and by a right use of their faculties; since the wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attain true notions in this as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of mankind, making far the greater number, take up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much troubling their heads about them; and if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate, for that also wise men have always had*. It is evident that men must be enlightened before they can know God, and happy is he who is so enlightened; but the common acceptation of wisdom, or of learned men, does not always imply this knowledge, for their study has oftentimes the contrary effect. The gods in Homer, and the pagan idols, may have occasioned great study, but they were not more the true gods on that account. The disciples of Christ were poor men, first uninformed, yet they knew their God; and, having known him, they extolled his power and magnitude, in language which the wisest men of learning could not have expressed. This plainly proves the derivation of all knowledge, and that virtue and knowledge may be in the humble breast, that seeks its God in its humble way; for neither the form, nor the words, can make it better understood.

* Essay, vol. i. p. 66.

Locke admits, that it does not derogate from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with the idea of himself; that he has sent us into the world with bodies unclothed, or that there is no art or skill born with us; for, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is the want of industry and consideration in us, and not the want of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain, he says, that there is a God, as that the opposite angles, made by the intersection of two straight lines, are equal*. Then, if it be so certain and so easy to know that there is a God, why does it require so much learning, that only the wise man can know his Creator? He as often mistakes what he is, and the way to find him, as the pious peasant, whose humble prayer, offered up in thankfulness, may prove more the existence of a bounteous God, than the sublimest evidence of learned eloquence; because the thankfulness of the one is innate, and the eloquence of the other may be acquired. It would be impious to deny, and folly to attempt to show, that there is not as much talent and philosophy seated under a hedge, or in a humble dwelling, as in the proudest seminaries of learning, if it could be called into action. Must not this, then, be something innate ?

It is true that we are born without mind and without strength, and consequently without power, principles, or ideas; therefore it might be said, so * Essay, vol. i. book i. chap. iv.

far, that none of our faculties, powers, or principles are innate, and that every thing is to be learnt; but the question is, how every thing is acquired. It would be as absurd to say that mind is not innate, as that strength is not innate; therefore, ideas and principles as much depend upon the formation of mind, or the organ of individuality, which is capable of receiving it, as strength does to the formation of the body. Now it is certain that strength cannot be taught, or acquired by habit or experience; no more can ideas, or powers of the understanding, or genius. The one depends on the formation and growth of the body, the other on those of the mind; but the various uses to which strength may be applied may be taught, or acquired, so may those of the mind; thus strength may be strengthened, both of body and mind. A man may labour with great strength and have little powers, unless he be taught properly how to apply them; and thus ideas would form a confused mass of things, unless they were regulated and applied by rules found out by others, for the life of man is too short to make every discovery; he is therefore indebted for what he knows, in general, to the discovery of others, which abridges his labour; but all ideas must have had their origin, and therefore must have been innate to those who conceived them; and this does not depend upon him that receives them, but upon him that gives them, for all minds are not of the same capacity. All our ideas and strength, therefore, depend upon

the formation of mind and body, and the acquirement of ideas, knowledge, and the use of strength from others, is only an abridgment of labour.

The first idea of the motion of the earth, or that idea to any other who had never before heard it, must have been innate; and why people are led away by false notions is, because their minds are not formed capable of discovering the truth. Those therefore who err, or stray from the right path, are often more to be pitied than blamed. Can the candle burn that has not the principles of light, and can the mind be intelligent that has not the capacity to receive it? The candle cannot burn by instruction, nor can the mind be illuminated by those means, without the necessary innate principles; but both may be improved by management, though more depends upon capacity than tuition. When a thing is done, it is easy for another to imitate it, because it is easier to copy than to compose either things or ideas; for what one man does another may do, but it is not every one that can, nor none, without the necessary capacity to do it; therefore that capacity, and the idea how to do the thing, must be innate to the person who does it, or it could not be performed. It is not all men that can be musicians, although there are rules to teach it; their souls are not all formed for music, and those that are so formed have different degrees of perfection, for human powers are limited, depending upon their first cause; and although music may be im

proved by scientific skill, as all other things may, yet we can imagine to ourselves a concord of harmony, surpassing all sounds we have ever heard. This idea then is innate, but it is true, and may be proved by mathematical rule; for what one power carries to a certain extent, a further power may lead to a greater. Who could write a book without some innate ideas? He must be a mere copyist if he did. Locke's conception, that, "there are no innate ideas," must to him have been innate, because he confesses that he had never before heard it, and that it was contrary to the general opinion.

The powers of the mind can evidently reach no farther than its capacity, which may be strengthened by energy, as the body may by exercise, but it never can exceed the capacity of its original formation, more than habit can make a weak man superior in strength to one of a robust form, or that an animal of ponderous weight can run with the swiftness of a deer. We therefore owe to nature that which we possess, but which may be increased by energy, or be diminished by neglect, and these are the only powers of man or mind; for, as Locke confesses, "we should perhaps make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain; in the consideration of things themselves, and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men's to find it; for we may as rationally hope to see with other men's eyes, as to know by other men's un