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either what a thing is, or some other category. We accept this statement so far as regards predications proper. These categories seem to be an exhaustive classification of those modes of predicative conception which men naturally use.

The first sets forth what a thing is, and has also been named ovoia, or substance. It is that employed when we predicate one noun of another, either affirmatively or negatively; for example, "John is, or is not, a man." It is the generic form of that large class of propositions which Locke and Leibnitz place under the head of identity and diversity; for the thing immediately asserted to be, or not to be, is identity, — that is, the identity of "John" with "a man." This, though not expressed by any word, is indicated by the juxtaposition of the terms "John" and "man," with only the verb "to be" between them; just as we indicate identity in saying, "John, a man whom I saw yesterday," or "John is the man whom I saw yesterday."

But it is essential to remark that this category does not use the relation of identity for its own sake; it employs it as the instrument of asserting or denying some nature of the subject. For John, being a man, must have all the attributes of a man; while if he is not a man, if, for example, he is a horse, - he cannot be said to have them. Thus this category uses one fact in order to state another.

Again, when we say, "John is six feet high," we assert that a certain quantity of height, or length, exists in John. When we say, "John is kind and strong," we state that the qualities of kindness and strength exist in John. The predication, "John is the son of William," is, in form, one of identity, a form under which every category may be expressed; but the essential fact set forth is a relatedness of John to William. "John is in a house," has a double force; it tells, first that there is a house, and then, that John is in it. Hence the category of place, sometimes at least, asserts more than mere local relation. "John will come at noon," in answer to the question "When will John come?" also has a doubleness: it calls attention, first, to a certain length of time about to exist and elapse between the present time and noon; and then to the relation of simultaneity which shall exist between John's coming and midday.

The categories of position and possession might perhaps be better named those of posture and condition. They also have a complexity. We assert a posture in saying, "John is sitting," or "John is resolved;" this language indicating a mutual adjustment of the parts of John's body or of the thoughts of his

1 Topics, book i. chap. ix.

mind, and, in addition, the external relation of this adjustment; for one sits on some seat, and is resolved on some conduct. But a condition would be asserted in saying, "John is well," or "John is wealthy;" for this language indicates both the existence of health and wealth, and the state in which John finds himself as the possessor of one or other of these blessings. The category of posture sets forth the existence of an external state as arising from internal adjustments; that of condition the existence of an internal state, together with that of its cause, be the cause what it may.

Finally, "John strikes" sets forth the existence of an action in its relation to the doer, while "John is struck" presents the same in its relation to the sufferer. Thus affirmative predications assert the existence, and of course negative predications the non-existence, of various forms or modes of entity.

CHAPTER XVI.

KNOWLEDGE.

Knowledge 1. KNOWLEDGE is absolute and well-founded belief. defined. When we are certain of anything, and that, too, on good grounds, we know it. But the term "knowledge" differs from the term " belief," in that knowledge always covers the conception, or thought-element, on which conviction depends, as well as the conviction itself; while belief may stand for the mere mental confidence. Knowledge includes both a correct conception of something as existing (or as non-existent), and an absolute and well-grounded assurance accompanying that conception.

Its objects are facts.

Language, too, owing to its practical character, makes a difference between the objects of knowledge and those of belief. The things which we believe, are statements or propositions; the things which we know, are facts or realities. The reason for this is that whenever we exercise a weaker belief than knowledge, our attention is necessarily directed to our mental state, with some inquiry as to its claim upon our confidence; but in knowledge, this question having been settled, the interest of the mind fastens at once upon the facts. Therefore it is correct to say, "I know the fact that there is a sun in the heavens, and I believe the proposition that the sun is a solid body."

Knowledge of the

"that" and of the

A distinction has come down to us from Aristotle between knowing that a thing is and knowing what it is; or, as he expressed it, between the knowledge of "what." the "that" and the knowledge of the "what." Both modes of knowing may be expressed by the very same forms of thought and of language,- that is, by the assertive proposition. For if any one should say, "I know that the man is a knave,” and should emphasize the word "is," he would answer the query, "Is the man a knave?" and would express his knowledge of the "that." But if he should emphasize the word "knave," he would reply to the question, "What is the man?" and would express his knowledge of the "what." Evidently both kinds of knowing assert the existence of something of a given nature; but the one emphasizes the existence, and the other the nature, of that which is said to exist. If no special emphasis should rest on either of these things, then the two kinds of knowing would combine in one.

Existential

The distinction which we have now noticed brings and defini- up another, which, however, is only another form of tional knowl- the same distinction. It is that between the existenedge tial, or assertive, and the definitional, or determinative, knowledge of things. All knowledge is existential and assertive, but one form of knowing is pre-eminently so. For instance, should one say that he knows the guilt or innocence, the foolishness or the trustworthiness, of a man, this would mean that he knows these things to exist; it would be a knowledge of the "that."

