48. lines, made daily sorties, which, though at- 49. of the realm; they had lost the important for- 1 Ann. Hist. Schumla. Meanwhile the operations before Schumla continued with various success, but 51. on the whole to the advantage of the Operations Ottomans. On the 15th August Ru- before diger received orders from WittgenAug. 15. stein to move on Kioitei, a village near Eski-Stamboul behind that fortress, and on the road to Constantinople, in order to dislodge a body of three thousand Turks who were stationed there, and kept up the commu nications with the interior. He was at Aug. 15. first successful, and drove the enemy back, but, attacked in his turn by superior forces, he was routed with the loss of four hundred men, and a gun taken. This check revealed the superiority of the enemy in detached actions, the ascendant which their horse had acquired, and the extreme danger to which the army was exposed in consequence. Provisions were becoming scarce, and forage in particular, in consequence of the first growth of summer having been consumed or past away, was every where awanting. The Turkish horses, accustomed to be fed entirely on barley or bread, On the other hand, the condition of the Turks did not suffer in consequence; but the Rus50. was hardly less critical, for they sian, accustomed to the green pastures of the were pierced to the heart of their Ukraine and the Don, were daily becoming measures of empire, blockaded in their strong-weaker, and died in great numbers from pure inhold, the last and greatest bulwark | anition. This rendered a more extensive circuit xi 396, 397. Defensive the Turks. 271. for foraging indispensable; and that in its turn | curity were spread over their whole lines, and induced fresh dangers, by exposing the ad- the Turks gained the substantial 1 An. Hist. xi. vanced parties to attack, not only from the fruits of victory by the introduc- 404; Turkish indefatigable light troops of the enemy, but tion, two days after the tumult, of and Russian Bulletins, ibid. the armed peasants, who had every where taken a considerable body of troops and 109; Pièces up arms to defend their hearths from spoliation. large convoy of ammunition and Just; Val. 269, In a word, the situation of the Russians before provisions into Schumla.1 Schumla in 1828 closely resembled that of the French around Moscow in 1812; great numbers of foraging parties were every day cut off, the horses of the army were rapidly melting away; and the Russians were experiencing the danger so often encountered by a victorious invader 1 Valentini, in Eastern warfare, that of being 264, 265; starved in the midst of their conAnn. Hist. quests by the superiority of the ene-evacuated on the 6th August. The 7th corps, my in light horse.1 xi. 399. 52. These dangers were brought to light in the clearest manner by an event which Surprise of a took place on the 26th August, and Russian re- what was really extraordinary, by doubt. a phenomenon wholly unknown in August 26. Ottoman warfare-a nocturnal surprise. At one in the morning a large column of Turkish infantry silently defiled out of Schumla, and attacked the last redoubt on the Russian right. The surprise was complete; the redoubt was carried, six guns taken, and General Wrede, with five hundred men, put to the sword. The Russians experienced an equal loss in their efforts to regain the redoubt, which was obstinately defended, and in the endeavor to rescue the guns, which the Turks succeeded in carrying off. This attack was not a mere detached operation, but was intended to divert the attention of the Russians from the principal design, which was nothing less than to crush by a concentric attack the troops of Prince Eugene at Morai, in the redoubt of Tchangalick, four thousand strong, and then assault General Rudiger at Eski-Stamboul, who would in that event have been seriously compromised. These attacks were not entirely successful, but such as they were they inflicted a serious loss upon the Russians, and demonstrated the extreme dan2 Ann. Hist. xi. ger which they ran when scattered 404; Valentini, around Schumla, in presence of a 267, 268. powerful and enterprising enemy. The column destined to attack Eski-Stamboul, composed of eight thousand inAttack on Prince fantry, four thousand horse, and Eugene and Es- eight guns, met with more resistki-Stamboul. ance than that which destroyed August 26. General Wrede, for the enemy were informed of what was intended, and were on their guard. One Russian battalion was cut to pieces in the first fury of the assault, and although obliged to retire by the vigorous attack which three other battalions directed against it, the besieged carried with them one gun, and inflicted a very severe loss upon the enemy. The division destined for the attack of Prince Eugene, in the redoubt of Tchangalick, was still more successful, for by a vigorous assault they made themselves masters of the redoubt; and though obliged soon after to evacuate it, by the cross fire of several other redoubts by which it was enfiladed, they did so in the best order, and carrying with them as a trophy one of the enemy's guns. In these different Aug. 28. actions the Russians lost above fifteen hundred men and eight guns; alarm and inse 53. 