Besides, a knowledge of the achievements, and even of the failures, of preceding laborers is indispensable to those who would carry on a work which has already been begun; so that the philosopher himself, who seeks for independence and originality of view, must study with care the efforts of his predecessors. If he do not, in all probability he will neither avoid their mistakes nor equal their attainments. CHAPTER III. PRIMARY CLASSIFICATIONS. ; 1. OBJECTS which possess a common nature may be variously classified according to their agreement and difference in some one or other important respect. This may belong either to their internal constitution or to their external relations. Thus mankind may be classified according to race, or language, or country, or degree of enlightenment, or religious creed, or sex, or age, or occupation. Such classifications are called logical divisions and they contribute greatly to clear, systematic, and comprehensive thought. The study of mental philosophy naturally commences with some such distinctions. First, let us divide the powers of the soul, so as to separate and distinguish the intellect from the other powers, and, after that, let us divide the powers of the intellect, so that each of these may receive its due attention. The old division of psychical powers into the understanding and the will was that employed by the philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages, and perhaps served sufficiently well for their peculiar discussions. Our earlier English writers, also, whose attention was devoted chiefly to the intellectual powers, contented themselves with this division. Locke did so; and Reid, the illustrious founder of the Scotch school of philosophy (he lectured in Glasgow during the middle of the eighteenth century), expresses himself thus: "There never has been any division of the powers of the mind proposed which is not liable to considerable objections. We shall therefore take that general division which is most common,—into the powers of understanding and those of will." But afterwards, in his second essay on the will, he condemns this division. "Some philosophers," represent desire, aversion, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, all our appetites, passions, and affections as different modifications of the will, which I think tends to confound things which he says, 66 are very different; and he remarks that things which have not a common nature should not be confounded under one name. The dissatisfaction thus expressed, being generally felt, resulted in that threefold division which is now commonly made. "Our conscious acts or states," says Dr. Porter," are separated into the three broad and general divisions of states of knowledge, states of feeling, and states of will. To know, to feel, and to choose are the most obviously distinguishable states of the soul. These are referred to three powers, or faculties, which are designated as the intellect, the sensibility, and the will. This threefold division is now universally adopted by those who accept any division or doctrine of faculties." Objections to the com mon division: 1. No separate place for the power of sense. Nevertheless, for several reasons, we cannot regard this threefold division as sufficient and satisfactory. First of all, it seems a serious defect that no separate place is allowed in it for the power of sensation, and that on this account the discussion of the subject of sense is made to fall under the head of intellect. The former of these powers presents objects to the latter, and contributes a stimulus to its exercise; but they are radically different from each other. The treatment of them together, under the same division of thought, favors the materialistic doctrine that intellect is but a modification or development of sense. Sensation is essentially diverse also from that emotional feeling which the perception or remembrance of objects often excites; although, we think, it might as well be classified with emotion as with intellect. It differs greatly, and perhaps equally, from both; and if this be so, ought not sense to be reckoned an independent power? not suffi ertion on the other. Secondly, this division makes no distinct place for 2. Motivity desire, or, using a more comprehensive term, for that ciently dis- motivity by reason of the exercise of which the spirit tinguished from emoof man seeks various ends. The motivities constition on the tute a marked and important class of pyschical pheone hand, or from ex- nomena; they include the instincts and appetites, the propensities and passions, the affections, and such active principles as self-interest, public spirit, rational benevolence, a sense of duty or of justice, and the love of what is right and good. Some authors, as Drs. Upham and Haven, place motive tendencies and emotions together under the head of "sensibilities." Sir William Hamilton, on the other hand, unites will and desire together as the third grand division of spiritual life, and calls them "the exertive faculties." Were a choice necessary, we would rather classify motivity with will than with the emotional power; and to this last, exclusively, we would assign the term "sensibility." But we prefer to consider desire, or motivity, as itself an elementary power, which should be distinguished from every other. power. 3. The will This leads to a third objection. The threefold dishould not vision is professedly a generic classification of our be regarded as a simple powers, not as these exist and operate in combination, but as they are seen after an ultimate analysis. In other words, it is given to represent only simple and undefinable elements of our conscious spiritual life. Now, with Brown and Hamilton and other older metaphysicians, we believe that there is something in volition of the nature of motive tendency. At the same time we hold that volition contains more than motivity; that it is a combination of intellect and motivity under special and modifying conditions. For this reason we cannot regard volition as being a simple and fundamental power, nor even as being a specific form of such a power. Intellect comprehends sense-perception, consciousness, memory, reasoning, imagination, and so forth, but cannot include volition, determination, or purpose, because, although these last contain an intellectual element, they have also, essentially, a quality not intellectual. In like manner, motivity may be divided into appetite, propensity, affection, self-interest, public spirit, and so on, but must be separated from decisions, intentions, and resolutions, because these are characterized by a peculiar exercise of