also may be perceived through that certain or perfect evidence which is the cause of such knowledge. But often, not from any difference in the degree of the reality of things, since whatever is real is perfectly real, but from something lacking in our means of knowing, we have to be content with evidence which is fit only to produce probable conviction. Frequently, too, we have to act upon such evidence. Now that which is partial or imperfect can be understood only by reference to the complete or perfect; therefore let us first study the nature of certain evidence, and after that we may consider probable evidence.

The word

fined.

The word "fact" is commonly used to signify the "fact" de- actual existence, or non-existence, of anything considered as assertible of that thing. Factum originally meant that which has been done or made;" but as an accomplished result is a real thing, which it is not so long as it is merely purposed or contemplated, and since the question, Has the thing been effected? chiefly asks, Does it, as a result, exist? the term "fact" came to be applied to that which has an actual existence, whether it be the product of some agency or not. We say it is a fact that there is a moon, and another fact that there are mountains in the moon; and in this we set forth simply the existence of the moon and of the mountains in it. The essential point in every fact that which makes it a fact is the existence, and not the nature, of the object, although of course no object could exist without having a definite nature. Whenever anything exists, its existence is a fact, no matter what the thing may be. In like manner, when anything does not exist, we extend the term, and call the non-existence of it a fact. In short, this word signifies that which corresponds to, and is the object of, any proposition which is literally true. It may therefore be employed to designate the object of literal knowledge, - that is, of certain and well-founded belief as to the actual existence of things.

The evidence

two kinds.

Perception

Now this knowledge this absolute and correct of fact is of actualistic belief, the knowledge of literal fact- seems to arise from the connection of the soul, as a thinkand this connection is In the former case the soul, or, if we may so

or cognition ing substance, with the fact; defined. either immediate or mediate. fact is either included in the life of the speak, exists in contact with that life. In the latter case the fact is perceived, not directly, but through the knowledge of another fact with which it is necessarily co-existent. These two modes of knowing may be distinguished as presentational and as inferential perception. Both are forms of judgment, when this latter term is used in the widest sense, covering every

mode of forming convictions, and not in its stricter meaning, which includes only probable inference. Perception, in the broad signification now employed, is precisely the equivalent of cognition; so that, in actualistic belief, there are two kinds of judgments, first, perception or cognition, by which we perceive or cognize fact, either in itself or through other fact, and thus have knowledge; and secondly, judgment proper, which is the probable inference of fact from fact, and which originates belief proper, or probable conviction. With the latter we have nothing to do at present.

Presentative and illative evidence.

The evidence, in any case of presentational perception, is simply the fact itself, considered, of course, as immediately subject to the cognizance of the thinking being. Hence we say that the fact is self-evident. If one has a thought or a pain or a desire, what evidence has he of its existence save that it exists within the sphere of his immediate consciousness and notice? The fact as thus related is its own evidence; nor can we conceive of any other cause of immediate knowledge than the fact itself as immediately related to our power of cognition.

On the other hand, the evidence in inferential perception is not the fact perceived, but some other fact or facts with which it is necessarily co-existent. Seeing a bird flying over a grove suddenly collapse and fall immediately upon the report of a fowling-piece, we perceive that some unseen sportsman is successfully practising his art.

Comparing these two kinds of evidence together, we may name the first presentative, because, in a sense, it presents the existing object immediately to our perception. "Intuitional" might be a better term, had not "intuition" of late come to mean, not the immediate perception of fact, but only the immediate apprehension of necessitudinal, or ontological, relations and sequences. And the second kind of evidence may be named illative, because in a sense it brings the existence of an object not immediately cognizable within the compass of our perception.

Presentative evidence is

originative,

illative evidence is ap

This radical distinction, which refers to the use or non-use of means in cognition, is allied to, and coincident with, two other distinctions. First, with reference to the thought, or the conceptions, of the mind, plicative, of presentative evidence may be called originative, bethought. cause our ideas of the things perceived originate in the very perception of them; while illative evidence may be termed applicative, since it merely enables us, according to certain rational methods, to apply conceptions or propositions which

have been recalled to, or constructed by, the mind, out of its acquired stores, to the explanation of any given case. If one has toothache, the idea of that pain is given in the very perception of it, whether it be a first or a subsequent perception; the evidence in this case is presentative of the toothache, and originative of the thought of the toothache. But when, without examination of the tooth, we infer that there is a decayed nerve from which the aching proceeds, the conceptions of this inference must have been derived from a previous examination of aching teeth. In this case the evidence is applicative of the conception of a decayed nerve, and is illative of the fact of such a nerve. So when we see the bird falling, and hear the report of the fowling-piece, we have presentative and originative evidence of the fall of the bird and the noise of the gun; but, supposing the sportsman to be out of sight, we have only illative and applicative evidence of his presence and skill.

Presentative

primordial, illative evi

dence is logi

cal, in its mode of conviction.