2 sians from These disasters convinced Wittgenstein of the necessity of concentrating his 54. troops, and evacuating the ground Retreat of which he held around the Turkish the Rusposition on the southern side. The re- the south of doubts on the Balkan side of Schum- Schumla. la were held for a few days after, to Sept. 6. avoid the appearance of a defeat, but finally which had been stationed to the south of the place, was withdrawn, so as to be placed in close communication with the 3d, on the north of it, and both occupied positions on the roads to Jenibazar and Silistria. The communication of the troops at Schumla with both Adrianople and Constantinople was thus left open; not even the semblance of a blockade was kept up: the Russians merely occupied a position to the north, observing the place. The Turkish general profited by this opening to throw large supplies into the place, which augmented the strength and audacity of the garrison so much, that, no longer confining themselves to operations on the Balkan side, they 2 An. Hist. xi. threw out detachments on the 404, 405; Valroad to Jenibazar, intercepted entini, 271, 272; several Russian convoys, Russian Buland letins, August daily made prisoners of great 27 and Sept. 2, numbers of their foraging par- 1828; Ibid 111; ties.2 Pièces Hist. While affairs were beginning to wear this sombre aspect on the side of Schum- 55. la, the siege of Varna had come to Operations be seriously prosecuted. The rein- before Varna. forcements from Russia, which be- September 3. gan to come up in the end of August, were directed to that place, and the communications connected with it; and as they amounted to above forty thousand men, including sixteen thousand of the guards, the best troops in the empire, the besiegers were enabled to assume the offensive in that quarter with every prospect of success. Admiral Greig, with eight sail of the line and as many frigates, kept up a close blockade by sea, and not only prevented any supplies from being thrown in, but destroyed a flotilla of twenty-eight Turkish gun-boats in a bay in the vicinity. Prince Menschikoff unfortunately was severely wounded in the thigh by a cannon-ball in the commencement of the siege, which rendered it necessary to confer its direction on Count Woronzow, who immediately pushed it with rigor on the side next the sea, in order to obtain the advantage of the co-operation of the fleet. Foreseeing that important events were approaching, the Emperor returned in person to Varna, and took the command of the besieging army; while General Golownin was detached to the other side of the bay, between the seas Valentini, and the lake of Dewno, to take the 271; An. Hist. command of the covering force.3 xi. 404, 405. It soon appeared how necessary the great reinforcements which were now coming up were to the invaders, and how serious were the dangers which threatened them on the | kept up a continual and very heavy cannonside of Schumla. Vague reports ade, little progress was made during 1 An. Hist. 56. Attack on had of late reached the Russian out- the next ten days, and it was evident xi. 408, 409; Wittgenstein. posts of the arrival of the Grand- the means of defense of the besieged Valentini, September 8. Vizier with ten thousand men at were very far from being exhausted.1 260, 261. Adrianople, and the concentration of daily increasing numbers in Schumla, and ere long Wittgenstein had convincing proof of their presence. Half an hour before daybreak on the morning of the 8th September, three of the Russian redoubts on the left were attacked by eight thousand Turkish foot, while nearly an equal force assailed the left under Prince Eugene. The Ottomans were vigorously resisted, for the Russians were forewarned and on their guard, and after a bloody combat they were obliged to retire; but the Russians having pursued with their attenuated horse, the spahis turned upon them fiercely and