that the true cause, or a reliable sign of it, is discoverable by what logicians call the method of difference (for the explosion takes place only when the blow is given); and that like causes are conjoined with like effects.

These principles are ontological; and not only does the cosmological judgment involve the assertion of them, as a part of itself, but its whole force, whether as a presentational perception of necessity or as an inference, depends on, and flows from, this assertion.

The only part which experience performs in connection with inferences respecting the actual operations of Nature is to give a knowledge of fact simply as such, and without reference to the logical relations of fact. Thereupon inferential perception, according to ontological principles, taking hold of the facts, and retaining the specific forms of thought furnished by experience, yet without any further aid from presentative perception, can produce the conclusion proper in the case. The judgment that the explosion necessarily follows the blow is something so independently intellectual that it takes place as well on the supposition or remembrance, as on the perception, of the facts; while the judgment that a similar cap will be exploded by a similar blow is a homological inference from the particular intuition already made. So that although cosmological judgments find the specific form of their data and of their conceptions in experience, or the observation of fact, their whole force comes from the apprehension of truths which are evident merely on being stated and independently of our cognition of the actual.

Therefore, as opposed to experiential perception, and as being a mode of necessary and of inferential perception, the cosmological judgment is intuitional, and, in a certain limited sense, ontological.

While our reasonings respecting the operations of specific causes are pre-eminently cosmological, all other inferences, which employ any mode of conception not essential to the ontological principle which they follow, have the same character. Such are mathematical judgments and inferences about natural objects, considered as such and as having their observed peculiarities. The assertion that a pound of feathers is of the same weight as a pound of lead, because they are each equal in weight to a pound of iron, is a cosmological intuition.

Such judgments, yet more evidently than those regarding causational sequence, depend for their strength on the abstract principles which they enclose and embody.

The reliabil

CHAPTER L.

METAPHYSICS, OR ONTOLOGY.

1. THE doctrine of the reliability of our original, or ity of experi- primary, judgments, or perceptions, relates equally to exence and in- periential and to intuitional perceptions. But it is more tuition. comprehensive than that which asserts the reliability of every mode of presentational cognition.

Both our first perceptions of simple fact and our first perceptions of things as necessary, or as contingent, are presentational. They are immediate cognitions respecting our own souls and bodies as being and as being related, as acting and as acted upon, now and here. These presentational judgments, when tested, exhibit every possible mark of trustworthiness. In the first place, they are attended with irresistible conviction; in the second, they are upheld by the universal consent and " common sense" of mankind; and, thirdly, they are perfectly consistent and coherent with each other.

We have now to add that both memory, the reproduced knowledge of fact, and that intuitive inference in which judgments of necessity and contingency are repeated, while the things asserted to be necessary or possible are not immediately present, have the same marks of reliability as our presentational cognitions.

When we speak of these intuitional judgments being repeated, we do not of course mean that they are repeated from memory, or even that the present has any dependence on a previous perception of truth. We only recognize the fact that the mind can perceive the same connection of things inferentially which it formerly perceived presentationally, in each case acting independently and according to the same law of conviction.

Intuition

Moreover, it is to be noticed that the knowledge thus perceives an gained is that of an objectual necessity. It asserts not objectual ne- merely that we must believe something, but that this somecessity. thing in its own nature must be so, and cannot be otherwise. We not only perceive that equals added to equals are equal, but also that this is so by an absolute and inherent necessity. Were this not so, it would be necessary to explain inferential intuition as simply a sort of memory, or as resulting in some way from reproduced experience.

Some philosophers, resting on such an explanation, deny that we really perceive any absolute necessity, - that there are any such judg ments as those called intuitional. But we appeal from these teachers to the unsophisticated consciousness of mankind.

Others, who cannot deny that an objectual necessity is asserted, say that our intuitions are delusive and unreliable. To prove this, they adduce certain "antinomies," or contradictions, in which they claim that the primary judgments of the mind conflict with each other.

These antinomies, however, derive their force from concealed assumptions and mistakes. They remind one of the arguments by which ancient sophists proved the impossibility of motion and the non-existence of plurality. None of our primary cognitions have ever been shown really to contradict one another.

But while defending the authenticity of intuition, we see no advantage in making for it doubtful or preposterous claims. For example, the doctrine that we have an intuition of the infinite seems unnecessary and untenable. In our own persons we perceive space and time and their necessary natures and relations. The convictions that space is boundless, and that time has been without beginning and shall be without end, are constructively and inferentially derivable from these immediate cognitions. In like manner belief in a Supreme Being, though very natural to the soul, appears to be not an immediate, but an inferential conviction.

Ratiocina

The doctrine that all intuitions which are not presention a series tational are either actualistic or hypothetical inferences, of intuitions. throws light on the nature of reasoning. Every link by which, in a chain of ratiocination, one fact is connected with another already known, is an actualistic intuition; and every similar step by which one imaginary fact is united to another is an hypothetical intuition. Therefore, as the whole chain is composed of such links, we conclude that reasoning is simply a series of connected intuitions. It is admitted that every step in any mathematical demonstration employs some axiom or postulate, or rather follows that law of necessity or of possibility which the axiom or postulate expresses. So, also, when we predict a course of successive events, we reason according to those radical laws which connect cause with effect and similar causes with similar effects. And even those principles which regulate our inferences in contingency and in probability are intuitive perceptions of necessity and of possibility.

If these remarks be true, there is an intimate connection between the philosophy of intuition and the science of logic; for they show that reasoning not only begins with intuition (which is the common statement), but also employs intuition at every step of its progress.