But let us suppose one to say, "I know the shape of the earth, the form of its planetary orbit, its distance from the sun, and the law of its perpetual motion in space." Does he now mean to assert that he knows of the existence of the shape of the earth and of the other objects? Not at all. He means to say that he is acquainted with their nature, so as to be able to satisfy our inquiries concerning them. For he can add, "I know the shape of the earth as that of an oblate spheroid, the form of its orbit as elliptical, its distance from the sun as ninety-one millions of miles, and the law of its motion as a resultant of the gravitation and the momentum of matter;" and this is equivalent to saying, "I know that the shape of the earth is an oblate spheroid," and so forth. In this style of knowledge the element of thought is much more prominent than the element of conviction; and as it qualifies a person to explain the nature of things, it may be called definitional knowledge.

2. So far we have spoken as if all knowing had actual fact for its object. But no doctrine of belief would be complete which

should not recognize those modes of credence in which we may be said to believe without believing in the real existence of things, and to know without there being any real objects of knowledge.

Idealistic For example, we sometimes call our ideas knowlknowledge. edge when they do not represent any realities that ever existed, but only correspond with similar ideas previously entertained by some one. The student of Homer is said to know the stalwart strength of Ajax, the conquering craft of Ulysses, the wisdom of Nestor, the prowess of Achilles. He knows too how the capture of Helen led to the Trojan War, and how the Greeks entered and obtained possession of the city through the stratagem of the wooden horse. Or if one be not perfectly certain of some Homeric description, he may say that he believes that certain things were so; as, for example, that the shield of Achilles had on it the twelve signs of the zodiac in sculptured work. Strictly speaking, this knowledge or belief in things imaged or represented is not knowledge or belief at all. The only element of fact in the case is the correspondence of our thought with previously existing thought, that is, with the conceptions of Homer; yet we do not speak of knowing this correspondence, but of knowing the fictitious events and objects. Such language is metaphorical. We call our conceptions knowledge, because they correspond to those of Homer in a manner somewhat similar to that in which true knowledge, by reason of its very nature, corresponds with our first perception of fact.

Hypothetical knowl

Again, the formation of hypothetical judgments and assertions presents a very important case, in which edge. we speak of knowing and believing facts and objects without this language being true, at least in its strict and primary sense. We often assert that if a certain antecedent exist, a certain consequent must exist also, and say that we know or believe this, even in cases where no antecedent exists, and in which, therefore, no consequent can be inferred to exist. Thus John Smith might say, "If I had $100,000,000, I would be richer than Astor," and we could reply, That is a fact, Mr. Smith; that is true; we all know that.' At the same time we

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perceive that there is no real antecedent, and therefore also no necessity of consequence (or co-existence), and no consequent at all. In truth, it belongs to the nature of every hypothetical assertion to leave out belief as to actual existence. Reality may characterize some part of the composition of the antecedent or of the consequent, but neither of these, as a whole, is asserted to exist. We only think and say that if the one exist, then the other must exist also. In the case adduced, Smith and Astor

might both be living men, and other realities might be thought of; but neither the possession of the $100,000,000, nor the superiority to Astor in wealth, nor the necessary consequence of the latter on the former, is stated as a fact. Therefore hypothetical knowledge and belief, as such, deal not with real but only with conceived or supposed objects and their supposed existence. Yet the only true existence, the only true fact, is the actual.

At the same time it is clear that a large and important portion of our knowledge and belief is hypothetical. The chief part of every system of science and philosophy, and the great body of the practical wisdom of mankind, together with all thoughts or statements which are ever used as principles in reasoning, are not properly assertions of fact, but of that which must be or become fact, provided certain specified conditions should exist. Moreover, many statements are of this character which at first sight appear to assert general facts, but which, at least as to their use in reasoning, are not assertions of fact at all. Thus, in laying down the principle, "Books are pleasant companions," the existence of books and their pleasant company is referred to; but we assert only that if books exist, or wherever they may exist, they afford a pleasant fellowship. So, also, "Man is mortal" signifies, "Man, whenever or wherever he may exist, is mortal ;" and this would be true even though there were not a single human being to be found.

The extensive use and the prominent importance of hypothetical belief, and the fact that logic, the science of rational conviction, is chiefly occupied with the laws which regulate the formation of hypothetical belief, account in part for the failure of philosophers to see that the expression of confidence in existence is the essential office and ultimate end of every form of intellectual assent.

cal to actual

tion dis

The relation That hypothetical conviction is a mode of confidence of hypotheti- wholly secondary, subordinate, and ministerial to beistic convic- lief in actual fact, that is, to belief which asserts cussed. Hy- actual fact, and that its very essence is dependent pothetical a upon its having this character, without which it would ferential be- not be belief at all, becomes evident when we analyze hypothetical belief, and compare it with that form of belief in actual fact to which it is most closely allied.

mode of in

lief.

That radical form of conviction which we have just mentioned as belief in actual fact, and which therefore might be termed actualistic belief, may be distinguished into two kinds, or classes,

the presentational and the inferential. The former of these is experienced in the presentations, or immediate perceptions, of

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