Economics, Organization, and ManagementPrentice-Hall, 1992 - 621 ページ We have organized the text into seven parts. The first deals with the fundamental problems of economic organization, namely those of coordinating and motivating the members of an organization to work in ways that are coherent and advance the common interests of the organization's members. Part II is about coordination, both by the invisible hand of prices in markets and by the quite visible hands of managers. Part III introduces the problems of contracting, information, and incentives, and gives an informal treatment of their solutiins. Part IV provides a careful, formal treatment of some of the central methods providing incentives efficiently. Part V presents an economic treatment of the nature of the employment relationship, examining explicit and implicit employment contracts, compensation policies, and career paths. Part VI treat financial decisions, particularly in investments, capital structure, and corporate control. The last part of the book comprises two chapters about the design, internal structure, and dynamics of organizations, including an examination of the boundaries and scope of business firms. |
目次
THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION | 1 |
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND EFFICIENCY | 19 |
MARKETS AND MANAGEMENT | 55 |
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activities actual adverse selection agent allocation amount analysis asset assigned bargaining behavior benefits Bounded Rationality buyer Chapter Coase theorem communication compensation competitive consumer Contracts and Ownership coordination corporate costly crew hours decision maker demand determine Economic Organization efficiency wage Efficient Incentives effort employee's employees employment example expected factory firm firm's hold-up problem Incentive Contracts income increase individual inefficient influence costs informational asymmetries interests investment labor managers marginal cost measured monitoring moral hazard Motivation Nash equilibrium offer optimal organizational outcome output owners paid parties payoff performance possible price system principle private information problem production profits promotion quantity quasi-rents rent seeking reputation requires responsible result risk aversion risk premium Risk Sharing sell seller specific strategy suppliers Suppose theorem theory trade transaction costs units utility wage wealth effects welfare economics workers