enemy's armies, to take away or cut off their provisions, to attack them in flank and rear, and not to leave them a moment of repose*. All general actions to be avoided. The entrance into the provinces by the north and east to be blocked up; the entrance into Spain to be also blocked up against French troops coming from Portugal.

No accurate estimate has been made, or could well be made, of the numbers of men bearing arms, veterans and new levies, that appeared in the cause of the country in the provinces. In some, all the males capable of bearing arms, were enrolled from fifteen to fortyfive. In others, from sixteen to forty-six; and in some, to fifty. If all the enrolments were duly made, and all the persons enrolled actually brought into the field, the amount of the whole must have exceeded a million. But this is scarcely to be supposed. The numbers must have been fluctuating. One circumstance, wholly unworthy of the cause of the patriots, is not to be passed without notice. The provincial juntas, even the central junta into which these, in the progress of time and events were resolved, were in the constant habit of exaggerating, prodigiously, the numbers of their fighting men. If this would have dismayed the French, or inspired a general confidence in the Spanish nation, it might have been excused, nay commended; but the trick was quickly discovered. And those false statements, by misleading their own generals, as was afterwards sadly ex

perienced by Sir John Moore, did infinitely more mischief than good. However, there certainly was not any deficiency either in numbers, or individual zeal or courage. What was really wanted, and not possible at once to be found, was some man of authority, talents, and experience, pre-eminently distinguished above all his compatriots, to command and direct the resources of the country in one combined plan of operations. On the other hand unity of design, promptitude of action, and aggression instead of defence, were mighty advantages to the invaders.

The exact numbers of the French armies in the Peninsula, at the time when the insurrection broke out, cannot be ascertained. The French gazettes sometimes exaggerate and sometimes extenuate the numbers of their soldiery, at particular places, and on particular occasions, just as it seems to suit their purpose. It is certain that there were at the end of May and beginning of June, three marshals of France in the heart of Spain; namely, Murat, Moncey, and Bessieres ; which supposes three distinct corps of the grand army, or nine divisious, forming, in all, from seventy to seventy-five thousand men: to which we are to add the corps of the army under marshal Ney, on the frontier of the eastern Pyrennees, and occupying the fortresses of Barcelona and Montjuich. This corps of Ney's may be computed at ten thousand men. Adding to these twenty-thousand French in Portugal under Junot, and fifteen thou[03] saud

sand auxiliaries, Hanoverians, Swiss, and Spaniards, we have an aggregate of one hundred and twenty thousand men.

Of these 120,000 men, 50,000 were either stationed in Madrid, or encamped in the vicinity, under the orders of Murat and marshal Moncey. From this great body at or near the capital, detachments were sent to take possession of Cadiz and of Valentia. One of these detachments proceeded towards its destination under the orders of the general of division Dupont: the other marched to Valentia, under marshal Moncey himself. Marshal Bessieres, whose principal force was posted at Vittoria and Pampeluna, for guarding the two roads to Madrid, and securing the communication between that capital and Bayonne, had it in charge to push detachments to the right and left, for bridling as great an extent of country as possible.

The reduction of the city of Valentia, would be an important step towards that of the whole province, and also open a way for combining the operations of marshal Moncey and general Duhesme in Catalonia. That of Cadiz, besides the importance of its harbour, ships, and naval arsenal, would terminate a military line of posts from Bayonne by Vittoria, Burgos, Madrid, Cordova, and Seville, that should completely divide the Peninsula from north to south, and cut off all cooperation between the eastern and western divisions.

Marshal Bessieres, who commanded the northern army of the French, was opposed by general Cuesta, who was at the head of the forces of the four western provinces of Gallicia, Asturias, Estramadura,

Leon, and certain unsubdued, or as they were called by the French, refractory districts of Biscay. General Castanos was commander in chief of the four kingdoms of Andalusia, with the provinces of Grenada and Valentia, which had united themselves with Andalusia. Admiral Cisneros was captain general of Murcia; Don Joseph Palafox of Arragon, and count Espellata, as already mentioned, of Catalonia. The garrisons of St. Roch and Ceuta, joined their brethren in arms, under the general command of Castanos; those of Majorca and Minorca, the patriots of Catalonia.

