existence which they have not in fact or in supposition. The reference to existence in such cases is no part of our negative conceptions, but only an accompaniment.

Neither does it conflict with the view now advocated that negative conceptions are all necessarily derived from positive; in other words, that our ideas of things as non-existent are all formed from our ideas of things as existent. This is involved in the doctrine already taught, that all our thoughts originate in the perception of things actual. The only difference between a positive and a negative conception is that in the latter the idea of non-existence takes the place of the idea of existence in the former. Thus only we distinguish between "a flame of fire" and no flame of fire." Even our most general negative conceptions are formed in this way. "None" comes from "no one;""nothing" from "no thing;" "nemo from "ne homo;" "nullus" from "ne ullus; 35 66 οὐδείς ” from “ οὐ εἷς ; ” "non-entity" from "entity." What is common to both modes of conception is the schematic thought. For this thought, once secured, is retained and employed when the schema itself may have ceased to exist.

It is further to be allowed that our minds, even while using conceptions negatively, tend also to use them positively. Nonentities that is, cases of non-existence of themselves never affect us. No man ever sought or avoided emptiness for its own sake. All power and life reside in entities; and non-entities, as such, interest us, not because they are non-entities, but because they are not entities. Only for this reason do they become objects of either aversion or desire. Hence the tendency of the mind, especially when dwelling directly on any conception, to construe it positively. This may be accepted as an ultimate law of spiritual life; and it explains not only why we so frequently think of things that are not as though they were, but why, even while thinking of non-existences as such, we tend also to think of them as things at least that may be. Such thought, however, is distinguishable from the negative conceptions to which it is related. Formal, or Finally, we seem in certain cases to think simply of schematic, the schemata of objects; that is, we think of objects conceptions. without thinking of them either as existent or as nonexistent. This mode of thought, it is to be acknowledged, is, for several reasons, difficult of deliberate realization. The endeavor to think two thoughts the thought of the object (or form) and that of its existence - apart involves the necessity of thinking them both at once, so long as this endeavor may be intentionally continued. Such an attempt, however, may settle the question whether we can clearly distinguish the two thoughts.

If this be answered affirmatively, it is likely that we can think them separately.

Then that strong inclination, already mentioned, towards the exercise of positive thought militates against schematic even more than against negative conceptions, and causes the mind to strengthen the former with the idea of existence. Our schematic conceptions may be likened to those material elements which are seldom to be found save in combination with others, and which can be brought to view in separate existence only by special care. Language, also, increases our perplexity, because we have to use the same designations for objects, whether thought of with or without reference to their existence, — that is, for entities as such, and for the corresponding schemata.

Nevertheless, if we recall and examine certain modifications of thought in which conceptions merely formal are used, we may renew these conceptions, and may perhaps be able to distinguish them from those of entities and of non-entities, somewhat in the same way that we distinguish the idea of man, viewed simply, from those of man as a citizen and as an alien, — that is, as being and as not being a member of some State.

Schematic conception pertains to

the nature of

For example, when the previously unknown existence of some object is asserted of it, the logical subject seems to include the conception of the schema only. things sim- Respecting a known entity, we may interpret the expression, This pen exists," as an analytical judgrately exer- ment; but when the existence is a matter of new

ply, but not

often

sepa

66

cised. information, and we say, "Eyeless fishes exist in the Mammoth Cave;" or, "There is a race of men with only one eye, situated in the centre of the forehead," our language seems to be ampliative, adding to the subject an existence not previously recognized as belonging to it. Or should we, in either of the above cases, assert, negatively, that such objects do not exist, we would be joining the idea of non-existence to the subject.

Moreover, when the mind is in doubt as to the existence or non-existence of things, is not this a hesitation as to the combination of either the idea of existence or that of non-existence with the conception of the schema in a statement of belief?

Again, schematic conceptions appear to be used whenever our consideration is exclusively directed to the nature or quality of an entity. For instance, when we contrast the nature of a thing with its existence, the conception of the nature may be regarded as schematic. When we are taught that God is, and is the rewarder of those that seek him, we are led to distinguish his being from his character, and to think, in the first instance at least, of the nature, rather than of the existence, of the latter.

In like manner purely attributive words may be said to

express schematic thought. When we say, The man is

cowardly," "The rose is red," the adjectives indicate merely form or quality. This is yet more evident in such expressions as the cowardly man," "the red rose; for in these

the thought of existence attaches itself primarily to the substantive, being needed only there.

Or should we compare two apples, both of which equally exist in all their parts and qualities, and say that they differ, the one being sweet and the other sour, we could scarcely be said to think of the existence of the sweetness and the sourness, - that is, so far as reference to these things is included in the thought of the difference, because the apples differ not at all as to the existence, but only as to the schema, or nature, of their qualities. Such is the doctrine of the three ultimate modes of thought. Some may find it difficult to see that we can think of the nature, or schema, of things separately from the thought of their existence or that of their non-existence. But if we can agree that there are at least two ultimate modes of thought, into the one of which the idea of existence, and into the other of which the idea of non-existence, enters, and which have a formal, or schematic, part in common, the principal end of this discussion shall have been attained.

