it was founded, and by which it received its first footing in the earth? Ought there not to appear in the servant, some portion, some traces of the spirit of the master? To the dispensation of the gospel, which is the dispensation of grace, mercy, and peace, ought there not to be a suitableBess in the methods employed to promote it? Shall we then think of any expedient for defending the cause of Christ, different from those which he himself and bis apostles so successfully employed? Nay, it were well, if all that could be said were, that we employ different measures from those employed by them: some of ours, I am afraid, on examination, will be found to be the reverse of their's. Christ engaged by being lovely, we would constrain by being frightful. The former conquers the heart, the latter at most but forces an external and hypocritical compliance, a thing hateful to God, and dishonourable to the cause of his son.. "But, say our opponents in this argument, Popery is a superstition so banctul as not to deserve any favour, especially at the hands of Protestants. Its intole rance to them, and persecuting spirit, if there was nothing else we had to accuse it of, would be sufficient to justify the the severest treatment we could give it. This treatment to Papists could not be called persecution, but just retaliation, er the necessary means of preventing perdition to ourselves. I do not say that either Popery or Papists deserve favor from us ; on the contrary, I admit the truth of the charge against them, but not the consequence ye would draw from it. Let popery be as bad as it will call it Beelzebub ♦ you please; it is not by Beelzebub that I am for casting out Beelzebub, but by the spirit of God. We exclaim against Popery, and in exclaining against it we betray but too manifestly, that we have imbibed of the character, for which we detest it. In the most unlovely spirit of Popery, and with the unhallowed arms of Popery, we would fight against Popery. It is not by such weapons that God hath promised to consume the man of sin, but it is by the breath of his mouth, that is his word. As for us, though we be often loud enough in our pretensions to faith, our faith is not in his word; we have no faith now in weapons invisible and impalpable, fire and steel suit us a great deal better. Christians in ancient times confided in the divine promises, we in these days confide in acts of parliament. They trusted to the sword of the spirit for the defence of truth and the defeat of error, we trust to the sword of the magistrate, God's promises do well enough, when the

legislature is their surety. But if ye destroy the hedges and the bulwarks which the laws have raised, we shall cry with Israel in the days of Ezekiel, 'behold our bones are dried, our hope is lost, we are cut off for our parts.' There is no more security for the true religion. Protestan tism is gone! All is lost! We shall all be Papists presently! Shall we never reflect on the denunciation of the prophets cursed be the man that trusteth "in "man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord.' Let me tell those people so distrustful in God's providence and promises, and so confident in the arm of flesh, that the true religion never flourished so much, never spread so rapidly, as when, instead of persecuting, it was · persecuted; instead of obtaining support from humah sanctions, it had all the terrors of the magistrate and of the laws armed against it. Do we provoke the Lord to jealousy; are we stronger than he?" p. 11, 12.

The title of the second chapter of the pamphlet is, "The Conclusion to which sound Policy would lead us in Regard to the Toleration of Papists." In page 28 of this chapter, he observes: "As to the aspect which their (the Papists') tenets hear to civil society (for it is not in a religious nor in a moral view, but solely in a political, that I am here considering them) it must be acknowledged that to social union their tenets are no wise adverse, witness those kingdoms and states in Europe, where the whole or the greater part of the people are popish. It has been remarked however, that the Romish religion is not equally favourable to a free government, as the Protestant. But though there be something like a servility of spirit in implicit faith, or the belief of infallibility in any human tribunal, which is more congenial to political slavery; it cannot be saki that the former is incoinpa-tible with civil freedom. This country, as well as others, was free even when Roinau Catholic: and it would not be just,to deny that there have been of that communion eminent patrons of the liberties of the people."

And again in page. 40. "But just or unjust, say some, it is better to have it (the law against popery) as a rød over their heads: that is in other words, "Though we have no mind to do injustice at present, we wish to have it in our power to he unjust with impunity when we please; may to bribe others to be villains (for the law gives a high reward to informers) that those who have no religion at all, no sense of virtue or honor may be tempted by avarice. Is this a law becoming a "Chris

Ligh

he will find but few precedents to support, "that all the lineal male descendants of certain ancient families are entitled to bear supporters." If he had said that for many generations they have assumed the bearing of supporters he would have been nearer the truth, as, generally speaking, these families have really no legal right to such honour. One, for instance, assumes the bearing of buils, because it pleased the fancy of one of his ancestors to place on each side of the gate leading to his mansion two bulls by way of ornament. If the object of N. Y. was to make the public believe and acknowledge their title, it will completely fail, as such attempt only provokes discussion, which I have no doubt would set aside most, if not all, their pretended claims to this honour.

