a hero,' as Lord Collingwood (himself a hero) expressed it, 'whose name will be immortal, and whose memory ever dear to the British navy, and the British nation; whose zeal for the honour of his King, and for the interest of his country, will be held up to the latest posterity as a shining example for a British seaman.' We are well aware that it has been the policy of the French to disparage a victory that laid them prostrate at the feet of a too generous enemy; but M. Dupin may be assured that, had it pleased Providence to add to our misfortune by the loss of another hero, whose career in arms has been no less glori ous, a nation's gratitude would have been displayed by similar tokens of affection and regret; and that columns would then have been inscribed with the name of Wellington, as they now are with that of Nelson.*

To return to our subject. Few naval men were of opinion

* We must do the French the justice to say, that they appear to have adopted the tone and manner in which they treat the battle of Waterloo from the great whig politicians, the judicious ˊ husbanders of our resources,' who cannot yet forgive the Duke of Wellington for conquering in their despite. The bloody Waterloo is still the only phrase with which they can bear to designate that glorious field! But we turn to manlier sentiments, to nobler feelings-and trust to convince not only M. Dupin but some of his reflecting countrymen, that we appreciate better than be imagines, the victory which he justly calfs, the most important ever gained by the British arms.'

While history' (we use the words of a most valued friend) shall record the deeds of that immortal day in the appropriate language of one of its most distinguished heroest-" An army hastily drawn together, composed of the troops of various nations, among whom were numbered several brigades of inexperienced militia, was the force which the Duke of Wellington had to oppose to one of the most formidable and best equipped armies which France ever produced. Every officer and every man did his duty; but the Duke of Wellington alone was capable of giving union to such a force; his great name filled it with confidence-No other man living could have gained that victory with an army so composed"-While history shall record this proud tribute to the name of the conqueror-it will have to add that, at the moment when the shout of victory was raised through the land, and every British heart exulted in the triumph of his country, the simultaneous impulse was felt to administer relief to all who had been sufferers in the conflict on this memorable field of glory. All ranks, all classes, all denominations, hastened to provide a fund for this sacred purpose-the sentiment was universal-it pervaded alike the palace and the cottage-while the noble and the wealthy held meetings in the metropolis, and in the principal towns of the empire, even in the humblest village, the most obscure hamlet, the inhabitants, when they assembled in the House of God to return thanks for the triumphs of their country, contributed to this fund with cheerful gratitude. Nor was the impulse confined within the limits of the British isles-it passed with electric rapidity to the most distant regions; it thrilled through every Briton's heart, wherever placed and however circumstancedin the north and in the south, in the east and in the west; all were equally warmed with the patriot glow, and most justly was it observed by the Marquis of Hastings, on transmitting from Calcutta a portion of those contributions, which in magnitude were indeed worthy of the liberality that has ever characterized the British subjects of our Indian empire" that a subject of the British empire must indeed be unworthy of those blessings and of those honours to which he was born, who does not acknowledge a kindred interest in the fortunes of the army who fought at Waterloo."'

+ Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, in reply to the Thanks of the House of Commons.

VOL. XXVI. NO. LI.

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that

that the miserable flotilla of Boulogne could ever succeed in throwing upon our coast the hundred thousand men which were to overcome all opposition and march to London sword in hand.' They were well aware that thirteen hundred vessels could never in one, two, or three tides get out of the harbour; and that they could not remain out of it in safety from our cruizers for an hour. Even with the aid of a covering fleet, (and without it the attempt would be the very paroxysm of madness,) M. Dupin admits that they must have failed; and that, had they effected a landing, we should have burnt their flotilla; and thus cut off the retreat of their army, which must have surrendered at discretion. When the covering fleet however had been demolished at Trafalgar, by what M. Dupin calls an incredible blindness, and the most absurd impatience' on the part of its commander, the idea of invasion was abandoned: it had indeed been relinquished from the moment that Villeneuve took shelter in Ferrol; and the manner of doing it is thus dramatically stated by M. Dupin, as he received it from Count Daru.

