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Congress, and held his seat in that assembly until 1820; when, returning to Philadelphia, he devoted himself to the avocations of his profession. In the various debates which arose during his Congressional career, on the Military Academy Bill, the United States Bank, the Bankrupt Law, and the exciting question of Internal Improvement, he took an active and prominent part. But the most powerful of his parliamentary efforts was made on the occasion of the discussion of the Missouri Question. That speech is spoken of as "one of the best reasoned, and most able speeches, that has ever been heard in the Hall of either House of Congress. It has almost exhausted the argument in favor of the prohibition of slavery in the new States and territories, and it was no small token of the respect and esteem which was then entertained for him (although comparatively but a young member and a young man), that he was selected and pitted as the champion of the North, against the best abilities of the able and experienced members who maintained the opposite doctrines." In 1825, Mr. Sergeant was the President of the Board of Canal Commissioners of Pennsylvania. The following year he was appointed by President Adams, Minister from the United States to the Congress of Panama, and passed the winter in Mexico, waiting the assembling of that body, which was to meet at Tacubaya, in that country. Owing to the political disturbances in South America at that time, the plenipotentiaries did not assemble, and in July, 1827, Mr. Sergeant returned to Philadelphia. Soon after he was again elected to Congress, and, in 1832, was the Whig candidate for the Vice Presidency, on the ticket with Mr. Clay. He was a member of the Pennsylvania convention that assembled for the purpose of amending the constitution of the State, and entered earnestly into the debates which arose on the several important measures that sprung up during its session. His speech on the Judicial tenure is referred to by his contemporaries, as embodying a clear and forcible exposition of the doctrines and principles which he held on that question.

In 1840, he was again elected to Congress, but remained there only one session. On the accession of General Harrison to the Presidency, he was invited to become one of his cabinet, but declined the honor. Soon after the mission to the Court of Great Britain was tendered him. This he also declined. In 1844, he was associated with Horace Binney in the celebrated Girard Will case. In 1847, he was selected by Mr. Marcy, then Secretary of State, as Arbitrator on the part of the United States, to determine the protracted controversy existing between the State of Delaware and the United States, on the question of the title to the Pea Patch Island. That difference was finally settled by his decree. This was the last public office he occupied. His last appearance before the public was at the Union meeting (of which he was the president) that assembled in Philadelphia, on the adoption of the Compromise measures. The last time his voice, then enfeebled by disease, was heard, was in an appeal for the Constitution and the Union. He died at Philadelphia, on the twenty-third of November, 1852.

As a lawyer, Mr. Sergeant was not surpassed, if equalled, by any who have occupied positions at the bar, of which he was a member. During a long life he was a diligent student. He was learned, not only in the different branches of his profession, but in the various subjects of history, ethics and philosophy, and by this multiplicity of knowledge he was enabled to bring to his aid, in the consideration of the greatest constitutional questions, or of the more simple matters of common practice, resources which seldom failed to ensure success. "The range of his mind," says Mr. Binney, "was just as wide as the whole circle of his professional necessities. He knew the bearings of every part of the law, * * He could draw his resources from-every part of it with equal ease when it was necessary. He had acquired an early training in criminal law, sud in that he not only went before his contemporaries, but he stood on one side of them, walking a different line. His honor and integrity in all that regarded the profession or the management of his cause, were not only above impeachment or imputation, but beyond the thought of it. His heart, his mind, his principles, his conscience, his bond to man, and his bond to Heaven, which he had given early, and which to the last he never intentionally violated, would have made it, humanly speaking, impossible for him to swerve from his integrity. It is the best example possible for the rising generation to have before them. He was perfectly fair-there was no evasion, no stratagem, no surprisal, no invocation of prejudice, no appeal to unworthy passions-he was above, far above all this. He had too much strength to make use of such arts,

to say nothing of his virtue. He was charitable in doing work at the bar without pecuniary compensation, though not without reward; he had that which, in his judgment, was the best reward. But he did not do it ostentatiously. He never let his left hand know what his right hand did. Still less did he ever impose upon the left hands of others, by giving those little informed of it what his right hand had not done. He was in every respect, internally, in the heart, a kind man." No extended biography of Mr. Sergeant has yet been written. A small collection of his speeches and addresses was collected and published in 1832, among which are those delivered in the Congress of the United States, the Oration in Commemoration of Thomas Jeffer son and John Adams, a Discourse delivered at Rutgers College, in July, 1829, and the Argument in the case of the Cherokee Nation vs. the State of Georgia, in the Supreme Court of the United States, on the fifth of March, 1831.*

THE MISSOURI QUESTION.

