In order to oppose the progress of this formidable army, Joseph Bonaparte again left Madrid, attended by the duke of Dalmatia, the duke of Treviso, the duke of Belluno, and general Sebastiani: the latter commanded the cavalry, and the duke of Belluno was dispatched with his division to cross the Tagus near Fuente Duanna, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Spaniards, if they should direct it in that route.

As the French were perfectly sensible of the inferiority in point of discipline and skill of the Spanish cavalry, they endeavoured to entice them to hazard an engagement in the open plain. Accordingly, instead of opposing their passage across the Tagus, they endeavoured to draw the whole of the army of La Mancha to the right bank of that river part of it actually did cross the Tagus, when the Spanish general, perceiving the intention of the French, recalled it, and posted his whole forces at Ocana. The French being foiled in their manœuvre, resolved in their turn to cross the Tagus and attack the Spaniards. This they effected. At nine o'clock in the morning of the 19th of November, the advanced posts of the enemy came in sight of the Spaniards: at eleven o'clock the action commenced, and in the short space of two hours it was decided in favour of the French. But the battle, though short in its duration, was by no means ill fought by the Spaniards. Their resistance was vigorous, and probably would have been crowned with success, had not the French, by a rapid and skilful manœuvre, succeeded in separating one division from the rest. After this fatal event, the utmost dismay and confusion took place. The remains of

the army, separated into different parties, fled in very opposite directions; and so rapid was their flight, and so great their terror of being overtaken, that they passed the Guidiana, and fixed upon Duy miel as the place of rendezvous for those who should escape. After such a defeat, and in such a flight, it was impossible to save their artillery: accordingly the whole of it fell into the hands of the French, A great number of prisoners were also taken, among whom were three generals, six colonels, and seven hundred inferior officers. Upwards of 40,000 muskets were found on the field of battle. The loss of the Spaniards in killed and wounded was comparatively small; while that of the French did not reach 1000 men.

Thus, at the close of the year 1809, did Spain witness the successive defeat and dispersion of her principal armies. Of the causes which led to their defeat, some are obvious and indisputable, while others probably lie beyond the discovery of those who did not witness their equipment and operations, and the talents and plans of the generals who commanded them. Too great confidence in their own strength,-ignorance of the force and movements of the enemy, joined to a foolish and ungrounded contempt of their power, a total neglect of, or only a partial and temporary adherence to, the mode of warfare best suited to the nature of the Spanish troops,-are some of the causes, arising from the generals themselves, which may be detected by the most superficial acquaintance with the campaign of 1809. It is also obvious, that not one of their generals evinced any extraordinary military talents; and that the infe rior officers must have been greatly

deficient

deficient in skill and attention, since the discipline of the men exhibited scarcely any marks of improve ment, after a continued warfare of eighteen months. But there are still other causes, with which the generals and inferior officers are not justly chargeable, that operated in a much stronger degree in producing the misfortunes of the Spa These causes must be sought after in the conduct and measures of the junta,-of that body of men, in whose hands was placed the liberty and independence of their country, and to whose incapacity or treason the loss of that liberty and independence, if they should ultimately be lost, must principally be attributed.

nish armies.

The line of duty along which the supreme junta of Spain ought to have proceeded with steady and undeviating steps, was marked out to

them in a clear and distinct manner. No very extraordinary talents were requisite: a patriotism so evident and influencing as to afford no room to suspect its purity, unwea ried activity and constant vigilance were principally requisite. They possessed an instrument for opposing the power and the plans of Bonaparte, of which every government which he had hitherto overthrown had been destitute, and which, had they known its value, and its proper application and use, would have enabled them to have maintained the combat on more equal terms. The insurrection in Spain had, strictly speaking, originated with the people, and it was principally supported by them. The Spanish armies were formed and recruited, not from men who engaged in a military life merely for hire, and equally ignorant and indifferent about the cause for which they were going to shed their blood,

