ing with France previous to our attack on her capital: no such inference could be drawn from the quantity of stores found in her arsenals, because there had not been time for collecting these stores between the period at which the treaty of Tilsit was concluded, and the date of our invasion. Lord Hawkesbury observed, that the law of nations was founded on the law of nature. One nation was bound to another in the commonwealth of states, just as one individual was bound to another in civil society. The only difference was, that in civil society there were tribunals to judge-between man and man; and that in the commonwealth of states there was no such tribunal. Specific intelligence of the secret arrangements of Tilsit had reached ministers from a quarter which precluded all doubt of an intention to form a maritime confederacy against Great Britain. After the battles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, there was nothing on the continent that could oppose any resistance to France. Denwark, when called upon, would have had no alternative. This was the plea she had alledged in excuse for declaring against us before, in circumstances less imperative. Denmark was unable to defend Holstein; and it was the opinion of the ablest officers, that if two bodies of French of 15,000 each, had been stationed along the belt, in separate corps of 5000 each, some of them would have got over. into Zealand. And when once a body of them did get over, there was no doubt that they would have got the better of the Danes, who were the worst land troops in Europe. If the Danes had been willing to join with the British force, the attempt of defending Zealand would have been made. That offer having been made and rejected, no time was to be lost. The moderation and forbearance of our commanders, before and after the attack, left no room for regret at the manner in which the business had been done, How then could it be said, that the expedition excited disgust in all the. nations of Europe? There was indeed but little freedom of speech on the continent; but where that freedom existed, the voice proved favourable to Britain. And it was no wonder, for the general interests of Europe were consulted as well as those of Great Britain. Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, would find in this act the nucleus of their future independence and graudenr. Without ships, colonies, and commerce, our enemy would never be able to humble Britain; and this grand blow would for ever prevent the attainment of his object. The earl of St. Vincent declared his opinion, that, supposing Zeáland and the Danish navy to be in the possession of Denmark, and the French to be in possession of Holstein, he should think it more practicable to invade this country from Boulogne, than Zealand from Holstein. As to the state of the Danish fleet, it seemed to his lordship to be exactly what it was when he first knew it about eight years ago. Lord Grey observed, that though it might be the policy of France to take the most immediate measures for accomplishing her ends, it was far from likely that Denmark should grant a ready compliance with the demands of the French government, It was undoubtedly her interest to keep keep out of the contest. And if she was desirous of doing so, she had a threat to hold out to Buonaparte, as powerful as any he had to drive her to a compliance with his wishes. She had the British navy to apply to for protection; and it would have been absolute ruin to Buonaparte's own schemes to have driven her to such a resource. His noble friend (lord St. Vincent) had just declared that the Danes in Zealand were as secure against an attack from Holstein, as we were against an attack from Boulogne. From the opinion of a military person, Lord H. wished to infer the contrary. But that opinion did not seem to lord Grey to be at all to the point. It was an answer to a question, as to the chance of some one of five or six divisions, or 5000, out of 35,000 men succeeding in effecting a landing. This was merely a hypothetical question, the answer to which proved nothing; for it did not say, that on one division landing, Zealand must fall as a necessary consequence. It was said, the Danes were hostilely disposed towards us, in proof of which, the American war was cited, the armed neutrality, and the confederacy of 1800-1. From these however, particularly the last, his lordship was inclined to form an opinion directly opposite. They would call to mind what had been the effect of that confederacy: an attack on their capital, and the loss of a considerable part of their feet. Lord G. entered into a statement of the actual situation of the Danish fleet; no part of which, it appeared to him, could have been ready for sea in less than six weeks, and the greater part in not less than six months. If the ministers had been anxious to strengthen the country, they would have turned their eyes towards Ireland. Let them restore to Denmark her ships; let these be manned by the most hostile of our enemies. To meet that force, let government grant to Ireland her civil and religious liberties, and they would have done more for the safety of the country than all the fleets of Denmark could ever effect. As to Lisbon, which had been referred to, our commander there had no instructions to attempt carrying off the fleet, but in the event of the French