The following speech, on a bill to enable the people of the Missouri Territory to form a constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union, was delivered by Mr. Sergeant in the House of Representatives of the United States, on the eighth and ninth of February, 1820.

ty," aiming to re-establish itself in the possession of power, and has spoken of a "juggler behind the scene." He surely has not reflected upon the magnitude of the principle contended for, or he would have perceived at once the utter insignificance of all objects of factious and party contest, when compared with the mighty interests it involves. It concerns ages to come, and millions to be born. We, who are here, our dissensions and conflicts, are nothing, absolutely nothing, in the comparison: and I cannot well conceive, that any man, who is capable of raising his view to the elevation of this great question, could suddenly bring it down to the low and paltry consideration of party interests and party motives.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: The important question now before the committee, has already engaged the best talents and commanded the deepest attention of the nation. What the people strongly feel, it is natural that they should freely express; and whether this is done by pamphlets and essays, by the resolutions of meetings or citizens, Another member (Mr. M'Lane), taking indeed or by the votes of State legislatures, it is equally a more liberal ground, has warned us against legitimate and entitled to respect, as the voice ambitious and designing men, who, he thinks, of the public, upon a great and interesting pub- will always be ready to avail themselves of oclic measure. The free expression of opinion is casions of popular excitement, to mount into one of the rights guaranteed by the constitu- power upon the ruin of our government, and the tion, and, in a government like ours, it is an in-destruction of our liberties. Sir, I am not afraid valuable right. It has not, therefore, been without some surprise and concern, that I have heard it complained of, and even censured in this debate. One member suggests to us that, in the excitement which prevails, he discerns the efforts of what he has termed an "expiring par

* See the Philadelphia newspapers, published after Mr. Sergeant's death, also the Hon. W. M. Meredith's Eulogium. + The debate commenced on the 26th of January, 1820, on the following amendments, proposed by Mr. Taylor of New York, to the bill: And shall ordain and establish that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said State, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. Provided always, that any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or

service is lawfully claimed in any other State, such fugitive

may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the

person claim

ing his or her labor or service as aforesaid. And provided also, that the said provision shall not be construed to alter the condition or civil rights of any person now held to service or labor in the said territory.

See the speeches of Rufus King and William Pinkney,

on the same subject, at pages 44 and 114 ante.

of what is called popular excitement—all history teaches us, that revolutions are not the work of men, but of time and circumstances, and a long train of preparation. Men do not produce them: they are brought on by corruption-they are generated in the quiet and stillness of apathy, and to my mind nothing could present a more frightful indication, than public indifference to such a question as this. It is not by vigorously maintaining great moral and political principles, in their purity, that we incur the danger. If gentlemen are sincerely desirous to perpetuate the blessings of that free constitution under their exertions to the preservation of public and which we live, I would advise them to apply almost said, entirely depends. As long as this private virtue, upon which its existence, I had is preserved, we have nothing to fear. When this shall be lost, when luxury and vice and corruption, shall have usurped its place, then, indeed, a government resting upon the people for its support, must totter and decay, or yield to the designs of ambitious and aspiring men.

which otherwise they might; and also, in grateful commemoration of our own happy deliverance from that state of unconditional submission to which we were doomed by the tyranny of Britain-Be it enacted, that no child born hereafter shall be a slave, &c." In this manner did Pennsylvania express her thankfulness for the deliverance that had been wrought for her, and I am confident she will never incur the sin and the danger of ingratitude.