but from men who trowded to the standard, from the impression that the cause for which they were about to fight, was their own cause. In Germany, the great scene of the conquests and triumphs of the French, the people looked on as unconcerned spectators: that country was so divided into petty princi. palities, and the inhabitants had so often been transferred from one sovereign prince to another, that they felt little or nothing of that national spirit which binds man to his native land, and makes him regard a foreign yoke with dread and abhorrence. In Spain this national spirit existed in great purity and strength: towards the domination of any foreign power they would have looked forward with terror or indignation: but to the domination of France, the inhabitants of which they regarded with a peculiar mixture of contempt and abhorrence, they looked forward with an uncommon degree of dread. If, therefore, the supreme junta had made proper use of this national spirit of the Spaniards, and of their extreme dislike to the French,-if they had even enabled their countrymen to have carried into full effect what this spirit and antipathy prompted them to perform, there can be no doubt that the resistance to the arnijes of Bonaparte would have been more uniform, combined, and successful.

The duties of the supreme junta naturally divided themselves into those which had relation to the Spanish nation at large, and those which regarded the armies more particularly. With respect to the former, it was incumbent on the supreme junta, not merely to have cherished the enthusiasm of the Spanish nation, and to have applied it to the most beneficial pur

poses,

poses, but also to have aided and increased it by the adoption of such measures as would have brought interest to its side.. The mass of the people no doubt were not sufficiently enlightened to have felt the want, or to have duly appreciated the value, of many of those blessings of civil liberty, on which the British nation so justly pride themselves, and for which they would cheerfully pour out their blood. Had therefore the promise and prospect of these blessings, of a constitution similar to that which we enjoy,-been held out to the Spanish people, it is probable that it would have excited little desire or exertion. But there must have been many positive evilsevils which men in the most degraded and ignorant state know and feel to be such-the prospect of the liberation from which, provided they succeeded in driving the enemy beyond the Pyrenees, would have roused their minds and stimulated their exertions. All ranks of people in Spain, with the exception of some of the highest and most favoured grandees, suffered from the unjust and impolitic system of monopoly a system which extend. ed itself over some of the most necessary and useful articles- of life. The removal of this monopoly-and consequently of the dearness and inferior quality, one or both of which constantly result from monopoly must have been desired by the Spaniards. They might have turned an inattentive ear and an ignorant understanding to him who promised them many of the blessings of civil liberty; but they would undoubtedly have had their attention and interest strongly excited by the promise of the removal of those grievances under which they had long suffered;-of which they

were keenly sensible; and which trenched deeply and extensively on the very necessities of life.

The duties of the supreme junta, as they respected the army, were, if possible, still more clearly marked out, and lay in the way of fewer prejudices or fears. It may be that the junta were apprehensive, if they altered in any respect the situation of the mass of the people, innovations of a more serious nature and to a greater extent would creep in, or be forced from them. At any rate, it was impossible for them to relieve the people, without depriving those of their own rank and order of some of the privileges which principally distinguished and greatly enriched them. But prejudice, interest, or fear, could have little influence, when they considered in what manner they should conduct the affairs of the army. It was indeed necessary that they should adopt vigorous and active measures; but, as we have already re marked, the government of Spain laboured not under the difliculty and disadvantage which pressed hard

upon those governments which had before warred, with France. The latter not only were obliged to trust to soldiers who felt little or no interest in the contest; but they experienced no inconsiderable difficulties in recruiting the thinned ranks of their army. The supreme junta, on the other hand, found more pressing forward to fight the battles of their country than they could well employ or properly arm. There being then no difficulty or delay in getting men, the junta had only to turn their attention to the proper discipline and support of these men: they should by a regular and comprehensive system have established in different parts of Spain magazines

magazines for their armies:-on the contrary, it is notorious that the Spanish armies were often unable to proceed, or obliged to retreat, for want of provisions, while the French had abundance of them. In their own country it might have been expected that the movements, force, and probable operations of the enemy would easily have been learnt: here too both the junta and the generals whom they appointed were miserably and fatally deficient. The victories of Bonaparte had sprung in no inconsiderable degree from the unity of his measures and plans: the junta, instead of imitating him in this respect, appear either to have had no fixed and regular plan, or to have formed one, which from the multiplicity of its parts, and the total want of communication and union in the execution of them, was injurious rather than beneficial to the cause of the patriots. In short, the junta of Spain may fairly be said to have left undone almost every thing which they ought to have done, and to have done not a few things which were positively bad and prejudicial.