taking possession of the country. And at Constantinople no demand was made which we had not a right to make by treaty. Lord Mulgrave urged the same arguments that had been made use of again and again in defence of the expedition to Copenhagen. There might be a great deal, he said, of magnanimity in contemplating, without any degree of apprehension, so much danger, as that of the Danish fleet falling into the hands of the enemy; but for his part he preferred the prudence which saved us from incurring it. A great deal had been said on the absurdity of allowing the Russian fleet to navigate the seas at pleasure, at the same time that this serious attack had been made on the Danish marine. Now the fact was, that orders had been dispatched to our officers not to permit a Russian fleet to go into an enemy's port. It was not want of caution that had admitted the entrance of a Russian squadron into the Tagus, but want of wind, and unfavourable weather, by which Sir Sidney Smith was prevented from reaching the Tagus, until two days after that squadron had got into it. Lord Darnley contended, that [D4] no no case whatever had been made out to justify the harsh measures resorted to by ministers in attacking a defenceless people in a state of avowed neutrality. Lord viscount Sidmouth contended, in the first place, that there was no reason to suppose that the Danes were hostilely inclined towards us; and in the next, even admitting that they were, that this would not in itself justify the measure of the expedition. He commented on the glaring anachronism of imputing the expedition, which sailed in July, to intelligence not received here till the Sth of the following month, and the indecency of putting such an assertion in the mouth of his majesty. As to the designs of the French in the Baltic, Russia would never have suffered France to have established any serious influence in that sea. With respect to the danger to this country,' he considered it first, with respect to its certainty, and next, with respect to its magnitude. Its certainty had not at all been made out, nor was it greater in point of magnitude than of certainty, nor was its urgency greater than either. He gave it as his opinion, that the Danish ships should be kept in a state of readiness for restoration, He conjured their lordships to pause before they decided on a question involving so deeply the national character; and that they would bear in mind, that if, as had been said, the expedition had been hitherto generally approved of by the country, it was because the country looked with confidence to ministers, for the fullest justification of their conduct. The house then divided-For the duke of Norfolk's motion, 48. Against it, 105. House of commons, February 8th.-Mr. Whitbread called the attention of the house to a subject of the highest importance. Ailuding to the conduct of Mr. secretary Canning, in quoting partial extracts in support of the opinions he was maintaining, in the late debate of February 3d, on the subject of Copenhagen, he said, a practice had crept into that house which, he thought, had been carried to an immoderate extreme. He considered the right honourable gentleman to be bound by every tie of honour and of policy, to prove by the production of the papers he should move for, that the feelings, honour, and character of our ministers abroad and at home were safe in the hands of the secretary of state for foreign affairs. The first extract be should allude to, was that referred to by Mr. C. in his speech, February 3d, from lord Howick's official dispatch to Mr. Garlicke, bearing date the 3d of December, 1806. He would move for a copy of that dispatch; for he had authority to state, that lord Howick had reason to think himself not done justice to in this instance. He did not mean to say that the right honourable secretary had forged such extracts; but he did say, that by stopping short in the midst of a sentence, and omitting the subsequent part, that wholly qualified the preceding, by reading as absolute what was meant hypothetically; he did say, that this was reading a man's evidence against himself, and against the true nature of the evidence. It was neither more nor less than falsifying the statements of another person, whose situation should have commanded more delicacy. Mr. Garlicke had been hardly treated. Lord Lord Howick might stand up in his place and vindicate himself, but where could Mr. Garlicke vindicate his dispatches, from garbled misrepresentations. And how anxious must be be to vindicate his character to the Danish court, and every other? But independently of any personal relations, Mr. C. was placed in a most important one to the public. The Copenhagen expedition was not yet justified. The honourable secretary for foreign affairs had been driven from reason to reason, and it was for him to prove, that the last he had resorted to, the extracts he had read, were not falsified. Mr. Whitbread concluded, with moving, "that a copy of a dispatch from lord Howick, dated the 3d of December, 1806, from which extracts had been read in the debate, on Wednesday the 3d of February, be laid before the house; and also a copy of a note from Mr. Rust to lord Howick, from which extracts had been read, &c." Mr. Canning asked, if Mr. W. recollected with what view he had cited the dispatch of the 3d of December? It was probable that