Secondly, with reference to the ground of our belief, evidence is presentative evidence may be called primordial, because it is the immediate fountain of our primary perceptions, and the ultimate source from which every actualistic conviction draws its life or validity; while illative evidence may be termed logical, because it is employed in reasoning, and is the means of deducing secondary from primary convictions. Possibly the truth thus indicated might be better stated should we first say that certain of our cognitions are primordial, not being dependent on any others, but being themselves the source whence all others are derived, while the rest of our convictions are logical or derivative; and should we then say that the evidence of our primordial cognitions may be distinguished as primordial, while that of our logical beliefs may be distinguished as logical.

Primordial evidence is merely the fact or thing known considered as in immediate connection with the thinking substance; it is presentative evidence, viewed, however, not simply in itself, but also as the foundation for illative evidence. Logical evidence consists either in primordial convictions so used as to derive other convictions from them, or in derivative convictions so used as to become in their turn the source of new convictions: it is illative evidence, viewed not simply as to its effect but also as to the nature and ground of its operation. To explain the modes and laws of derivative conviction is the chief office of logic.

To illustrate logical evidence let us suppose that one sees money put into a pocket-book, and then sees the pocket-book put into a desk. He now has presentative and primordial evi

dence as to the relation of the money to the pocket-book and as to the relation of the pocket-book to the desk, while his knowledge of these facts is the illative and logical evidence that the money is in the desk. Again, to enable one to conclude that a certain cupful of black powder is explosive, let one have observed several times that a certain pulverized composition of sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal, called gunpowder, will explode; and let him know, from examination, that this powder in hand is gunpowder: he has now presentative evidence of these facts, or at least a remembrance in which the result of that evidence is reproduced; for he has observed the facts themselves. And he has logical evidence that the powder in the cup, which has not yet exploded, will explode if ignited, or is explosive, because the facts already observed, considered in their relation to this derivative conviction, are logical evidence. In the above instances the knowledge employed as logical evidence is itself supported by primordial evidence; but any knowledge, whether obtained by observation or by inference, may serve as logical evidence.

between

and illative

stated.

The doctrine that presentative evidence, or presenThe relation tational cognition, is primordial to all our convictions, presentative and originative of all the conceptions used in them, evidence cannot be fully vindicated without discussing thordefinitely oughly the various modes of conviction. It can, however, be defined without further discussion. First, in saying that immediate perception is the origin of all thought, we mean only that presentation furnishes all the materials or elements of conception. We admit that new constructions of thought not only take place in connection with inference, but are a condition of it. When we say, "The powder in that cup is explosive," we unite the idea of explosiveness to that of this cupful of powder; and this combination is new, though we had the elements of it before making it. So also there is a new synthesis of thought when we conclude that the money is in the desk, that the bird which has fallen has been shot by the unseen sportsman, and that the aching proceeds from decay in this hollow molar.

The question, however, may be asked, Is it absolutely true that the mind originates no elements of conception in inference? For example, might not the thought of the necessary connection of the fact inferred with the facts already known be immediately produced by the intellect on the occasion of its first inferences? To this we reply that were there any necessity for it, we might suppose the mind to have the power to conceive not only of the necessary connections, but also of the radical natures of the

things inferred, without having directly perceived such natures in such connections previously. There are certain fundamental elements of conception, which correspond with certain fundamental elements of entity, and which enter into all thinking; and we might attribute to the mind a power of generating these elementary conceptions at the time of its first inferences. But we can discover no need for such a theory so far, at least, as regards the human spirit. It seems sufficient to say that these conceptions are primarily produced as parts of our presentational cognitions. The doctrine appears sustainable, that every element of inferential thought has been originally experienced in immediate perception.

Secondly, in saying that our presentational perceptions are primordial as related to our illative actualistic convictions, we do not mean to say that inference has not a force of its own, in addition to that of immediate cognition, or to that which memory may reproduce from such cognition. On the contrary, it has such a force; and this must be recognized as an ultimate fact in mental science. When a chain hangs from a hook fastened in a beam, there is strength in each link of the chain as well as in the hook. When a column rests on a pedestal and upholds a roof, there is supporting power in the column as well as in the pedestal. So actualistic inferential conviction, though founded on presentational, has a confidence that is peculiarly its own. That such is the case is evident from the fact that illation, or inference, produces new convictions. We form beliefs about things in the future or in the distance, and about whose existence we never heard before. Such beliefs cannot be explained as merely the reproduction of old perceptions.

Diversity of views. Causes of

error.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PRESENTATIONALISM.

1. THE operation of presentative evidence is very simple. There is no process. The object as existing in, or in immediate relation to, the experience of the soul, is immediately perceived-that is, absolutely and correctly judged to exist - either as a part of the experience or as related to it. That which is simple does not call for explanation; but the question arises, What facts, or classes of fact, are