It is possible, by entering into the plans of commanders, and tracing the means by which they were either frustrated or accomplished, to give even in such a brief narrative as ours a general, though by no means a circumstantial or detailed account of military operations in ordinary campaigns: but not to relate all the enterprizes and skirmishes of the various parties that appeared in arms against the French in the different provinces of Spain in 1808, under the orders of the different juntas; which indeed would fall under the denomination rather of provincial than of national history. Therefore we shall confine ourselves to a sketch of the principal actions and events; those that were followed by the most important results, or by which the issue of the contest was most materially affected. The heroism and patriotic ardour, that were displayed by so many individuals and small parties, in a kind of mountainous and desultary warfare, in different provinces, deserve, indeed, to be recorded; nor, whatever may be the final result of the present conflict,

will provincial historians be want ing to transmit to posterity their glorious efforts.

The army under Dupont, when it left Madrid, towards the close of May, amounted to 15,000 men; but in its progress, it was gradually diminished by sickness, by desertion, and by the necessity of sending out from time to time, parties for bringing in forage and provisions, the greater part of which were destroyed or taken by parties of armed peasants. Having crossed the mountains of Morera, while the insurrection was yet without any thing of consistency or form, he descended into the plains of Andalusia, and on the 7th of June advanced to Cordova, of which he took possession, with out much opposition from the few Spanish troops quartered there, joined by a number of peasants. For three days, the city of Cordova, was given up to pillage. The churches, after being swept of their sacred vessels and ornaments, were converted into stables. On the 13th, parties of French were advanced beyond Cordova, On the 16th, the French commander being informed that general Castanos was marching against him, at the head of 21,000 regular troops, infantry, 25,000 cavalry, and a numerous artillery, besides a great number of insurgents who volunteered their service, retreated from Cordova to Andujar; where be took up a strong position with the Guadalquevir in front, and added to the natural strength of the place, deep entrenchments. General Castanos being unwilling to waste any part of his force by attacking the enemy in his entrenched camp, determined to

cut off his supplies, by coming between him and another division of Dupont's army, posted under the immediate orders of general Wedel. General Dupont, in this straitened and perilous situation, dispatched messenger after messenger to Madrid, calling loudly for reinforcements. A division of 8000 men, was sent under the orders of general Belliard, famous for his exploits in Upper Egypt, by the Sierra Morena.And Dupont, in order to facilitate a junction with the expected reinforcements, quitted his position at Andujar, and fell back on Baylen. But Castanos posted divisions and detachments of his army in so judicious a manner as not only to cut off all communication between the corps under general Wedel and general Dupont, but also between this last corps, which was the most numerous, and Madrid.

The deplorable situation to which Dupont was reduced, is thus described in an intercepted letter from him to general Belliard. -"We have not a moment to lose for quitting a position in which we cannot subsist. The soldier being under arms the whole day, cannot now, as heretofore, reap the corn and make bread: for all the peasants have abandoned both their hamlets and their harvests. For heaven's sake, send us prompt reinforcements; in one word, a body of troops forming one compacted mass, of which the component parts shall be as near to each other as ever it is possible. If we suffer the enemy to keep the field, all the southern provinces aud the other troops of the line will hasten to take part with the rebels. A decisive blow in [04] Andalusia,

1

Andalusia, would contribute greatly to the subjugation of all Spain. Send me, without a moment's delay, medicines and linen for the wounded: for the enemy has intercepted for the space of a month, all our ammunition waggons, and the provisions sent for us from Toledo." A detachment of 500 men sent out from the French camp at Andujar, to seek and meet Belliard was cut off to a man by the smugglers of the mountains, who had formed themselves into a body, 4000 strong, and sworn to grant no quarter. The same body, and other parties of Spaniards, harassed the detachment of Belliard, in the defiles of Morena, night and day. Instead of forming a junction with Dupont, he was seen to return to Madrid with half the numbers with which he had set out. It has come to be a maxim and practice, that when a general is hemmed in into any desperate situation, bis only chance of extrication is, to make a bold attack on the enemy.-On the 20th of July, about three o'clock in the morning, the army under Dupont attacked the Spaniards. There was a division of 9000 strong,. under the command of lieutenant general Reding, a Swiss. There was another division of the Spanish army of 5000, under general de Coupigny; a third under general de Pena, of 6000: and a fourth under general Jones, of 5000; in all, 25,000 of these 25,000 the half was peasants. The force of Dupont did not exceed 8000. The brunt of the battle fell on the divisions of the generals Reding and Coupigny.