Another member, the gentleman to whom | dices and partialities we had imbibed, we conthe committee lately listened with so much at- ceive ourselves, at this particular period, called tention, (Mr. Clay,) after depicting forcibly upon, by the blessings we have received, to and eloquently, what he deemed the probable manifest the sincerity of our profession. In consequences of the proposed amendment, ap- justice, therefore, to persons who, having no pealed emphatically to Pennsylvania; "the un- prospect before them, whereon they may rest ambitious Pennsylvania, the keystone of the fed- their sorrows and their hopes, have no reasonaeral arch," whether she would concur in a meas-ble inducement to render that service to society ure calculated to disturb the peace of the Union. Sir, this was a single arch; it is rapidly becoming a combination of arches, and where the centre now is, whether in Kentucky or Pennsylvania, or where at any given time it will be, might be very difficult to tell. Pennsylvania may in- | deed be styled “unambitious,” for she has not been anxious for what are commonly deemed honors and distinctions, nor eager to display her weight and importance in the affairs of the nation. She has, nevertheless, felt, and still does feel, her responsibility to the Union; and under a just sense of her duty, has always been faithful to its interests, under every vicissitude, and in every exigency. But Pennsylvania feels also a high responsibility to a great moral principle, which she has long ago adopted with the most impressive solemnity, for the rule of her own conduct, and which she stands bound to assert and maintain, wherever her influence and power can be applied, without injury to the just rights of her sister States. It is this principle, and this alone, that now governs her conduct. She holds it too sacred to suffer it to be debased by association with any party or factious views, and she will pursue it with the singleness of heart, and with the firm but unoffending temper which belong to a conscientious discharge of duty, and which, I hope I may say, have characterized her conduct in all her relations. If any one desire to know what this principle is, he shall hear it in the language of Pennsylvania herself, as contained in the preamble to her act of abolition, passed in the year 1780. I read it not without feelings of sincere satisfaction, as abridged by a foreign writer, with his introductory remark. (2 Belsham, 23, memoirs of Geo. 3.)

"It affords a grateful relief from the sensations which oppress the mind in listening to the tale of human folly and wretchedness, to revert to an act of the most exalted philanthropy, passed about this period, by the legislature of Pennsylvania, to the following purport: "When we contemplate our abhorrence of that condition, to which the arms and tyranny of Great Britain were exerted to reduce us, when we look back on the variety of dangers to which we have been exposed, and deliverances wrought, when even hope and fortitude have become unequal to the conflict, we conceive it to be our duty, and rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to others which hath been extended to us, to add one more step to universal civilization, by removing, as much as possible, the sorrows of those who have lived in undeserved bondage. Weaned by a long course of experience from those narrow preju

Steadfastly as Pennsylvania holds the position here taken, she will not officiously obtrude her opinions upon her sister States. One of the grounds of her rejoicing, and one of the causes of her gratitude, was, that "she had it in her power to abolish slavery." She will not, in this respect, presume to judge for others, though she will rejoice if they too should have the power and feel the inclination. But, whenever the question presents itself, in a case where she has a right to judge, I trust she will be true to her. own principles, and do her duty. Such I take to be the case now before the committee.

The proposed amendment presents for consideration three questions: that of the constitutional power of Congress, that which arises out of the treaty of cession, and, finally, that which is termed the question of expediency. I beg the indulgence of the committee while I endeavor to examine them in the order stated.

First. We are about to lay the foundation of a new State, beyond the Mississippi, and to admit that State into the Union. The proposition, contained in the amendment, is, in substance, to enter into a compact with the new State, at her formation, which shall establish a fundamental principle of her government, not to be changed without the consent of both parties; and this principle is, that every human being, born or hereafter brought within the State, shall be free.

The only questions under the constitution, seem to me to be, whether the parties are competent to make a compact, and whether they can make such a compact? If they cannot, it must be either for want of power in the parties to contract, or from the nature of the subject.

It cannot, at this time of day, be denied, that the United States have power to contract with a State, nor that a State has power to contract with the United States. It has been the uniform and undisputed practice, both before and since the adoption of the constitution.

There are numerous instances of cessions of territory or claims to territory. By States, to the Union. By New York, in 1781; by Virginia, in 1784 and in 1788; by Massachusetts, in 1785; by Connecticut, in 1786; by South Carolina, in 1787; by North Carolina, in 1790; and

by Georgia, in 1802. The last mentioned cession is the more remarkable, because it was made by a formal agreement between the United States and Georgia; in which the stipulations on each side are stated in the same manner and with the like solemnity, as in contracts with individuals. No doubt they were considered to be, and really are, of equal efficacy.