the intellect which distinguishes them from mere motivities. Therefore we incline to exclude the will from our radical division of psychical powers, and to treat it as a complex faculty. Yet, if any hold fast to the belief that the will is a simple power, and in its essential part incapable of analysis, this view also leads to a more than threefold division; for, after sensation, intellect, emotion, and motivity, volition would come as the fifth radical mode of conscious life. 4. The dis character of Again, we object to the common classification that tinctive it does not recognize, as a fundamental power, what exertion, or may be called the faculty of exertion, or of action; action, over- for every exertion is an action when it is successful looked. in accomplishing some result. This power is generally included under that of will. Dr. Haven thus describes "the third form of mental activity: "Thought and feeling lead to action. I resolve what to do. I lay down my book, and go forth to perform some act prompted by the emotion awakened within me. This power also I have; the faculty of voluntary action, or volition." But we distinguish easily the volition, or determination to act, from the action which we resolve and purpose to do. Intentions and deeds are things radically diverse. The language of Reid applies here: "Things that have no common nature ought not to be confounded under one name, or represented as different modifications of the same thing." Therefore, among the simple powers of the soul, we would place that of action, or of exertion; or, to use terms of Hamilton's, the exertive, or conative, faculty. But it should be stated that while Hamilton employs this language, he does not specify any such power as that now mentioned. rather identifies desire, volition, and conation, as to their essential nature, by making them the manifestations of the same general power. In our view, these activities, though closely connected with each other, differ radically as to their internal character. should be recognized as a funda mental power. He Our concluding objection has reference to the phe5. The capability of nomena of pleasure and pain, and to the power or pleasure and of pain capability which the mind has of experiencing these phenomena. This power has no proper place in the common division. It is true that pleasure and pain have not so independent an existence as the other activities of mind. Happiness is a kind of aroma which accompanies a well-ordered and well-sustained life; misery is the effluvium of an ill-regulated life. Nevertheless, these phenomena should be distinguished from those which they attend, and especially from those to which they are most intimately related. We object to Hamilton's classification of them with our emotions or sensibilities. The pleasure or pain of an emotion should be distinguished from the emotion itself, just as the pleasure or pain of a sensation should be distinguished from the sensation itself. In short, these subtile concomitant modes of experience arise not only from our sensations and emotions, but also from our thinkings, desires, volitions, and actions; that is, they flow from, and attend, every mode of psychical activity. If, then, we distinguish the experiences of sense and thought, of motive feeling and of exertion, from their attendant pleasures and pains, we certainly should make a similar distinction with reference to emotion. No investigation of psychology is more interesting than that which, commencing with pleasures and pains, goes on to seek the general nature and causes of happiness and misery; and perhaps none as yet is so undeveloped. Some theories have been proposed to solve its questions, but no doctrine has secured general approbation. The distinction of pleasure and pain from other phenomena, and the recognition of them as having a nature and laws of their own, are plainly a necessary condition of progress in this important philosophical inquiry. A new division pro 2. If the foregoing objections be well founded, they call for a new enumeration of the fundamental powers posed. of the soul. We propose the following sixfold division: first, sensation, or sense; secondly, thought, or intellect; thirdly, emotion, or sensibility; fourthly, desire, or motivity; fifthly, exertion, or conation; and sixthly, the capability of pleasure and pain. Each of these powers has characteristics of its own. For example, sense is distinguished by its peculiar and inherent dependence upon material excitants and bodily organs. Intellect is the most prominent faculty of spirit, and is the condition of all psychical life, save that of sense only. Emotion is a psychical excitement produced by the perception or thought of some object, and has a correspondence to the nature of the object. Motivity is a more active principle than emotion, and is always a tendency towards some end. Exertion, or action, is an ability in the exercise of which the soul voluntarily uses the mental and physical powers at her command. And the capability of pleasure and pain is manifested in that peculiar experience, or element of experience, which, under laws of its own, accompanies all the different forms of psychical activity. separateness of But here, in order to avoid misconception, let us Diversity of powers does remark that neither the foregoing nor any other not involve division of psychical powers conflicts with the doctrine of the unity of the soul, or involves the idea that parts. a spirit is composed of parts. Our activities not only belong to the one ego, or self, but they mingle and blend in the formation of one complex life. They neither exist nor operate separately; it is only through philosophical analysis that they can be separately thought of. As a glassful of water may have weight, fluidity, incompressibility, transparency, temperature, and other qualities, without being thereby divided into parts, so the possession of diverse powers is consistent with the fact that the soul is a yet more perfect unit than any material body is, or can be. Three divis 3. Having divided the powers of the soul in general, ions: 1. The we turn to the division of the intellect. The ends of primary and our study now require that we should make, not merely the secondone, but three classifications. ary powers of intellect. First, we divide our mental powers into the primary and the secondary. This division refers to the natural order of the operation of these powers. We say that thought and belief are the primary powers, because in their exercise intellect accomplishes its ultimate work, that which alone gives importance to all the rest. And we call attention, acquisition, |