'In 1805, M. Daru was at Boulogne, "intendant general" of the army. One morning, the Emperor sent for him into his cabinet: Daru there found him transported with rage, striding rapidly up and down the apartment, and breaking a sullen silence only by abrupt and short exclamations-" What a navy!-What an admiral!-What sacrifices thrown away!-My hope is destroyed!-This Villeneuve ! instead of being in the channel, he is gone into Ferrol! It is all over! he will be blockaded. Daru, sit down, listen and write." The Emperor had received early in the morning the news of Villeneuve's arrival in a Spanish port; he saw instantly that the conquest of England was abortive, the immense expense of the fleet and the flotilla lost for a long time, perhaps for ever. At that moment, in the transport of rage, which permits not other men to preserve their judgment, he had taken one of those bold resolutions, and traced out one of the most admirable plans of a campaign, that any other conqueror could have conceived at leisure and with coolness, without hesitation, without stopping; he then dictated the whole plan of the campaign of Austerlitz, the departure of the several corps of the army, from Hanover and Holland, even to the confines of the west and south of France, &c.'—tom. i. p. 244, 245.

Bien jouée! The farce was well got up, and well acted; and M. Daru, we doubt not, entered fully into the amusement. The simple truth, however, is, that Buonaparte was glad at heart of an excuse to break up an armament, which he was perfectly satisfied would never accomplish what, in a hasty moment, and in the wantonness of power, he had pledged himself to perform.

All the arts and sciences connected with the navy and navigation in general, have experienced in England the public patronage. From the days of Newton, the Parliament of Great Britain has

not

not ceased to offer the most splendid rewards for discoveries in geography, and improvements in navigation. Thus the sum of £10,000 was granted to Mr. Harrison, for the invention of a time-piece; to the widow of Mayer £3,000, for the Tables of the Moon,' published by that excellent astronomer; and £300 to Euler, for some theorems on the same subject. About the same time, a reward of £20,000 was offered for the discovery of a north-west passage, and since renewed with certain modifications, which enabled that able and intelligent navigator, Captain Parry, to obtain a portion of it amounting to £5,000. As a further proof of the extraordinary encouragement held out by us for whatever may be turned to the improvement of the navy, M. Dupin mentions the splendid sum of four hundred thousand francs, besides all expenses, granted to that ingenious artist, Brunell, as a reward for his invention of the block machinery; and one hundred thousand francs, with a considerable pension for life, to Sir Robert Seppings, for his most important improvements in naval architecture.

M. Dupin admits, and laments, that these matters are managed very differently in France. Louis XIV., he observes, has deservedly been praised for his munificence towards learned men; but his largesses, unlike those of the parliament of England, never extended to the offer of half a million to the man of science or the artist who should successfully resolve one single problem really useful; and with regard to the liberality of Buonaparte,--a single example, he thinks, will suffice to show what kind of encouragement was held out, by this patron of the arts and sciences, to the French navy.

When the engineer Hubert had constructed at Rochefort the beautiful mill, which serves at the same time for cleansing the basin or inner harbour, the rolling and turning of metals, the mixing of colours, &c. the minister, Decrès, caused a remuneration to be made to him of six hundred francs! (£25!); and this is the only instance of a reward being decreed, under the Imperial government, to officers of genius. Those even which the law prescribed to be given on the launching of each ship of war, were not bestowed, trifling as they were. Thanks to this parsimony, during the whole period of which we are speaking, the sciences and the arts connected with the French navy remained stationary! But could it be otherwise, when the minister declared that he wanted only sailors for sea-officers, and carpenters for constructors ?'-tom. ii. p. 28.

Every one knows, says M. Dupin, what disorder prevailed in all the branches of the naval administration during the first years of the French republic. On the one hand, anarchy, insubordination, plunder; on the other, presumption, prejudice, ignorance, destroyed all the good which a small number of officers