There is one instance, of a cession of territory by the United States to a State, that to Pennsylvania, in September, 1788, in which also there are mutual stipulations.

Each of these instances is a case of mutual compact, by which there was a surrender of a portion of power and sovereignty, on the part of the respective States; by which, too, there were terms mutually agreed upon. The most striking is that from Virginia, to which I shall have occasion to refer hereafter, and that from Georgia, because they both contain conditions operating as a restraint upon the legislative authority of the United States, binding and adhering to the ceded territory, and fixing the terms and conditions of its future government. So, when the United States soon after the State of Louisiana was admitted into the Union, enlarged the territory of the State by a cession, it was done upon conditions, which thenceforth became obligatory upon the State.

These instances are sufficient to show that the United States, and a State, are competent to make a binding compact. Indeed, it is impossible that any man should doubt it. The States have capacity to contract with each other, so far as they are not restrained by the constitution. In 1785 a compact was made between Pennsylvania and Virginia. There was a compact between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and between South Carolina and Georgia. The only restraints in the constitution (art. 1 sec. 10, clause 2,) is that which prohibits States from entering into any agreement or compact with each other, or with a foreign power, without the consent of Congress; and this prohibition, from its very nature, admits that they may enter into such compacts or agreements with the United States.

and benefits of the Union, such terms might not be proposed and insisted upon as the general welfare should seem to require. As the stipulation, whatever it may be, derives its binding efficacy from the assent of the State, which its sovereignty, or qualified sovereignty, enables it to give, a new State is as competent as an old one. Indeed, the possession and the exercise of this power are necessary to enable the United States to execute the contracts they may enter into, with any State of the Union, upon receiving from it a cession of territory, wherever such cession is accompanied, as it usually has been, with terms upon the part of the ceding State, applying to and intended to bind the territory ceded.

Accordingly, no new State (unless formed out of an old one) has ever been admitted into the Union, but upon terms agreed upon by compact, and irrevocable without the consent of all the parties. The States formed out of the North-west Territory, (Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,) have been made subject, as a fundamental law of their government, to the terms of the ordinance of 1787, including the very condition now proposed for Missouri. The States of Mississippi and Alabama, formed out of the territory ceded by Georgia, have been subjected to all the provisions of the ordinance, except the one which regards slavery, and that was expressly excluded by the terms of the cession. The State of Louisiana, the only one yet formed out of the territory acquired from France, has been, in like manner, admitted upon terms, different, it is true, from those which have been required from the other States, but still such terms as Congress thought applicable to her situation, and such as are sufficient to demonstrate the extent of the authority possessed by the United States. Even in the bill now under consideration, certain propositions, as they are styled, are offered to the free acceptance of Missouri, but if accepted, they are to be for ever binding upon her.

Thus it appears, that a new State may contract; and it is essential that it should be so, for her own sake as well as for the sake of the The States have a capacity to contract even Union. It remains, then, to inquire, whether with individuals, and in so doing, to part with the stipulation proposed in the amendment is, a portion of their legislative power. This is on account of the nature of the subject, such s the case wherever a charter of incorporation is one as it is beyond the power of a State to enter granted, by which rights of property become into? It has already been remarked, that a vested. During the period of the charter, the State, at the moment of its formation, is as ensubject is beyond the control of the legislative tirely sovereign, and as capable of making a authority, which is so far suspended or extin-binding contract, as at any future period. The guished by the grant. The United States have done the same thing, and with the like effect.

If it be competent to the United States to contract with an old State, it seems to follow of course, that it has a competency to contract with a new one. The admission of the State is itself a compact, as the Constitution of the United States was a compact between the existing States, and it would be difficult to assign any good reason, why, upon the admission of a new State to a participation in the privileges

real question, therefore, is, whether it is beyond the power of any State in this Union, for any consideration whatever, to bind itself by a compact with a State, or with the United States, to prohibit slavery within its borders? To suppose so, seems to impute a want of sovereign power, which could only arise from its being parted with by the constitution; and this, I think, can scarcely be affirmed. But I do not mean to anticipate, as my object, at present, is to follow the practice of the government.