Nothing proceeded from them worthy of commemoration or praise, except their occasional addresses to the Spanish nation. The very circumstance of their issuing these addresses; the exertions and sacrifices to which they call the people; and the confidence of final success which they invariably breathe, are not a little singular and unaccountable, when it is recollected that they came from a set of men, on whose measures in a great degree depended the putting forth of the exertions they called for, and the realizing of those blessings which they predicted; and yet who, at the moment they were issuing these

addresses, were absolutely torpid and lifeless for every purpose of cooperation.

On the anniversary of the battle of Baylen the supreme junta addressed the Spanish nation. In giving the character of this paper we give the character of all their addresses: it is distinguished by a species of eloquence congenial to the Spanish temperatnent and turn of mind;-solemn and impressive; -filled with lofty ideas, finding utterance in language of singular dignity and grandeur. But, like all the addresses of the supreme junta, it is too long: they appear to have forgotten, or never to have reflected, that it was intended for the great mass of the people; of whom by far the greatest number have neither patience nor intellect sufficient to peruse and understand a long address. On this point, as well as on many others, the example of Bonaparte ought to be well weighed, if not implicitly followed. In every address he puts forth,-whether to his army at the commencement of a war, or on the gaining of a victory, or to the French nation at large, his words are few, but they speak directly and powerfully to the understanding, the feelings, the prejudices, and the pride of those to whom they are addressed.

We have said that some of the measures of the supreme junta were absolutely and really prejudicial to the cause of the patriots. Among these may be reckoned the restraints they put upon the liberty of the press: in the state in which Spain at that time was, the utmost liberty of the press which they were likely to employ could not possibly endanger their cause, or lead them to excesses, while it certainly would have been of essential benefit in many important respects. It was

impolitic

impolitic and unwise to restrain it, on the ground that if it were free the success of the French would be known; since it is absurd to expect, that a danger, the extent and propinquity of which is not known, can be provided against, or met with due firmness and presence of mind. If the supreme junta put restraints on the press because they were afraid their own inactivity would be exposed and condemned, they only added another proof of their own incapacity and want of patriotism for such restrictions can be necessary only where the people are unprepared and unfit for a free press, or where the rulers have acted in a manner which, if generally known, must excite against them indignation and resistance. Under the circumstances in which Spain was placed, no danger but much good must have resulted from the people's being acquainted with the strength, operations, and even the successes, of the foe against whom they were carrying on the warfare, the nature, extent, and application of their own resources, and above all with the capacity and measures of their rulers.

Two circumstances took place, from which a change in the character of the measures adopted by the junta was looked forward to by many people; the admission of the marquis of Romana into that body, and the arrival of the marquis of Wellesley as ambassador from the court of Great Britain. But neither of these noble personages was able to instil into the junta even a small portion of their own energy and activity. Indeed, towards the latter part of the year, intrigue and cabal entered in among the members of the junta, and increased, if possible, their indecision and inactivity. So palpable and

notorious at last was their incapacity, that a regency was suggested, and several attempts were made to establish it; but they were all ineffectual. The members of the junta, in possession of power, did not feel disposed to yield it up, and could not easily or readily be divested of it. It may be doubted, too, whether a regency would have been more efficient and beneficial. It was proposed to form it of much fewer members than the supreme junta, and by this means it was hoped that the slowness in deliberation and action, with which the latter was charged, would in a great degree be done away; but the cause did not lie so much in their numbers, as in their disposition and abilities; and if the mem bers of regency had been, as there was too much reason to suspect they would have been, men of the same principles and prejudices, the Spanish nation could not have been benefited by the change.

The marquis of Wellesley, after many ineffectual efforts to induce the junta to put the armies on a better footing in respect to equipment and discipline, and to adopt general measures better calculated to carry the nation through their arduous struggle, left Spain. On one important point only he gained a reluctant and tardy consent from the junta. They agreed to issue a proclamation, fixing on the time for the meeting of the cortes. this proclamation their language, as it had ever been, was worthy of more wise and enlightened rulers, and formed a striking and melancholy contrast to their deeds. The first of January 1810 was the day fixed for the convocation of the cortes; and the first day of March following, the day on which they were to enter on their functions.

In

CHAP.