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of youthful passions, which must therefore be bridled by the authority of the law, so as that what is painful by nature may become pleasing by custom.' We are the children of habit, and may be formed

to

any mould by proper regulations; it is therefore indispensible to happiness, that youth should receive good impressions, not only by admonition, but by practice and example; for the former alone would be but a bare prescription to cure a disease, without the ingredients to make up the medicine. The practical efforts and examples of good men will do more to improve and reform the morals of a people, than the wisest exhortations that can issue from the press or the pulpit.

Nor can the severity of laws alone be sufficient to make men virtuous; they may control their actions, but they cannot govern their minds without the force of example, and the proof of their benefits, in every respect; for if men do not get the habit of virtue, by enjoying its benefits, it is not the power of law that will restrain them from being vicious. More is done by example than by law; for, if it were as much the fashion, or custom, to be virtuous and amiable, as it is to be vicious and dissolute, all mankind would follow the former, or very few the latter. This turn may be given to a people in a short space of time, by those in power and in the higher stations of life, and by proper education and regulations; but never without the rules of justice in practical example.

Chastisements, or punishments, can only be calculated for those who are become incorrigible, or who cannot be corrected by other means. Severity can never be established as a radical cure for evil; for although banishment, coercion, total extinction, or extermination, may be necessary to remove the extreme evils of incurable profligacy, or incorrigible villany; yet they are no means to prevent evils, as they are punishments of crimes committed, and no preventive against their recurrence. The way to subdue evil is, to prevent its growth, by checking it early, or by removing its causes; and, by proper and just regulations, both virtue and good laws would then be obeyed.

If, therefore, a people are to be made virtuous and happy, the attainment must be made in early life; but, it is said, the condition of the greater portion of mankind is such, that, to be kept within the bounds of propriety and virtue, they require not only the benefit of early instruction, but the watchfulness of perpetual regulation through life. Good laws therefore became as necessary as good and early education; for law, though compulsive, has also a necessary force, since it is acknowledged as the commanding voice of prudence and reason, and its power is not invidious, like that of men. Laws, however, can only have the effect of doing good, when they are just, wise, and necessary, and when they produce conviction of their utility; for, according as may be the principles of legislation,

so will be the public happiness, and such as governments are, such also will be the people; so that the best school for the instruction of youth, or for promoting the happiness of mankind, is A WELL

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CHAP III.

On Government.

ACCORDING to Aristotle," men are, and always have been, not only moral and social, but also political animals; in a great measure, dependent for their happiness and prosperity on the public institutions of their respective countries." That men are, and always have been dependent, for their happiness and prosperity, on the government and public institutions of their respective countries, may be fully admitted; but that they are, and always have been, moral and social beings, may probably, in a great measure, be doubted. The moral and social nature of man, in society, certainly depends upon the moral and social virtues which governments may establish, encourage, and refine.

Aristotle maintained, that society and government are as congenial to the nature of man, as it is natural for a plant to fix its roots in the earth, extend its branches, and scatter its seeds. According to him, neither cunning, cowardly principles, nor benevolent moral reflections, ought to be involved in the solution of the question of politics; since the first political societies were as independent of human intelligence, and therefore of

moral determination, as the instinctive actions of plants and insects, tending to the preservation of their respective kinds, are independent of any intelligence of their own, even when they move and operate conformably to the laws of the most consummate wisdom. Government then is coeval with society, and society with men. Both are the works of nature; and therefore, in explaining their origin, there cannot be the smallest ground for the fanciful supposition of engagements and compacts; or that invisible thing, called the fundamental contract of nations, which, as Bishop Stillingfleet observes, being no where to be found, may signify what any one pleaseth.

This axiom, however, although it, no doubt, explains the origin of the first state of political society, yet it not only supposes, but leaves man in a state of nature, such as the lowest savages, or the untutored brute; but we must allow that there are different degrees of happiness, prosperity, and refinement among mankind; and such as governments are, such will be their people. The bees may associate and form their governments, or communities, by instinct, and men may exist in a state of nature, but it is evident that they are designed for a progress of improvement, otherwise the necessary faculties would not be given them. The doctrine of Locke, though directly opposite to that of Aristotle, is as bad as, or still worse than, this; for he declares that, "no government can be law

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