In this view, the ordinance of 1787, respect- | ing the North-west Territory, and the history of the States formed under it, are eminently deserving of consideration and respect. This ordinance was framed upon great deliberation. It was intended to regulate the government of the territory; to provide for its division into States, and for their admission into the Union; and to establish certain great principles, which | should become the fundamental law of the States to be formed. In its territorial condition, it was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, to be exercised by the ordinary process of legislation. But it was one of the terms of the cession by Virginia to the United States, that this territory, as it became peopled, should be divided into States, and that these States should be admitted into the Union, "upon an equal footing, in all respects, with the original States." We shall now see how the fulfilment of this engagement was effected. After providing for the territorial government, the ordinance proceeds as follows: "And for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions are erected; to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions and governments, which for ever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory; to provide, also, for the establishment of States, and permanent government therein, and for their admission to a share in the federal councils, on an equal footing with the original States, at as early periods as may be consistent with the general interest-It is hereby ordained and declared, that the following articles shall be considered as articles of compact, between the original States and the people and States in the said territory, and for ever remain unalterable, unless by common consent." Then follow the several articles, of which the sixth declares, "that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, &c." The fifth article provides expressly, that "the constitution and government (of the States) so to be formed, shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles." When the States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, respectively, applied for admission, they were admitted upon the express condition, that their constitutions should be republican, and in conformity to the ordinance of 1787. They assented to the condition, and were admitted " upon an equal footing with the original States."

I am aware that all this has been pronounced, rashly I think, to be a usurpation. The term does not well apply at this time of day, after the repeated sanction of every kind which the ordinance has received. In truth, if there be any thing in our legislative history, which is entitled to our affection for the motives in which it originated; to our veneration for the authority by which it is supported; to our respect for the principles embodied in it; it is the ordinance of 1787. But the charge of usurpation

is in every sense inapplicable; for the efficacy of the contract arises from the assent of the State to the conditions proposed as the terms of her admission.

But this ordinance is entitled to still higher consideration. It was a solemn compact between the existing States, and it cannot be doubted that its adoption had a great influence in bringing about the good understanding that finally prevailed in the convention upon several points which had been attended with the greatest difficulty. It passed on the 13th of July, 1787, while the convention that framed the constitution was in session. From the minutes of that body, lately published, it will be seen, that the two most important and difficult points to adjust were those of the admission of States, and the slave representation. This ordinance finally adjusted both these matters, as far as concerned all the territories then belonging to the United States, and was therefore eminently calculated to quiet the minds of the advocates of freedom, to remove their objections to the principle of slave representation, and to secure their assent to the instrument which contained that principle, by limiting its operation to the existing States. It is not to be questioned that this ordinance, unanimously adopted, and, as it were, fixing an unchangeable basis by common consent, had a most powerful influence in bringing about the adoption of the constitution. It is a part of the groundwork of the constitution itself: one of the preliminary measures upon which it was founded. Hence the unusual solemnity of the terms in which it is conceived, so different from the ordinary forms of legislation, and which give to it the character of a binding and irrevocable covenant.

Such, then, is the power that has always been exercised by Congress, upon the admission of new States into the Union, and exercised without dispute. Whence was it derived? It was exercised, as we have seen, immediately before the adoption of the constitution, while that instrument was under consideration, and recognized immediately after by the act of the first Congress, supplementary to the ordinance. Nothing can be more clear than that, if the ordinance of 1787 was inconsistent with the constitution, it was repealed by that instrument. If the convention had meant to repeal it, they would have done so. It was directly in their view, and embraced a subject which was earnestly and carefully treated by that body. And yet, immediately after, when the same men who had framed the constitution, and knew its intention, were many of them members of Congress, the supplement to the ordinance was adopted. That was not a time, you may be assured, for stretching the federal power. The greatest jealousy prevailed, and the friends of the constitution were obliged to observe the utmost caution, while it was slowly winning its way to the public favor, refuting the suggestions of its enemies, and settling down, gradually but

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