At all events, it is only the head of the family, that can have any just pretensions.

The Lord Lyon of Scotland grants supporters to heads of families and baronets, but they are never borne by the junior branches of the family.

N. Y. roundly asserts that such and such families are entitled to bear suppor ters; and it is but fair to suppose he has good grounds for his assertion, at the same time to call on him to state them is equally so.

The insertion of the above will oblige
Yours, &c.
HERALDICUS.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

SIR,

N reply to your correspondent under the signature of W. I. in your last publication, respecting the importation of foreign plants, sea-shells, &c. I beg leave to observe that those things, and every object of natural history to which he alludes, may be imported into this country by paying a certain sum, ad valorem, i.e. a per centage on the value, to be ascertained when they are landed on the quays; but it frequently happens that masters of vessels, to whose care these things are entrusted, omit to enumerate them in the ship's manifest, previous to its being produced at the custom-house, whereby they become, by the Manifest act, liable to seizure; but when that cau tion has been observed, regular report and entry made at the customs for the duties thereof, they are subject to no detention by the revenue officers, nor considered contraband by any law what ever. Yours, &c. I. II. Customshouse, Dec. 16, 1808.

To

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine,

SIR,

MY

Y attention was attracted by an arucle in the "Extracts from the Portfolio of a Man of Letters" in your last number, relative to the Pere Bouhours, of critical celebrity. Your correspondent stated, that he had written lives of Saint Ignatius and Saint Xavier, in which he had compared the one to Cæsar, and the other to Alexander.

If your correspondent will take the trouble to consult the "Manière de bien Penser dans les Ouvrages d'Esprit, par le Père Bouhours." Ed. Paris, 1785, p. 145, he will find that the remark does not belong to Bouhours, but to the great Prince de Condé, of whomit is said in the same work, "Qu'il étoit de ces hommes extraordinaires en qui l'esprit & la science ne cedent point à la valeur heroique."-His expression was this: "St. Ignace, c'est Cesar qui ne fait jamais rien que pour de bonnes raisons: St. Xavier, c'est Alexandre que son courage empore quelquefois." There follow several observations upon the propriety of this comparison, by which, I am inclined to think, the absurdity which your correspondent fancied he had discovered, will be entirely removed. The arguments, which are extremely neat and ingenious, are too much at length to be inserted here.

The learning and abilities of the Pere Bouhours were held in great estimation during the reign of Louis XIV. and it is no inconsiderable testimony in his favour, that Lord Chesterfield had the highest opinion of his taste and judgment, which appears in many of his Lordship's letters to Mr. Stanhope.

• Yours, &c.

E. S. S.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

IT

SIR,

T is my intention in this and a subsequent letter to trouble you with some reflections on the prevailing system of metaphysical reasoning; I mean the material or modern philosophy, as it has been called. According to this philosophy, as I understand it, all thought is to be resolved into sensation, all morality into the love of pleasure, and all action into mechanical impulse. These three propositions taken together,embrace almost every question relating to the human mind: and in their different ramifications and intersections form a net, not unlike that used by the enchanter of old, which whosoever has once fairly thrown, over-him, will find all further efforts vain

and his attempts to reason upon any subject, in which his own nature is concern❤ ed,baffled and confounded in every direc tion. This false system of philosophy has been gradually growing up to its present height ever since the time of Lord Bacon, from a wrong interpretation of the word experience; confining it to a knowledge of things without us, whereas it in fact includes all knowledge, relating to objects either within or out of the mind, of which we have any direct and positive evidence. Physical experience is indeed the foundation and the test of that part of philosophy, which relates to physical objects: farther, physical analogy is the only rule by which we can extend and apply our immediate knowledge, or reason on the nature of the different substances around us. But to say that physical experiment is either the test, or source, or guide, of that other part of philosophy, which relates to our internal perceptions, that we are to look in external nature for the form, the substance, the colour, the very life and being of whatever exists in our own minds, or that we can only infer the laws which regulate the phenomena of the mind, from those which regulate the phenomena of matter, is to confound two things essentially distinct. Our knowledge of mental phenomena from consciousness, reflection, and observation of others, is the true basis of metaphysical inquiry, as the knowledge of facts is the only solid basis of natural philosophy. To argue otherwise, is to assert that the best method of ascertaining the properties of air is by making experiments on mineral substances. It is assuming the very point in dispute, namely the strict analogy be tween mind and matter (insomuch that we may always judge of the one by the other) on no better a foundation than a mean and palpable play of words.