slew great numbers, so as entirely to stop the pursuit. Such was the exhaustion of the Muscovite horse, that sixteen in one brigade dropped down dead unler their riders during the pursuit, and every day afterward they lost one hundred or one hundred and fifty men in detached combats with the enemy. Seeeing that it was now impossible to keep up even the semblance of a blockade, and that his army was daily melting away under the Osmanli sabres, Wittgenstein resolved on a general concentration of his troops in front of Janibazar, in a position 272, 273; An. which in some degree covered the Hist. xi. 404, siege of Varna, and entirely barred the advance to Silistria.1 1 Valentini, 405. The Turks on their side were not indifferent spectators of this strife, but were 58. preparing a grand armament in Advance of the the rear, to interrupt, and if pos- Turks to raise sible raise the siege. A corps of the siege. twenty thousand men had been collected under the orders of Omer-Vrione, by means of the reinforcements which had been collected at Adrianople, and detachments from the army in Schumla; and it had advanced as far as the village of Hadgi-Hassan-lar, a little to the south of the Lake of Dewno, within a few miles of Varna, where it had taken a position in very strong ground, flanked on either side with impenetrable forests. As soon as the Russians received intelligence of their approach, they detached fifteen hundred men to make a reconnoissance, under the command of General Harting; but having fallen unexpectedly in with a large body of the enemy, he was totally defeated, with the loss of half his force, and Sept. 26. driven back to the lines before the place, without having effected his object. Upon this success the Turks advanced several miles forward in the forest, to a position in front of Kurteppe, which they strongly fortified with several advanced posts between it and Hadgi-IIassan-lar. Upon this the greatest efforts were made to collect a respectable force to oppose the enemy, and next day General Bistrom was dispatched with five thousand men from the lines round Schumla, while Wittgenstein_received orders to detach as large a force as he could spare to attack them in rear. He sent Prince Eugene accordingly Sept. 27. with nearly six thousand men, which, after winding their way with difficulty through the forests, were approaching it, when the post of Hadgi-Hassan-lar, in the Turkish rear, was surprised by some troops that had come up from the lines before Varna and the post of Dewno, under the orders of General Sochozannet. Forces deemed sufficient for the undertaking having arrived during the 28th, a general attack was made on the Turkish Sept. 28. as when they left St. Petersburg four position at Kurteppe by General Bistrom in months before. The besieged, however, were front, and General Sochozannet in rear; but 10,000 strong, had a powerful artillery on the although the Russians displayed their wonted ramparts, and were animated by the best spirit. valor in the attack, and two battalions of the They made a vigorous sortie on the 1st Sep-guard were brought into action, they were retember, captured the most advanced of the besiegers' works, and nearly destroyed two Russian regiments; but they were in the end driven back. By the 5th September the blockade was complete on the north side; where the approaches were most complete, trenches had been opened on the 31st August; and on the 14th September the Russians sprung a mine, which brought down the northeast bastion of Notwithstanding this check, the Russian genthe place, and left a practicable breach. The erals prepared a grand attack on 59. Emperor immediately summoned it to surren- both sides the following day. It Bloody defeat of der; and the Capitan Pacha, who commanded, met with no better success. At the the Russians. repaired on board the Ville de Paris to treat first onset the Russians under Eu- September 30. for a capitulation. But as it was evident he gene made themselves masters of an advanced was only feigning to gain time, the negotiations redoubt of the enemy at a distance from their were broken off, and the fire resumed on the camp, and took a gun; but having arrived in 15th; but although the breaching batteries | front of the central camp, they were received Meanwhile the siege of Varna was slowly 57. advancing; for the extraordinary inSiege of trepidity of the Turks greatly interVarna. rupted the operations, and their activity gave the Russians no respite night or day. In the night of the 31st August, the besieged made three sorties, and gained possession