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the act of imagining. In suppositive thought we think an idea, say Hamlet, but we do not think of it at all. Imagination makes no subjective reference, but simply entertains thought so far as it might possibly correspond with objects. It endeavors to construct conceptions as nearly like those of cognition as possible, and succeeds admirably. These acts of the imagination affect us more or less in a way similar to that in which cognitions or remembrances affect us. The lifelike experiences of Robinson Crusoe, and even the incredible adventures of Baron Munchausen, move us in the same way, though not to the same degree, as if we knew them to be realities. Some explain this power of the imagination as the result of a momentary belief in the existence of objects corresponding to our thoughts, a belief which Professor Stewart maintains always to occur, and to be corrected only by our more sober judgment. Probably the imagination itself, without the belief, has power to affect us; but, however it is to be accounted for, the fact that we are affected is beyond dispute.

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Now when, without any presentation of fact to our minds, we think the same thoughts and are moved in the same way as when we perceive or remember existing things, and then seek to express and communicate our thoughts, we naturally, spontaneously, use precisely the same language as that in which we utter cognitive ideas. But the thought and the language thus employed are not the statement of facts, and do not concern existences; they are simply the exercise and the expression of the imagination. We think and speak in the same way as if we were thinking and speaking of things, and therefore seem to be thinking and speaking of things. Whole stories are formed and told after this manner. Yet, in sober truth, we are not thinking or speaking of things at all. Strictly and in fact we are not thinking of anything, for no object exists; we are only thinking.

If the foregoing account be correct, it is plain that our difficulties concerning hypothetical existences, ideal things, or imaginary beings arise chiefly from our taking thought and language according to its primary use, when it should have been taken according to a secondary use; in other words, from assuming, without reason, that things exist corresponding to imaginative thought and speech. We employ ideas and terms properly pertaining to real entities, as when we speak of the little men and women in the land of the fairies, - while there are no entities of a kind corresponding to our thought. We have the names and the conceptions, Macbeth, Hamlet, Lear, while there are no such beings. Hence the expression that we think of ideal objects is not literally true. It is a metaphor,

founded on the similarity of suppositive to cognitive thought. The fact, literally stated, is that we think in the same way as if we were thinking of objects. To say, "I think of Hamlet," means only, "I think as I would think if there were a Hamlet." This leads to the remark that imaginative thought A puzzling and its expression are rendered doubly perplexing of two kinds and delusive from the fact that we unite them intiof thought. mately with cognitive thought and its expression. For example, should one say that he has been thinking of Hamlet and of Shakspeare, there would be a double meaning, not very easy to detect, in the expression "thinking of."

A similar conjunction of suppositive and of cognitive thought takes place when we say that such and such objects — the fairies, for instance-exist in imagination, but not in fact. The word "exist" here has a double sense, or rather a double meaning. It is taken suppositively in the affirmative, and cognitively in the negative, part of the sentence. This difference in use is indicated by the phrases "in imagination" and "in fact." The full import of the sentence is that the statement, "The fairies exist," is one of suppositive thought, and not of fact, or of cognitive thought. But this meaning is given by the use of suppositive thought itself in the affirmative clause, accompanied by an indication of its true character, and of cognitive thought in the negative clause, similarly accompanied. The expression "in fact," which shows the cognitive or assertive use of thought, is an emphatic repetition of the idea of existence, whereby we signify that it is used literally. To say that a thing does not exist in fact is simply to say that, speaking literally and truly, it does

not exist.

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Again, it seems plain language to say, "Hamlet is an ideal existence," or "Hamlet is one of Shakspeare's heroes." Yet these statements are compounded partly of suppositive and partly of actualistic thought. We say, "Hamlet is an existence, "Hamlet is a hero," suppositively; and then, in the first, we add actualistically the thought "ideal" to indicate, not the nature of any object, but the suppositive character of our thinking; and, in the second, we use Shakspeare's name in the same way, to show both the suppositive character and the authorship of our conception of Hamlet. Such is the only rational account of these and similar statements; to interpret them throughout as the language of fact, or of belief, involves absurdities.

Recapitula

2. We have now discussed the question of ideal obtion. Presi- jects or existences. Respecting this subject, Presiquoted. dent Porter says, "Scarcely any single topic has

dent Porter

been more vexed in ancient or mediæval philosophy;" adding that the controversy concerning it either includes or trenches upon almost every possible question in metaphysics. Many notable and fundamental errors have originated in connection with this topic, and can be fully understood and met only through a satisfactory understanding of it. The question, completely stated, may be presented as a dilemma: Do ideal objects exist? If they do, what are they? If they do not, why do we call them existences, and speak of them as such? We assert that they do not exist, and that we call them existences, and speak of them as such, while knowing that they do not exist; or, expressing ourselves more accurately, we use the same thought and the same language that we employ respecting existing things, while we know that there are no existing things to correspond with our thought and language. We therefore free

ourselves from the question, What are they?

use of

Then, when asked, How do we come to think and speak as if there were entities? we answer that the human soul has a native power and tendency to exercise itself in such thought and language. This imaginative - or better, imaginational thought seems sometimes wholly to occupy the attention of the mind; but sometimes it is sensibly accompanied, and sometimes it is mingled and united, with actualistic thought. But it can always be distinguished from the latter.

