one entity, or only one substance. Yet, ever since the dawn of philosophy, this fallacy has had a wonderful attraction for metaphysical speculators. It has given many the fundamental doctrine of a religious creed, as well as the central teaching of their philosophy. For the old Eleatic identification of the One, the Existent, and the All (τὸ ἕν, τὸ ὄν, και τὸ πᾶν), and the demand of modern Pantheists that "the antithesis between the unity and the multiplicity of Being must be reconciled," both rest on the paralogism that Entity is one because the thought of Entity is one. Perceptionalism, escaping such delusions, recognizes a boundless variety of entities, and at the same time asserts the existcnce of one all-pervading and eternal Spirit. It finds the Universe arranged and governed by an intellect not its own, and ascribes that intellect to a self-conscious Being. We have now named a philosophy, and illustrated its docOur aim in this has been, in the main, expository. But the inculcation of truth is the refutation of error; and the only refutation that can be full and final. Therefore we oppose the principles of Perceptionalism to those of the Sensationalism, the Materialism, the Idealism, and the Pantheism of our age. For no one grounded in the right doctrine can allow that cognition is merely refined sensation, or that spirit is a development of matter, or that thought can be identified with its objects, or that there is only one substance. We believe that the inadequacy of these views will become more and more apparent as the analyses of Perceptionalism shall be more thoroughly considered. We even venture the hope that certain philosophers, who occasionally suggest that their theories would be accepted universally if only ordinary mortals had the ability to understand them, may be aided, by the teachings of Perceptionalism, to a clearer comprehension of the truth. 18. Some of the doctrines of Perceptionalism have now been stated briefly. The object has been to present them for attentive and studious consideration. It is hoped that persons interested in philosophy may find time to compare these doctrines with those of existing systems. In explanation of the foregoing tabulation of judgments, the following remarks may be serviceable: : 1. The term "judgment" is here used in its wide logical sense for the act of the mind in forming any kind of conviction from mere presumptive or probable belief up to, and including, absolute knowledge, — in other words, for mental assertion. 2. The table assumes that every judgment or cognition is (not a synthesis of conceptions, but) a putting forth of mental confidence, the formation of belief or conviction, in connection with the thought of a thing as existing or as non-existent. 3. Every judgment in the table may be either affirmative or negative; and, in another and more complex relation, every judgment, whether affirmative or negative, must be either true or false. 4. The table illustrates the philosophical importance of inference. Every judgment in it, excepting only the presentational, is illative, and follows the law of antecedent and consequent. 5. Moreover, all these inferential judgments in their essential nature are modal and set forth an apodeictic or a problematic sequence from antecedent to consequent. Even the pure categorical judgment, as expressing a general truth or law of inference, sets forth necessity when it is universal, and when it is particular, contingency. The pure categorical, therefore, must be explained from the modal, and not the modal (nor the hypothetical) from the pure. These principles involve a considerable modification in the theory and treatment of the Aristotelian syllogism. 6. With the foregoing table, compare that of Kant, who says that "the function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads: (1) QUANTITY, either (a) universal, (b) particular, or (c) singular; (2) QUALITY, either (a) affirmative, (b) negative, or (c) limitative; (3) RELATION, either (a) categorical, (b) hypothetical, or (c) disjunctive; (4) MODALITY, either (a) problematical, (b) assertorical, or (c) apodeictical;" and who teaches that these twelve modes of judgment result from the synthetic use of twelve modes of a priori or transcendental conception which he calls "categories." The categories, like the forms of judgment which they are to explain, are given in sets of three each. We have "Unity, Plurality, and Totality," "Reality, Negation, and Limitation," and so on. Let any one take these "fundamental conceptions" and endeavor to understand the true nature of our judgments by means of them. He will soon find himself lost in a confu. sion of indistinct and irrelevant thinking. No theory can explain the phenomena of Judgment which does not distinguish between Thought and Belief (or Conception and Conviction), and which does not teach that judgment is the assertion, mentally, of the thought of the existence, or of the non-existence, of something. с |