of an important post, which was only wrested from them the following night by a great expenditure of life. On the 5th September the Emperor arrived in person, and communicated new vigor to the besieging force, which was now reinforced by 21,000 men, with 96 guns. The two divisions of the guard, which were reviewed by his majesty, presented, after a march of 1700 miles, as magnificent an appear ance pulsed with the loss of twelve hundred men, among whom were General Tregtay, and two colonels of the guard killed at the head of their troops. After the combat was over, Eugene came up with his men to Hadgi-Hassan-lar, united with Sochozannet, and assumed 2 Ann. Hist. xi. the general command of the troops 410, 411; Valoperating on the Turkish rear. entini, 280, 281. by so terrible a fire of artillery that they were the hopeless nature of his situation, and the obliged to recoil. Finding that the position was impossibility of longer continuing the defense. unassailable in front, Prince Eugene divided his Accordingly, on the 8th, at mid-day, negoforce, and placed the weight of his men in the tiations were commenced with Jussuf Pacha, two wings; and some words of encouragement the second in command, which, on the 10th, led having been communicated to them from the to the surrender of the place unconditionally Emperor, they returned to the assault with in- on the 11th, the garrison being prisoners of describable enthusiasm. A terrible conflict en- war. They were still 6800 strong; 162 pieces sued, for the Turks fought with not less reso- of cannon were taken on the ramparts, with lution than their antagonists, and the slaughter considerable stores of ammunition and proviswas dreadful. General Limanski was killed as ions. The Capitan Pacha, who was governor, he mounted the intrenchments; the two colo- was so indignant at these proceedings that he nels of the regiment of Azof shared the same shut himself up with three hundred brave men fate; and the regiment itself, which burned with in the citadel, when he threatened to blow desire to wipe away a reproach received in one himself up if he was not permitted to join the of the conflicts before Schumla, was almost en- forces on the Kamtjik. The Emperor, respecttirely destroyed. On his side, General Bistrom ing his courage or dreading his despair, acceded with his little force did his utmost to aid the to the terms; and on the 12th he marched out main attack, but his troops were too weak to and joined Omer-Vrione, who had, on hearing enable him to effect any thing, and he was re- of the fall of the place, retired behind the Kamtpulsed with the loss of five hundred men. At jik, and thence to Aidos, without being seri length Prince Eugene was obliged also to draw ously disquieted in his retreat. The Emperor off his shattered battalions, burning with shame Nicholas, with praiseworthy remembrance of 1 Valentini, at being obliged to retire before former valor in misfortune, sent twelve of the 283, 286; An. the enemy, and found shelter in guns taken in the town to Warsaw, to form a Hist. xi. 410, the surrounding forest, after hav-monument to Wladislaus VI., King of Poland, Bulletin, Oct. ing fourteen hundred killed and slain under its walls by the Turks under Amuwounded around the foot of the in- rath II. in 1444. The times were far distant trenchments.1 from those when the chivalry of 1 An. Hist. xi. France perished under the sabres 413,414; Ibid., of the janizaries of Bajazet, after Russian Bultheir glorious and victorious charge 1828, 117; Vabefore the same town four hundred lentini, 204, years before.1 411; Russian 1; Ibid. 115; Pièces Hist. Had Omer-Vrione, after this hard-fought 60. success, possessed, in addition to The siege is not his own, ten thousand English or interrupted. French troops capable of encountering the Russians in the open field, he would have raised the siege of Varna, and the Muscovites, driven in all quarters across the Danube, would have been unable to effect any thing material in the succeeding campaign. But the want of such a force rendered this impossible. The Turks, admirable in the defense of fortified posts, could not be trusted in combat with the Russian guards in the open country; and not deeming himself strong enough to force his way through, Omer-Vrione halted, and busied himself in fortifying his position, awaiting the opportunity of a sally from Varna to endeavor to throw supplies into the place. Such an opportunity, however, did not occur. The Russians also strengthened their position, and as the Turks were not in sufficient force to storm it, the