moral and governmental law as a general mode of conduct prescribed for us by some authority or necessity. It has no more reality than those general forms, or modes of existence, which are necessitated by general antecedents. Therefore the legal profession properly distinguish between fact and law. But sometimes by a law we mean the mental or verbal statement of some mode of conduct prescribed by authority or duty; and in that sense a law may be individual and real. 3. Along with the truth that universals do not exist, we may consider the correlative doctrine, which Locke maintains, that "all things that exist are particulars," that is, individuals. By this it is not taught that we cannot think of — that is, as if of — individuals which do not exist, but only that whenever anything really exists, it is an individual.

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That only individuals exist, naturally follows from the non-reality of universals; for whenever our thought leaves the general, it necessarily returns to the individual. It must therefore find the real in the

individual, or not at all.

This doctrine, however, does not stand in need of extrinsic proof; it is self-evident. Every object that is perceived to exist is perceived also to have individuality and form, or nature. As individual, it is perceived to be the same with itself, and to differ from other objects in being other than they; this is individual, or numerical, identity and difference. As having form, or nature, it is perceived to agree with other objects of a similar form, and to differ from other objects of a dissimilar form; this is formal, or specific, agreement and difference. Not only substances, but spaces, times, powers, and, in short, all kinds of entity, are thus characterized. That only individuals exist, or can exist, may be accepted as a simple and ultimate law of being.

The principium individui is a

simple and

In mediæval metaphysics there was much discussion concerning the principium individuationis, or origin of individuality. This naturally attended realism. For on the supposition that a universal really exists and is the basis of the individual existence of all things of a given kind, the question arises, How is the individual produced, or formed, from the universal? But when realism is rejected, there is no place for such an inquiry.

ultimate law of being.

Individuality, as a necessary characteristic of all entity, can be produced or destroyed only so far as entity can be produced or destroyed. The individuality of God, of spaces, and of times is not produced at all; for these objects are not produced or producible. But the individuality of created objects and of their relations necessarily comes into existence with the objects themselves.

The terms conception" and

4. In the present and previous discussions we have used the term " conception as a general word applicable to either the power, the process, or the product of the mind "notion." in the formation of its ideas, whether singular or general. On the other hand, the term "notion " has been for the most part restricted to general ideas, though it naturally applies also to those indefinite individualized conceptions which are so closely allied to the general. In this use of language we have been governed partly by necessity and partly by propriety. Of late years, especially since the days

of Hamilton, many have applied the term "conception to general thinkings only. This is a departure from earlier usage and from that still employed in common speech, and, without any sufficient reason, deprives philosophy of a most useful word. "Conception," being derived from concipere, "to grasp," properly denotes any thought, but especially any synthetic thought, in which the grasping, or comprehending, power of the mind is exerted.

ed for.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE PHASES OF INTELLECT.

1. In order to the attainment of that degree of Three grand phases of intellectual development and efficiency which charmental life acterizes the human mind, there is need of a threefold distinguished and account- work, and consequently of an ability, on the part of the soul, to act mentally in three diverse ways. First of all, we must be able to perceive such objects as come within the range of our immediate observation; for without such a power we could have no ideas at all. Secondly, we must be able to recall and control the ideas and the knowledge gained by this perception of things; otherwise our thought, dying the instant it was born, would serve only as a momentary illumination of our darkness. Finally, we need a penetrative and comprehensive power of mind, a power whereby the nature of things may be clearly understood and correctly reasoned from; without which we would be incapable of intellectual progress and of the management of affairs. Corresponding to these necessities, and, in a sense, originating from them, are the three grand phases of mental life, the perceptive, or cognitive; the reproductive, or representative; and the discursive, or

rational.

These phases have so many attributes in common, and each of them comprehends such a variety of modes, that they are distinguished more easily by a reference to the necessities in which they originate and the ends which they serve, than by any internal characteristics. In this way, we believe, our ordinary conceptions of them are formed. At the same time we should seek accurate ideas of the diversities of these phases considered in their own character as aggregates of mental operations. No one of them is distinguishable from the others by any radical or generic diversity in the powers productive of it. Not only thought and conviction, the primary powers, but also attention,

suggestion, synthesis, analysis, abstraction, conception, generalization, in short, all the secondary powers, - are involved, to a greater or less extent, in each of these general modes of mental action. Yet in each phase our powers, being exercised under special conditions, act also in peculiar or specific ways. A critical consideration of these peculiarities of action may lead to an exact conception of internal or essential differences. Using this discriminating care, we will first avoid some mistakes of confusion, and will then attempt the definitions we desire to make.

Misconceptions to be avoided. No

phase is the

exclusive field for the

operation of

any fundamental power.