Lord Bacon was undoubtedly a great man, indeed one of the greatest that have adorned this or any other country. He was a man of a clear and active spirit, of a most fertile genius, of vast designs, of general knowledge, and of profound wisdom. He was in one sense what Plato was among the ancients, and what Burke was in our own times; or he united the powers of imagination and understanding (as they are generally called)in a greater degree than any other inan, except them. These three are perhaps the strongest instances of men, who by the

rare privilege of their nature were at once poets and philosophers,

and

Con

and phenomena of the material world and we have hastily concluded (revcrsin. the problem) that the only way to arris at the knowledge of ourselves also was to lay aside the dictates of our own sciousness, thoughts, and feelings as deceitful and insufficient guides, though they are the only things that can give us the least light upon the subject. We seem to have resigned the use of our natural understandings, and to have given up our own existence as a non-cntity. We look for our thoughts and the distinguishing properties of our minds in some image of them in matter, as we look to see our faces in a glass. We no longer decide physical problems by logical dilemmas, but we decide questions of logic by the evidence of the senses. Instead of putting our reason and invention to the rack, and setting our ideas to quarrel with one another on all subjects, whether we have any knowledge of them or not, we have adopted the casier method of suspending the use of our faculties altogether, and settle all controversies by means of "four champions fierce, hot, cold, moist, and dry," who, with a few more of the retainers and hangers-on of inatter, determine all questions relating to the nature of man and the limits of the human understanding very learnedly. That which we seek however, namely the nature of the mind, and the laws by which we think, feel, and act, we must find in the mind itself, or not at all. The mind has laws, powers, and principles of its own, and is not a mere dependent on matter. This original bias in favour of mechanical reasoning and physical demonstration, was itself owing to the previous total neglect of them in matters where they were strictly necessary, strengthened by the powerful aid of Hobbes; who was indeed the father of the modern philosophy. His strong mind and body appear to have resisted all impressions but those which were derived from the downright blows of matter. All his ideas seemed to lie, "like substances in his brain: what was not a solid, tangible, distinct," palpable, object, was to him nothing. The external image pressed so close upon his mind that it destroyed all power of consciousness, and left no room for attention to any thing but itself. He was by nature a materialist. Locke assisted greatly in giving popularity to the same scheme, as well by espousing many of Hobbes's metaphysical principles, as by the doubtful resistance he made to the rest. And it has of late been perfected, and has

They were eager to be acquainted with its shape and figure, or at least with the place where it was lodged. Without some sensible token, or the testimony of persons who had inquired into the fact, they could not be certain whether they had a soul or not. Accordingly, many voyages of discovery were made for this purpose along the nerves, and the conduits of the animal juices. Some thought they had found it seated on the top of the pineal gland, and others traced it to the cellular and membranous substance of the brain, where all the nerves terminate. Howe ver this might be, it was agreed on all hands that the last agent in matter was the true seat or cause of thought and consciousness, because we had no right to suppose the existence of a principle beyond, of which we could have no positive evidence. But we might with just as much propriety insist on seeing the very thoughts themselves lying naked in the brain, or deny that they had ever existed, as conclude that we have got at the seat of the soul, because we can go no farther with our dissections and experiments. The argument is a good one, if we suppose the mind to be one department of matter; when we can trace the natural connection of causes and effects no further, there we ought to stop. But if there is reason to believe that the mind is not material, then, by the nature of the supposition, it must lie out of the reach of all such experiments. The argument in favour of the materiality of the mind from the want of anatomical experiments to prove the contrary, therefore, first of all supposes that the mind is material, and the subject of such experiments.The simple argument by which I satisfy myself that mind is not the same thing as matter is this, that there is something in the nature of thought essentially distinct from any idea we have of the common properties and operations of matter, and that something so distinct in essence and in kind, cannot be resolved into any combination or modification of other properties which in themselves are allowed to have no sort of relation or affinity to it. The jumbling of these together in different forms and quantities. may produce an intermediate result ditfering from them all, and yet partaking of the nature of all; but it cannot produce a result, of which there is not the slightest trace or resemblance to be found in any of them. There is in matter nothing at all like thought, or that ever D makes