also erected at the north end of the bridge from this island, which necessarily protected and strengthened the rear of the French army. Their front was covered by the deep ditches immediately before Aspern, which carried the superabundant waters from the fields to the river; while their right was protected by a battery, and their left by the bushy ground which has been already mentioned. The Danube at this time had risen to an unusual height: this circumstance, in an important respect, was advantageous to the French. A ditch, extremely broad and deep, which carried off the waters of the river when it overflowed, lay on their left: this it was necessary to pass before an attack on that part of the enemy could be commenced; but on account of the freshes in the river it was impossible to cross this ditch, unless by means of the bridge; and the passage of the bridge was defended by a strong division and several pieces of can

non.

The archduke Charles having duly considered the position of the French army, the advantages they derived from it, and the difficulties which he had to surmount, ordered the attack to be made in five columns. As the recapture of Aspern was essentially necessary, in order to enable the Austrian artillery to play with effect upon the centre of the enemy's line, the first and second columns were ordered to attack this village. The conflict here was most obstinate and murderous: every street, every house, and every barn was the scene of it: scarcely had the Austrians succeeded in gaining possession of part of the village, when the French poured in strong reinforcements and

regained it: at last, the second column, combining its movements and attacks with those of the first, made itself master of the upper part of the village, and maintained its position during the whole of the first day's combat.

In the mean time, the enemy having formed his left wing, which he refused, towards Aspern, and his right upon Esling, advanced in columns, supported by a heavy cannonade, upon the main army of the Austrians. He succeeded in driving back part of the cavalry, which were drawn up in front, and fell upon the infantry. The latter, reserving their fire till the French were within ten paces of them, then opened upon them with so much effect, as completely to rout them. In consequence of their retreat, the whole line of the Austrian army, entirely disengaged from the enemy, obtained possession of the remainder of the village of Aspern.

The third column endeavoured to take advantage of the rout of the enemy by advancing against them in close battalion supported by their artillery; but the French cavalry rushing forward in great numbers rendered it necessary to withdraw the artillery, and to leave the first line of this column to defend itself by its own valour. The enemy's cavalry succeeded in turning both the wings; but at the very moment when they had summoned the battalions to throw down their arms and surrender, a destructive and tremendous fire well directed and incessantly kept up, compelled them to retire.

The object of the fourth and fifth columns of the Austrian army was to drive the French out of the vil lage of Esling, which was of equal

importance to the right of the ene my, that Aspern was to his left: the latter secured their centre from the attack of the Austrian artillery: the former protected it on the opposite flank, and at the same time would enable them, if they found it necessary, to retreat in safety. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if the French here fought with still greater obstinacy and courage than they displayed in the defence of Aspern. The Austrians, indeed, succeeded in driving back the corps which were posted in front of the village; but they could not during the first day's engagement obtain possession of the village itself. The Austrian cavalry under prince John of Lichtenstein was of great service, in covering the movements of the fourth column, and enabling it to form a junction with the fifth in the attack upon Esling: they afterwads received and repulsed an attack made by the French cavalry upon the right wing of the Austrian main army. After this repulse, the enemy's cavalry to the number of 3000 endeavoured to penetrate between the left wing and the corps of reserve; but by the intrepid and steady attack made on their flank by two Austrian regiments, they were again compelled to retreat.

The battle of the 21st was terminated only by the night: the French had been driven from Aspern: they still retained possession of Esling: but the general position of their army was nearer the Danube than it was at the commencement of the engagement. The archduke Charles passed the night on the ground which he had gained from the enemy: he expected the renewal of the combat on the following day, and he made every

preparation and arrangement to carry it on in such a manner as should render complete the repulse and defeat of the enemy. The known character of Bonaparte left no doubt, that on the morrow all his military talents would be on the stretch to retrieve the glory he had lost, and to compensate for the disappointment he had sustained. He had still large bodies of troops on the south side of the Danube; but the archduke had rendered their passage tedious, difficult, and dangerous. During the battle of the 21st, he had ordered fire-ships to be sent down the river, and they had been so well managed and directed, as to have burnt down the two bridges that connected the isle of Lobau with the small island, and the small island with the south bank. By this destruction of the bridges, Bonaparte was rendered less able to repair the disasters and losses he had sustained; and in case the battle of the succeeding day should prove decidedly adverse to him, his retreat, it was expected, would be completely cut off. In this point of view, the breaking down of the bridges might justly be considered as highly advantageous to the archduke: but, on the other hand, it led him to expect a most obstinate defence from army placed in a situation of such extreme peril.

an

The morning of the 224 witnessed Aspern again in possession of the French: an Austrian regiment endeavoured to drive them out, but without effect; another rushed in, and, having gained possession of the church-yard, succeeded in maintaining themselves in the entrance to the village; being reinforced here by the troops under

general

general Hiller, the Austrians at length obtained a final and unmolested possession of this long and dreadfully contested place.

The archduke Charles was now enabled to act on the offensive, the corps of count Bellegarde, having its right wing resting on Aspern, and its centre and left towards Esling, by degrees gained the right flank of the enemy; while the artillery, stationed near the former village in such a manner as to command the whole space between it and the latter, was brought to bear on his left flank:-thus attacked and exposed, the French army was compelled to give way, and retire towards the Danube.