First of all, we must bear in mind that one phase of intellect may be distinguished by the special or prominent exercise of some power, without being the only or exclusive field for the exercise of it. The use of general conceptions and the formation of inferences from them are prominent features of the discursive phase of thought; but they also occur in certain modes of sense-perception, and in that style of reproductive thought which is called imagination. In like manner the power of association or suggestion, which is a prominent factor in the reproductive phase, is a necessary element of rational thinking. In view of these and similar facts, the most that can be claimed for any one of the generic modes of intellect now under consideration is that it exhibits the special or peculiar action of one or more powers.

mental expe

Secondly, it is not to be supposed or understood that No phase comprises the each phase of activity necessarily constitutes the whole whole of our of our mental experience during the time of its conrience at one tinuance. By the term "phase," here, we mean simtime. ply the total collection of those activities which, arising from common conditions, accomplish, or tend to accomplish, a common end or work, and are therefore naturally regarded by us in one general view. We do not mean the total of our mental experience at any one time.

Activities belonging to different phases may co-exist, and a constant influence may be exerted from one phase upon another. Thus an object seen may give a new turn to some train of thought, or may furnish a link in some chain of reasoning; the observations of sense may be directed by the recollections of memory or the principles of science; and the playful work of fancy often interrupts, and sometimes is interrupted by, the earnest inquiries of philosophy. Yet the activities of the different phases may be distinguished even while mingling with, and affecting, each other. For the operations of the reproductive intellect are always subsequent in nature to those of perception,

and presuppose them; while the operations of the discursive faculty are subsequent in nature to both the rest.

A mental Thirdly, it may be difficult, sometimes, to say to operation which one of the three grand phases of intellect some may belong to two phases complex activity, or series of activities, should be asat once. signed; it is even conceivable that an operation may be of such a double character as to belong to two phases at once. An argumentative history or a philosophical poem might be claimed either for the reproductive or for the rational phase; for the one would combine memory, the other imagination, with reasoning.

Ordinarily, the character of any intellectual state or work may be determined by considering simply the principal end immediately subserved by it. Imagination involves skill and judgment in the analysis and synthesis of ideas, and might therefore be assigned to the discursive intellect. Yet this faculty, in its ordinary development and use, is properly classed as one mode of reproduction; for it aims simply at the contemplation of its own creations, and not at all at the attainment of truth and understanding. But there is an exercise of intellect very nearly akin to imagination, which, taking reason for its guide, and acting in the service of the knowledge of fact, forms conjectures, hypotheses, ideals, and illustrations; and this mode of thought, which has been called the philosophical imagination, is a subordinate part of the discursive faculty, its proper aim and effect being to discover and comprehend the truth.

longs to it at

involves in

Finally, we must be careful not to limit our concepEach phase should be tion of any one of the grand phases of thought so as to regarded as exclude from it any element of activity which is ever including whatever be- properly included within it. The perceptive phase any time. may be styled the presentative, because in it alone Perception we find immediate or presentational cognitions, and ference, and because no perception takes place without at least reason intu- having such a cognition as its most essential part. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that perception that is, the perceptive phase of thought—is confined to cognitions which in the strict or absolute sense are immediate. Every secondary, or acquired, sense-perception involves an inference. The immense majority of our external perceptions are of this kind. The very word "perception," though now applicable to cognitions which are immediate, probably signified originally a learning through the use of means.

ition.

In like manner the reproductive phase of thought includes more than the mere reproduction of thought. In all the higher

employments of the fantasy the reproductive power simply furnishes materials, which then are elaborated by poetical skill and judgment.

The discursive phase, also, may be the subject of inadequate conception. The "discourse of reason," as it is called, is only the more prominent method, or manifestation, of that faculty whereby man seeks to perfect and extend his knowledge of things. There is also what has been called the "intuition of reason," from which the discourse of reason originates, and which may be conceived to take place without the latter. This intuition is simply that clear analytical perception of elements and relations of which brutes are incapable, unless in a very low degree, and the development of which gives to the human understanding its peculiar and penetrating power. It is with reference to these two modes of rational activity that the division of reason into intuitive and discursive may be best maintained. The penetrating analytical apprehension of the nature or composition of objects is a condition of the discursive processes of reason, and is the chief and the ultimate source of the distinctive character of the rational faculty; but this apprehension is mostly to be found and seen only in connection with those discursive processes such as formal generalization, analysis, synthesis, and inference - which are discussed in the philosophy of logic. Moreover, language expresses the operations of reason only as they are discursive.

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With reference, therefore, to its notable manifestation we may rightly style reason the discursive faculty; remembering at the same time that the discursus mentis is not the whole work of reason, but only its full and principal development. The same extension of meaning takes place when, in English, "the understanding" is used as equivalent to "the reason,' and when, in Greek, ἡ διάνοια is used as equivalent to ὁ νοῦς; for diavola, "the discursive faculty," and "the understanding are all interchangeable terms.

The grand phases of

With the foregoing explanations such definitions as the following of the three grand phases of mental thought de activity may prove sufficient. The perceptive phase fined. is composed of perceptions which are either immediate, or which closely and invariably follow upon those which are immediate. It exists whenever there is immediacy of perception; and there is a sense according to which it includes immediate perceptions only. It excludes all formal inference, or such as deserves the name of reasoning. The reproductive phase comprises every form of the reproduction and elaboration of knowledge and thought which the purposes of contemplation,