association, synthesis, analysis, abstraction, and generalization, secondary powers, because their working is simply to modify the operation of the primary powers, and has all its consequence from this fact. Thought and belief, no less than thought, are concerned with things, objects; whereas the other powers are essentially subjective in their operations, and cause certain modifications in our ideas and beliefs.

The distinction between conception and conviction, between thought and belief, is clearly marked in the speech and consciousness of men, and is of the utmost importance in philosophy.

2. The three phases of Intellect.

A second division of intellect has reference to the mode of the formation of mental states; and it sets forth several complex phases of intellectual life, and the capabilities, or faculties, of which these phases are the manifestation. This division does not arise from so searching an analysis as that just mentioned. It recognizes the fact that certain manifestations of thought and of belief result from certain general causes; and it leads to the study of the forms of intellectual activity thus produced. These phases are three in number, and may be styled the perceptive, or presentational; the reproductive, or re-presentational; and the discursive, or rational, phases of intellect. Both thought and belief are exercised under each of these modes of intellect; as are also, though in different degrees, the various secondary powers of mind.

The perceptive phase of mental life originates in, and is characterized by, the immediate cognition of objects. It is subdivided into sense-perception, consciousness, and concomitant perception; this last signifying that cognition of relations and the fundamenta of relations, which, without being included in senseperception and consciousness, is exercised in connection with them.

The reproductive phase arises from the repetition or reproduction, by the mind, of the ideas and beliefs of immediate cognition. Its principal forms are the memory, the fantasy, and the imagination. The law according to which our thoughts are reproduced, in whole or in part, is called the law of the association of ideas.

The essential and distinguishing mark of the rational phase of intellect is the exercise of a peculiar degree of penetration and of comprehension. This results from a higher degree of mental power than is possessed by irrational creatures, and is manifested, first, in the precise and thorough cognition and understanding of things, especially of relations and consequences, and, secondly, in connected logical thinking, or, as it has been named, the " discourse of mind." This second mode of reason differs from the first only in being more deliberate and consecutive: it produces

the notion, the judgment, and the inference, which, as forms of rational thought, are discussed in logic; for it is only as developed modes of mental action that notions, judgments, and inferences specially belong to the rational phase, or faculty. A third radical distinction in intellect finds its tional and fundamentum divisionis, or principle of division, experiential in the character of our convictions. It is commonly conviction indicated by the twofold division of the elements of and of con- our belief—and also of the elements of our thoughtinto the intuitional and the experiential.

3. The intui

elements of

ception.

So far as a piece of knowledge or information is merely historical or matter of fact, it may be called experiential, because it sets forth something that can be originally known only through experience, or the direct cognition of the actual. For example, it is an experiential conviction that there is such a city as New York, and that it contains one million of Englishspeaking inhabitants. But a conviction which sets forth a thing as necessary or as possible asserts something different from the mere matter of fact. We now say that something must be, or may be, because something else is known to be; and so we introduce the necessary relations of existence, and what are called our necessary beliefs. Thus it is necessary that New York, being a large city, should not only be located somewhere, but should also occupy a considerable territory; and it is conceivable or possible that its inhabitants, being all human beings, should learn to speak some other language than English. Again, it is an experiential judgment that I am now writing with a pen, but it is a necessary judgment that I must use some instrument in order to write, or that I might use a pencil instead of a pen; for, from the nature of the case, one of these things is necessary and the other possible.

Possibility perceived intuitionally.

Judgments of possibility may, of course, be distinguished from those of necessity, but for our present purpose we must regard both as necessary judgments; and this, too, in a peculiar sense. In one sense all beliefs are necessary; they are the inevitable result of the exercise of certain faculties. Now, however, we speak of those convictions which are not mere perceptions of fact, but which, being based on a consideration of the necessary relations of things, assert this or that to be necessarily true. In this sense a postulate, which asserts a thing to be possible, is a necessary judgment no less than an axiom, which asserts a thing to be necessary. Though philosophers differ as to the ultimate origin and ground of these necessary convictions, it is quite evident that we constantly form and use them.

That school which teaches that our first cognitions of the necessity and of the possibility of the existence of things are direct and reliable perceptions, are called Intuitionalists, because they believe in a direct intuition of necessary truth. We prefer their doctrine especially to that of the Associationalists, who do not make a sufficient difference between the assertion of a necessary consequence and a mere historical statement.

As we have direct cognition of matters of fact, as well as of things necessary, there may be a question as to the propriety of confining the term "intuition" to the immediate perception of necessary truth. But language has been employed in this way; so that now an intuitional, especially as contrasted with an experiential, perception signifies the immediate cognition of some truth or fact as necessary.