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were able to produce, who alone had any idea of the true principles of a well organized navy. But, adds he, 'order appeared to be restored under the consulate, and under the empire; though it was an order that was directed more towards the preservation of the matériel than the amelioration of the personnel. Disaster after disaster occurred; but the tribune was dumb, and the public journals were gagged, and nothing was permitted to be said or published respecting the navy without the formal sanction of the minister.' As new defeats added to their shame, an official article, drawn up,' as he tells us, by the hand of impudence,' appeared in the Moniteur, for the purpose of proving to Frenchmen that the loss of their colonies was advantageous to their navy. In the Prince Regent's Speech to Parliament in 1811, it is observed that the conquest of the Isles of Bourbon and Amboyna has. further diminished the number of the enemies' colonies;' upon which the Moniteur has the following commentary: Under existing circumstances, Martinique, Guadaloupe, the Isle of Réunion, and the Isle of France, contributed nothing to the mothercountry, and cost her more than twenty millions every year. With twenty millions we can build ten ships of war in the year; it follows then that in the course of five or six years, which the present war may continue, we may have fifty sail of the line. The colonies occupied by the English will be restored to the mothercountry, either at the conclusion of peace, or when the empire shall have a hundred and twenty ships of the line, with two hundred frigates and smaller vessels. This period, which is foreseen and calculated, is not very far from us!'

After stating at some length what, in our author's opinion, ought to be observed with regard to the nature and the number of ships of war to be kept up by France, he gives, as a contrast, what we conceive to be a true picture of Napoleon's navy.

To dazzle the eyes of the vulgar by the parade of numbers, they seemed to estimate our naval force by the enumeration of our masts and sails. The rapid increase of the matériel of our fleet was pompously announced to all Europe. But what was the actual condition of that fleet? Constructed, in a great degree, with materials of the very worst quality, it was manoeuvred by crews composed of recruits, the greater part strangers to the sea-service, and moreover strangers to our na tional interests. Germans, Italians, Illyrians and Greeks were mingled with French seamen. These foreign subjects of the great empire, ill paid, ill fed, ill treated, served France with rage and hatred in their hearts; full of cunning and of courage to desert a service which they abhorred, they were cowards in defending the honour of a flag, the symbol of their slavery-these were the support and the companions which were given to our inexperienced seamen.

Moral power was equally wanting with physical strength to this

mass

mass of involuntary navigators. The finest men and the best seamen were called away to serve in the train of the troops of the line, or rather in the train of the Imperial guard; and the refuse of seafaring people was reserved for the navy. In order to fill up the skeletons which were weakened every hour, they enrolled, without selection, and without distinction, the weak, the impotent, the ricketty; they kept on board the maimed, the convalescent and the incurable, in order to present to the Emperor, to the Empire, and to Europe, the state of a personnel, imposing by its numerical force, and contemptible by its real weakness.'-tom. ii. p. 85.

Over such a navy as this picture represents, it is no great compliment to assert an immeasurable superiority on the part of Great Britain. But when that of France was in its most healthy state, the English navy is admitted to have been pre-eminently superior; a fact which M. Dupin mainly ascribes to the perfect state of discipline which prevails in every branch of the service, and the rigid adherence to promotion by seniority in the upper classes, and to rank and command in all. The power which given to the flag-officers commanding squadrons, under the admiral commanding in chief, to inspect and examine into the good order, the cleanliness and discipline of each individual ship placed under their respective commands, characterizes and constitutes, in his opinion, one of the great excellencies of the British navy. 'But in France,' he observes, the lowest captain of a ship of war believes himself the king, or rather the despot, of his quarterdeck. He cannot conceive that an admiral should have the right of coming on board to inquire with his own eyes into the manner in which the details of the service are carried on; and it is as much as can be expected if, in the performance of evolutions, this same captain will condescend to abstain from a disobedience of the signals which may point out to him the conduct to be observed by his ship.' This fatal spirit,' he adds, of insubordination, greater before than since the Revolution, must be rooted out of the French navy before it can hope to obtain success to any great extent.'

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The cool, quiet and determined manner in which the officers give their orders, the readiness and regularity with which they are executed, and the imposing silence of the crew, on board an English ship of war, when actually engaged in battle, form so many characteristics of the British navy. C'est le calme de la force, c'est le recueillement de la sagesse.' In the midst,' says our author, of the most complicated operations, and even in the heat and hurry of battle, the words of command only are heard, pronounced and repeated distinctly and coolly from rank to rank— no intemperate councils, no murmurs, no clamour, no tumult.

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The