operations of the siege were not interrupted; and the Russians, succeeding in their main object, reaped from their bloody repulse all the fruits of a brilliant victory. One of the last outworks of the place was stormed on the night of the 25th September; and two mines having been run under the ramparts, they were Oct. 3. sprung on the night of the 3d October, and a large opening made; and another mine fired on the following night made a still larger breach. On the night of Oct. 7. the 7th, some companies of the Russian chasseurs succeeded in making their way into the blown-up bastions, and even got into the centre of the town; but, not being supported, 2 Valentini, they were obliged to retire, after 292, 294; An. sustaining a loss of four hundred Hist. xi. 411. men.2 This event, however, coupled with the obvious inability of Omer-Vrione to 61. force his way into the fortress, opened the eyes of the governor to Oct. 4. Fall of Varna. VOL. II.-G letin, Oct. 11, 295. The Turks, as well they might, exclaimed "Treachery" at this discreditable 62. capitulation. Contrasted with the Reflections on defense of Brahilov, there is eer- this surrender. tainly too much room for the imputation, for that fortress repulsed a desperate assault, and capitulated on condition of the garrison being sent to Silistria, after having stood it; whereas Jussuf Pacha surrendered at discretion, without any assault at all having been delivered, and when still in possession of considerable means of defense. Whatever doubt might have been entertained on this point was soon removed by the conduct of Jussuf Pacha himself. Not content with repairing in person first on board the Ville de Paris in the roads, and then to the Emperor's tent ashore, to conduct the capitulation, he sailed away in a Russian frigate when it was concluded, to Odessa, where he soon after received an ample grant of lands in the Crimea from the Emperor, in compensation, as it was alleged, of his extensive estates in Macedonia confiscated by orders of the Sultan! The Russians allege that his means of defense were exhausted; that the first assault would have proved fatal to the garrison and inhabitants; that the fate of the governor of Brahilov, who only escaped the bowstring by voluntary exile to Mitylene, demonstrated that the Grand Seignior did not know how to distinguish between misfortune and misconduct, and that Jussuf Pacha had no alternative between exile and death. There can be no doubt that there is some truth in these observations; but every man of honor will feel that the good deeds of an enemy are always suspicious, and that he was 2 Ann. Hist. not in reality reduced to the dilem- xi. 413, 414; ma which his advocates represent. Valentini, 295. 63. While these important events were determining the campaign in favor of Operations be the Russians on the shores of the fore Widdin. Euxine, operations, subordinate indeed, but worthy from their heroism of being recorded, occurred at the other extremity of the line, where General Geismar, with an inferior force of five thousand men, observed the Aug. 15. Pacha of Widdin in that fortress. In the middle of August, when the Russian general was making preparations for an inroad into Servia to raise the warlike inhabitants of that province, the pacha suddenly issued from Kalafat, the tête-du-pont of Widdin on the north of the Danube, with fifteen thousand men, and moved upon Bucharest. Unable to resist forces so superior, Geismar retired as far as Slatina, abandoning his whole magazines to the enemy; and the inhabitants of Little Wallachia in consternation fled into the adjoining provinces of Austria. At length, having received a reinforcement of two thousand men, the Russian Sept. 26. general advanced to Krajowa, where he was attacked by the Seraskier of Widdin with eighteen thousand men. The combat was obstinate, but the Russians had the worst of it, for they retired at nightfall to a position in rear, and the Turks remained masters of the field of battle. All seemed lost, for a retreat in presence of so superior a force through the level plains of Wallachia was utter ruin. But then was seen what can be effected by the resolution and conduct of one man Foreseeing that he would be assailed and outflanked or surrounded on the following day, Geismar resolved to anticipate the enemy by a nocturnal attack. It completely succeeded. Surprised, and thinking they had to do with a fresh enemy, the Turks made very little resistance. In less than two hours they were entirely put to the rout, with the loss of seven hundred prisoners, seven