CHAPTER XII.

IDEAL EXISTENCES.

1. THE doctrine of the objectivity of thought has sometimes been stated too strongly. It has been said that thought is the reflex or the correlative of being, and that every thought therefore has a being, or entity, as its object. In opposition to such teaching, we hold that we have many thoughts which have no objects whatever to correspond to them. There never were races of beings such as the dwarfish Lilliputians and the gigantic inhabitants of Brobdingnag. The wonderful stories of the "Arabian Nights" are mere conceptions to which no actualities ever corresponded. Novels, poems, dramas, are combinations which either refer but remotely to historical facts or have no such reference at all. Even in daily life the golden prospects of youthful fancy and the more sedate anticipations of mature days are always of that which never has been, and very frequently of that

which never comes to pass. It is clear that thought does not need the existence of an object apart from itself for its own existence, and that it often actually takes place without the presentation of any object whatever. The doctrine of objectivity implies only that thought in all cases might correspond with entity, not that it always does.

At the same time it is to be noticed that human A difficulty in philosophy language seems to imply that often, when there arising from the nature are no objects of thought, thought provides objects of of thought. its own. We speak of ideal existences, imaginary beings, fictitious scenes, supposed objects; and, in connection with the ideas thus expressed, we employ the same names and make the same statements that we would regarding true and literal existences. We say that Falstaff was an old courtier, fat, witty, and unprincipled; that Othello, the Moor, was a dangerous, passionate man; that Hamlet had a very discreet madness; that Lear was a sad wreck of royalty. We express ourselves in this way while knowing that no Falstaff, Othello, Hamlet, or Lear, such as we think of, ever existed. Such language at first seems capable of easy explanation. It is quite common; and the thought conveyed by it is instantly understood. Yet philosophers, when asked to define exactly an imaginary object or an ideal entity, — that is, to state in literal language what we mean in speaking of Hamlet, the prince, or Lear, the king,— have found themselves at a loss.

-

It is certain that these objects and beings have no existence apart from the ideas of the mind, and also that if they exist in connection with our ideas, they must be those ideas themselves. We cannot recognize any other entities that is, true and literal entities in the case than our own thoughts or thinkings. The question, then, arises, Are these ideal existences to be identified with our ideas of them? This solution has authority in its favor; but there are difficulties in the way of accepting it. We believe that nothing exists in the case of an imaginary entity save the mental state or operation; yet we find it impossible to regard the ideal object and the mental state as the same. When one tries to believe, not that the thought of Hamlet, but that Hamlet himself, is or was an idea, the mind refuses to act. We say, "Hamlet had a discreet madness." Did an idea have the discreet madness? Could an idea be fat and unprincipled? Could it be a revengeful Moor or a crazed old king? It may be said that the ideal beings had such characteristics only in imagination. But this does not help the matter. Ideas cannot have such characteristics even in imagination.

The difficulty here is deep-seated: it lies in the very nature

ence.

of our modes of thought. When we think of Hamlet as an ideal being, we do indeed have the idea of his existence as a man and a prince. This idea, unaccompanied by any belief, is a part of our conception of Hamlet. But in thus thinking of Hamlet, we have no thought of the conception of Hamlet and of its existThis thought may accompany or follow the other, but is distinct from it. Moreover, the thought of the conception is always attended with belief, for the conception really exists; but the conception itself of Hamlet is not attended with belief. Those, therefore, who say that Hamlet, as an ideal existence, is the idea of Hamlet, or the idea "Hamlet," attempt to unite two incongruous conceptions. They try to identify that in connection with which we have the thought of existence (the belief being excluded) with that in connection with which we have the belief of its existence. Such an endeavor must terminate in failure.

We can indeed say that Hamlet is a conception of Shakspeare; but in such a sentence "Hamlet" does not signify the ideal existence, the Prince of Denmark. The word is used in a secondary sense; as when we say, "Theft is a bad idea," we mean that the idea of theft, not theft itself, is a bad idea.

only realities.

In short, we hold that any philosophical definition Philosophy defines and of an ideal existence is an impossibility. When we discusses ask what an ideal object is, we mean, With what can it be literally identified? This takes for granted that an ideal object can be, and is, an existing object. Hence the absurdity of the question, and the impossibility of an answer. Speaking soberly and philosophically, there are no such things as ideal objects and existences. They cannot be identified with anything, and it is vain to inquire what they are.

At the same time, when we speak and think of ideal things and beings, of the heroes and events of poetry and romance, - our expressions and our ideas are actualities; and philosophy may properly be called to explain this peculiar use of thoughts and words, and the perplexity which we experience in its critical consideration.

Imagination is the power, the marvellous power, of the mind to think thoughts as if there were entities to correspond to them, even when there are no such entities. Though imaginative, or suppositive, thought differs from knowledge, or cognitive thought, as to pliability and permanency and motive force, and in the full normal working of the soul is especially distinguished by its want of any concomitant belief, yet, after all, as thought it is essentially of the same character with other thought. Suppositive is accompanied with cognitive thought when we are conscious of imagining; but this consciousness is not an element of