shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. But if ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another. Walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh. Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, adultery, fornication, hatred, variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like; of which those who do these things shall not inherit the kingdom of God; but the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance. Against such there is no law. Let us not be weary in well doing; and as we have an opportunity, let us therefore do good unto all men." Good government requires nothing more than a due observance of these rules and principles.

What my Lord Bacon observed, respecting the deference due to political institutions, is very just. "It is improper," he says, "to try new experiments in the political body, unless the necessity be urgent, and the utility evident." But where necessities exist, it is a want of penetration not to perceive them, or a degree of dotage and imbecility not to attend to them. The constitution and laws of England are, no doubt, admirable, and were thought sufficient, when they were established, to secure the happiness of the people; but, as Dr. Warburton observes," the nature of mankind, the genius of society, and the ceaseless vicissitudes of human things, prevent the perpetuity of the wisest

regulations, and call for amendments, according to circumstances and events." The fabric may remain entire, if it be good, but as all human things are subject to spoilage, corruption, and decay, they cannot be eternal, though their durability will be in proportion as they are well or ill constructed and preserved.

Demosthenes, in his oration against Simocrates, explained to the judges how the Locrians made their laws. The Locrians, he said, were so firmly persuaded that it was their duty to uphold their ancient laws, and to defend them against the interest and caprice of innovators, that whoever proposed a new law, did it with a halter about his neck. If the law were approved, the proposer departed unhurt; but, if his law were rejected, he was strangled in his own halter. The old Locrian law also ordained, that whoever struck out the eye of another, should lose one of his own eyes, a punishment which did not admit of any pecuniary commutation, but was rigorously inflicted; eye for eye, and tooth for tooth. However, it happened, that a man with only one eye, being threatened by his adversary with the loss of his single eye, and thinking life insupportable, under the calamity of blindness, ventured to propose the following alteration of the law: "That he who struck out the eye of a person who had only one, should be deprived of both his own eyes, so that the punishment should be equal to the crime. The

amendment was approved, and this was said to be the only alteration in the Locrian law, during the space of more than two hundred years. The laws, however, must be good which do not require amendment; but if they are found efficient, they should neither be increased nor altered. "Your demagogues," says Demosthenes," continually make new laws, but solely for their own convenience. If you do not punish them, the people at large will soon be enslaved by these wild beasts." There is no easier way of enslaving the people than by multiplying and confusing the laws by which they are to be governed; but certainly it must be for the benefit of the community to abolish such laws as may be hurtful, and to substitute such others in their stead as may be found more useful.

Though innovation, in general, should be universally reprobated, says Aristotle, various occasions may arise to render it warrantable. The dif ference of manners, governments, and of men, by whom alterations are proposed, and by whom they are to be conducted, will however produce very complicated and almost innumerable questions and considerations. In examining any system of laws, two questions ought to fix our attention. The first question is, "whether these laws are calculated to promote the best interests of mankind? The second, whether they are calculated to promote those interests which, under peculiar circumstances, the legislator takes to be best;

or, in other words, whether the institutions which we examine are consistent with the most desirable and most perfect model of civil polity; or whether they are consistent with what the lawgiver, all things considered, deems most suitable to govern those for whom he legislates?" The Lycians were, however, once a happy and independent people; their government had been, from time immemorial, representative; they had one common archon, or stadtholder, which was anciently hereditary, but, before the decline of those states, he became elective. It is therefore dangerous to make changes in a system, which, by long experience, has been found to be good and useful.

No constitution of government can be good or lasting, that is not founded on justice, and all the revolutions, which we have seen and heard of, have proceeded from this cause. To give stability to any government, it is necessary that all orders of the state should feel their interest in its safety, and that all should partake of its benefits. While the greatest severity of manners, carried to the extreme of harshness and rigour, was the prevailing feature of Lycurgus's policy, and, whilst the rest of the citizens snatched only by stealth even the most lawful pleasures, the Ephori indulged in the unbounded gratifications of all their passions. The multitude were starved, that a few might be well fed. Such are the Ephori and such the state of the people in most countries; but can such govern

ments expect to prosper, or to be tranquil and happy? No people can be content, or happy, if they have not a fair chance, by their exertion and industry, to obtain their share of the benefits of life, or at least a comfortable subsistence; and no state, or government, can be durable or perfect that does not admit of this principle.

Malversations may be restrained by the regular operation of law; but an undue exercise of power can be but imperfectly checked, whilst one part of society has every thing to give, and the other has nothing to bestow. It is also easy for places and emoluments to be given, when they cost the giver nothing; and, in that case, it is not difficult for men in power to oblige their favourites and friends, and it is well if their gifts are bestowed on the most deserving; but those that pay ought also to have some share in the disposal, or benefit, of their contributions.

Every man, who pays taxes or contributes in any way to the support of the state, has a right to know how his money is disposed of, in the smallest minutiæ. He has a right to know and understand for what good, and for what purpose, he is put to expence; and this enquiry is one of the incumbent duties of the representatives of the people. As the support of government is solely derived from the wealth and industry of the people, and as those that labour contribute most to its support, it is but just that every one should have his share of benefit