existing circumstances might have led to a compromise, by which the fleet of Denmark would have been surrendered to France. In support of this assertion, he had very naturally read part of a dispatch from lord Howick to Mr. Garlick, in which the latter was instructed, if any disposition should be manifested on the part of the Danes to enter into such a compromise, distinctly to state, that it would be resented by his majesty. He had no objection whatever to the production of the notes to and from Mr. Rist. They contained an able discussion of the French decree of the 21st of December, and of the English order of council of the 7th of January. For the production of these papers he would vote cheerfully, but not for the dispatch of the noble lord, for the production of which there had not been laid any sufficient ground. Mr. Whitbread observed, that Mr. C. in his statement of the instructions to Mr. Garlicke, had left off where the very first word of the next sentence, the word but, would have completely knocked down all his reasoning on the subject. Mr. W's. motion was supported by lord Temple, Mr. Herbert, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Horner, Mr. Windham, Mr. Lyttleton, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Sharp. It was opposed by the secretary at war, Mr. Lockhart, the chancellor of the exchequer, sir John Orde, and sir M. Montague. On a division of the house, there appeared for the motion 73; against it 127. House of lords, February 11th. Lord Sidmouth gave notice of a motion he intended to make, on a fit opportunity, for an address to his majesty, praying he would be graciously pleased to give directions that the Danish fleet be kept in such a state, as not to preclude the possibility of restoring it, should circumstances occur under which it might be expedient to restore it. Agreeably to this notice, the noble viscount rose to make a motion to this effect, on February 18th.; but he requested, previously, that the summons sent by the British commanders to the governor of Copenhagen, on the 16th of August, and a subsequent letter from them night be read; which was done. ' His object he said, was to propose to their lordships, to come to a resolution stating the importance of preserving the Danish fleet in such a state that it might be eventually restored to Denmark, on the restoration of peace, or sooner, if possible. He said eventually, as it was possible that such a situation of affairs might exist, that to restore the Danish fleet might be giving it to France, and also because he did not wish to bring forward any motion that might interfere with the prerogative of the crown. He had also used the terms the restoration of peace, or sooner', because circumstances might occur, notwithstanding the continuance of the war, in which the restoration of the fleet might be proper. He should not have brought forward the motion if he had not seen by the votes of the house of commons that the Danish ships had been surveyed, for the purpose of being taken into the British service. To adopt a resolution of the nature proposed, would set us right in the eyes of Europe, and evince our desire to be just. We should have at some period either to restore the fleet or to make compensation for it; and it was better to come at once to a resolution, declaring a decided opinion on the subject. Not all the victories of the ruler of France, nor all his conquests, could give him so much pleasure as to obtain a victory over the honour and integrity of this country. He had, upon consideration, thought it better to propose a resolution of the house, than an address to the throne. His lordship concluded, by moving, "that it was highly important to the honour of this country, that under present ircumstances, no measures should be taken with respect to the ships of war now in the possession of his majesty, in consequence of the capitulation of Copenhagen, that might preclude the eventual restitution of them to the government of Denmark, agreeably to the spirit of the requisition referred to in the proclamation issued on the 16th of August, by the commanders in chief of his majesty's sea and land forces, employed on that occasion; and renewed in their letter of the first of September, to the commander in chief of the forces of his Danish majesty." . Lord Boringdon thought the proposition of the noble viscount of a novel and extraordinary nature, and such as if adopted, must lead to the most prejudicial consequences. Had such a proposition as this been adopted with respect to the Spanish frigates, would it not have greatly embarrassed the earl of Lauderdale in his negociations at Paris? Such a proposition could be adopted only on the ground, that the Spanish expedition was wholly unjustifiable, and the house had already decided on both its justice and necessity. Lord Eilenborough thought, that every consideration of justice and regard for the interests and welfare of the country were in support of the motion of his noble friend. The lord chancellor contended, that both by the law of precedent, and by that of the constitution, the present motion must be resisted. The ships we had taken from Holland had not been restored, nor those from Spain, nor those taken at Toulon. But the constitution of the country was decisive upon this point. Captured ships became the property of the crown, and the present |