guns, twenty-four standards, and their whole baggage and ammunition. In utter confusion they sought refuge under the cannon of Widdin; Wallachia was delivered from their incursions, and the whole right of the Russian line of operations secured from danger. Following up his success, Geismar, after a march of thirty 1 Ann. Hist. miles, made a sudden attack on xi. 400, 401; Kalafat, which he carried by escaLangeron's lade, the greater part of the garriDispatch, Oct. 4, 1828; son being drowned in attempting Ibid. 114, 120; to make their way across to Wid Val. 299, 300. din.1 64. retreat of the ube. After the fall of Varna, the Russian generals were in hopes of being able to reAbandonment duce Silistria before winter. This of the siege of important fortress had hitherto Silistria, and been only blockaded by General Russians be- Roth, with ten thousand men. A yond the Dan- severe action took place under its walls on the 11th October, which Oct. 11. turned out to the advantage of the Russians, and the investment of the place had already commenced when the approach of the autumnal storms, and the alarming news from Wittgenstein's army, rendered it evident that it could not be undertaken with any prospect of success before the following spring. The blockade therefore was raised, and orders were sent to Wittgenstein to retreat with all his forces behind the Danube. The Emperor him self, seeing the campaign over, embarked on the 14th October on board the vessel Oct. 14. "Empress Mother," and made sail for Odessa. On the second night of their voyage they were assailed by a dreadful tempest, which drove them back almost to the mouth of the Bosphorus. So imminent was the danger that all on board gave themselves up for lost, and the Emperor alone preserved his presence of mind. The captain proposed running the vessel ashore; but Nicholas declared he would prefer death to falling into the Sultan's hands; and the wind having veered round a few points, he was saved either alternative. At length, on the night of the 19th October, after undergoing a thousand perils and hardships, they reached Odessa, the crew more dead than alive; and not without furnishing to the journalists of Europe ample ground for comparison with the flight of Xerxes across the Helles- 1 Ann. Hist. pont after the defeat of Salmis, two xi. 414, 415. thousand years before.1 stein. 65. Wittgenstein commenced his retreat on the 15th October; and it was conducted with so much secrecy that the Turks, Disastrous for some days, were not aware of retreat of what was going forward, and he at Wittgenfirst sustained very little molestation. Oct. 19. But this did not long continue. On the 19th, the rear-guard, near the village of Ardokhan, at the entrance of a woody defile, was attacked by eight thousand Turkish horse; and though they kept their ground till the third corps, which was defiling, had got through, this was only done at a very heavy loss. After this, as the weather every day became worse, the retrograde movement became eminently disastrous. Eye witnesses of both compared it to the Moscow retreat. The Turkish roads, bad at all times, had been rendered all but impassable by the ceaseless passage of artillery and carriages over them during the summer and the heavy rains of autumn. Caissons and baggage were abandoned at every step; the stragglers nearly all fell into the enemy's hands, by whom they were instantly massacred; and Wittgenstein experienced in his turn the disas ters which he had inflicted on Napoleon's army during the retreat from Witepsk to the Beresina in 1812. At length, after having undergone innumerable hardships, and sustained a very severe loss, his wearied columns reached the Danube, which they immediately crossed, and spread themselves in winter quarters over Wallachia. The Turks made preparations for an attack upon Varna in the beginning of December, and approached the fortress in considerable strength; but they found the Russians too strongly posted to hazard the attempt. Thus ended in Europe the campaign of 1828, in which the Russians, with the exception of the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were abandoned without resistance, and the reduction of Brahilov and Varna, had made no sensible progress. Both parties, after it was over, found themselves on the banks of the Danube, after being mutually exhausted by the greatest efforts. The Russians, by their own admission, had lost half the troops engaged; for out of 158,800 which during the campaign had crossed the Pruth, only 80,000 remained in November in the fortresses they had subdued |