2. Those two modes of cognitive judgment which we have called experience and intuition perfectly blend and unite in all our ordinary perceptions and convictions. For this reason, in previous discussions, intuition and experience have been spoken of not simply as two modes, but also, and more definitely, as the two radical elements of belief, or conviction; for it is scarcely possible for us to perceive or think of any fact without also perceiving some of its necessary relations. The intui- Growing out of this distinction between the elementary modes of conviction, is another, already noticed in an early experiential chapter, between the intuitional and the experiential eleelements (1) of thought and ments of thought, or conception. The intuitional elements (2) of being. of conception are those which enter as thought-factors into axioms, and into the most abstract statement of our necessary convictions; the experiential are those additions, obtained in experience, by reason of which a judgment which would otherwise be purely ontological is a cosmological intuition. These experiential elements never

tional and

enter into any ultimate law of conviction; they only affect and color our convictions.

This distinction between the intuitional and experiential elements of conception is not parallel with that between the intuitional and experiential elements of conviction; that is, we cannot say that only intuitional elements of conception are employed in intuitional cognitions, and only experiential in experiential. On the contrary, both modes of conception are employed in each mode of belief. Cosmological intuitions employ experiential conceptions as well as those on which their peculiar force depends; and our experiential cognition of things includes, and sometimes mainly consists in, the perception of elements which serve also as the fundamenta of necessary, or logical, relations.

When one sees a man walking along the road, his body and its parts, his place, his size, his motion, and his rate of speed, are all perceived as matters of fact. But these things involve such radical entities as space, time, substance, power, action, change, quantity, and relation, which are ontological elements. Plainly, experience perceives such elements, and objects compounded from them, as well as the non-ontological peculiarities which may be found in such objects.

There is, however, a distinction immediately connected with that between intuitional and experiential elements of conception, which is exactly parallel with it, and which some have confounded with it. It is that between the intuitional and the experiential elements of entity. The elements thus divided are the objects, or rather the ultimate elemental parts of objects, which correspond to the elements of conception. They may also be distinguished as the ontological and the empirical elements of entity. Let us speak first of the one, and then of the other.

Different thinkers have given different categories, or The ontological elements summa genera, of those elements of being which are the of entity. bases, or fundamenta, of necessary relations, and thereThe transfore also the essential matter of intuitional conviction. cendental objects of So far as we can see, there are in all seven such categories, intuition. and, beside these seven elemental genera, several radical kinds of relation which subsist between them, and which constitute another comprehensive category. The seven are space, time, quantity, substance, power, action, and change. These categories are to be regarded as setting forth absolutely simple elements, and as being entirely exclusive of one another. They furnish the necessary constituents for the framework, or form, of particular entities.

- no cate

Beside these generic categories there are what we may call the transcendental objects of intuition. They are simple entity, or being, existence, non-existence, necessity, and possibility. They are transcendental, not because they transcend presentative cognition, gory does that, but because of their universal logical applicability. That science which specially discusses the intuitional elements both of conception and of entity, together with the leading laws of conviction and of existence, was named metaphysics by the disciples of Aristotle. Aristotle himself entitled it "The First Philosophy." It has also been called ontology, or the science of being, this term bringing into prominence the objective side of the science.

Moreover, because ontological principles affect almost every question concerning the intellect, the name "metaphysics" is frequently, though improperly, applied to mental philosophy in general. Metaphysics and logic are twin branches, both outgrowths of the general philosophy of mind.

tial character

of things arises from the different modes in

The experiential elements of entity and the elements of The experien- conception corresponding to them include all those simple, or ultimate, modes of thought and of being which are not intuitional, or ontological. Unlike the ontological elements, they are seldom the objects of special and separate considerwhich power ation; they merely qualify or characterize. In all ordinary generalization only experiential thought is dismissed; that sibility. which is retained has an intuitional constitution, and in the highest abstractions is purely intuitional. Intuitional thought furnishes a framework, or form, which is filled in and clothed with the experiential, and with which the latter is always found united.

excites sen

In what way the experiential and the intuitional elements of entity are related to each other by reason of their own natures, - in other words, how those modifications of being which are simple and ultimate to experience are connected with those elements which are simple and ultimate to intuition, — is a question for metaphysics rather than for mental philosophy. But we may say that the experiential character seems specially related to power and its operation; for it primarily attaches itself to those specific modes of power by the operation of which, either in or upon spiritual beings, feelings are produced. The peculiarities both of the sense-affecting qualities of material objects and of the life and experience of the soul itself, as these are seen by sense-perception and consciousness, are the primary objects and sources of experiential thought. These peculiarities are recognized as affecting every part both of the spiritual and of the material universe, and are of a countless variety.

Intuitionalism. Scep

Kantianism.

3. That theory of immediate cognition which distinguishes between experience and intuition, and which exticism. Dog- plains the nature of each of these modes of mental action, matism. has been named intuitionalism. This doctrine at once admits Association- all the facts presented by consciousness, and explains these, after their true nature, according to generalizations justified by a careful comparison and analysis. On this account we believe that it will stand as the final statement of philosophy regarding man's primary beliefs.

alism.

The excellence of the intuitionalist view may be illustrated by the incompetency of all other theories which have sought the approval of studious minds. These may be rudely classified under four heads, as the sceptical, the dogmatic, the Kantian, or conceptionalist, and the associationalist theories of our primary convictions.

Pyrrho,
Hume.

In ancient times, philosophical scepticism nourished itself Philosophic scepticism. on the sophistical refinements of Pyrrho regarding our acknowledged cognitions; in modern times, under the leadership of David Hume, it has triumphed in overthrowing inadequate accounts of our perceptions of fact and truth. But it never has been a common doctrine even among philosophers; for no man,