While the division of count Bellegarde was thus employed, the French cavalry, by a desperate effort, endeavoured to break in between the Austrian cavalry commanded by prince Lichtenstein and the left wing of the prince of Hohenzollern. Here the archduke particularly distinguished himself: the battalion of Zach seeming disposed to give way, he seized its colours, placed himself at its head, and inspired it and the whole army with the same enthusiasm with which he himself was animated. In the midst of this attack by the French cavalry, the prince of Hohenzollern perceived on his left wing, near Esling, an opening in the French line, formed during the heat of the engagement: he immediately took advantage of this circumstance, by ordering thither a regiment in three divisions, which

succeeded in gaining and main taining their position in the opening, till, having been supported by the grenadiers of reserve, they were enabled to turn and attack the cen tre of the enemy.

The only post now which the French were able to maintain was the village of Esling: here they were repeatedly attacked by the fourth and fifth columns under the prince of Rosenberg, but without success. This village, essentially necessary for covering the retreat of the French already begun, was defended with most sanguinary obstinacy, and by reinforcements continually thrown into it.

In the night between the 22d and 23d the enemy had effected his retreat from the south bank of the Danube, and taken up a position in the isle of Lobau In this dread.ful battle the Austrians took three pieces of cannon, and about 8000* prisoners. The loss of the French in killed, wounded, and prisoners, it is impossible to ascertain; it probably amounted to nearly 30,000. Five of their generals were killed on the field of battle, eight were wounded, one of whom, the duke of Montebello, afterwards died; two were taken prisoners. The loss of the Austrians was also very great: they acknowledged the death of 87 superior officers, and of upwards of 4000 subalterns and privates. Twelve of their generals, 663 officers, and 15,651 subalterns and privates were wounded ;-of these, one general, eight officers, and 829 men were taken prisoners.

CHAP.

N detailing the operations and

and in estimating the nature and extent of the loss and repulse which Bonaparte experienced on that occasion, we have followed, as our guide and authority, the official documents that were published by the Austrian government. It is proper and fair, however, to observe, that the accounts given in the French bulletins differ from the former in many subordinate and minute circumstances, and in some points of more considerable moment and importance. It will not, therefore, be acting impartially, if we do not briefly state the latter, and at the same time subjoin the grounds and reasons which induced us to prefer the Austrian to the French account of this celebrated battle.

The most material points of difference between the two ac counts relate to the manner in which the bridge was broken down; the time when this event took place, and the state of the 1809.

battle at the close of the first day. bulletins

and positively assert, that the bridge was broken down accidentally. Some trees which had been felled and lay on the banks of the Danube, having been floated off the land by the rise of the river, destroyed it, according to their representation. There are many presumptions against this statement: in the first place, it is highly probable that the archduke Charles would use his utmost and most unremitted efforts to destroy the bridge, as he would thus cut off the supplies of Bonaparte :-in the second place it may be remarked, that if the felled trees had been fleated into the river, the troops of Bonaparte, many of whom, by his own account, were still on that side of the Danube from which they were swept away, would have prevented their effecting the mischief they actually did; but lastly, in a bulletin published by the French some time subsequent to the battle of Aspern, it is triumph2 C

antly

antly stated, in reference to the works they were constructing over the Danube, that they were so formed as to be unassailable by freships.

With respect to the time when the destruction of the bridge took place, the French bulletins assert that this event did not happen till the morning of the second day of the battle, just at the time when their armies, by a most masterly naneuvre,had placed the Austrians in a situation of the most imminent and extensive danger. This statement, however, bears very much the mark of falsehood; it locks like the exercise of French ingenuity, in order to account for and cover French disgrace: just at the moment when the French were exhibiting their most masterly and splendid maneuvre, envious fortune interposed, and snatched from them the fruits of their superior enterprise and skill!-On this point it is barely necessary to add, that if what we have advanced relative to the preferable credibility of the Austrian documents respect ing the mode in which the bridge was destroyed be true, there can be little doubt that they are equally worthy of preferable credit in the account they give of the time when the destruction was effected; since the archduke Chanics was much more likely to take advantage of the night to effect his purpose, than to wait for daylight.

That the loss sustained by both armies in this most obstinate and bloody battle was very great, there can be little doubt; that the less of the French was infinitely greater than they acknowledged, and than the Austrians suffered, may be gathered even from beir own bulletins. These state, hat for nearly a whole day, the French army, while re

treating, and consequently while in a disadvantageous condition, and exposed, at least, to some degree of disorder and confusion, had to sustain the constant and well directed fire of upwards of 200 pieces of cannon. If we also reflect on the nature of the ground where the battle was fought; on the points to which the French were compelled to direct their re treat; and on the apprehension which they must have experienced, lest the remaining bridge should also be destroyed, we shall be compelled to believe that their loss was most dreadful. These cir cumstances, however, at the same time, will lead us to estimate very highly the powers of Bonaparte as a general, exhibited in a new situation, and under circumstances to him unprecedented; and the discipline and steadiness of the French army. In some accounts, Bonaparte is represented as acting the part of a madman and a savage; as forcing his soldiers up to battle after all was decidedly over; and as foaming with rage and disappointment. That he actually brought off the whole of his army and artillery, in the face of a victorious enemy, when his retreat was necessarily directed to a single point;-across a narrow bridge, and into a small island, cut off from that shore where his resources lay, and in which, consequently, his troops must neces sarily be cooped up for some time, exposed to the fire of the Au strians, and liable to infectious sickness;-all these circumstances prove, not only that Bonaparte has extraordinary talents both as a conquering and as a defeated com. mander, but that no fit of passion, rage or disappointment materially deprived in of the use and ap

plication