well translated into ours. met with Mr. Pavilliard only in the assembly.

I

If the march of an hundred and twenty thousand Russians is not a fable, what must become of the King of Prussia? Does it not appear to you, that we are threatened with great revolutions? I have long suspected a design of reducing the general system of Europe to three great empires; that of the French on the west of the Rhine, of Austria on the east, and of Russia in the north. Yet we read of nothing of this kind in the Revelation. But let them divide the world as they will, provided it be lawful for us to believe that "whatever is, is ;" and "that two contradictory propositions cannot both at the same time be true." Those three empires will be great only when measured on this earth; viewed but from the moon, they will be small enough; and how far do philosophical eyes soar beyond that luminary!

I have the honour to be, with much respect, yours, &c.,

ALLAMAND.

M. de N*** writes to me that things go better and better now; that his niece Madame D. is extremely ill; and that 200,000 men are ready to cut one ano her's throats at the rate of five sous a day. He is provoked at the maxim, "all for the best."

IV. PROFESSOR BREITINGER TO MR. GIBBON, AT LAUSANNE.

October 22nd, 1756.

Though I am Davus, not Edipus, I will give you my opinion concerning the difficulties in Justin, which you propose for my consideration.

1. In the third chapter of his second book he says, "That Asia was tributary fifteen centuries to the Scythians, and that Ninus put an end to those contributions." The number of years is so manifestly erroneous, that it is astonishing such a reading should ever have been admitted into the text; for it makes Ninus later than Sesostris by a period of fifteen hundred years. Orosius, who abridged Justin with the greatest fidelity, speaks to the following purpose: "The Scythians would have ravaged the whole of Egypt, had they not been prevented by the marshes. When they returned from that country, they made a bloody conquest of Asia, and rendered it tributary. Having remained there fifteen restless years, they at length returned home, at the earnest entreaty of their wives; who said, that unless their husbands came home to them, they would, for the sake of having children, cohabit with their neighbours."—Orosius, lib. i. c. 14. There cannot be any doubt, therefore, that "fifteen hundred" has been substituted for "fifteen." You investigate very ingeniously the cause of the error; but the emendation which you propose, by changing per mille into permissa, cannot be well founded, if the number was expressed, as is most probable, by arithmetical marks in the ancient copies.

2. In Justin, lib. xii. c. 8, we read, "They (the Macedonians) returned, after beating the enemy, with congratulations, or thanksgivings, into the same camp. In this passage you seem to me needlessly to disturb the ancient reading. You assume, without proof, that they did not venture to attack the Cuphites. Orosius, Justin's faithful interpreter, declares the direct contrary. "When they came to the country of the Chosides, they fought with two hundred thousand of the enemy's cavalry; and, having conquered them with much difficulty, because they themselves were now worn out with years and fatigue, and sunk in spirit, they formed a camp more magnificent than usual, to commemorate their exploit."-Orosius, lib. iii. c. 19. They did not, therefore, return into their camp until they had combated and conquered the enemy. Justin himself gave us to understand as much, when he says, "That Alexander, moved by such just prayers, caused, at the end of his victory, a camp to be formed, whose walls might inspire terror into the enemy." If the Macedonians, therefore, as you imagine, had been frightened at the innumerable forces of the Cuphites, and therefore returned hastily into their camp, I do not see why Justin should say, at the end of his victory, inspire terror into the enemy, or that they returned to their camp with thanksgivings. It may here be remarked, in opposition to Ŝebisius' emendation, that the expression, cum

gratulatione, if translated with thanksgivings, will include the casis hostiis, ra Evxapornpia Over; that is, the sacrifice of thanks: so that your alteration of cæsis hostiis into omissis hostibus, is equally inconsistent with historical truth and the words of Justin.

3. In Justin, lib. xxiv. c. 8, we read, "Part of the mountain carried away by the earthquake overwhelmed the army of the Gauls; and its thick masses breaking in scattered pieces, fell down with great force, not without wounding the enemy." You need not be offended with the harsh transposition of the word hostium, which you think ought to be joined with confertissimi cunei; as if that last word meant, the military cunei, or wedges, of the Gauls; whereas it really means the thick masses detached from the rock or mountain, which, breaking into smaller fragments, fell down and wounded the enemy, that is, the Gauls. There is no transposition, therefore, in the case; the sentence flows in the most natural order; and the confertissimi cunei ought not to be joined with hostium, lest the ambiguity of the word cunei should make it be applied to the military cunei, or wedges of men.

4. In Justin, lib. xxviii. c. 2, we read, "That the Romans could not save their city from the Gauls; and when it was taken, instead of defending it by the sword, had ransomed it with money." If this passage required or admitted emendation, there is no correction I would adopt more willingly than yours, which, instead of captamque, substitutes capitoliumque. Schefferus objects, without reason, that a city captam, taken, cannot properly be said defendi ferro, to be defended with the sword; for the Roman historians agree that their city, when taken, was defended, though in a cowardly manner. Orosius, among others, says, lib. xi. c. 19, " The Gauls penetrated into the open city; Rome was now taken; the rest of the youth were shut up and besieged in the citadel of the Capitoline Mount; where they were a prey to hunger, pestilence, terror, and despair." You may perceive, therefore, that though the city was taken, its defence was not entirely abandoned; and if it had not been taken, it needed not to have been ransomed. It seems not to have occurred to you, that your correction implies the Capitol only to have been ransomed, which is not historically true.

5. In Justin, lib. xxxi. c. 1, we read, "Ambassadors were first sent by the Roman senate, to persuade Antiochus, King of Syria, that he should not make war on the cities of Cole-Syria, which the Egyptians had occupied in the former war, and which were therefore subject to Egypt; using with him this argument, that these cities belonged to a young prince, their pupil, who had been committed by his father to the protection of the Romans." This same author, lib. xxx. c. 3, says, "M. Lepidus was sent into Egypt to govern that kingdom, with the title of tutor to the young king. A second embassy was sent, after Antiochus had taken possession of these cities, demanding that they should be restored; and without making any mention of the pupil king, merely on this ground, that these cities belonged to the Romans by the right of war."-Justin, lib