Three principal causes have co-operated to mislead critical inquiry as to the prior question, Do ideal objects exist? and thus error and confusion have resulted through an affirmative answer. First, the difference between imaginative and cognitive thought, and especially our power to conceive of existence and of existing things, or entities, without any attendant belief in their existence, have not been fully recognized. Secondly, our imaginations often, if not always, are accompanied with a delusive belief, or rather tendency to belief, in the existence of such objects as would correspond to them. This tendency works unobstructed in dreaming. And, thirdly, suppositive ideas and expressions are frequently so conjoined with those of knowledge or fact, that, finding ourselves thinking and speaking continuously, we lose sight of the diversity in our thought. But the truth is that the language of the imagination, whatever it may seem to say or to imply, never expresses knowledge or assertion, but suppositive thought only. Such is to us a satisfactory account of the whole matter.

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1. WE name thought and belief the primary powers of intellect chiefly because the importance of those powers which we call secondary is that they modify the workings and results of thought and belief, while that of thought and belief lies in the very working and results of these powers themselves. The analysis and synthesis of ideas and of facts, the association of fancies and memories, the abstraction and generalization of notions and of truths, the formation from a transitory process of a reproducible product of conception or conviction, are all operations subsidiary to the main work of the intellect. The exercise of thought and belief is itself this work. Of these two, however, we may add that thought has a priority over belief; for it is possible to exercise the former without the latter, but belief takes place only in connection with thought.

Common lan

Since belief is exercised only along with thought, guage is not the same word often covers the combined exercise analytical. of the two powers: such terms, for example, as "perception," "judgment," "inference," always signify such a combined exercise; while other terms, such as "belief" and "conviction," "apprehension" and "thought," which specially belong to the one power or to the other, through metonymical extensions or transitions, become positively ambiguous. The ensuing discussion will illustrate these remarks. Yet we believe that the common intellect of men does not at all confound these powers; it simply does not emphasize the distinction between them.

Thought and

carefully distinguished.

In distinguishing thought and belief, as primary, belief to be from each other and from the secondary or subsidiary, powers of intellect, and in pointing out the dependence of belief on thought, we somewhat determine our conception of both these powers. In other words, we partly define each through an enumeration of characterizing relations, which is the only way in which any simple mental power can be defined. The difference between thought and belief should be noted, because, as we have said, the terms "belief" and "believing" stand often for a combination of thought and belief, and not for belief simply. We sometimes even use the "belief" to indicate, not belief itself, but the form of thought which it may accompany; for example, we speak of

noun

the religious beliefs of mankind, and we say that such a religious belief is entertained by such a person. This use of language exhibits the complete transition of a term from one conception to another nearly related.

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More frequently words indicating belief have merely an expansion of significance, so that they cover the united exercise of both the primary powers of the intellect. As, when one says he thinks that such is the case, he intends to say that he both thinks and believes that such is the case, so we can scarcely deny that the statement, I believe that such is the case," may mean that one both thinks and believes as stated. In like manner the assertion, "Lincoln cherished belief- or a belief — in the doctrine of Divine Providence," may easily mean that he cherished both a conception of the doctrine and a reliance upon it as true. Similar variations of signification might be observed in other words which express credence, such as faith," "confidence," ""trust."

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Nevertheless, we hold that thought and belief are different things, and we would maintain this distinction even though these things were never distinguished and opposed in ordinary speech, and were separated only in philosophical analysis. They are, however, often contrasted in the statements of common life. For instance, were a man accused of theft without any evidence, men would allow that they had the thought of that evil action without any accompanying belief; and if proper proof were presented, they would agree that they not only understood the charge, but believed it. In this way the two things would be presented as clearly distinguishable.

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2. Belief, as thus distinguished, might be called Heled proper belief proper. It is that belief which is sometimes every degree described as "the receiving, taking, accepting, or of conviction. holding a thing as true:" that is, the action of the

power of belief is thus styled; for in this, as in other similar cases, the power and its action go by the same name.

In the above statement the word "thing" does not signify the fact, which may be the object of thought, but only the conception of the fact; for not the fact, but only our conception of it, can be taken or accepted as true. This is said to be received and held by the mind, because, in exercising belief, we think the thought of the object with an increase of attention and interest and purpose. And yet even this grasping of a conception does not appear to be the essence of believing, but rather a characteristic result or accompaniment. The statement that the mind in credence rests or reposes on a thing as true is analogical also, and marks the intellectual act by that cessation from

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