The first shock of the French was so furious, that the foremost companies of the Spaniards, suffer

ed prodigiously. But the Spaniads maintained their ground, and supported by their artillery, attacked and drove the French before them at all points. Yet the French kept up the conflict, constantly renewing their assaults without any other interruption than what was unavoidably occasioned by momentary retreats, for the formation of fresh columns, till half an hour past midday. At different times they broke through the lines of defence, with the boldness peculiar to troops accustomed to conquer, and sometimes advanced even to the Spanish batteries. The last attack was led on by Dupont himself, who with the other generals placed himself at the head of the columns, under the fire of the Spanish artillery, which, on that day, was admirably well served, as was admitted by the French, who owned that they had forty pieces of cannon dismounted.

At two o'clock P. M. the advanced guard of the division under general Pena arrived at the scene of action, and began to play ou the enemy with his artillery; when a flag of truce appeared, desiring to treat for a capitulation. An armistice ensued of course. But during this, the division under the command of general Pena, was attacked by the French division, 6000 strong, under general Wedel, who came up, while Dupont was engaged with the generals Reding and Coupigny, from Carolina. The battalion of Condova was surprized and taken, with two field pieces.

The number of the French killed and wounded in the battle of Baylen, amounted, it was computed, to 3000; that of the Spaniards, to 1200. The negociation between Dupont and the Spanish commander-in-chief,

general

general Castanos, did not last long. Dupont was told at once that he must surrender at discretion: which he agreed to. General Wedel's division was comprehended in the capitulation as well as that of Dupont, forming together a body of 14,000. It was agreed that general Wedel's divisiou should be sent home by sea, to Rochfort.

Marshall Moncey was not more successful in Valentia, than general Dupont in Andalusia, though he escaped capture, and made good his retreat, though with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to Madrid. The kingdom of Valentia is well fortified by nature by means of the rivers Gabriel and Xuccar, and by a chain of steep and rugged mountains. The passes through these were guarded by some troops of the line, and a considerable body of Valentian insurgents. These guards were attacked by Moncey, on the 21st of June, and routed. --Having crossed the monntains, he marched straight on Valentia.

On the 26th, he was attacked at Banolos by general Caro, a nephew of the illustrious general Romanas, and suffered pretty severely, in both cavalry and infantry. He was attacked again by general Caro, between Quarte and Mislata, when he also sustained considerable loss. Nevertheless, though thus harassed, he continued his march, and on the 28th, opened a heavy fire on Valentia, of both artillery and musquetry, which was continued without ceasing from mid-day to the evening. The Valentians returned his fire with some pieces of artillery planted at the gates of the city, and by showers of musketry, from the tops of houses. On the

other hand, he had to maintain a conflict with general Caro, who had followed the French close at their heels, for the defence of Valentia. An impetuous charge with the bayonet, made such havoc among the ranks of the French, that they retired, at about eight hours at even to their camp between Quarte and Mislata, which was fortified by strong entrenchments and formidable batteries. From thence he continued his retreat on Madrid, harassed for some days by general Caro, as he had been on his march through the plain of Valentia. Of 15,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, that marched with Moncey from Madrid, 10,000 returned, and 150 waggons carrying the wounded. Fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and sent to Carthagena.

The campaign of Arragon was still more glorious to the Spanish patriots, than those of Andalusia and Valentia. Arragon, situated between Madrid and the frontier of France, was obliged to fight with one reinforcement of fresh troops after another. In every engagement before the walls of Saragossa, Palafox was victorious. The inhabitants of Saragossa equalled— it was not possible to exceed the patriotic heroism of the Numantians and Saguntines. Every mode of defence and attack that human imagination could devise, adopted, and whatever human courage could dare, was performed.

was

Saragossa, the capital of the kingdom of Arragon, is situate on the right bank of the Ebro, with a suburb on the left bank, connected with it by a stone bridge. Though the mountains that bound the valley of the Ebro are distant, yet

Sarra