The distinction between intuitional and experiential judgments or cognitions is not a difficult one. Even when we recognize something both to be fact and to be necessary fact, we can easily separate the two elements of conviction. Letting a bullet fall to the floor, we perceive both the fact of the fall, and that it falls necessarily, by reason of some cause. In like manner we can see, simply as facts, that two bullets are equal in weight to each other, and that each of them is equal in weight to a third bullet; and we can also see that the two bullets, being each equal to a third bullet in weight, must be equal in weight to each other.

The onto

cal elements

There is, however, another distinction, closely relogical and lated to the foregoing, which cannot be understood the empiri- without careful consideration. It does not pertain to of concep- our convictions directly, but to our ideas or conception. tions as these are employed in our convictions. When we examine any historical or merely matter-of-fact statement, we find that our belief in the truth of it is not specially connected with any one part of its thought more than another, but, on the contrary, is related alike to the whole thought. Such is the case when we simply perceive the weight and fall of the bullet, or when we see that three groups of three bullets each are, simply as a matter of fact, equal in number to a single group of nine bullets. When, however, we examine any specific statement that is necessarily true, that is, which sets forth something as existing necessarily or possibly, we discover that its peculiar force does not arise in connection with the whole of our thought, but only in connection with a certain portion of it. When we say that the unsupported bullet must fall because of its weight, the force of this statement does not depend on the special nature of the bullet and its weight, but on the fact that

the leaden ball is a substance endowed with a certain power, or tendency, and on the general principle that any substance endowed with any tendency necessarily exerts that tendency under conditions which may be ascertained. In other words, we see that power, under proper conditions, must operate. And, seeing the bullet fall a second time, we not only perceive that a similar event has occurred, but we say that it must have occurred, on the general principle that substances exert their potencies in the same way under a repetition of the same conditions. In short, analysis shows that these judgments concerning the necessary fall of bullets do not depend for their peculiar force on the whole nature of the objects considered, but only on the character of the objects as substances endowed with tendencies to certain fixed modes of operation. So, also, when we say that three given groups of bullets of three each are necessarily equal to a single group of nine, this does not depend on the fact that they are leaden balls, but only on the fact that they are individual things; for any three groups of three things each would be collectively equal to a group of nine. Such being the case, it is possible to discard from specific statements of necessity those elements of thought on which their necessity does not depend; accordingly, in this way, the axioms and postulates of algebra and geometry and the other sciences have been formulated.

Now, when the conceptions employed in these general modes of necessary conviction are examined, they are found to be comparatively few and simple. They are such thoughts as those of existence and non-existence, of necessity and possibility, of space, time, quantity, and relations, of substance, power, action, and alteration. It is observed, too, that although these abstract ideas are themselves distinct notions, yet, with reference to our ordinary thinkings, they may be styled elements of thought, because they enter into the composition of all our ordinary conceptions. And the remaining portions of our ideas may still more appropriately be named elements, because we never naturally employ them in abstract and separate thought, but use them in their combination with those few fundamental conceptions which relate immediately to the general nature and laws of being.

Those parts of our thinking on which our necessitudinal, or intuitional, convictions depend might be styled, collectively, the intuitional element of thought; while the remaining parts, taken together, might be called the experiential element.

But we should note that this distinction is not coincident with that between intuitional and experiential beliefs or convic

tions; for an intuitional conviction, though it does not depend on experiential thought, can make use of it, as in the case of the necessary fall of the bullet; and experiential convictions, likewise, use those elements of conception on which the force of intuitions depends, as well as those whose employment in assertions depends peculiarly on experience. This may be seen in illustrations similar to those which have been given.

The word

CHAPTER IV.

SENSE AND ITS RELATIONS.

1. THE word "sense," being derived from the 66 sense." Latin sentio, originally signified either feeling or the perception that accompanies feeling. The latter meaning appears in such expressions as a sense of danger or of impropriety, and when we speak of a sensible man, or of a man of good sense. In modern psychology, however, this term, when used alone, has generally been confined in its application to our bodily feelings, as distinguished from the perceptions formed in connection with them. Moreover, as the word "sensation" indicates the exercise of these feelings, the name "sense" may very properly be restricted to our power of having them.

When sensations are styled bodily feelings. the Sense a psychical expression refers to their source rather than to their power, and nature; for the power of sense belongs to the soul, sui generis. and not to the body. As the soul uses the organs of locomotion, but is different from them, so it is affected by the organs of sense, and is different from them. Sensation, it is true, belongs to the soul only as embodied; it is conditioned upon certain corporeal or nervous changes, but it is to be distinguished from these changes. In itself, it is purely psychical.

This power is not to be confounded with any other power of the exercise of which our spirits are conscious. Especially we should observe that sense is not intellect. Sensation and thought are things radically unlike. Who cannot distinguish the pain of a cut finger or a burnt hand from the thought of these things, or the satisfaction of a refreshing draught or a comfortable meal from the mere conception of these objects as matters of unrealized desire? Therefore, separating sensation on the one hand from corporeal affections, we separate it on the other from all the higher activities of spirit.